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 My education for this project began in Youngstown, Ohio, since I began there. Even 
though I moved from Youngstown when I was young, the city’s history shaped me. 
Youngstown’s appearance in this dissertation was serendipitous, not planned. But even if 
Youngstown had not appeared in the text, its influence would have been felt, nonetheless. 
Youngstown’s story sparked my interest in social and economic inequalities, which has shaped 
this dissertation. In a more formal sense, my education began at St. Charles, only a short drive 
down Market Street from the Youngstown schools discussed in Chapter 1, but far away from 
them in virtually every other sense. As much as I bristled at the strictures of Catholic school, I 
got a good education at St. Charles, as well as a consistent reminder that the Beatitudes are a 
pretty first-rate justice text. Public school suited me better. At Boardman High School, teachers 
such as Colleen Ruggieri and Vivian Axiotis inspired me to write, which I have been doing ever 
since. The late Donald ‘DeLo’ DeLorenzo deserves special mention, too, as an amazing teacher 
and, more importantly, wonderful human being.  
Beyond Youngstown, no place shaped my intellectual world more than Ohio University’s 
Honors Tutorial College. Even though it was only four hours from my hometown, Athens, Ohio, 
felt like a different world – and what a great world it is. The town’s idyllic scenery, no doubt, 
made trips back to my dorm room lugging a backpack full of library books more bearable. I 
would not have been in Athens, however, without the anonymous person at OU who called me 
weeks after submitting my application to suggest that I might have erred in not applying to HTC. 
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She could not have been more correct. The moment I stepped onto OU’s campus for HTC’s 
interview weekend, I knew Athens was where I wanted to be. I owe Eddith Dashiell a debt that I 
cannot possibly repay for accepting me into HTC’s competitive Journalism program. She 
changed my life. In HTC, I was fortunate enough to experience a close-knit intellectual 
community under two different deans, Joseph Berman and Ann Fidler. Perhaps no one at HTC 
shaped my experience there more than Jan Hodson, who served as a surrogate mother to me and 
so many other HTC alums during her years there. Along with Eddith Dashiell, many other 
Journalism faculty members mentored me during my time at OU, especially Joe Bernt and 
Marilyn Greenwald. Outside of the Journalism department, Deborah Thorne in Sociology and 
Chester Pach and Kevin Mattson in History helped inspire the intellectual direction that has 
culminated in this dissertation. No one, however, proved to be more important to my time at 
Ohio University than Tom Vander Ven. Tom sparked my interest in Sociology and remains 
perhaps the best teacher in the classroom I have ever experienced. More than that, Tom served as 
a mentor outside of the classroom and a tireless supporter of my work in the years that followed. 
I sincerely doubt I would be where I am without him, and it is an honor to now consider him not 
only a mentor but also a friend.  
Following an eye-opening and rewarding stint as a journalist, the University of Michigan 
became my new intellectual home, and I could not have asked for a better one. The History 
Department at UM is an intellectual community in the truest sense of the term. Moreover, the 
graduate program deserves every accolade it gets. I never anticipated the support I would receive 
at UM. In large part, that was due to outstanding department staff members, especially Lorna 
Altsetter, Diana Denney, and Kathleen King. Whether it was a quick response to a frantic email 
(even on the weekends) or a leisurely chat in the department, Lorna, Diana, and Kathleen were 
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always there. I doubt any grad student in the History Department could survive without them. 
The number of faculty members in History at UM who helped shape my thinking is almost too 
long to list. However, Sueann Caulfield, Matthew Countryman, Greg Dowd, Geoff Eley, Regina 
Morantz-Sanchez, Ron Suny, and Maris Vinovskis deserve special mention. Somewhat 
audaciously, I decided to join another intellectual community at UM, the Department of 
Sociology, in pursuit of a joint degree. With that process and many others, Jeannie Loughry 
provided invaluable assistance. Like her counterparts in History, I do not know where graduate 
students in my cohort would have been without her. Numerous faculy members in Sociology 
assisted me in my pursuit of a joint degree, including Howard Kimeldorf, Karin Martin, George 
Steinmetz, and Peggy Somers. Sarah Burgard deserves special mention for all of her formal and 
informal mentoring during my time at the University of Michigan. The Sociology Department 
also gave me the opportunity to work with wonderful research assistants through the Sociology 
Undergraduate Research Opportunity program. I am thankful for the help I received from 
Andreea Matei, Stefanie Skulsky, Joseph Chatham, Chelsea Segal, Katelyn Hoisington, Kathryn 
Pelino, Jessica Kaltz, Wanruo Zhang, Helen Rucinski, Justin Wagner, Rachel Chase, Mayra 
Orozco, Ellen Schroeder, Grace Carbeck, Tamara Mackie, and Wendy Lin. 
Throughout my time at the University of Michigan, some of the greatest support and 
inspiration came from my friends and fellow graduate students. Paul Brykczynski deserves 
special mention as one of the most brilliant and compassionate people I have ever met. Though 
his geographic field, Poland, and mine are far apart, our conversations helped shape my thinking 
about this dissertation and so much more. Dinner and board games with Paul and his wonderful 
wife Andrea also served as a welcome distraction from the grind of graduate school during my 
first years at UM. I only wish their time in Ann Arbor had lasted longer. Aaron Cavin and his 
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wife Kate Krieger also deserve special mention. Even though I am not quite sure Aaron agreed 
with anything I said in the cultural history course we took together, he nonetheless befriended 
me. The time I spent with him and Kate will always be among my best memories of graduate 
school. During my later years of graduate school, Antonio Ramirez and Kate McCormack made 
Ann Arbor fun again, and I am sure they are making Chicago just as fun now. During my time at 
UM, several elder graduate students served as informal mentors to me. For that guidance, Lily 
Geismer, Andrew Highsmith, and Angela Parker deserve special thanks. A number of other grad 
students made my time at the Unviersity of Michigan better, both intellectuall and personally, 
especially Tamar Carroll, Nathan Connolly, Drew Meyers, Anthony Ross, David Schlitt, Stephen 
Wisniewski, Austin McCoy, Laura Ferguson, Rabia Belt, Cyrus O’Brien, Emma Nolan-Thomas, 
Jacqueline Antonovich, Patrick Parker, Ronit Stahl, Denise Bailey, Claire Whitlinger, Nora 
Krinitsky, Katie Rosenblatt, Colleen Woods, Rebecca Grapevine, Pascal Massinon, Aimee 
VonBokel, Cookie Woolner, Elspeth Martini, Lauren Hirshberg, Lotus Seeley, and Mathieu 
Desan (along with his wife Beth Coddington). 
Much of this dissertation was developed in conferences and workshops at the University 
of Michigan and elsewhere. I am grateful for the feedback I received at the American History 
Worshop, the Metropolitan History Workshop, the Eisenberg Institute’s “Writing the History of 
Modern Capitalism” roundtable, the Conference on American Intellectual History, the Social 
Science History Association Annual Conference, the Organization of American Historians 
Annual Meeting, the Business History Conference, the Policy History Confernece, the University 
of Michigan-University of Chicago Graduate Student Conference in Modern American History, 
and the University of Chicago’s “Refiguring the 1970s” graduate student conference, among 
other events. Through these and other gatherings, I met scholars who generously gave me 
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support and feedback on this work, including Andrew Kahrl, Nancy MacLean, Robert Self, 
David Steigerwald, Marisa Chappell, and Rebecca Marchiel. 
This dissertation would not have been possible without the amazing work of librarians 
and archivists across the country. Here at the University of Michigan, the Interlibrary Loan staff 
never rejected one of my requests and frequently tracked down items that existed in only one or 
two libraries across the country, which helped to make a national study like this possible. Either 
remotely or in person, archivists at the Bates College Edmund Muskie Archives, California State 
Archives, Carl Albert Congressional Center, Gerald Ford Library, Michigan State University 
Special Collections, Ohio Historical Society, Richard Nixon Library, Ronald Reagan Library, 
State Historical Society of Missouri, University of Illinois-Chicago Special Collections, 
University of Kansas Special Collections, Wisconsin Historical Society, and Julian P. Kanter 
Political Commercial Archive assisted me in this research. Though far too many archivists 
helped me to name them all individually, Simone Munson, Dorissa Martinez, Craig Ellefson, and 
Terri Jordan deserve special mention. 
My research has been supported by several generous grants and fellowships. At the 
University of Michigan, I received support from both the History and Sociology departments. 
The Sweetland Institute funded an incredibly productive summer of writing, and the Rackham 
Graduate School awarded me several travel grants and research fellowships, as well as a year-
long humanities fellowship. Though it carried no financial support, an honorable mention in the 
National Science Foundation’s Graduate Research Fellowship competition early in my graduate 
career provided me with much-needed encouragement. The Carl Albert Center, Lyndon Johnson 
Library, and Bentley Library all awarded me grants or fellowships to conduct research at their 
institutions. I was honored to receive the James P. Danky Fellowship from the Wisconsin 
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Historical Society and the University of Wisconsin-Madison, which helped fund my third trip to 
WHS. Finally, the Scholar Award in Honor of Robert M. Teeter from the Gerald Ford Library 
helped fund much of the rest of my research, including my trip to California to visit the Nixon 
and Reagan libraries.   
The members of my dissertation committee deserve special thanks for not only reading 
my nearly-1,000 page dissertation, but also providing encouragement and advice throughout my 
time at the University of Michigan. Greta Krippner’s work served as a model for what careful 
historical social science should look like. In the classroom and in one-on-one meetings, Greta 
always challenged me to think more clearly and frame my work in ways that would be 
recognizable to both historians and sociologists. Any failures to do so are mine alone. Howard 
Brick’s arrival at the University of Michigan midway through my graduate career was a welcome 
event. At the time, I was looking for someone to supervise my intellectual history prelim field, 
and I could not have asked for a more perfect intellectual history mentor than Howard. Often, it 
seemed to me that Howard had read everything. Over time, I learned that was because he had, in 
fact, read everything. More than that, Howard consistently pushed me to think more theoretically 
by making connections in my work that I would not have seen on my own. Though I managed to 
meet Tony Chen and convince him to co-chair my dissertation only shortly before he left the 
University of Michigan for Northwestern, he profoundly shaped my time in graduate school and 
my dissertation. No one is able to distill an idea or an argument down to its essence better than 
Tony. In numerous conversations, Tony helped me sharpen my dissertation’s arguments and 
framing. Moreover, he has been a constant source of support and encouragement, whether in the 
form of a kind text message or by putting me up at his apartment when I am in Chicago for 
research or a conference. My dissertation’s other co-chair is Matt Lassiter, but no single title can 
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do justice to all that Matt has done for me. Shortly after I submitted my application to the 
University of Michigan, Matt called me to ask me more about my interests and encourage me to 
consider Michigan. From that moment forward there was little chance I would go elsewhere. 
Much of graduate school was a foreign experience for me, but Matt always pointed me in the 
right direction. Times I was stressed or discouraged, Matt gave me the advice and 
encouragement I needed. I cannot imagine that any other adviser puts more time and energy into 
the advising process. For those lucky enough to have him as an adviser, Matt is both a mentor 
and a friend. It is no exaggeration to say that this dissertation exists because of Matt’s guidance 
and support.  
Nothing is more important than family, and I have been blessed with a great one. None of 
my grandparents is still with us, but I think of them often. In life, they always let me know how 
proud of me they were, and I hope that this dissertation would make them proud, too. When it 
comes to parents, I have been blessed with the best. No matter my goals, my parents have always 
encouraged and supported me. Most importantly, they have always let me know that their love is 
not contingent on my success or failure. That is all any child can ask for. Both of my parents 
worked long hours at difficult, and often thankless, jobs to give me the opportunities that I have 
had. Even more, they always made time for me, no matter how tired they were. Not a day goes 
by that I am not profoundly grateful for all that they have done for me. I owe them everything. 
Midway though graduate school, I gained a second set of parents. Edwin and Kathy McLeod are 
the kind of inlaws that defy all of the bad jokes and stereotypes. Even before I officialy joined 
their family, they treated me as one of their own children. I am lucky to call them my family. 
Likewise, I am happy to have gained a sibling (my first and only one) in Eddie McLeod. Finally, 
there is my wife, Shannon. What can I possibly write to due justice to Shannon? Our relationship 
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started with perhaps the greatest nerd “meet cute” possible. We saw each other in the microfilm 
room at UM’s graduate library and found excuses to begin talking. In many ways, the 
conversation we began in the microfilm room has never stopped. Shannon is a brillian writer, an 
inspiring teacher, and a compassionate partner. The worst day with her is better than the best day 
I had before I met her. She has been patient and encouraging as I worked through this mammoth 
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Understanding the Tax Revolt 
 
 
Time [magazine] said on June 19, 1978 that [Proposition] 13 was "a middle-
class tax revolt." I don't think that's accurate at all. This was across the board. 
We got 40% of the minority and lower-income vote. We got about 60% of the vote 
of the middle class. We got practically all of the vote of the wealthy. When you 
roll up a 65% vote in a state the size of California, there's no way to say that this 
was an action of any particular class…. I think people from every class resented 
the fact that the government was stealing too much of their money. I think the 
general idea in California and all over the country, with rich and poor alike, is 
that the government is too invasive; it has too much control; it passes too many 
laws; it curbs too many freedoms.  I was glad that 13 had so much appeal to 
wealthy people. More often than not, the rich make more money because they're 
brighter – as far as I've observed. 
   
      – Howard Jarvis, I’m Mad as Hell (1979)1 
 
 
 Here was the face of the revolt. White, middle-aged, jowly, wealthy, and 
unapologetically conservative. The year was 1978, but this visage would look remarkably similar 
to the faces of those who would claim the mantle of the revolt in the years that followed – 1980, 
1994, 2010, and many others. This time, however, it Howard Jarvis on the cover of Time 
magazine, the stars of a revolutionary-era flag framing his grey hair, fist pumped in victory, the 
words “Tax Revolt!” emblazoned in bold letters across his grey business suit. Why was he on the 
cover? California voters had put Jarvis there. To the shock of most observers, voters in one of the 
most liberal state in the union went to the polls on June 6, 1978, and cast their votes with Jarvis, 
an unlikely populist hero, by passing his property tax-slashing initiative, Proposition 13. 
According to Time, “It was as though millions of the state’s taxpayers had thrown open their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







windows like the fed-up characters in the movie Network and shouted in thunderous unison: ‘I’m 
mad as hell – and I’m not going to take it any more!’”2 
 Just why were they “mad as hell”? Jarvis had a clear answer. In the hands of Jarvis and 
his conservative allies the revolt became a symbol of the public’s rising conservatism. But that 
was ideological spin, not historical fact. A credulous press, however, echoed Jarvis’s framing of 
the tax revolt. As a Newsweek columnist wrote, the conventional wisdom on Prop 13 could have 
been headlined “California to Liberal Government: Drop Dead.”3 Time certainly did not dissent 
from this conclusion. “That angry noise was the sound of a middle class tax revolt erupting, and 
its tremors are shaking public officials from Sacramento to Washington, D.C,” it argued. 
“Suddenly all kinds of candidates in election year 1978 are joining the chorus of seductive 
antitax sentiment, assailing high taxes, inflation and government spending.” Everywhere one 
looked, it seemed that the outlines of a new anti-tax, anti-government conservatism could be 
discerned. “On the same Tuesday that Proposition 13 swept to victory,” Time noted, “taxpayers 
in Ohio turned down 86 of 139 school tax levies, including emergency outlays designed to save 
public schools in Cleveland and Columbus from bankruptcy.”4  
Yet, to anyone who had been following American tax politics in the preceding years, that 
last statement would have sounded oddly familiar. Nearly a decade earlier, the same magazine 
had declared the beginning of the tax revolt it was now rechristening in 1978. “A taxpayer’s 
revolt has hit Ohio, where public schooling is financed through a combination of state aid and 
local property taxes,” Time reported in early 1970, in one of several articles on what, years 
before Prop 13, was already being terms a tax revolt. “Taxpayers turned down 166 out of 523 
proposals to increase local school levies in November and vetoed 52 more out of 99 in a special 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “Sound and Fury Over Taxes,” Time (June 19, 1978) 
3 Meg Greenfield, “The People’s Revenge,” Newsweek, June 19, 1978.  






election last month.”5 Nationwide, school levy and bond approval rates fell from more than 80 
percent in 1950 to less than 50 percent in 1970. Yet, both contemporary accounts of the passage 
of Prop 13 and the decades of academic analyses that would follow largely forgot the years of 
revolt that preceded Prop 13. Why the amnesia? What happened in the intervening years that 
have been erased from memory, rendering Prop 13 the beginning, rather than the culmination of, 
the tax revolt, and what can the events of those intervening years tell us about the nature of the 
tax revolt and the political realignment of which it is a key part? This dissertation seeks to 
answer this puzzle. Perhaps most importantly, it also seeks to explain what was lost at the time, 
and is still lost by scholars and policymakers, in forgetting the struggles, the uncertainties, and 
the missed opportunities that took place in the decades prior to Prop 13. 
This dissertation demonstrates that a “pocketbook squeeze” driven by regressive tax 
increases and rising inflation caused the tax revolt, which actually culminated in, rather than 
began with, Prop 13. The simple fact of the household budget, not ideological fervor, drove the 
public’s tax discontent. That is not to say, however, that the revolt lacked any ideological 
content. From the beginning, the tax revolt assumed a decidedly leftward tilt. The pocketbook 
squeeze afflicted low- and middle-income Americans, in particular. Inflation and the tax system 
acted in tandem on the pocketbooks of these modest income Americans, as rising housing prices 
increased property taxes, rising prices of consumer goods increased sales taxes, and rising 
nominal incomes pushed low- and middle-income workers into higher tax brackets without a 
corresponding rise in real incomes. When combined with a nonstop parade of exposés of tax 
loopholes benefitting the well-off in everything from local property tax assessments to the 
federal income tax code – loopholes that low- and middle-income Americans noted stood in 
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sharp contrast with their own rising taxes – most Americans had good reason to feel resentful of 
both their own tax burden and the fairness of the tax system itself. As a result, most Americans 
preferred solutions to the pocketbook squeeze that combined progressive loophole-closing 
reforms and tax relief targeted and low- and middle-income taxpayers, not conservatives’ 
preferred cuts to business and progressive taxes and slashes in government spending.  
This dissertation also demonstrated that, while pocketbook squeeze motivated the tax 
revolt as it unfolded in the decades prior to Prop 13, political responses to the revolt determined 
how the public’s tax discontent would be reflected in policy. The revolt’s ultimate political and 
policy outcomes, moreover, were determined by the interactions between policymakers and the 
parties, on one hand, and activists and interest groups, on the other. Each group of actors 
attempted not only to understand the public’s tax views that were driving the revolt but also to 
frame those views in ways that supported their preferred policy outcomes. While with historical 
hindsight it is clear that the pocketbook squeeze on lower- and middle-income Americans made 
the revolt more amenable to solutions that focused on providing tax relief to low- and middle-
income Americans, not the upwardly tilted or across-the-board cuts preferred by many 
conservatives, that conclusion was far from clear to most contemporary observers. Moreover, 
those policymakers and activists that disagreed with the public’s preferred policy solutions had 
good reason to discount such a conclusion even when it seemed clear. 
Because of the ideological content of the pocketbook squeeze, the grassroots left first 
capitalized on the tax revolt. Beginning in the 1960s, activists from the black freedom, consumer, 
labor, and community organizing movements began to form a broad “tax justice” left. These 
activists critiqued the tax system’s fairness and analyzed various tax policies in terms of how 






Americans, tax justice activists argued, faced soaring taxes at the same time that upper-income 
taxpayers and large corporations escaped paying the rates called for by law. Labor unions, such 
as the AFL-CIO, and nascent black power groups, such as the Lowndes County Freedom 
Organization, were among the first to advance unmistakable tax justice arguments. By the end of 
the 1960s, however, consumer activist Ralph Nader, former Congress of Racial Equality and 
National Welfare Rights Organization leader George Wiley, and community organizer Saul 
Alinsky would become perhaps the three biggest influences behind the growing tax justice left. 
These tax justice activists hoped to effect change not only through direct action, but also through 
pulling the Democratic Party towards their diagnosis of the tax revolt.  
The tax revolt would prove to be a missed opportunity for the Democratic Party, 
however. The Kennedy-Johnson era marked the rise of “growth liberalism,” which argued that 
growth would serve as an emollient for battles over the distribution of income. Democrats, in this 
view, need not concern themselves with the distribution of tax cuts, since the rising tide of 
prosperity the cuts would create would “life all boats.”6 However, in focusing on growth, not 
distribution, most Democrats missed the extent to which the United States’ peculiar system of 
“fiscal federalism” was generating the pocketbook squeeze and the resulting tax revolt. Taken 
together, the Kennedy-proposed federal tax cuts favored upper-income taxpayers and business. 
At the same time, however, regressive state and local taxes, as well as federal payroll taxes, were 
rising rapidly. National Democrats, moreover, had contributed, both directly and indirectly, to 
these increases in regressive taxes by enacting a variety of federal programs – from the New 
Deal to the Great Society and beyond – that involved fiscal partnerships between the federal 
government and states and localities, thereby necessitating hikes in state and local taxes. Thus, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America (Oxford, 2000); Allen Matusow, 







federal policymakers during the Kennedy-Johnson years were congratulating themselves on the 
triumph of growth liberalism and touting the relatively small amount of money deposited into the 
pockets of Americans of modest means thanks to cuts in the federal income tax, soaring state and 
local taxes were removing federal cut, and then some, from the same taxpayers’ pockets. As 
some contemporary critics pointed out, though, many low- and middle-income Americans 
experienced the high-growth sixties as an era of an increasing pocketbook squeeze, rather than as 
a period of boundless prosperity.7  
In the post-Kennedy era, the Democratic Party moved further towards growth liberalism, 
making it difficult for Democrats to both recognize and capitalize on the underlying causes of the 
tax revolt. The tax justice grassroots left, in contrast, aligned itself with average Americans’ tax 
discontent and, in doing so, hoped to pull the Democrats back towards an understanding of taxes 
that would privilege the distribution of the tax burden above growth concerns. Fortunately for the 
grassroots left, growth liberalism had not completely eliminated more distribution-centric views 
within the Democratic Party. The candidacy of George McGovern – whose unapologetically 
lower- and middle-income focused tax policies were more popular than Nixon’s, according to 
polls – and the rise of “New Populist” Democrats on the state and federal levels in the early 
1970s temporarily overshadowed growth liberalism’s influence within the Democratic Party, 
making an alliance between the grassroots left and the Democrats to address the tax revolt seem 
possible. However, the defeat of McGovern and Nixon’s inglorious fall after Watergate 
facilitated the rise of the “New Democrats,” a group of young Democrats who took their cues 
from Kennedy’s growth liberalism and even, at times, President Dwight Eisenhower’s anti-
inflation conservatism. Throughout the mid-to-late 1970s, New Democrats, including Jerry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Perhaps the best summation of this line of argument is Andrew Levison, The Working Class Majority (Penguin 
1974). More recently, Judith Stein has expanded upon this argument. Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United 






Brown, Michael Dukakis, and Bill Clinton, gave little support to – and, at times, even opposed – 
the tax justice left. Some New Democrats even rejected the idea that the tax revolt existed. As a 
result, the public’s demands for tax relief grew throughout the 1970s.  
The grassroots right and the Republican Party, in contrast, were moving in the same 
direction on taxes. By the 1960s, Eisenhower’s anti-inflation conservatism, which emphasized 
balancing the budget to fight increasing prices above all other priorities, was falling out of favor 
with Republicans and grassroots activists. Richard Nixon would emphasize spurring growth, not 
combatting inflation, as his main goal in the White House. Moreover, when Nixon recognized 
the ideological tilt of the tax revolt and the popularity of the tax justice left’s solutions, he would 
even flirt with tax policies tilted to low- and middle-income Americans. Other conservatives 
were moving away from Eisenhower’s anti-inflation fiscalism, but they were moving right, not 
left. Anti-government, libertarian-leaning activists, including economists such as Milton 
Friedman and James Buchanan, began to emphasize that conservatives should focus on 
distribution, too, by cutting taxes for upper-bracket taxpayers and businesses. Though the 
grassroots right’s solutions to the tax revolt proved to be decidedly out-of-step with the public’s 
policy preferences, they were echoed by both business groups and Republicans such as Barry 
Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, and both provided the grassroots right with significant support. 
Despite voters’ rejection in the early-to-mid 1970s of tax initiatives in states from California to 
Arizona that would have concentrated their benefits on the rich and business, business groups 
and libertarian-leaning Republicans like Reagan continued to support the grassroots right. When 
Nixon’s resignation created a power vacuum in the GOP leadership, both Reagan and the 
grassroots right were primed to capitalize on the opportunity.  






for tax relief grew in tandem. Moreover, the public’s willingness to continue rejecting the 
upwardly titled tax initiatives pushed by business groups and the grassroots right at the state 
level waned as it became clear that the New Democrat-controlled Democratic Party was unlikely 
to propose more progressive alternatives. So, when Jarvis’s Proposition 13 unexpectedly made 
the ballot in California, where housing prices and property taxes had spiraled out of control in 
the previous few years, the grassroots right and sympathetic Republicans like Reagan were well-
positioned to take advantage. After California voters approved Prop 13 in June of 1978, anti-
government conservatives moved quickly to obscure the fact that the initiative passed out of the 
public’s pocketbook desperation, not ideological conviction.  Reagan, along with like-minded 
Republicans and activists, in fact, undertook a concerted post-Prop 13 campaign to portray Prop 
13 as proof that the public favored tax cuts tilted towards corporations and upper-income 
individuals.  
The spin worked. Already ideologically predisposed to favor business and the well-off 
more than their predecessors, the New Democrats put up little resistance to the analysis of Prop 
13 offered by Reagan and his allies. With little mainstream debate about Prop 13’s meaning, the 
press also accepted this redefinition of the tax revolt. In the decades that have followed, scholars 
often unwillingly have echoed the conservative framing of the tax revolt. Yet, Prop 13 was the 
product of more than a decade of building pocketbook frustration, rather than a referendum on 
conservative tax policies tilted towards the well-off. Moreover, the portrayal of Prop 13 as the 
beginning, rather than the culmination, of the tax revolt created the mistaken impression that it 
was a “revolt of the haves,” as the title of one early account put it.8 Here, the epigraph from 
Howard Jarvis’s autobiography is instructive. Jarvis was correct about the distribution of support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






for Prop 13 among income groups. The higher one’s income, the more likely he or she was to 
support Prop 13.9 However, during the series of school bond and levy failures in the 1960s and 
early-1970s the pattern was just the opposite. Low-income voters were more likely to oppose the 
levies and bonds than high-income voters. Conservatives’ reframing of the meaning of tax revolt 
and the press’s reperiodization of the tax revolt’s beginning, then, worked in tandem to obscure 
the revolt’s origins in the post-WWII pocketbook squeeze on low- and middle-income 
Americans. It is an error that largely has continued to this day, and one that this dissertation aims 
to correct. By understanding the origins of the tax revolt in the pocketbook squeeze, as well as 
the political battles to define and capitalize on the revolt, it becomes clear that the revolt 
continues, in many ways, to this day both because the public’s tax preferences have yet to be 
addressed in policy and because the pocketbook squeeze on low- and middle-income Americans 
has persisted almost wholly unabated. 
 
Ideologies of Taxation in American Politics 
This dissertation provides a framework for understanding varying shades of tax ideology, 
which, in turn, map onto larger philosophical differences about the nature of government, the 
economy, and American politics. Tax politics are often discussed in simplistic, binary terms 
(“anti-tax conservative” and “tax-and-spend liberal”). However, such dichotomies obscure the 
real action in tax American tax politics over the better part of the past century, which has 
occurred as much within as between the parties, interest groups, and grassroots activists. In 
complicating simple left-right descriptions of taxation, this dissertation follows in the footsteps 
of scholars who have attempted to discern the ideological variations within ostensibly coherent 
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philosophies, such as Alan Brinkley, who delineated the overlapping strands of New Deal 
liberalism, and Lizabeth Cohen, who cataloged the divergent strains of consumerism in post-
World War II American politics.10 
Two philosophical visions of the role of taxes in U.S. policymaking competed throughout 
the post-New Deal era of American politics, and vision each found adherents across the political 
spectrum. The first was a “distributionist” view, which emphasized who paid taxes and how 
different groups’ tax burdens compared with abstract principles, such as fairness. Distributionists 
on the right generally sought to cut taxes on upper-income groups and businesses, often by 
pushing taxes downward to the poor with regressive forms of taxation – taxes that take a higher 
percentage of income from low-income taxpayers than high-income taxpayers – such as sales 
taxes.11 Right-distributionists included not only Goldwater, Reagan, and the grassroots right, but 
also Howard Jarvis. The upward tilt in Prop 13’s tax benefits was a feature, not a bug. For 
example, when left-leaning activists in California, including former Students for a Democratic 
Society leader Tom Hayden, met with Jarvis to offer their support for Prop 13 if he shifted the 
measure’s benefits more towards low- and middle-income Californians, Jarvis flatly refused.12 
And when Prop 13 was criticized for being a windfall for big business, Jarvis quipped, “I’m glad 
they got it.”13  
Distributionists on the left, in contrast, generally sought to distribute the tax burden 
upward to the rich. They tended to favor progressive forms of taxation, such as the graduated 
income tax, because they took a higher percentage of the taxpayer’s income the more he or she 
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made. Tax justice activists were, by the very nature, left-distributionists, and the policy solutions 
to the tax revolt that they proposed reflected that fact. In all situations, tax justice activists were 
primarily concerned with how a policy proposal would affect the distribution of taxes and 
income.  In a debate with Jarvis, for example, Ralph Nader critiqued the conservative activist for 
ignoring “the inequitable share of property tax burden.” Low- and middle-income homeowners 
deserved property tax relief, Nader believed, but upper-income homeowners and large 
corporations did not. Both Jarvis and the media, Nader argued, “didn’t analyze the consequences 
of the cut [in Prop 13] in terms of who was going to bear what percent of the burden among 
homeowners, renters, and industrial and commercial property.”14 Fewer Californians would have 
supported Prop 13, in Nader’s opinion, if they clearly understood the measure’s upwardly 
redistributionist elements of the measure. Obscuring the distribution of its benefits, in contrast, 
was part of Prop 13’s right-distributionist supporters’ plan. 
The second overarching philosophy of taxation was a “fiscalist” view, which 
subordinated concerns about the distribution of the tax burden to a focus on the effects that 
various types of taxes and levels of taxation had on the macroeconomy and the budget. This view 
of taxation gained intellectual and political traction, as well as a new vocabulary, thanks to the 
Keynesian revolution – or, as some called it, the “fiscal revolution” – of the 1930s and 1940s, 
which provided economists and policymakers with new ways of conceptualizing both the 
economy and the government’s relationship to it.15 Among adherents to the fiscalist view of 
taxation, those on the right were generally most concerned with combating inflation. 
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Conservative fiscalists, perhaps best exemplified by President Dwight Eisenhower, would forgo 
tax cuts and even support tax increases in order to fight inflation and balanced the budget. For 
these efforts, right-distributionists derided conservative fiscalists as “green eyeshade” 
Republicans.16 In contrast with conservative fiscalists’ concern with inflation and balanced 
budgets, fiscalists on the left were generally most concerned with spurring economic growth. 
President John F. Kennedy’s tax cut proposals – which specifically avoided left-distributionism – 
represented the apex of growth liberalism for both its adherents and its critics.17 
Understanding the subtle shades of tax ideology in the post-New Deal era clarifies the 
terms of the political battles over the tax revolt that would follow. In the Weberian tradition of 
“ideal types,” the terms distributionist and fiscalist are meant to describe a theoretical space of 
debate (Figure 1). Placed on a left/right spectrum, the typologies would roughly fall, from left to 
right: downward distributionist, growth fiscalist, anti-inflation fiscalist, and upward 
distributionist. In general, most Democrats were either downward “distributionists” or “growth 
fiscalists,” and most Republicans were either upward distributionists or anti-inflation fiscalists. 
However, no one actor perfectly embodied any view. Indeed, both individual actors and political 
parties moved and shifted over time between the positions. Richard Nixon’s time in the 
Eisenhower administration, for example, led him to reject anti-inflation fiscalism and, over time, 
Nixon would dabble in both growth fiscalism and left-distributionism.  Moreover, it was not 
uncommon for a distributionist to invoke fiscalist arguments, and vice versa. The true test of 
one’s ideology was the outcome that one prioritized above others, not necessarily the rhetoric 
used to achieve that outcome.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Worshipping the Balanced Budget,” Washington Post (April 13, 1981); 
Grover Norquist, End the IRS Before It Ends Us (Center Street, 2015) 
17 Herbert Stein, “Tax Cut in Camelot,” Trans-Action (March 1969); Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics of 
Economic Growth in Postwar America (Oxford, 2000); Allen Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of 







For the past three decades, tax politics have been almost synonymous with conservative 
politics. As New York Times columnist David Brooks put it recently, “One thing Republicans 
know how to do is exploit the tax issue.”18 Scholars, journalists, and pundits searching for the 
roots of the conservative capture of American tax politics have turned to the 1970s – a decade 
once dismissed as a shallow “polyester decade,” but that has been recently recast as a “pivotal 
decade,” a “great shift,” and “the decade that brought you modern life,” as the titles of several 
recent book-length accounts have put it.19 Looking to the 1970s, both liberals and conservatives 
agree that the decade’s tax revolt proved to be a key turning point that helped shift both U.S. tax 
policy and American politics, more broadly, to the right. However, much of the scholarly 
literature – in fields such as the New Political History and the New Fiscal Sociology, as well as 
the History of Capitalism, Policy History, and American Political Development – has 
inadvertently reflected the reflected an argument advanced by conservative activists that the tax 
revolt represented a backlash against liberalism. This dissertation, in contrast, builds upon an 
underdeveloped and incomplete strand in the literature – which began with one of the very first 
accounts of the revolt – that sees the revolt as a more ideologically complex and politically 
contingent event. 
The backlash narrative of the tax revolt has its roots in the 1960s. In his influential 1969 
work, The Emerging Republic Majority, Republican political strategist Kevin Phillips predicted 
an incipient revolt on the right. By moving “beyond programs taxing the few for the benefit of 
the many (the New Deal) to programs taxing the many on behalf of the few (the Great Society),” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 “Week in Politics: The ‘47 Percent,’ Senate Races,” NPR, September 21, 2012 
19 Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (Yale 
University Press, 2010); Bruce Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics 
(Free Press, 2001); David Frum, How We Got Here: The 70s, The Decade That Brought You Modern Life – For 






Phillips argued, Democrats were alienating white working- and middle-class voters and driving 
them into the arms of the Republic Party.20 Not only did this view of the tax revolt comport with 
the analysis offered by right-distributionist activists and Republicans like Ronald Reagan in the 
wake of Prop 13, it also found perhaps its clearest and most developed expression in liberal 
journalists Thomas and Mary Edsall’s 1992 book, Chain Reaction. While both Phillips and 
Reagan would argue that the public’s alleged rejection of economic liberalism was rooted in a 
rational embrace of anti-tax, anti-welfare conservatism, rather than any subterranean racism, the 
Edsalls cast the backlash in less favorable terms. Whites who had previously supported New 
Deal liberalism and the taxes that went with it, the Edsalls argued, turned against liberalism in 
the 1960s because the Democratic Party’s alliance with the Civil Rights movement and racial 
liberalism, which “drove home the cost to white of federal programs that redistribute social and 
economic benefits to blacks and other minorities.”21 Aside from the subtle shift in value 
judgment, however, the Edsalls’s analysis of the revolt echoed Phillips’s. 
The backlash thesis of the tax revolt erases the pocketbook squeeze, the tax justice 
movement, the right’s pre-Prop 13 failures to pass conservative tax initiatives resentment, and 
the unpopularity of the distributional effects of right-leaning measures like Prop 13. Yet, in the 
two decades since the publication of Chain Reaction, the backlash diagnosis of the tax revolt has 
remained relatively unchallenged. With his call for historians to take the history of conservatism 
seriously, Alan Brinkley helped ignite the New Political History’s focus on the “Rise of the 
Right,” which historians have answered with aplomb.22 Despite the leaps in out historical 
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knowledge of American conservatism, however, the view of tax politics in the history of 
conservatism, by and large, has followed the Edsalls’ lead.23 As a recent survey of the 1970s 
summarized, “mostly white taxpayers saw themselves as being forced, through taxes, to pay for 
medical and other services for other disproportionately black and Latino people,” a realization 
that “moved [whites] decisively toward an even more individualistic, anti-tax perspective” and 
prompted the passage of Proposition 13, which “turned taxpayers against the public sector, not 
against corporate interests.”24 Even much more nuanced works – such as Molly Michelmore’s 
Tax and Spend, which follows scholars such as Christopher Howard in linking antigovernment 
sentiment with the increased use of tax expenditures by Democrats, in particular – maintain 
Phillip’s link between the whites’ racial resentment of welfare and anti-tax sentiment. 25 
Sociologist Monica Prasad has offered another variant of the backlash thesis. In several works, 
Prasad has argued that U.S. economic politics and tax policies titled too far to the left in the 
1960s and 1970s. This leftward tilt, Prasad argues, was unpopular with the public, which 
provided popular support for upwardly tilted “neoliberal” tax measures, such as Prop 13 and the 
Reagan tax cuts.26 
Other explanations for the tax revolt offered by social scientists in the still-developing 
subfield of the New Fiscal Sociology have generally differed from those offered by the backlash 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 On the role of the backlash thesis in the conservatism literature, see Kim Phillips-Fein, “Rethinking the History of 
American Conservatism,” Journal of American History 98:3 (December 2011) 
24 Thomas Borstelmann, The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality (Princeton, 
2011), 155-157.  
25 Molly C. Michelmore, Tax and Spend: The Welfare State, Tax Politics, and the Limits of American Liberalism 
(University of Pennsylvania, 2012); Christopher Howard, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social 
Policy in the United States (Princeton, 1999). See also, Suzanne Mettler, The Submerged State: How Invisible 
Government Policies Undermine American Democracy (University of Chicago, 2011) 
26 Monica Prasad, The Politics of Free Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Economic Policies in Britain, France, 
Germany, and the United States (University of Chicago 2006). Monica Prasad and Yingying Deng, “Taxation and 
the Worlds of Welfare,” Socio-Economic Review 7:3 (2009), 431-457; Monica Prasad, “The Popular Origins of 






thesis.27 Yet, most of the social scientific literature on the tax revolt has focused only on the late-
1970s and state-level tax initiatives, especially Prop 13, to the exclusion of the tax revolt’s longer 
chronological lineage, as well as the importance of both local and federal politics in shaping the 
revolt. Numerous studies, both article- and book-length, investigated the tax revolt solely 
through analysis of public opinion surveys taken shortly before or shortly after the passage of 
Prop 13.28 Other studies, likewise often focused on California, have businesses role in the 
passage of Prop 13 and subsequent measures at the center of the story, with only varying 
attention to the revolt’s longer history and the presence of left-leaning grassroots groups and 
little attention to the revolt’s local roots.29 In a recent study, The Permanent Tax Revolt, socialist 
Isaac Martin argued that the modernization of assessment practices in the late-1960 and 1970s 
eroded informal property tax breaks given to homeowners, ultimately triggering the tax revolt. 
Despite its admirable attention to the grassroots left, The Permanent Tax Revolt’s exclusive focus 
on property taxes and state-level ballot initiatives limits its reach, since the revolt was already 
well-underway at the local level years before assessment reforms were enacted.30 Other scholars 
have likewise pointed to events, such as the Serrano v. Priest decisions in California, as the 
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cause of the revolt, despite the fact that the beginning revolt predated them by many years.31  
In challenging these explanations of the tax revolt, backlash and otherwise, this 
dissertation builds upon one of the earliest book-length studies of the tax revolt. Published in 
1980, before the full policy effects of the revolt had even been felt, journalist Robert Kuttner’s 
Revolt of the Haves gave ample attention to left-leaning, as well as conservative, tax activism in 
the 1970s. Though it still overlooked much of the action at the federal and local levels 
throughout the decade, Kuttner’s account portrayed the passage of Prop 13 as a contingent, rather 
than an inevitable, outcome and did not presuppose its ideological content.32 In his survey of the 
1970s, historian Bruce Schulman follows in Kuttner’s footsteps, and a few recent surveys of left-
leaning protest movements in the 1970s likewise have devoted attention to ideologically diverse 
roots of the tax revolt.33  While these works still tell only part of the story, Kuttner’s book and 
the historical studies it has influenced remain the most compelling previous accounts of the tax 
revolt. As a result, this dissertation builds upon their insights.  
This dissertation speaks to larger issues in the study of American taxation beyond the tax 
revolt itself. Most notably, it aligns with an argument advanced by political scientist Andrea 
Louise Campbell that Americans views on taxes often corresponded with the level of taxes 
themselves, rather than outside issues or political rhetoric.34 Likewise, this dissertation follows 
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the work of historian Robin Einhorn, which investigated the links between the institution of 
slavery and the development of American taxation, in seeing taxation as central to American 
politics and in trying to understand the development of U.S. taxation on its own terms, rather 
than reducing it to a supposedly exceptional case in the transnational history of state-building.35 
This dissertation also builds upon historian Julian Zelizer’s Taxing America, a detailed policy 
history of federal tax policymaking in the three decades prior to 1975 centered on Ways and 
Means chair Wilbur Mills.36 Though this dissertation devotes more attention to public opinion, 
grassroots politics, and state-and-local taxation than Zelizer’s study, it also charts the dissolving 
influence of the technocratic “tax policy community” studied Zelizer, as the 1970s saw the 
community challenged by outsiders from the left and, eventually, the right. 
In using the tax revolt to investigate larger issues in recent American history, this 
dissertation also addresses other topics of concern to scholars interested in the shift in American 
politics and policy to the right over the past 40 years. Most obviously, this dissertation joins the 
now-burgeoning literature on the 1970s, which has focused on the decade as the fulcrum of 
American political realignment.37 Another recent trend that this dissertation also joins has been 
to recover previously overlooked activism by the grassroots left during years from the mid-1960s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Robin L. Einhorn, American Slavery, American Taxation (University of Chicago, 2006); Robin L. Einhorn, 
“Liberty, Democracy, and Capacity: Lessons from Early American Tax Regimes,” in The New Fiscal Sociology: 
Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 2009) 
36 Julian E. Zelizer, Taxing America: Wilbur D. Mills, Congress, and the State, 1945-1975 (Cambridge, 1998) 
37 In addition to surveys of the decade, such as Schulman’s (mentioned earlier), recent years have seen an explosion 
in topical studies of the decade. See, for example: Jefferson Cowie, Stayin' Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of 
the Working Class (New Press, 2013); Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for 
Finance in the Seventies (Yale, 2010); Bruce Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, 
Society, and Politics (Da Capo, 2002); Thomas Borstelmann, The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to 







onward that have often been portrayed as periods of a declining left and a rising right.38 By 
making the pocketbook squeeze the focal point of the study, this dissertation also follows 
influential studies by scholars such as Meg Jacobs and Lizabeth Cohen that have placed 
individuals’ everyday economics at the center of U.S. political history.39 With its framework for 
understanding tax ideology, this dissertation also builds upon recent attempts to move “political 
history beyond the red-blue divide.”40 This dissertation also joins works in the new History of 
American Capitalism subfield, which link the transformation of American capitalism over the 
past 40 years to contingent ideological and policy struggles, rather than overwhelming global 
forces.41 This contention, which is central to many of the recent studies of American capitalism, 
follows the influential work of political scientists Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rodgers, who 
placed the policy choices of the Democratic Party at the center of the story of American political 
and economic realignment.42 This dissertation likewise joins recent work in political science that 
have demonstrated that the public’s views on a variety of issues – especially economic ones like 
taxes – are not reflected in policymaking. Instead, these new works show, policymakers reflect 
the views of economic elites and the well-off, not average Americans or the median voter. 43 This 
dissertation is, in many ways, an explication of how that process played out in the 1970s with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See, for example, Gordon K. Mantler, Power to the Poor: Black-Brown Coalition & the Fight for Economic 
Justice (UNC,  2013); Bradford Martin, The Other Eighties: A Secret History of America in the Age of Reagan (Hill 
and Wang, 2011) 
39 Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, 2005); 
Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (Knopf, 2008) 
40 A prime example of work in this vein is Lily Geismer, Don’t Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the 
Transformation of the Democratic Party (Princeton, 2015). On the outdated red/blue divide framing, see Matthew 
D. Lassiter, “Political History Beyond the Red-Blue Divide,” Journal of American History 98:3 (December 2011). 
41 A few influential examples in the field are Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of 
Christian Free Enterprise (Harvard, 2009); Louis Hyman, Debtor Nation: The History of American Red Ink 
(Princeton, 2011) 
42 Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American 
Politics (Hill and Wang, 1986).  
43 Martin Gilens, Affluence & Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (Princeton, 2012); 
Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady, The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and 






regard to taxes. 
 
Chapter Outline  
Chapter 1, “The Stirrings of Revolt,” demonstrates that the tax revolt first began stirring 
at the local level among modest income Americans facing a pocketbook squeeze at the same 
time that federal policymakers in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were touting the 
triumphs of growth liberalism. In the 1960, liberal economists and Kennedy administration 
Democrats began moving away from thinking of taxes in fairness and distributional terms in 
favor of thinking of taxes in terms of macroeconomic management and GDP growth. This new 
growth-fiscalist ideology culminated in the Kennedy-Johnson tax cuts. At the same time this 
shift was occurring at the national level, local taxes – particularly regressive property taxes – 
were rising to record highs. State legislators exacerbated the local tax bite by shifting costs to 
localities in response to new federal mandates and public demand for expanded services. As a 
result, while federal policymakers were applauding the achievements of Keynesian growth 
liberalism, states and localities were facing growing fiscal crises. Meanwhile, civil rights 
activists in groups like the Lowndes County Freedom Organization drew attention to the racial 
and class disparities in the assessment of local taxes, pulling the discussion of tax politics away 
from Democrats’ new language of technocratic expertise and back toward questions of fairness 
and justice. The continuing trend of rising, unequal regressive taxes at the local and state levels 
spurred the first iteration of the tax revolt in the 1960s. From California to Ohio, school levy and 
bond approval rates fell from over 80% in 1950 to less than 50% in 1970, wreaking havoc on 
school budgets across the country. When voters in Youngstown, Ohio, defeated six consecutive 






schools. National reporters flocked to Youngstown, and the nation’s top-rated show, Rowan and 
Martin’s Laugh-In, even mocked Youngstown’s voters. But cities across the country faced 
similar crises. Many observers in the media and both political parties argued that alienation, a 
white backlash, or simple ignorance caused the revolt. However, national polls found no racial 
differences in levy support. Instead, the poor were most likely to vote against property tax levies, 
and surveys showed that Americans viewed the property tax as the “worst” and “least fair” form 
of taxation. At the federal level, President Johnson eschewed suggestions from advisers to pursue 
federal tax reform or revenue sharing with state and local governments, policies which would 
have placed an emphasis on fairness, not growth, and helped to ease the growing pocketbook 
squeeze on lower- and middle-income Americans. 
Chapter 2, “The Tax Revolt Goes to Washington,” tells the story of how in the late 1960s 
public pressure for progressive tax reform continued to build, resulting in the first national 
attention to the idea of a tax revolt and movement towards progressive tax reforms. Federal 
payroll taxes and Johnson’s “surtax” offset the 1964 federal income tax cuts championed by 
Kennedy, while state and local taxes continued rising precipitously. Newspaper, magazine, and 
television exposés of tax “loopholes” that benefitted the wealthy stoked public anger, while 
rising inflation exacerbated the still-potent pocketbook squeeze. When President Johnson’s 
outgoing Treasury secretary announced statistics on the number of millionaires who paid no 
federal taxes in January 1969, average Americans sent thousands of angry letters to Washington 
decrying the unfairness of the U.S. tax code. Quickly, the notion of a distribution-based tax 
revolt began garnering national attention. Labor unions and civil rights activists championed 
progressive reforms in response to the public’s tax frustrations, and their arguments received 






Nixon, as well as many moderate Republicans and Democrats, remained more concerned with 
fighting inflation than taming the tax revolt, which they believed was a passing political fad. 
Conservative Republicans in the House and Senate, in contrast, insisted that the public wanted 
tax cuts, not tax reform, and sought unsuccessfully to exploit the revolt for their own ends. 
Ultimately, few national politicians in the late-‘60s understood the full measure or meaning of 
the tax revolt, and the final legislative result of the tax reform debates of the late-1960s, the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, did little to address the public’s pocketbook discontent. 
Chapter 3, “‘New Populism’ and the Ascendance of Left-Distributionism,” explains how 
the grassroots left came to make unfair taxes a new and powerful organizing issue, as well as 
how their left-distributionist framing of taxes as a question of fairness and justice trickled up 
from the local level into state and federal politics. Beginning in 1970, consumer advocate Ralph 
Nader and community organizer Saul Alinsky, among others, organized around the issue of tax 
fairness. In Gary, Indiana, Nader joined forces with the Calumet Community Congress, one of 
Saul Alinsky’s groups, to challenge unequal tax assessments. Their efforts garnered national 
media attention, as well as crucial support from populist Democrats, who were amenable to a 
left-distributionist tax philosophy. By 1972, Democrats like Edmund Muskie and George 
McGovern made property tax reform a cornerstone of their presidential campaigns. In response, 
Nixon privately told his advisers to pursue policies that would “appeal to those who are part of 
the ‘Tax Revolt,’” and in his 1972 State of the Union, Nixon called property taxes “one of the 
most oppressive and discriminatory of all taxes.” Throughout the 1972 election campaign, both 
Nixon and his Democratic counterparts moved towards a left-distributionist analysis of taxes that 
understood the tax revolt as a response to the growing pocketbook squeeze. Most adherents to 






regressive taxes, particularly the property tax, was the solution to the tax revolt, in addition to 
loophole-closing federal reform. Nixon’s first step was Johnson’s discarded revenue sharing 
idea, but both Nixon and all of the major Democratic presidential candidates promised to go 
beyond that by funding direct federal relief of local property taxes – a revolution in “fiscal 
federalism.” Though McGovern lost in a landslide to Nixon, taxes proved to be the only issue on 
which the public preferred McGovern to Nixon. With the president’s move to the left and the rise 
of left-distributionist Democrats like Muskie and McGovern, many observers agreed that left-
distributionist tax reform was imminent. 
Chapter 4, “The ‘New Democrats’ versus the Distributionists,” begins by explaining how 
McGovern’s loss and the Watergate scandal destabilized both parties’ power structures and put 
once-seemingly-inevitable left-distributionist tax reform in question. Meanwhile, at the state and 
local levels, the number of left-distributionist grassroots tax groups continued to grow, adding 
groups like George Wiley’s Movement for Economic Justice and ACORN-affiliated groups like 
California’s Citizens Action League. These activists formed national networks of like-minded 
tax reformers that shared information and strategies, giving the tax justice movement a coherent 
philosophy, language, and toolkit. However, in the years that followed McGovern’s defeat and 
Watergate, the Democratic Party would become increasingly hostile to this growing tax justice 
left, even as the latter was eager to translate its state and local successes to the national level.  
While congressional hearings led by Edmund Muskie continued to explore inequities in local 
property taxes, including the case of Gary, Indiana, many of his fellow Democrats moved in 
another direction. The post-Watergate “New Democrats” ignored the entreaties of the grassroots 
left and instead pulled the Democratic Party towards a fiscalist budget-conscious, pro-growth 






increased the public’s demand for distributionist solutions to the pocketbook squeeze and 
decreased policymakers’ inclinations to view issues like taxes in those terms. Indeed, inflation 
and taxation were inextricably intertwined elements of the pocketbook squeeze in the minds of 
voters, with one exacerbating the other. In contrast to the Democrats’ move away from the 
grassroots left on taxes, the GOP became a friendlier place for right-distributionist activists in the 
years following Watergate. While numerous right-distributionist referenda, including one pushed 
by California’s Governor Ronald Reagan in 1973, failed, Reagan and other conservative 
Republicans continued to nurture the efforts of right-distributionist tax activists. Supporters of 
Reagan’s defeated 1973 initiative, for example, founded the influential National Tax Limitation 
Committee in 1975 and campaigned across the country for right-leaning tax measures, albeit 
with little success. With left-distributionist reform foreclosed at the federal level, left-
distributionist activists attempted to cushion low- and middle-income Americans from inflation-
induced property tax increases with left-distributionist relief programs at the states level. 
However, New Democrats in power in key states – such as California’s Jerry Brown and 
Massachusetts’s Michael Dukakis – rebuffed the grassroots left’s efforts. Polls consistently 
showed that the public had not turned to the right and opposed both reductions in most services 
and tax cuts for the wealthy. However, the failure of Democrats to provide institutional support 
for progressive tax reforms left an increasingly squeezed public with no alternative to the 
conservative initiatives being enthusiastically endorsed by Republicans. 
My dissertation’s conclusion explains why, while most voters preferred more 
progressive, fairness-conscious solutions to the pocketbook squeeze, they ultimately supported 
conservative tax-cutting measures like Prop 13 out of pocketbook anxiety, rather than ideological 






13, “I want to keep my home.” In the wake of Prop 13, another battle in the tax revolt began – 
the battle to frame its meaning. This battle commenced the instant Howard Jarvis took the stage 
to deliver his victory speech. It continued through a well-organized publicity barrage 
orchestrated by conservative activists and right-distributionist Republicans like Ronald Reagan. 
Following conservatives’ lead, many on the left agreed with the right’s diagnosis. Likewise, 
journalists almost universally portrayed Prop 13 as a sign of rising conservatism, rather than 
economic desperation. Republicans capitalized on this interpretive consensus by arguing that 
Prop 13 vindicated their calls for regressive pro-business “supply side” tax cuts aimed at 
boosting “capital formation,” and Democrats soon followed. President Carter – who had 
campaigned on a platform of progressive tax reform – called Prop 13 a “shock wave” and 
quickly signed a regressive Republican-backed capital gains tax cut into law. This regressive, 
GOP-pushed cut was soon followed by others. Earlier progressive tax reform efforts were 





























The Stirrings of Revolt 
   
 
The NBC evening news cameras panned over drab schools, hardened lunch-pail-carrying 
steelworkers, and an elderly woman sweeping leaves in front of her dated house. In voiceover, 
correspondent Del Donahoo intoned, “Youngstown is a workingman’s town [where] the people 
with money have moved to the suburbs.” Donahoo was there to answer a puzzling question. Why 
had the residents of the Ohio city voted down six consecutive school levies? It was a question 
being asked not just by the college students going door-to-door for a locally sponsored survey 
designed to help boosters pass the next levy, but also by journalists, social scientists, consultants, 
and public officials in both parties. Though not all observers used the term, they were all trying 
to explain what was by then a full-scale “tax revolt.” In the early-1950s, local schools in states 
across the country could count on voters approving over 80 percent of their levies and bonds. But 
in the mid-1950s, approval rates began falling, and they continued to fall throughout the 1960s, 
dipping to less than 50 percent in 1970. Moreover, when voters did approve levies and bonds in 
the late-‘60s, they did so by smaller margins than in the early-‘50s.1  While Youngstown’s six 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Author’s analysis of levy and bond data for all states available. California data from Arnold J. Meltsner, Gregory 
W. West, John F. Kramer, and Robert T. Nakamura, Political Feasibility of Reform in School Financing (Praeger, 
1972).  Ohio data compiled by author from various sources. See Richard E. Kelley, “The Diminishing Vote,” Ohio 
Schools (May 1963), 16-17; Byron H. Marlowe, “Voter Behavior in School Bond and Tax Elections in Ohio,” in A 
Time For Priorities: Financing the Schools for the 70s: Proceedings of the 13th National Conference on School 
Finance (National Education Association, 1970), 158-167; “Levy Defeats: From Curiosity to Commonplace,” Ohio 
Schools 49:1 (January 22, 1971), 8-9. For a national overview of school bond approval rates from 1963 through 
1972, see Figure 3-1 in Howard Devon Hamilton and Sylvan H. Cohen, Policy Making by Plebiscite: School 
Referenda (Lexington Books, 1974) and Table 1 in Richard Barr and Irene King, Bond Sales for Public School 
Purposes, 1969-1970 (National Center for Education Statistics, 1971). See also various state tables and graphs in 






consecutive defeats, threatening a school closure, might have been a dramatic example, it 
nonetheless captured an undeniable trend. 
Local officials in both parties struggled to understand this new anti-tax sentiment.2  In 
most cities that experienced a local revenue crisis, there was no organized opposition to the levy, 
leaving local officials to contend with what they experienced as spontaneous, irrational revolts. 
Some observers believed the phenomenon was a white backlash against civil rights and school 
integration.3 However, national surveys actually found that whites supported local school levies 
at slightly higher rates than people of color.4 Moreover, overwhelmingly white rural and 
suburban communities were facing educational revenue crises, too.5  Others commentators 
believed that the tax revolt portended rising anti-government conservatism.6 But the same voters 
turning down school levies told pollsters that they supported the schools and did not believe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Studies of local school finance referenda failures, often funded by local governments or business groups, like the 
Youngstown study cited above, became common during the levy defeat epidemic of the mid-to-late-1960s and 
early-1970s. Defeats also became a common topic for theses and dissertations. Due to the rising tide of levy and 
bond defeats, elaborate pro-levy campaigns became commonplace, too. Howard Devon Hamilton and Sylvan H. 
Cohen, Policy Making by Plebiscite: School Referenda (Lexington Books, 1974), 106-111.  
3 In some cities, like Pasadena, anti-integration racism was, indeed, implicated in the defeat of school finance 
initiatives. However, cases with clear racial divisions in the support for a school levy or bond were rare. Yet, based 
on assumptions or limited data, many local officials and observers believed that the link was almost universal. For 
example, the superintendent of schools in Youngstown, Ohio, blamed his city’s levy defeats on the racial views of 
blue-collar whites in his city, even though later surveys would prove his assumptions incorrect. Roy Reed, “Schools 
in Pasadena Confronted by Classic Segregation Crisis,” New York Times, April 7, 1969; Alvin Rosensweet, “Just 
Out of Money – Youngstown Ready to Close Schools,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, November 18, 1968; “School 
Funds / Ohio,” NBC Evening News, November 25, 1968; Alvin Rosensweet, “Crisis in Youngstown – Vote Against 
the School Levy,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, November 19, 1968. 
4 Stanley M. Elam, ed., A Decade of Gallup Polls of Attitudes Towards Education, 1969-1978 (Phi Delta Kappa, 
1978). Moreover, in 1974, 53 percent of blacks and 47 percent of whites said they would “sympathize with a 
taxpayers’ revolt.” Author’s analysis of Harris Poll, May 1974, Odum Institute [#7485] 
5 Steven J. Weiss and Robert W. Eisenmenger, “The Problem of Redistribution of Federal and State Funds,” paper 
presented at Federal Reserve Bank of Boston conference, “Financing State and Local Governments,” June 1970; 
“Tax Reform/Ohio/New York/Michigan,” NBC Evening News, March 28, 1969; William K. Stevens, “Tax Revolt: 
46,00 Shut Out of School,” New York Times, September 14, 1970. 
6 The depiction of anti-levy and anti-bond voters hewed closely to the depiction of Wallace voters. Wayne E. 
Thompson and John E. Horton, “Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action,” Social Forces 38:3 (March 1, 
1960); John E. Horton and Wayne E. Thompson, “Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated 
Local Referendums,” American Journal of Sociology 67:5 (March 1, 1962); Sylvan Cohen, “Voting Behavior in 
School Referenda: An Investigation of Attitudes and Other Determinants by Q Technique and Survey Research” 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Kent State University, 1971); Philip Piele and John Hall, Voting in School Financial Elections: 






teachers made too much money. Moreover, the same voters turning down school levies were also 
often voting Democrats, who usually supported the local levies more than their Republican 
counterparts, into office.7 Most observers and officials were simply puzzled. They could not 
understand why voters would spite their own schools and governments.  
But while public officials, journalists, social scientists, and consultants puzzled over the 
causes of these local tax revolts, voters had a simple explanation.  As one African American 
worker in Youngstown told the door-to-door interviewers, “I earn approximately seven-to-eight 
thousand dollars a year…. I have five kids, and we don’t have any new automobiles… [and] we 
can’t save money because I think the taxes are too high.”8 This worker had a point. Between the 
early-1950s and the early-1970s, taxes increased dramatically for most low- and middle-income 
Americans. Taxes on a family of four making just above median income almost doubled – from 
11.8 to 20.2 percent – between 1953 and 1972, according to the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations. The biggest single increase came in state and local taxes. These 
taxes – especially sales and property taxes – were regressive, taking a greater percentage of 
income from lower-income taxpayers than higher-income taxpayers.9 Combined with inflation, 
rising taxes created what was widely dubbed a “pocketbook squeeze” on low- and middle-
income Americans.10 The Youngstown residents voting against property tax levies in the mid-
1960s were caught in the middle of this squeeze. In contrast, thanks to cuts in federal income 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See, for example, J. Kiriazis and S. Hotchkiss, “Community Attitudinal Survey of Youngstown Voters on the 
School Tax Levies,” Youngstown State University Archives and Special Collections, LB 2823.K5; Stanley M. 
Elam, ed., A Decade of Gallup Polls of Attitudes Towards Education, 1969-1978 (Phi Delta Kappa, 1978). 
8 “Tax Reform / Ohio / New York / Michigan,” NBC Evening News, March 28, 1969. 
9 Author’s analysis of ACIR data, Table 38, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Federal-State-
Local Finances: Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, M-79 (U.S. GPO, 1974).  
10 See, for example, Life magazine’s August 15, 1969, cover story, “The Dollar Squeeze,” subtitled on the cover, 






taxes – one of the few progressive taxes in the American fiscal system – upper-income 
taxpayers’ burdens actually fell between 1953 and 1972.11  
The architects of those federal tax cuts, the Kennedy-Johnson growth liberals, largely 
missed this pocketbook squeeze. Instead, they embraced growth fiscalism over left-
distributionism when it came to taxes. Growth, they believed, had ushered in a middle-class 
society, its prosperity acting as a salve on the economic anxiety that had characterized the Great 
Depression and the years immediately following World War II. They thought, in Kennedy’s 
famous words, that a rising tide had lifted all boats. Others on the left disagreed, but their views 
were largely swept away by the economic triumphalism of the Democrats’ Keynes-inspirated 
“New Economics.” The local tax revolt, however, would slowly, but surely, undermine this 
confidence and bring questions of distribution and fairness to the center of discussion about tax 
policy.  
 
Growth Liberalism and Its Discontents 
When Time magazine placed British economist John Maynard Keynes, dead for nearly 
two decades, on its cover at the end of 1965, it was as much an endorsement of the Kennedy-
Johnson administration’s growth liberalism as it was of Keynes himself. Kennedy, the magazine 
explained, was the first Keynesian president. His administration’s economic advisers “presided 
over the birth of the New Economics.” Specifically, the New Economics under Kennedy stood 
for “spur[ing] an expanding economy to still faster growth” through tax cuts. “The Kennedy 
Administration stimulated capital investment by giving businessmen a 7% tax kickback on their 
purchases of new equipment and by liberalizing depreciation allowances,” Times noted. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Author’s analysis of ACIR data, Table 38, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Federal-State-






“Kennedy also campaigned for an overall reduction in the oppressive income-tax rates in order to 
increase further both investment and personal consumption.”12 By combining capital-friendly 
business tax cuts with distributionally neutral across-the-board individual income tax cuts, the 
Kennedy-Johnson tax plan meant placing fiscalism over distributionism.   
 In choose growth-oriented fiscalism over a left-distributionism, Kennedy and his New 
Economics advisers were making a clear shift away from New Deal liberalism. Franklin 
Roosevelt was, at least in rhetoric, an adherent of distributionist economic populism. FDR 
championed “soak-the-rich” taxation, both in rhetoric and in reality when it came to federal 
income taxes, and advocated shifting the burden from the “common man” to the rich. FDR said 
that his goal was to “progressively lighten the tax burden of the average taxpayer.” In speeches 
he declared, “Here is my principle: Taxes shall be levied according to ability to pay. That is the 
only American principle.” This was different, he explained, from “the succeeding Republican 
Administration [which] did not believe in that principle [the ability to pay].” Roosevelt also 
called the businesses and wealthy individuals who opposed progressive taxation “propagandists,” 
who he said sought to lower their taxes as the expense of low- and middle-income Americans. 
While the New Deal also contained elements of a fiscalist ideology, it was a decidedly minor 
element. With its lingering concerns about the size of deficits, at least prior to the country’s entry 
into WWII, the Roosevelt administration pragmatically accepted a variety of regressive tax 
increases, such as payroll taxes for Social Security, and utilized a variety of other levies and 
fees.13 Such fiscalist moves, however, were counterbalanced by FDR’s distributionalist income 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 “We Are All Keynesians Now,” Time (December 31, 1965) 
13 Franklin Roosevelt, “Address at Worchester, Mass.,” October 21, 1936, Public Papers of the President; Franklin 
Roosevelt, “Message to Congress on Tax Revision,” June 19, 1935, Public Papers of the President. The classic 
work on New Deal taxation, which was critical of its claim to progressivity, is Mark Leff, The Limits of Symbolic 
Reform: The New Deal and Taxation, 1933-1939 (Cambridge, 2003). A more recent account notes both the 






tax policies.  
 The Kennedy administration, in contrast, was the first to embrace specifically growth-
oriented fiscalism. Most New Economics liberals had little use for tax populism. The distribution 
of income was secondary to the country’s total income. “One of the chief arguments for a more 
positive program for economic growth,” Kennedy’s chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, 
Walter Heller, explained in 1961, “is that it is far easier to achieve many of our common goals by 
enlarging the size of our economic pie than by transferring income and wealth from one group to 
another.”14 To be sure, many in the Kennedy administration supported loophole-closing tax 
reforms. Such concerns, however, paled in comparison to the focus on growth. For some 
holdovers from earlier Democratic administrations, like Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
Stanley Surrey, reform was its own calling. Surrey slammed “provisions favoring special groups 
or special individuals that run counter to our notions of tax fairness.”15 Kennedy himself also 
noted, “[S]pecial provisions have developed into an increasing source of preferential treatment to 
various groups. Whenever one taxpayer is permitted to pay less, someone else must be asked to 
pay more.”16 However, for most of Kennedy administration, tax reform was subordinate to 
growth-boosting tax cuts. “The central focus of the President’s program is the prompt enactment, 
in a single comprehensive bill, of the permanent and meaningful reduction, by stages, of rates of 
tax on corporate income, individual income, and capital gains…,” Treasury Secretary Douglas 
Dillon told Congress in 1963. Insofar as reform was a factor, Dillon explained, it should be 
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reform “of a base broadening nature are necessary to permit rate reductions as extensive as are 
required to stimulate the return to full employment and higher rates of growth and to encourage 
efficiency in use of resources.”17  
In attempting to secure support for his tax cuts, Kennedy repeatedly stressed their 
growth-oriented, rather than distribution-oriented nature. Likewise, the administration’s 
proposals strenuously avoided any tinge of redistributionism by stressing the “across-the-board, 
top-to-bottom” nature of his tax program, as Kennedy put it, which including generous cuts for 
businesses and wealthy individuals in the hope of minimizing opposition to the cuts.18 In 
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292-295; Leon Keyserling’s testimony, especially Chart 28, in Revenue Act of 1963, Part 2, October 21-25, 1963, 
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emphasizing that too much taxation, not the distribution of the tax burden was the main problem 
facing the country, Kennedy and his advisers argued that the progressive income tax’s high 
marginal rates were strangling the economy. In his address national radio and television address 
calling for a tax cut, JFK explained that high taxes hurt both the supply and the demand sides of 
the economy, businesses and consumers. “The single most important fiscal weapon available to 
strengthen the national economy is the federal tax policy. The right kind of tax cut at the right 
time is the most effective measure that this Government could take to spur our economy 
forward,” Kennedy said. “For the facts of the matter are that our present tax system is a drag on 
economic recovery and economic growth, biting heavily into the purchasing power of every 
taxpayer and every consumer…. [The present tax system is] far too heavy for the purposes of 
curbing inflation and far too heavy to encourage investment and enterprise and risk-taking which 
make jobs and which make growth.”19 Or, as Dillon told Congress, the administration’s “primary 
objective is to release our economy from the shackles of an overly repressive income tax rate 
structure.” 20  Especially to business audiences, the president stressed the conservative 
implications of his tax proposals. To the New York Economic Club, Kennedy argued that the 
existing high tax rates were “deterrents to private initiative,” since they “reduce[d] the financial 
incentives for personal effort, investment, and risk-taking.” Most controversially, Kennedy 
predicted that the tax cuts could actually stimulate so much growth that they would raise 
revenue, eliminating the tradeoff between anti-inflation fiscalism and growth fiscalism. “[I]t is a 
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paradoxical truth that tax rates are too high today and tax revenues are too low and the soundest 
way to raise the revenues in the long run is to cut the rates now,” Kennedy argued.21 
Many on the left objected to the Kennedy administration’s neglect of the issues of 
distribution and reform. Organized labor proved to be a strong and consistent opponent of what it 
saw as the upward tilt of the tax cuts. Labor leaders like George Meany and Walter Reuther 
criticized the White House, both in the press and in congressional testimony, for not focusing 
more cuts on lower- and middle-income brackets.22 During the hearings on the Kennedy 
proposals, Democratic Senator Paul Douglas noted, in support of the AFL-CIO’s calls for 
reform, that there were 15 people with incomes over one million dollars in 1959 who paid no 
income taxes.  “Now if we try to trace the devices by which the taxes were avoided by these 
gentlemen,” Douglas said, “I think we will find that there is first a capital gains loophole; 
second, the depletion allowances loophole; third, the corporate shield thrown up around personal 
income; fourth, stock options; and a number of others.” It was strange, Douglas quipped, that 
these issues were getting so little attention during the tax hearings.23 Even putting aside 
loophole-closing reforms, critics on the left questioned the very distribution of the individual rate 
cuts. Former Truman economic adviser Leon Keyserling argued that the “across the board 
nature” of the tax cuts was a myth. While the tax cuts on individuals were progressive in terms of 
the percentage of existing tax liability that they reduced, they were actually regressive when the 
cuts were viewed in terms of their effects on income – meaning that the well-off would see their 
incomes boosted by a higher percent because of the cuts, due to the effect of across-the-board 
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cuts on progressive rates. Not only was this distributionally unjust in Keyserling’s view, it was 
also bad for growth. Cuts for low- and middle-income people would stimulate the economy more 
than cuts for upper-income people. It was a criticism of which Kennedy was well-aware. When 
the president was asked in a news conference whether his proposed tax cut did enough for low 
income brackets, he argued that the “balance[d]” tax cut did benefit them, not only through their 
direct cut, but because it would “stimulat[e]” the economy as a whole, which would help the 
poor indirectly.24 In another conference, Kennedy said that the House and Senate could “deal 
with” the question of “who should get the cut and how it should be divided.” The important 
issue, in Kennedy's mind, was the stimulative effect of the cut, regardless of the distribution.25 
Indeed, Kennedy boasted of the fact this tax plan was being attacked “from both the left and the 
right” as proof of its well-balanced nature. 26  Kennedy’s desire for equanimity, in fact, 
demonstrated the degree to which his Democratic administration had moved away from populist 
distributionism towards technocratic fiscalism.  
Much of the opposition surrounding the Kennedy tax proposals, however, had to do with 
the limited reforms included, as well as the distribution of the tax cuts. Whether the Kennedy 
administration liked it or not, debates over distribution were inescapable. Corporations and 
business groups were not enthusiastic about the inclusion of any reforms, but were enthusiastic 
about cuts, provided they tilted upward. Labor was enthusiastic about both, also depending on 
the distribution of the cuts. To the White House, it became clear that loophole-closing reforms 
and other distributionist issues were the stumbling block to getting the tax cuts it wanted. Indeed, 
Kennedy was personally frustrated by interest groups’ focus on distributional questions. “Tax 
reduction will not be passed if each economic group continues to treat growth as a crop to be 
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divided, or if each group examines what is available through the wrong end of a telescope,” 
Kennedy lamented in a what amount to a rejection of distributionist views of taxation. “If the 
low-income man looks at the dollar amounts of his cut, he will decide that the rich are getting all 
the breaks; and if the high-income man looks at the percentage cuts, he will decide the opposite.” 
To Kennedy, these oppositional social and economic groups should simply be grateful for their 
own cut, not question the overall mix of cuts. “The facts of the matter are that the reduction is 
fairly distributed through all income brackets,” he said. “And I would hope that all groups would 
put the national interest first, and recognize that the prospects for tax reduction and economic 
growth must not be endangered by squabbles over who is going to get what.”27  
Ultimately, the Kennedy – and later, Johnson – team decided to postpone any discussion 
of tax reforms in order to smooth the passage of the tax cuts. Growth, in the view of the New 
Economics, was far more important than distribution. Kennedy economic adviser James Tobin 
called the Kennendy-Johnson tax cut, eventually passed in 1964, the “first major use of the 
federal budget for stimulation of the economy…an historic event.” “The main purpose of the tax 
cut is to reduce unemployment,” Tobin argued. Both distributive issues and reforms had been put 
aside in the interests of passing the tax cut, which badly damaged distributionist reformers’ 
leverage. “For the most part Congress provided lower and less progressive rates without 
broadening the tax base or eliminating loopholes,” Tobin wrote. Nonetheless, it was “a victory 
for rational fiscal policy,” at least in Tobin’s view. 28 Not all left-liberal interest groups agreed, 
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though. Proponents of loophole-closing reforms, like organized labor, had been persuaded to 
drop their calls for progressive tax reform in order to facilitate speedier passage of the tax cuts. 
The implicit promise was that reform was still on the agenda and would be dealt with later. 
However, as even Tobin noted, “the whole episode cost the cause of tax reform a good deal of its 
bargaining power,” since it was harder to push through reforms without the sweetener of cuts.29  
The Kennedy-Johnson administration would never return to tax reform, despite calls from 
Congress, left-liberal interest groups, and the public. Just as Kennedy decided to delay reforms in 
order to ease the passage of the tax cut, Johnson decided to delay reforms in order to ease the 
passage of the anti-inflation tax increase – the “surtax” or “surcharge.” As CEA chairman 
Gardner Ackley explained to Johnson, “[T]ax reform cannot be combined with a temporary tax 
increase without delaying them both.” The administration debated the distributional effects of the 
surcharge, as well as how to pass it while defusing calls for distributionist policy shifts from both 
business and labor.30 The decision to raise taxes in the face of inflation made perfect fiscalist 
sense. Higher taxes would siphon purchasing power out of the economy, reducing demand for 
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both goods and labor, thereby driving down prices and wages. However, polls showed that the 
public opposed the measure, viewing it in distributional terms as something that exacerbated – 
rather than alleviated – the economic squeeze caused by inflation.31 Moreover, in order to secure 
congressional approval for the surtax, Johnson had to promise to submit a full slate a tax reform. 
Ultimately, Johnson broke this agreement, failing to submit his tax reform proposals until he was 
leaving office, when the package was viewed as little more than a dead-on-arrival piece of 
legislation issued by a lame-duck president.32 
While the Democrats failed to act, the public’s frustrations about the fairness of the tax 
system grew. The 1960s saw rising cynicism about the tax system. In the middle of the decade, a 
flurry of exposés outlining the inequities of the tax code hit newspapers, magazines, and 
bookstore shelves. Perhaps the most famous was 1964’s The Great Treasury Raid, written by 
Philip Stern, a former legislative assistant of both Henry Jackson and Paul Douglas. The previous 
year, Stern had been an outspoken critic of the direction Kennedy’s tax cut was taking, writing a 
Harper’s article on “The Slow, Quiet Murder of Tax Reform.”33 Now, with The Great Treasury 
Raid, Stern documented all that was being ignored by pushing reform to the side. The front cover 
of the mass market paperback blared, “MISSING: FORTY BILLION DOLLARS EVERY 
APRIL 15th! The story of: How five people had incomes of $5 million but paid no tax. How one 
person had an income of $20 million but paid no tax. How movie magnate Louis B. Mayer was 
saved $2 million by a special tax law all his own.” Stern explained in excruciating detail how 
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loopholes allowed many of the richest Americans to pay less than middle-class families. The 
takeaway was that the tax system was tilted towards the rich and against low- and middle-income 
Americans. If the loopholes were closed, Stern noted, everyone – especially taxpayers with 
modest incomes – could pay much lower rates.  The Great Treasury Raid was a national 
bestseller. It was praised by John Kenneth Galbraith and former IRS commissioner Mortimer 
Caplan and reviewed and excerpted widely in national and local publications.34 Other high-
profile exposés of tax loopholes followed. For example, in 1965, Tennessee Democratic Senator 
Albert Gore took the page of the New York Times Magazine with a call for loophole-closing tax 
reform dubbed, “How to be Rich Without Paying Taxes.”35 Likewise, throughout the mid-to-late 
1960s, muckraking journalist Jack Anderson often made tax loopholes the focus of his widely 
read columns.36  
As publications’ pages overflowed with tales of the loopholes in the federal tax code, 
most Americans needed only to look down their street to find other examples of tax inequities 
much closer to home. In cities across the country, serious flaws in the fairness of the property tax 
system were common knowledge. The average homeowner only needed to compare his or her 
assessment to that of a friend with a similar house to understand the assessments process’s 
arbitrary nature. Moreover, the appeals process in most cities was a complex maze that only the 
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wealthiest and most well-educated property owners had the resources and knowledge to 
navigate.37 But the public also knew about more than just everyday errors and incompetence. By 
the mid-1960s, tales of outright corruption and malfeasance in assessors offices dominated 
headlines across the country. In 1965, a disgruntled tax consultant turned over his files to the 
California Attorney General, and the resulting investigation, centered on San Francisco’s 
assessor, ensnared officials in other counties and other states. Most dramatically, the San Diego 
assessor killed himself rather than stand trial.38 Cities small and large across the country saw 
similar scandals, including New York City, where a state investigation alleged that Mayor John 
Lindsay’s chief fundraiser – who also happened to be the city’s tax commissioner – gave lower 
assessments to businesses that donated to Lindsay’s campaigns.39 For good reason, many 
homeowners wondered whether they were paying through the nose while other, more well-
connected, property owners were getting big breaks on their property taxes. 
Scholars have long argued that homeowners received informal property tax breaks in the 
form of fractional assessment, while businesses were socked with high taxes.40 However, both 
local studies and Census data paint a different, more complex, picture of the distribution of the 
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property tax burden. In the aggregate, homeowners and industrial and commercial property 
owners faced almost exactly the same property assessment as a percentage of the sale price.41 
However, these averages concealed a great deal of variation.42 In theory, assessors assigned each 
property an unbiased, scientifically determined market value that approximated what its sale 
price would be on the market. In practice, the assessment process was subjective. A combination 
of political favoritism, ineptitude, and the inherent difficulty of determining the value of an 
unsold good meant that similar properties varied widely in their assessments.  As a result, lower-
income homeowners paid the highest effective property tax rates, in general. African American 
homeowners, in particular, faced both economic and racial discrimination in assessments. High-
income homeowners usually paid the lowest rates.43 Among commercial and industrial property, 
small businesses – particularly minority-owned businesses – paid often strikingly high rates, 
while the largest manufacturers and commercial property owners usually paid the lowest, thanks 
to their economic and political clout.44 In many cases, assessors simply let the biggest companies 
assesses themselves. Even ethnical assessors avoided tangling with commercial and industrial 
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landowners. Compared to homes, business property proved difficult for assessors to value. 
Relatively few business properties changed hands each year, making determining the market 
price of unique properties very difficult. Perhaps most importantly, large businesses, in 
particular, had the money to hire experts and challenge assessments. As a result, many assessors 
simply gave companies favorable assessments from the start. Homeowners did not get the same 
benefit.  “It was easier to go after the homeowners because they were a defenseless group…,” 
explained Peter Behr, a member of the Marin County Board of Supervisors in the mid-to-late 
1960s. “Little grey-haired ladies would come in, widows sometimes, and they would say with 
tears in their eyes, ‘I can’t say I couldn’t sell my house for this amount, but I can’t afford to pay 
the taxes, and I don’t want to sell my house! I don’t know what I can do about it!’ Whereupon, 
county counsel, quite properly, would be forced to say, ‘Well, we certainly sympathize, but 
that’s not a legal reason for reducing the valuation, unless we feel you haven't been fairly 
evaluated.’… It was never a fair contest.”45 
This disconnect between cuts to progressive federal income taxes and rising regressive 
state and local taxes, particularly the property tax, was lamented by many experts and 
policymakers. During the Kennedy tax cut hearings in Congress, Keyserling noted the strange 
lack of attention to state and local taxes. “My views [that the Kennedy tax cuts are too tilted 
towards the upper brackets] are immensely strengthened when we consider that the federal 
personal income tax is not the only tax which bears down upon the American people,” 
Keyserling told the Ways and Means Committee. “Quite the contrary, because of its relatively 
progressive nature, the federal personal income tax has served, though in my view not served 
well enough, to redress in part the undesirable and inequitable imposition of the entire tax burden 
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– federal, state, and local, direct and indirect.” Keyserling was dismayed that systematic studies 
of the entire U.S. tax system were neglected by economists, noting that the overall tax system 
was “not nearly so progressive” as the federal tax burden. The problem of state and local taxes, 
he continued, was also getting worse. “[T]he significance of the highly regressive nature of state 
and local taxation has been greatly augmented in the decade since 1954….since the outlays of 
the states and localities have risen many times as fast as the outlays of the federal government.” 
Given that, Keyserling argued, it was “not the time to diminish the progressive nature of the 
federal personal income tax, either on economic or social grounds.”46 That is, however, exactly 
what the Kennedy-Johnson tax cuts did. Even President Kennedy understood that the tax 
situation at the state and local levels was far different from that at the federal level. “The 
property tax in most urban communities has reached the point of diminishing returns. It has 
reached in some communities the point of a capital levy, and we cannot expect that the property 
tax will furnish, in the 1960s, the same income for the sustenance of the public sector that it has 
sustained in the 1940s and the 1950s,” Kennedy said in a speech on the 1960 campaign trail. “I 
come from a city where the property tax is about $103 or $104 per thousand dollars, and the 
assessments reasonably high, and at that point I say it becomes confiscatory. The next 
administration is going to have the problem of at tempting to provide the necessary revenues to 
be secured for the local and state and national governments in such a way that these communities 
can meet their problems.”47 Kennedy was referring to the idea of federal revenue sharing with 
states and localities in order to lessen their reliance on regressive taxes, an idea proposed his 
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future CEA chair, Walter Heller, as early as 1960.48 However, like tax reform, revenue sharing 
was not acted upon by either the Kennedy or Johnson administrations, and it would ultimately 
fall to Republican Richard Nixon to act on it. 
By the mid-to-late 1960s, dissent from the liberal status quo on taxes was growing. Many 
left-leaning grassroots and interest groups became determined not only to push Democrats to act 
on tax inequities, but also to take action on their own. Black freedom activists, for example, 
began placing tax unfairness in the context of systemic racial discrimination and economic 
inequality. Property taxes, in particular, represented both economic hardship and political 
oppression for African Americans. In cities like Edwards, Mississippi, local officials used 
assessments to punish black activists, and assessments hikes in many cities also were used to 
force out black homeowners from white neighborhoods.49 Likewise, in Canton, Mississippi, 
blacks who exercised their right to vote often faced targeted property tax reassessment.50 In 
response, black activists took action to shift the balance of power when it came to taxes. SNCC 
offshoot, the Lowndes County (Alabama) Freedom Organization, placed electing a black tax 
collector and a black property tax assessor at the top of its priority list in 1966. Alice Moore, the 
LCFO’s candidate for assessor, explained, “My platform is to tax the rich to feed the poor.” 
Known for its early use of the “black panther” logo, the Freedom Organization printed pamphlets 
explaining how tax assessment worked – including detailed cartoons for voters with low levels of 
literacy – and circulated them in black neighborhoods. Controlling the fiscal structure, the 
nascent black power organization argued, was the key to controlling the distribution of power. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 “Federal-State Revenue Sharin,” CQ Researcher 
(http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1964122300) 
49 The details of the Edwards, Mississippi, case can be found in Percy Bland, et al. v. Robert McHann, et al., U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 463 F.2d 21 (1972). See also Andrew Kahrl’s excellent HNN article: Andrew 
Kahrl, “Property Tax Discrimination and the Question of Fair Taxation,” History News Network, January 2011 
(http://www.hnn.us/article/135752).  






“If poor people controlled the tax assessor’s office, the rich could be taxed fairly,” another LCFO 
pamphlet explained. “The money the county could collect from the rich people could be used for 
much-needed schools, roads, waters, sewers and other services.” As in cities throughout the 
country, one of the central issues for the LFCO was the unequal distribution of the tax burden 
thanks to economically and racially discriminatory assessment practices. “Most of the big 
landowners are paying from one-half to one-tenth of what they should be paying in property 
tax,” SNCC’s The Movement explained. “The LCFO plans to change that, by raising property 
taxes to the legal limit.” Amid widespread intimidation, violence, and allegations of outright 
voter fraud, the LCFO’s candidates lost their bids for office, despite the fact that 80 percent of 
Lowndes County was black.51 
The members of the LFCO were not the only activists from the black freedom movement 
with an eye towards taxes. Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton championed the LCFO’s 
tax activism in their 1967 book, Black Power. 52  And many black leaders linked racial 
discrimination with the fiscal state. Martin Luther King noted that “the federal government 
collects taxes from all citizens, Negro and white…yet billions of these tax dollars have gone to 
support housing programs and hospital and airport construction in which discrimination is an 
open and notorious practice.”53 The “National Black Agenda” approved at the National Black 
Political Convention in Gary, Indiana, in 1972 included a section critical of regressive taxes and 
called for officeholders to pledge to pursue a “steeply progressive income tax,” ensure “no 
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reliance on regressive taxes,” and to “close loopholes,” including taxing capital gains at the same 
rate as earned income.54 And when Black Panthers Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown ran for 
Oakland mayor and city council, respectively, their platform called for an end to abatements and 
exemptions for commercial properties, and for a four-year freeze in homeowners’ property taxes. 
“Property taxes either directly or indirectly impose their greatest burden on small homeowners, 
renters, and the poor in general,” the Panthers argued. “Sales taxes, utility taxes, and many others 
are consumer taxes. They, too, fall most heavily upon the poor who spen[d] significant 
proportions of their incomes on food, clothes, rent, utilities, and similar expenses.”55 In Atlanta, 
Baptist leader Dr. W.J. Stafford’s Free for Community Organization went to court in 1972 
seeking an injunction to stop disproportionately high property taxes in black neighborhoods. 
According to Stafford, his organization was urged to tackle tax discrimination by ordinary black 
homeowners. “We try to deal with all community problems,” he explained. “We’ve had a lot of 
people calling about taxes… [But] most of the people who called us feared that they would up 
the value of their property and get more taxes [if they complained].” A study of assessments in 
Atlanta showed that one affluent, all-white neighborhood was assessed at 24 percent, while a 
poor, largely black neighborhood was assessed at 44 percent.56 In the years that followed, 
national studies would confirm the trend. In nearly every city examined in a 1973 congressional 
study, “blighted” neighborhoods – which were disproportionately black – paid the highest 
effective property tax rates. And in the most unequal cities, like Baltimore and Chicago, the 
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average tax in “blighted” neighborhoods could be as much as 10 times higher than the rates in 
“upward transitional” neighborhoods.57 Inspired, and prodded, by black freedom groups like 
SNCC, many New Left activists – particularly those affiliated with SDS’s own abortive attempt 
at community organizing, the Economic Research Action Project – attempted to organize poor 
and working-class white neighborhoods around issues like unfair taxes. Though few had much 
success, within just a few years (as will be covered in Chapter 3), a group of activists from the 
Saul Alinksy organizing tradition would do so successfully. 58  
At the federal level, left-leaning activists began taking more strident stances, too. Perhaps 
the most well-known tax activism on the left in the 1960s came in the form of Vietnam War tax 
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resisters. SANE’s famous “Do You Know What Your Tax Dollar Buys?” advertisement, for 
example, linked high taxes to expenditures for wars past and present. And, in general, anti-
Vietnam tax protests called into question the distribution of taxes and spending from a left 
perspective, usually by comparing the amount of tax dollars spent on the military to the amount 
spent on education and social welfare.59 However, tax activism on the left in the 1960s and early 
1970s went far beyond the war. By the late 1960s, even the stodgy AFL-CIO had begun to use 
the language of grassroots tax agitation. The union released pamphlets with titles like “We Want 
Tax Justice!” and “The Case for Tax Justice” decrying the “loophole”-ridden state of the tax 
code in both technical and personal terms. “Let’s suppose that you and your neighbor are at the 
check-out-counter of a supermarket,” one AFL-CIO pamphlet began. “You each buy a loaf of 
bread. But the price to you is 30 cents, while your neighbor only has to pay 12 cents.” That, the 
pamphlet, explained, was just what the U.S. tax code did. “A married worker whose sole income 
is $8,000 a year in wages…will pay $1,000 in federal income tax. But a married investor who 
sole income in a year is an $8,000 profit from selling a stock or property…will have to pay only 
$354…. These tax loopholes, intended to benefit the rich, take money out of your paycheck.”60 
The AFL-CIO was joined by unions such as the UAW, the Teamsters, and Longshoremen’s 
union, among others, in decrying both federal loopholes and the steep rise in state, local, and 
payroll taxes that had taken place throughout the 1960s, increases that – for low- and middle-
income workers – more than offset the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut.61 In response, the unions 
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proposed closing loopholes both to finance new spending and to cut taxes for lower- and middle-
income Americans. They also called for public agitation to reform taxes. Near a cartoon 
depicting angry “tax justice” protestors, the AFL-CIO pamphlet explained that only public 
outcry could overcome the lobbying of corporations and the rich to keep the current tax code.62 
However, thanks to the Kennedy-Johnson administrations’ inaction on both tax reform 
and revenue sharing, the tax burden on low- and middle-income Americans continued rising 
throughout the 1960s. The biggest culprit in this rise came from regressive sources – those that 
took a greater percentage of income from lower-income taxpayers than higher-income taxpayers 
– such as the federal payroll tax and state and local taxes such as the property tax (Figure 2). The 
combination of cuts to the progressive income tax and increases in regressive taxes meant that, 
between the 1950s and the 1970s, the tax burden went up on average Americans, even as it fell 
for upper-income Americans (Figure 3).63 Inflation made matters worse in three significant ways. 
First, even when the gains where wiped out by inflation, rising nominal incomes pushed 
taxpayers into higher tax brackets, since brackets were not indexed to inflation. Second, rising 
prices on consumer goods also indirectly increased sales taxes as a percentage of income for 
many Americans. Third, rising property values dramatically increased property taxes. Combined 
with rising rates, the results could be striking. For example, property tax rates on FHA single-
family homes increased by nearly 50 percent from 1958 to 1971. Those rates applied to steeply 
rising housing values. Between 1960 and 1970, median home values in the U.S. increased from 
$11,900 to $17,000, before soaring to $47,200 in 1980.64 Taken together, rising taxes and 
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inflation created what in the years to come would be widely dubbed a “pocketbook squeeze” on 
low- and middle-income Americans.65 
Many policymakers and pundits missed this trend, though. As the Time magazine cover 
featuring Keynes and touting the growth-fiscalist policies of the Kennedy-Johnson years 
demonstrated, many observers believed that they had solved the economic woes that had been in 
the forefront of the public’s mind since the Great Depression. Yet, though growth liberals touted 
the early postwar decades as a period of prosperity, they had not actually created the “middle-
class society” that they imagined they had.66 In addition to the still-prevalent “poverty amidst 
plenty” that had been “discovered” in the early-1960s, spurring the War on Poverty, many lower-
income and working-class Americans were not sharing in the supposedly abundant prosperity of 
generated by 1960s growth.67 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 1970, more than 
half of all American families fell below what it called an “intermediate” family budget – a 
budget that assumed appliances lasted for decades, clothes lasted for years, no income needed to 
be saved, and families could go to the movies once a month for their only entertainment – and 30 
percent fell below the level of its “lower” family budget, which was even tighter than the 
“intermediate” budget.68 Taken in the context of rising regressive taxes, rampant loopholes, and 
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policymaker inaction, then, the pocketbook squeeze set the stage for an amorphous, unorganized 
revolt at the local level, where voters had a direct say in at least one form of taxation.  
 
“The Lesson of Youngstown” 
On a February evening in 1969, Americans across the country turned on their televisions 
to watch the nation’s top-rated show, Rowan and Martin’s Laugh-In. Tamer than the eras most 
controversial and political variety show, The Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour, Laugh-In offered 
a slice of domesticated counterculture that drew nearly 20 million viewers each week during the 
1968-1969 season. The show’s popularity was buoyed by a young cast that included Goldie 
Hawn, as well as an ever-changing list of famous guest stars like John Wayne, Sammy Davis Jr., 
and Jack Lemmon. Richard Nixon even appeared twice on Laugh-In that season, including one 
instantly-memorable campaign-trail appearance where the usually dour Nixon exaggeratedly 
held on the final word of the show’s most-famous catch phrase – “Sock it to me?”69 This 
particular Monday in November, though, Laugh-In featured a significantly less-noteworthy guest 
star – Davy Jones of the prefabricated early-Beatles knockoff pop group The Monkees. This 
episode’s trademark “party” scenes, featuring a series of rapid-fire one-liners, included jokes 
about John Lennon and Yoko Ono’s nude album cover, Elizabeth Taylor and Richard Burton’s 
rocky marriage, and a quip that wondered, “If the teachers are on strike and the students are on 
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strike what do they do with our school taxes?” The show returned to the topic of taxes a few 
sketches later.  
Rowan and Martin took to the stage to award the people of the city of Youngstown, Ohio, 
known for its steel production and organized crime, their dubiously honorable “Flying Fickle 
Finger of Fate Award,” designed to recognize acts of “gigantic stupidity.”70 Rowan explained to 
the tens of millions of Americans watching that “the voters of the city of Youngstown, Ohio” 
were selected because “for the sixth time in two years the voters of Youngstown voted down an 
increase in school taxes.” Playing the straight man, Martin questioned the selection, noting, “a lot 
of cities do that.” Then Rowan delivered the punch line: “Yes, but in Youngstown, they don’t 
even have enough money to keep the schools open.” Ribbing the city more, Rowan joked that the 
city’s antiquated textbooks told students that “maybe someday soon we can put a man into outer 
space.” Martin responded, “Gadzooks! Youngstown really keeps up, huh?” Then he asked 
Rowan, “What do you say we give it to ‘em.” Yes, “they got it coming,” Rowan agreed. Then 
Martin held up the statue depicting a gold hand with a winged index finger thrusting forward. 
“Voters of Youngstown, see the pretty statue?” he asked, accentuating the words as if talking to a 
small child. “Take the pretty statue, and stick the pretty statue in your pretty pencil box.” Both 
the hosts cracked up as the audience howled in laughter.71 Already the subject of dozens and 
dozens of national articles and nightly news segments on its tax crisis, the mocking Laugh-In 
segment was just the latest in a two-year long string of negative publicity for Youngstown. Now 
it was literally the butt of jokes.  
But Youngstown was only noteworthy for the number of times voters had rejected a 
school levy, not for the fact that they had voted one down. Though few states kept 
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comprehensive records on the fate of local school finance initiatives, those that did revealed a 
clear pattern. In states from Ohio (Figure 4) to California (Figure 5), approval rates for levies and 
bonds had been falling since the late-1950s.72 By 1970, even the White House would take notice. 
At a March 1970 legislative meeting, Daniel Patrick Moynihan made a presentation on education 
to President Richard Nixon and his advisers that included a chart showing the success rate of 
local school bond initiatives with the striking title “SCHOOL BOND DEFEATS HAVE 
INCREASED 70% IN FIVE YEARS.” Moynihan also presented data on the portion on 
municipal budgets in various cities and suburbs consumed by educational expenditures.73 
According to the national bond data, after seeing approval rates at or above 70 percent at the 
beginning of the 1960s, local officials faced rates in the low-40 percent range by the early 
1970s.74 
Indeed, the clear connection between the increasing rates of state and location taxation 
and the increase in defeats of school finance initiatives – the only type of tax in which voters had 
any say – was unmistakable. As property taxes went up, voters’ willingness to approve levies 
and bonds went down, at both the national (Figure 6) and state levels (Figure 7). Slowly, many 
experts and policymakers would come around to the idea local property taxes were bearing the 
brunt of Americans dissatisfaction with both the level and fairness of the tax system at all levels 
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of government. As the U.S. Commission of Education Harold Howe II noted in late-1968, 
“[S]chool bond issues – and school budgets – are particularly vulnerable since they may offer 
citizens their only chance to cast a direct vote against higher taxes.” 75 A few years later, the 
school district business manager in Thousand Oaks, California, would wonder, “I can’t help but 
wonder if schools would have as much trouble getting tax increases approved if voters could set 
rates for all government spending. All I can conclude is that the schools are the innocent victims 
of the system.”76 Likewise, one early-1970s scholarly study speculated that “citizens with little 
direct control over municipal, state, and federal tax policies may be taking out their frustrations 
in school tax issues-the one place where they still have a decisive vote.”77 Indeed, by that time 
both President Nixon himself and activists like Ralph Nader would be making the same 
argument in proposing left-distributionist solutions to the tax revolt (as will be discussed in 
Chapter 3). In the mid-to-late 1960s, however, such insights were rate. 
Undoubtedly, the federal government was complicit not only in its inaction on tax reform 
and revenue sharing, but also in its shifting of funding responsibility to states and localities as it 
created new programs from the New Deal to the Great Society. Federal mandates in areas such 
as social welfare, education, and medical care, though they came with partial federal funding, 
also required states and localities to raise their own revenues. Combined with the public’s 
growing demands for local services, which went hand-in-hand with a growing, modernizing 
economy, the stress on state, county, and local budgets was serious. The incentive for all levels 
of government was to shift the costs to a lower level, with cities and towns being the last in line. 
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Just as the federal government cut progressive income taxes, rather than use the money for 
revenue sharing, most state governments were loathe to enact new taxes, such as state income 
taxes, or raise existing taxes. Instead, the pushed the burden onto localities. The result was a 
fiscal crisis that cascaded from the federal government down to states, counties, and cities, even 
during the seemingly prosperous post-WWII decades. The end point in the cascade of buck-
passing was the local taxpayer. Not all taxpayers expressed their frustration at having the buck 
passed to them, however. As we shall see, low- and middle-income voters, both black and white, 
were the ones to lead the revolt against rising regressive taxes, such as the property tax. They did 
so in response to the pocketbook squeeze. However, it was a conclusion that many contemporary 
observers missed. 
Youngstown’s levy defeats must be seen in the context of both the governmental buck-
passing and the pocketbook squeeze. In Ohio, the state’s expenses grew faster than its revenues 
throughout the 1960s. Ohio’s population was growing, which increased demand for all services, 
and it was getting younger – thanks to the baby boom – which increased enrollment at both K-12 
schools and state colleges. The urbanization of the population also increased demands for the 
types of services typically found in cities. Economic growth, paradoxically, also contributed to 
budget crunch. On one hand, rising incomes generated new tax revenues. But, on the other hand, 
rising incomes also generated demand for more government. “As people's personal income 
rises,” one 1970 study noted, “there is a tendency for the citizenry to demand more and better 
public services.” The problem, however, was that inflation made the components of public 
services more expensive for government at all levels. Despite wage increases, public employees’ 
salaries in Ohio failed to keep pace with inflation during the 1960s. Meanwhile, the physical 






increase in expenditures from 1959 to 1969 was the result of inflation.78 And because of Ohio’s 
inelastic revenue structure, often revenue growth was not enough to offset both inflation and the 
public’s demands for new services. For a time, the state government was able to avoid facing its 
structural fiscal problems head on. 
In the decades following the end of WWII, state lawmakers used a variety of methods to 
avoid dealing with the state’s revenue crisis. Like many states, Ohio saw a boom in revenues 
during WWII, despite its antiquated tax structure and limited revue-raising potential, thanks to 
rapid growth. This allowed the state to build up a $216 million surplus by 1948, which the 
legislature gradually spent down during the next 10 years, as postwar demands for infrastructure 
and services outran the state’s yearly revenue intake in all but two fiscal years from 1947 through 
1958. Policymakers, in general, and Republicans, in particular, avoided increasing taxes at all 
costs. They were especially eager to dodge a state income tax. As the wartime surplus wound 
down, state lawmakers turned towards pursuing austerity on the state level. In the late-1950s, 
Republican Governor C. William O’Neill chose state budget cuts over new revenue, helping 
establish the GOP’s strategy for managing the politics and the economics of Ohio’s budget woes. 
In 1958, Democrat Michael DiSalle defeated O’Neill despite Ohio’s usual Republican tilt, 
thanks, in part, to Republicans’ failed attempt to turn Ohio into an anti-union “right-to-work” 
state. Like his Republican predecessor, DiSalle opposed a state income tax, though he – usually 
unsuccessfully – sought increases in a variety of other taxes.79 This decades-long pattern of de-
facto deficit spending “had the unfortunate effect of obscuring the fact that the state was living 
beyond its means,” as Ohio State University economist Frederick Stocker put it, and “allowed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 “Fiscal Position of Ohio, 1970,” B41, F Taxation Misc, JJGP, OHS; John F. Burke and Eric A Weld, “A 
Commentary on the Public Finances in Ohio,” December 3, 1970, B 460, F Taxes & Finance: State of the State , 
JJGP, OHS 
79 Frederick Stocker, “The Rough Road to Tax Reform: The Ohio Experience,” March 1972, 336.2 St62r, OHS; 






the people of Ohio to become lulled into the conviction that fiscal conservatism was synonymous 
with avoidance of tax increases….”80 Postwar growth helped swell revenues even without major 
tax increases. But growth was not enough.  
To close the gap, state lawmakers shifted more and more services to counties, cities, and 
other localities. This shift allowed state leaders to pretend that all was fine. But it put cities and 
other localities in a fiscal bind. Unlike the state government, these localities did not have the 
benefit of the state’s wartime surplus. “Municipalities were the first to experience the [budget] 
squeeze,” Stocker wrote. 81 Many had put off needed capital expenditures, such as building new 
roads or repairing crumbling old ones, during the war. When the war ended, localities were faced 
with fulfilling a backlog of expenditures during a period of soaring inflation. The state’s shifting 
of responsibilities to lower levels of government – without shifting comparable funding – only 
made matters worse. With growing public demands for services and the state unwilling to 
finance them, the job fell to local governments, who began seeking both increases in existing 
taxes and new forms of taxation. The situation was the same for cities across the country. 82 
However, for Ohio municipalities, raising taxes was particularly complex. Ohio’s uncommon 
“pre-emption” doctrine also prevented many cities from instituting their own sales taxes, since 
the tax was effectively reserved for state use only. The state also had one of the most stringent 
constitutional limits on local property taxes, requiring officials to seek voter approval for any 
property tax level above 10 mills.83 Nonetheless, localities vigorously pursued both voted and 
unvoted property tax increases during the postwar years. Between 1960 and 1968, alone, 
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according to an AFL-CIO study using Ohio Public Expenditures Council data, property taxes 
increased by an average of 34 percent increase in property taxes statewide, including increases of 
68 percent in Columbus, 63 percent in Toledo, and 74 percent in Cleveland.84  
Throughout the era, both Democratic and Republican governors continued to studiously 
avoid raising state taxes and, especially, institute a state income tax. Instead, they shifted more 
and more costs to localities. The numbers made the pattern clear. By 1970, Ohio ranked 40th in 
public expenditures per capital and 49th in public expenditures per $1,000 of personal income, 
despite ranking fifth in personal income.85 In contrast, Ohio’s localities spent more than the 
national average in most areas.86 The state government share of education funding, for example, 
had fallen from a high of 50 percent down to 30 percent, forcing localities to make up the 
difference.87 At the state level, Ohio relied overwhelmingly on the sales tax, while localities 
leaned on the property tax.88 “Ohio ranked 6th in 1968 among the states in the proportion of tax 
revenue raised at the local level largely from property taxes,” one study by two Cleveland State 
University economists found.89 The state’s high rank was directly related to declining state 
support for education. By the end of the decade, Ohio was spending spent 70 percent less on per-
capita state-to-local intergovernmental transfers for education than the national average.90 This 
meant that local governments had to make a greater effort to support their schools than in many 
other states, and this dynamic increased inequalities between districts. “This has probably 
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increased the inequality of income distribution between rich and poor districts in the State,” the 
CSU study noted, “and the amount of fiscal mismatch between areas with high needs for services 
and areas with taxable capacity to finance these services.”91 In simple terms, well-off areas had a 
relatively easy time supporting their schools, while poorer areas struggled to do so, even with 
very high tax rates.  And the story was the same for other services.92  
As a result, what was actually a political failure at the state level – itself exacerbated by 
federal cost-shifting to states – took on the appearance of a local crisis. “Although steadily rising 
property taxes and municipal income taxes caused growing unrest, few people recognized these 
as the outcome of state tax policies,” Stocker noted. “School boards, mayors, city councils, and 
county commissioners were seen as the culprits, while the state legislature and administration 
were long able to view the problems as local rather than statewide in nature.”93 To most experts, 
however, the true cause was clear. “Why have property taxes gone up?” the two CSU economists 
asked rhetorically. “Inflation and mounting costs certainly have something to do with it. But 
even more important is how the state government has increasingly neglected its responsibility 
and shifted taxing burdens on to local governments.”94 This was the context in which the 
Youngstown levy crisis unfolded – a context missed by most observers. Instead, in Youngstown 
and elsewhere, local officials and national observers, alike, puzzled at the causes of tax revolts 
unfolding across the country. 
Youngstown’s levy crisis began innocuously enough. The first levy failure, in December 
of 1966, barely made a ripple even in Youngstown’s local news. In fact, the levy itself was 
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initially little more than a side issue in a larger labor battle that swept through the schools that 
fall. In November, nearly 300 of the city’s 1,200 teachers went on strike – the first teachers’ 
strike in the state of Ohio – temporarily shutting down the schools.95 The striking teachers were 
members of the AFL-CIO-affiliated Youngstown Federation of Teachers, while most of the 
remaining teachers were members of its larger rival, the Youngstown Education Association. A 
month earlier, the board of education unilaterally selected the YEA as the sole bargaining agent 
for the city’s teachers. The striking YFT teachers’ single demand was an election to decide 
which union would represent the teachers of Youngstown.96 To add insult to injury – and, 
presumably, to woo teachers who had not yet decided to affiliate with the YFT – the school 
board gave a five percent raise to all school employees except those in AFL-CIO unions. So 
while YEA members had raises handed to them, members of six other school unions continued 
bargaining.97  
Thankful for the school board’s generosity, YEA’s leaders proposed a special levy 
election be held in December in order to pay for the raises.98 Perhaps not surprisingly, many 
YEA members crossed the YFT’s picket lines during the strike – even when no students attended 
– and the YEA ran ads in the local paper, the Vindicator, declaring that the YFT’s “only one 
goal” was “the complete unionization of Youngstown teachers.” The ad claimed that the YFT 
wanted to “force the Board of Education to its knees,” all while the union “recruited” students 
and “intimidated and threatened” other teachers. Noting how much the strike was hurting 
students, the YEA’s ad concluded, “WHO CARES ABOUT THE CHILDREN? The 
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Youngstown Education Association… WE CARE!... [And] the union won’t.”99 The school board 
had dismissal letters prepared to send to the striking teachers. But before it came to firing, a local 
judge granted an injunction halting the strike.100 That same day, the YFT reached an agreement 
with the school superintendent to hold a union election meeting in 1968, and all of the city’s 
teachers returned to work.101 
Attention immediately shifted to the levy, and most of the city’s prominent institutions 
quickly rallied to its support. The school board enacted the YEA’s proposal for a December 13th 
special election and set the rate at five mills. With only two weeks to plan before the vote, the 
president of the board urged all of the district’s employees to put the recent problems behind 
them, “join hands and work as one” to pass the levy.102 The YEA quickly gave $2,164 to the 
levy’s Citizens Advisory Committee, over three-quarters of the $2,700 the committee hoped to 
raise.103 The local Chamber of Commerce announced its support for the levy, and publicized its 
study supporting the city’s claim that it needed new revenue. The study also defended the 
teachers’ raises by showing that Youngstown’s faculty had the 34th lowest pay of the 35 
Northeast cities with populations of over 150,000 included in the chamber’s study.104 All of the 
local television stations donated money to the levy campaign.105 The Vindicator not only 
endorsed the levy in an editorial, but printed supportive letters from Youngstown residents in a 
special front-page article.106 All of the city’s religious leaders endorsed the levy, including the 
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Youngstown Rabbinical Council, Youngstown Area Council of Churches, and the bishop of the 
Catholic Diocese of Youngstown, as did most of the city’s civic organizations, from the 
Youngstown Federation of Women’s Clubs to various local Kiwanis clubs.107 Putting their recent 
battle with the board of education behind it, the YFT’s leaders also got behind the levy.108 But 
perhaps crucially, nearly all of the other labor unions in Youngstown – including ones 
representing other school- and public-employees – either openly opposed the levy or tacitly 
worked against it by uncharacteristically staying neutral.109 Local Steelworkers head, James 
Griffin even resigned from the Citizens’ Advisory Committee. 110  The message was 
unmistakable: labor would not back the levy. 
In the weeks before the election, doomsday headlines warned of the “catastrophe” that 
would befall the schools and the city if the levy failed. Responding to criticisms of the proposed 
tax hike, superintendent Dr. J. H. Wanamaker argued that the raises for the teachers did not 
create the need for the levy. He also noted the popular courses and programs – like driver’s 
education and vocation programs – that could be added and expanded if the levy passed. If it did 
not pass, it would be resubmitted the next year, and if it also failed then, the superintendent 
guaranteed that either the schools would close or they would drastically cut or eliminate things 
like bus service, kindergarten, and afterschool programs.111 Youngstown principals sent letters 
home with students encouraging parents to vote for the levy. These letters cited a topic most 
Youngstown residents knew well – inflation – as the single factor that most necessitated the levy. 
Once high school principal’s letter implored to parents: “The public schools need your help! The 
cost of living has skyrocketed. However, school income as not increased. We have now reached 
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a critical stage…. I, along with other school personnel, wish there were some other way than a 
tax increase [to pay the rising cost of books, supplies, and staff].”112 Campaign literature dubbed 
election day “Responsibility Day,” which was to “a day for ALL citizens to vote for THE 
SCHOOL TAX LEVY.” 113  Wanamaker seemed pleased with the response to the rushed 
campaign. He gushed to the Vindicator, “In 25 years…I have never experienced as much 
spontaneous offering of assistance as we have had in Youngstown in the past two weeks.”114  
Whatever optimism existed in the run-up to the election vanished when the votes were 
counted. Voters trounced the levy. Seven out of every ten voters opposed the levy, and only a 
third of the city’s eligible voters even went to the polls. Explaining the loss sanguinely, a clerk at 
the elections board told the Vindicator,  “It’s the current mood of the voters.”115  More 
sympathetically, the YEA president chalked the defeat up to the “economic pressures,” but noted 
that the pressures facing the schools were even more acute.116 The Vindicator’s editorial writers 
were less forgiving. Granting that there was “no question that with the cost of living and the 
inflationary process well developed, most citizens and particularly those with static incomes 
hesitate to add to their tax burdens,” the paper’s editorial castigated the parents who failed to 
vote, concluding that those who stayed home or voted no must not “think it’s important to keep 
the schools running normally and educational standards high.”117  
Quickly, a new vote was set for May. The levy value was increased from five mills to 
seven-and-a-half. Yet again, both the local Chamber of Commerce and the Vindicator endorsed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 “Election is Tuesday – Leaders Back School Levy,” Youngstown Vindicator, December 11, 1966. 
113 Howard Devon Hamilton and Sylvan H. Cohen, Policy Making by Plebiscite: School Referenda (Lexington 
Books, 1974), 164. 
114 “Election is Tuesday – Leaders Back School Levy,” Youngstown Vindicator, December 11, 1966. 
115 “City, Struthers Reject Levies; Poland’s Wins,” Youngstown Vindicator, December 14, 1966.  
116 “City, Struthers Reject Levies; Poland’s Wins,” Youngstown Vindicator, December 14, 1966. 






the levy.118 This time, the paper abandoned its past finger-pointing and sympathetically asked for 
levy support from those who stayed home or opposed the levy in December. It understood why 
taxpayers were “complaining that their burden is becoming difficult to bear,” and argued that the 
levy was “the result of an inflationary period when everyone wants more money for whatever 
service he renders in order, as he argues, that he can meet the vaulting cost of living.” Though 
“one can hardly blame the taxpayer for pinching pennies,” schools were not “the right place to 
begin to pinch.”119 Forty fifth-graders marched with signs like “Don’t Let Education Go Down 
the Drain” and “Pass the School Levy,” chanting “SOS – Save Our Schools.”120 The Citizen’s 
Advisory Committee for the levy also touted the “SOS” slogan in ads that ran in the days leading 
up to the election. They noted a laundry list of cuts that would result of the levy failed: athletics, 
kindergarten, field trips, and supplies. The committee blamed the impact of inflation on the 
schools for the levy, and reminded voters that real estate taxes were income tax deductible.121 To 
shore up support among the city’s steelworkers, volunteers distributed pro-levy leaflets to 
workers at plant gates. Other volunteers telephoned skeptical voters, while students contributed 
“signs, posters, stories in their school papers, and eloquent persuasion at the dinner table at 
home.” 122  In the biggest push for the levy yet, all local television and radio channels 
simultaneously broadcast a live call-in show the night before the election so that proponents of 
the levy could answer questions from skeptical Youngstowners.123  
The expanded efforts failed. Even though twelve thousand more Youngstowners voted, 
as many voted against the levy as for it. The levy garnered only 35 percent of the vote citywide 
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and failed to win a majority in any ward.124 In the wake of the second failure in a row, the 
president of the YEA complained that “the people of Youngstown did not want to listen to the 
facts.”125 Putting aside the sympathy for economically pinched Youngstowners it had voiced just 
a few days earlier, the Vindicator’s editorial concluded that “a good many Youngstown citizens 
do not want the advantages of quality education.” It heaped blame on local labor unions for 
staying silent and on Mayor Anthony Flask, the popular incumbent Democrat, who failed to 
endorse the levy until the day before the vote.126  
Five months later, the levy appeared on the ballot again, but at a lower 6.1 mill rate. The 
usual endorsements rolled in from the Vindicator, both political parties, and numerous religious 
and civic organizations.127 This time, Mayor Flask endorsed the levy a full month before the 
vote, pledging that “he and his cabinet are ready to serve in any way to help the Board of 
Education pass the 6.1-mill school operating levy.”128 A new, more popular superintendant, 
William Zinser, was expected to boost the levy’s chances, too.129 Labor support was mixed 
again, with some unions endorsing the levy and others choosing to stay neutral.130 This time, the 
Citizens’ Advisory Committee’s took a more emotional tack. They asked each voter to “examine 
[his or her] conscience carefully” and “think of the 28,000 children in Youngstown whose very 
future depends” on the levy. Consistent with the belief of many of the city’s elites that the levies’ 
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failures resulted from ignorance, the advertisements closed with the line, “Think…then vote.”131 
The levy failed again, garnering 44 percent of the vote.  
To add insult to injury, Youngstowners passed a different tax hike that November, even 
as they rejected the school levy. Throughout the year, the city’s police and fire employees had 
been negotiating over wage increases, seeking an additional one hundred dollars per month, 
parity with other major Ohio city’s officers, as well as fringe benefits like time-and-a-half 
overtime pay and paid holidays. Mayor Flask told the safety forces that the city’s finances were 
already precarious, and that it was likely the city would end the year without enough money to 
make the January 1968 payroll.132 Guarding against a covert strike, the city council passed a 
resolution calling for a doctor’s note if an employee missed two days of work.133 The tax 
committee of the Youngstown Area Chamber of commerce backed the mayor’s claims that the 
city’s finances were stretched thin and asked for the safety forces patience. The Chamber 
suggested that future raises might be financed by a property tax special levy or an income-tax 
increase.134 Nothing changed as the 1967 dragged on. Fed up with the lack of progress, police 
officers and firefighters staged a strike in early September with strong – if less-than-unanimous – 
participation. The striking police officers and firefighters gathered at a local union hall for a 
continuous “professional meeting” that constituted a de-facto – and illegal – strike.135 This strike 
set in motion the tax hike that eventually secured raises for the safety forces.  
In retrospect, passage of a safety forces tax hike in 1967 might not seem all that 
surprising. The late-1960s were besotted by protests, riots, and rising crime rates. In 1968, 
Richard Nixon would win the presidency on a “law-and-order” platform. But the passage of the 
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safety levy – and not the school levy – surprised many of the city’s leaders at the time. Despite 
its exaggerated “murdertown” nickname, the city had one of the lower crime rates in the state in 
the late-1960s, and Humphrey won Mahoning County with 55 percent in 1968.136 Rather than 
law-and-order, the passage of the police-and-fire tax increase had everything to do with the type 
of tax selected. During the same late-night secret union meeting where Youngstown’s police 
officers and firefighters approved their strike – a less-than-unanimous vote with a “stormy” 
debate – the membership also “passed unanimously a resolution condemning a proposed 2.5 mill 
[property tax] levy,” which the city council had suggested to raise money for the safety raises. 
The members of the gathered unions argued it would “penalize[e] property owners while all 
residents enjoy the services of city employees, and would further jeopardize the voters’ 
consideration of other issues, including the 6.1 mill school levy.”137 The attorney for the police 
and fire unions, Donald Hanni, said he believed that a property tax levy would fail. 138  
No matter the form, the odds seemed worse for a police-and-fire than for the schools. 
Levies for current operational expenses – such as the police-and-fire levy – needed 60 percent 
approval to pass, not the simple majority that governed school tax votes. Many observers felt that 
the schools were more popular than the safety forces, too. “If they won’t pass [a tax increase] for 
their kids, they aren’t going to pass one for us,” one police office said. “Every time a policeman 
has made out a ticket he’s lost one vote.”139 Needing some form of revenue, the city council took 
the demands made by the safety forces during the surprise strike seriously. Meeting in “the wee-
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hours of the morning,” the council turned away from the property tax idea, and began 
considering a half-percent income tax increase.140  
With only a small number of police officers at work, the council also weighed its options 
of how to protect the city. They considered invoking the state’s Ferguson Act, which banned 
strikes by public employees and the governor rejected a hasty appeal for National Guard 
assistance.141 Eventually, the council decided to petition the local common please court to issue 
an injunction ending the strike.142 Sidney Ringelhaupt, a “short, silver-haired judge,” gave the 
council what they wanted. But he also used his opinion to castigate them for their treatment of 
safety forces. According to Ringelhaupt, the issue had “gone far beyond the question of politics.” 
Taxes needed to be increases for police and fire pay raises even “if the levying of an additional 
tax will result in the defeat of the mayor and member of the council…[because] there is no 
question that the member of the police and fire departs of this city are entitled to a raise in pay; 
that they are inadequately paid; and that something must be done in this regard.” The night 
before the judge’s order, representatives of the safety forces and the city negotiated into the early 
morning. Mayor Flask and the city council proposed placing a one-half percent income on the 
December special election. Flask proposed that the majority of the money would go to provide 
Youngstown’s police officers and fire fighters wage parity with their counterparts in Ohio’s ten 
largest cities. The safety force’s representatives rejected the offer. The union wanted firm 
numbers outlining raises. Unable to reach an agreement, the meeting “almost came to blows.” 
The national president of the Fraternal Order of Police, John Harrington, came to Youngstown 
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for the negotiations. He castigated the city’s negotiation tactics, but also told union members that 
he “had no doubt” that an income tax increase would pass.143   
With the safety forces vowing to continue their strike despite his order and the city 
unwilling to budge on its offer, Judge Ringelhaupt personally intervened in the negotiations, 
bringing both sides into his chambers to reach a compromise. In the end, a deal was reached that 
promised an immediate twenty-six dollars per month raise for all city employees and an 
additional seventy four dollars per month if a half-percent income tax levy on the December 
special-election ballot passed. This raised the yearly salaries of most police and fireman from 
$6,330 to $6,642 immediately, with the promise of $7,530 if the levy passed.144 In a near-
unanimous voice vote, the safety forces accepted the deal.145 After the contentious negotiations, 
all sides seemed happy with the settlement and praised each other for their cooperation. 
Harrington told the Youngstown safety forces that it was the first time a police force had gone on 
strike and won in the country’s history.146 
Immediately, the income tax’s supporter sprung into action. The dean of Youngstown 
State University, John J. Gillespie, headed the Mayor’s Citizens Committee, which planned a 
door-to-door campaign and designated speakers – including the USW’s Griffin – to stump for the 
income tax.147 Learning from the failures of the school levies, the income tax Citizens’ 
Committee stressed unity. “All segments of the Youngstown area community are represented on 
the Citizens’ Committee, including business, industry, education, church, civic, and labor 
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groups,” reported the Vindicator. 148  Unlike the school property tax issue, Youngstown’s 
organized labor leaders readily endorsed and campaigned for the income tax increase. In addition 
to his speaking role, Griffin had headed the Youngstown Citizens Wage and Revenue Study 
Committee and promised “to do everything I can and will ask other in the steelworkers 
movement to go out and support the [income tax] levy.”149 The YFT, Youngstown Board of 
Realtors, AFL-CIO, Teamsters, and Building Trades all endorsed the income tax levy. So did 
both political parties.150 The Youngstown Board of Education even endorsed income tax hike, 
the first time it had ever endorsed a municipal levy.151 The only group that refused to 
unreservedly endorse the income tax was the Chamber of Commerce. Like the school levies, the 
Chamber of Commerce did endorsed the income tax increase, but unlike the schools levies, it did 
so only with the condition that it had a say in how the money raised would be allocated. 
Specifically, the chamber wanted to the council to close some fire stations and negotiate what it 
called “responsible long-term contracts” with the safety forces that would prevent future 
strikes.152 
Even with the proclamations of unity, the income tax levy campaign paled in comparison 
to the various school levy campaigns. Supporters held several rallies in support of the income 
tax.153 But it seems that many of the Citizens’ Committee’s more ambitious plans never came to 
fruition. Yet, the levy’s greatest strength lay in the type of tax it was proposing. Mayor Flask 
reminded voters that “only persons who work will pay the increase and not senior citizens on 
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retirement or fixed income.”154 And other supporters tirelessly pointed out that the income tax 
would be “collected only from those who live in the city and have a taxable income, or who live 
elsewhere and work in the city,” which meant that “old-age pensions, Social Security payments, 
payments for poor relief and workman’s compensation, and unemployment benefits” would not 
be taxed, facts that the Vindicator dutifully and repeatedly reported.155  
The committee also tried to dispel doubts about the need for the levy. It touted studies 
from local accountants that showed how no amount of economizing in other areas could generate 
enough money to bring Youngstown’s police and fire employees into parity with similar Ohio 
cities.156 Even after the twenty-six dollar pay increase, the city’s safety forces still ranked fiftieth 
in the state in pay, despite being Ohio’s seventh-largest city. In fact, even if the income tax 
passed and they received an additional seventy-four dollar increase, the city’s safety forces 
would still be eighteenth in pay in Ohio.157 Trying to put the safety forces on common ground 
with most workers, both the police and fire campaign leaders “point[ed] out that recent Bureau of 
Labor statistics revel that more than $9,000 has been cited as the annual salary required for a 
moderate standard of living for a family of four,” while the average police officer or firefighter 
would still only make $7,530 after both raises.158 Based on these studies, a front-page Vindicator 
editorial told readers, “There has been no question all along that the safety forces have been, and 
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are, underpaid.”159 The half-percent income tax increase passed with nearly sixty-five percent of 
the vote, raising the city’s income tax to one-and-a-half percent.160  
 Hoping Youngstown voters had turned generous, the school board announced that the 
property tax levy would face another vote. The higher turnout and support for the levy in 
November – and now the police-and-fire levy’s passage – gave hope to the levy’s supporters, and 
this time they doubled the levy value to 12 mills.161 With a date set for June, the board, citizens’ 
committee, and other levy supporters launched a more aggressive public relations campaign than 
the last three attempts. Superintendent Zinser also tried to address the public’s skepticism about 
the necessity of the levy by appointing a twenty-two-person committee to study the district’s 
finances, find ways to economize, and independently validate the district’s claim that it needed 
new revenue. The makeup of the committee, however, signified just how scarce unity was. 
Dominated by business officials, it included no labor representatives and only a few token 
African Americans.162 In what had become routine, many religious and community groups 
dutifully announced their support for the levy in the months leading up to the vote.163 What set 
this campaign apart from those that preceded it, though, was its tone. To be sure, many of the ads 
seemed like they could have come from any of the earlier campaigns. The citizen’s committee ad 
asked simply, “Do You Care?” and an open letter to Youngstowners from the NEA closed with 
the aphorism “Good schools make good citizens.”164 But overall this campaign had less moral, 
more instrumental appeals that played on fears of both local and national economic decline.  
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Two themes – protecting property values and defending the country’s economic 
preeminence – ran throughout the campaign. When the Ohio superintendent of instruction, Dr. 
Martin W. Essex, visited Youngstown to make a headline-grabbing address the YEA’s annual 
dinner, he tied the levy to broader economic matters. Essex argued that “Youngstown citizens 
must support their schools in order to maintain their own property vales, build an advancing 
economy for the city, and provide opportunities for young people.” Playing on fears of American 
decline, Essex told the crowd, “The answer is in the Japanese enthusiasm for education.”165 The 
bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Youngstown also put aside moral suasion in favor of economic 
hard-headedness, writing that “In our competitive world, we must not allow students of our city 
schools to be at a disadvantage.”166 The Youngstown Area Board of Realtors tied the school levy 
to homeowners’ self-interest in a Vindicator ad: “Good schools attract home buyers and thus 
support property values. Protect the value of your property and your neighbor’s, too; urge them 
to vote ‘YES’ for the school levy.”167 In its endorsement editorial, the Vindicator restated both 
points, noting that “Good schools are conductive to stable growth; poor schools encourage 
deterioration of the entire civic structure.”168 These new appeals to self-interest were not enough. 
The levy failed again, its support dipping slightly, to 42 percent. Perhaps the only consolation for 
levy’s supporters came in the fact that most other revenue-raising measures in nearby towns 
failed that day, including a tax hike in nearby Campbell, where hand-written signs against the 
measure appeared in yards throughout the city. Only more well-off suburbs approved levy 
measures. 169  
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Superintendent Zinser wasted no time resubmitting the levy. Waiting only a few days 
more than the 25-day minimum, another vote was set for June. This time, because it was a 
special election, the board had to foot a $45,000 bill.170 It also adopted new tactics. As one 
analyst put it, “the desperate board resorted to the sleeper strategy, truly a ‘quiet election’ – no 
media publicity, no billboards, and no literature.”171 Put more diplomatically, the levy’s backers 
used a “soft sell,” meaning that “little was said about the levy, in the hope that opponents would 
stay home.”172 The school board predicted that the schools would close for part of the upcoming 
school year if the levy failed again, and the YEA’s attorney flatly stated his union’s members 
would strike if the board pursued deeper cuts in order to stay open. Clearly frustrated, one board 
member complained at the levy resubmission meeting, “Parents bring children into the world, 
feed and clothe them, but then don’t pay to educate them so they can take care of themselves.”173  
In the month between the 4th and 5th votes, the levy received almost no coverage other 
than what were now almost perfunctory endorsements by the Vindicator and the Chamber of 
Commerce.174 Letters filled the void left by supporter’s “sleeper strategy.” One Youngstowner 
wrote to Mayor Flask asking the popular Democrat to more actively support the levy, which the 
writer believed would allow the levy’s supporters to overcome the “credibility gap” created by 
the school board.175 Three days before the vote, the Vindicator allowed readers to have their say 
in a special full-page spread. Even supporters of the levy acknowledged the economic pain 
inflicted by inflation and rising taxes. “There are very few tax levies on which citizens have the 
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right to vote,” one woman wrote. “[But] just because you can say ‘NO’ doesn’t necessarily mean 
that is what you should do.” Even though “the real estate tax is out of date and in some instances 
unfair as it is not based on ability to pay,” she argued, “education of young people is 
important.”176 Another woman wrote that the school tax portion of her property tax bill would 
jump from $138 to $210 if the levy passed, but argued that public schools were still a bargain. 
Like many, she worried that the levy defeats were further hurting Youngstown’s image, closing 
with the prediction that “as the levy goes, so goes Youngstown.”177 Inflation in school costs 
proved to be the biggest issue in the minds of the teachers and other levy supporters who wrote 
to the Vindicator. A high school librarian wrote in, providing figures demonstrating that the cost 
of many popular books that need constant replacing had doubled since 1950.178 Another 
Youngstowner implored his fellow citizens to remember that “costs have risen not only in 
groceries and taxes, but also in labor, books, salaries, paper, pencils, etc.”179  
The “sleeper strategy” succeeded in one sense: turnout plummeted over 25 percent from 
the previous two elections. Unfortunately for the levy’s supporters, more pro-levy voters than 
levy opponents stayed home. This time the levy garnered only 37 percent of the vote. The many 
Youngstowners who missed the vote also likely missed its defeat. It barely made a blip in the 
local news, having been obscured by Robert F. Kennedy’s assassination.180 In fact, the levy 
defeat was not even the biggest local story of the day. The Vindicator’s business editor penned a 
story largely based on unnamed sources that “a major national conglomerate” could take control 
of Youngstown Sheet & Tube, the largest mill in the city, a takeover that the writer reported 
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“could spell danger to the hard-pressed Youngstown district as a major steel producing center.” 
Youngstowners feared that the city could become a “remote control” community, with absentee 
ownership and few long-term guarantees.181  
Despite the levy’s loss, schools opened that November. On the recommendation of 
Superintendent Zinser, the board also voted to grant raises to district employees, a move that the 
school board’s “liberal faction” opposed as fiscally irresponsible until a levy passed. In effect, 
“the vote [to grant raises] was to close the schools when the money ran out if the next levy didn’t 
pass.”182 For those who worried that voters rejected the levies because of greedy public 
employees, the raise could not have been worse news. To make matters worse, another group 
often blamed for the public’s rising anti-tax sentiment – welfare recipients – made headlines in 
October. Welfare recipients staged a sit-in at the county’s offices to ask for a cold-weather 
supplement to Ohio’s five-dollar yearly budget for children’s clothing. Most of the parents in 
attendance were African American women who belonged to the Youngstown chapter of the 
growing National Welfare Rights Association (NWRO), a group founded by George Wiley, the 
former associate director of the Congress for Racial Equality. Thirty of the sixty protestors stood 
outside carrying signs that read “Welfare is not a privilege, it is a right” and “Ohio is the 5th 
richest state in the union, 45th in welfare.” 183 County AFL-CIO chairman, Al Shipka, attended 
the protest. He supported the welfare recipients, he said, because “you cannot have law and order 
in a community unless something is done about these basic fundamental problems.” Shipka 
argued that “welfare recipients receive less” than in the past, noting that the current system 
“destroys everything decent in a human being.”184 Commissioners blamed the low welfare 
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payments on state cuts to the county, explaining that a half-cent “permissive” sales tax might be 
the only untapped source of revenue for the county, but one that would likely be overturned by 
voters if enacted.185 That Shipka – who refused to support the levy because of the board’s “anti-
labor position” – supported the welfare protestors had to irk the levy’s supporters.186 The sit-in 
ended uneventfully, but one sign held aloft by a WRO protester outside the meeting seemed to 
foreshadow that the issue was not settled: “Money is the root of all evil. We want some of that 
evil.”187 
With school in session, the school board scheduled another levy vote on the 12-mill levy 
for November. They warned that if this vote failed the schools definitely would close.188 The 
recent closing of Perry Local Schools, outside of nearby Cleveland, made the threat all the more 
real.189 The school board pleaded for unity to avoid closings. “Youngstown voters must awaken 
to their responsibilities,” board member Robert Murphy implored. “Black, white, Catholic, 
Protestant, labor, management all must unite to keep our schools open.”190 But the board ensured 
unity would be hard to come by on the labor front. Shipka denounced the recent raises granted by 
the board as politically motivated, saying that they “demonstrated to the teachers that [the board] 
was anti-YFT.”191 Now the board broke its election agreement with the YFT by declaring that it 
would allow principals and supervisors to vote in October’s union-recognition election. The YFT 
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cried foul, removed its name from the ballot, and boycotted the election. The board also gave 
teachers another wage increase just before the election, part of what Shipka called an “anti-
labor” strategy.”192 In what was essentially an uncontested election, the YEA won with 889 
votes. Its supporters noted that even if all of those who refused or neglected to vote supported the 
YFT, it would still have won by a 600-vote margin. But the damage to the board’s appeal to 
organized labor was done.193 Once again, the levy’s supporters would run a levy campaign with 
little-to-no support from organized labor. 
In a last-ditch effort to avert the catastrophe of school closure, the board and other levy 
supporters eschewed the failed “sleeper strategy” of the June vote and staged their most 
publicized and provocative campaign yet. Levy supporters tapped former mayor Charles P. 
Henderson – viewed by one longtime reporter as “probably the most respected political figure in 
town” – to head the new Committee to Keep Schools Open, which essentially replaced the old 
Citizens Advisory Committee. The new committee adopted the “shock[ing]” slogan “Give a 
damn” for its campaign, buying ads with those bold words in large type in the city’s black 
newspaper, the Buckeye Review, as well as the local Catholic Exponent and Jewish Times before 
changing the phrase to the tamer “Give One.”194 The committee also ran large, emotional ads in 
the Vindicator, asking Youngstowners to “VOTE FOR ALBERT...And Mary, and Jack, and 
Pete, and Joan.” In the fine print, both the “Give a damn” and “ALBERT” ads warned that, if the 
schools closed, “all our children lose…no one will want to move to Youngstown…business will 
not want to locate here…[and] all property values fall, that means dollars to you.”195 More 
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simply, another of the committee’s ads told Youngstowners, “It’s your decision… If our kids 
don’t make it, neither do we. Neither does Youngstown.”196  
Putting even more cracks in the thin wall that separated the Vindicator’s editorial 
endorsements of the levy from its news coverage of the campaign, the paper ran a series of 
drawings from school children supporting levy. One drawn by a high school junior showed a 
forlorn little girl with the words “LOOKING THE OTHER WAY WON’T HELP, VOTE YES 
NOV. 5” emblazoned beside her.197 Another student drawing pictured three children tied 
together with rope, as if in on the train tracks in the dramatic final scene of a western movie. But 
the hoped-for heroes were not cowboys. They were the voters of Youngstown. The ad asked 
them, “WILL YOU HATE YOURSELF NEXT SEPT. FOR WHAT YOU DIDN’T DO THIS 
NOVEMBER [?]” Returning to a strategy from the May 1967 campaign, local television station 
WFMJ aired another hour-long call-in program where the board of education, superintendent 
Zinser, and committee chairman Henderson all answered questions about the levy.198 Some 
citizens even took matters into their own hands, like the owner of a clothing store who bought 
ten billboards throughout the city that stated “Pass the School Levy” in big letters.199 
Besides the more visible advertising and organizing, virtually nothing changed from the 
previous campaigns. The Vindicator, the Chamber of Commerce, and nearly all of the city’s 
religious and civic organizations endorsed the levy.200 Like the past campaigns, most organized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Vindicator, October 27, 1968; “Vote for Albert,” Youngstown Vindicator, October 28, 1968; “Vote for Albert,” 
Youngstown Vindicator, October 29, 1968; “Vote for Albert,” Youngstown Vindicator, October 31, 1968; “Vote for 
Albert,” Youngstown Vindicator, November 2, 1968; “Vote for Albert,” Youngstown Vindicator, November 4, 1968; 
“Give a Dam,” Buckeye Review, October 25, 1968; “Give a Dam,” Buckeye Review, November 1, 1968. 
196 “It’s Your Decision…,” Youngstown Vindicator, October 29, 1968. 
197 “Please Help Me,” Youngstown Vindicator, October 28, 1968. 
198 “School Levy Program on 21 Tonight,” Youngstown Vindicator, October 29, 1968. 
199 Alvin Rosensweet, “Just Out of Money – Youngstown Ready to Close Schools,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 
November 18, 1968. 
200 “Chamber Unit Endorses District School Levies,” Youngstown Vindicator, October 24, 1968; “School, TB Levies 






labor “ignored” the levy, though a few smaller unions and union leaders decided to endorse in its 
sixth attempt.201 The Youngstown area AFL-CIO even went so far as to hold a meeting where it 
gave endorsements candidates and other levies without even holding a vote on the school levy.202 
Once again, the mayor and city council supported the levy, going to far as to appear in multiple 
advertisements in the Vindicator paid for by the Henderson committee. Sandwiched between 
photos of all the council members and mayoral staff – a prominent image of racial and ethnic 
unity for the levy, if only in the form of photos city’s elected leaders – were the  “CITY HALL 
SUPPORTS THE SCHOOL LEVY,” encouraging Youngstowners to support the levy “FOR 
THE GOOD OF YOUR COMMUNITY, YOUR CHILDREN, AND YOURSELF.”203 
But the levy still failed for the sixth time. This time, it narrowly lost, garnering 49 percent 
of the vote.204 Its near success did not stop name-calling and recriminations from dominating the 
local news for the next several weeks, however. The president of the board of education, Dr. Earl 
H. Young, took to the pages of the Vindicator to call the local Steelworkers head, James Griffin, 
“Mr. Big” and blame him for the levy’s defeat.205 Griffin and other union leaders, in turn, 
responded that the board was anxious to “find scapegoats among ethnic, religious, and labor 
groups,” saying that the board had only itself to blame, while the YFT published an open letter 
calling for Young’s resignation.206 The Vindicator editorialized that “when the school is debated, 
it seems to be easy to pass out the blame…. James Griffin, United Steelworkers district director, 
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is blamed. Catholics are blamed. The school board is blamed. School administrators are blamed.” 
But, the paper’s editorial board argued, “hundreds and hundreds” of union members and 
Catholics “voted their own convictions, and no one else’s,” meaning that ultimately “voters 
make the decisions…not labor leaders or anyone else.”207 Regardless of who was to blame, the 
sixth defeat produced one unmistakable fact: the schools closed.  
The closing brought with it a degree of national attention that undoubtedly surprised 
Youngstown’s leaders and its citizens. National coverage of the Youngstown levy defeats before 
the closings came mostly in the form of wire-service articles. Now print and television reporters 
from across the country descended on Youngstown for a first-hand view of the crisis. The 
closing made Youngstown the butt of jokes and the object of finger-wagging scorn, confusion, 
and pity even before Laugh-In poked fun at the city. National news agencies, all three national 
television networks, and reporters from newspapers across the county often treated the city as 
little more than a bizarre spectacle.208 Many journalists noted the human effects of the school 
closing. “Mrs. Jack W. Sullivan has three school-aged boys who are not in school,” read an 
Associated Press article. “They are home underfoot, watching television and fighting boredom.” 
Not surprisingly, Mrs. Sullivan was not thrilled with her new company. “You just can’t teach 
them at home,” she complained. “When they first got home, they thought the school closing 
would be just one big blast. Now they’re bored to death. I just hope other parents are as tired of 
their children as I’m tired of mine, and they are tired of me.” 209 The school closings presented 
other problems for the city. It “dumped more than 13,000 bodies into the city’s labor 
market…[creating] a sudden, fierce competition for full- and part-time jobs…in a town where 
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there are already layoffs at some mills and strikes at other.” Many teachers found work, but 
students did not. Local churches and civic organizations created youth programs, local 
businesses offered tours, and two local movie theaters offered two free movies a week to the 
displaced students. While the closing disappointed some students, one high school senior noted 
that many of his friends viewed it as “just a long vacation.” 210 
When interviewed, local leaders seemed unable to make the city’s shameful crisis 
understandable to outsider. Instead, they offered diverse and sometimes conflicting accounts of 
how the city reached this point. National reporters solved the problem by offering a litany of 
potential causes. Oddly, though, taxes themselves – and pocketbook economic matters, generally 
– were relegated to the second-tier of explanations. Some speculated that levy defeats were 
sparked by a white “backlash” against funding schools and, especially, welfare payments for 
African Americans. They worried, in other words, that the same people voting against the levies 
were the people supporting George Wallace, who had made a controversy-filled campaign stop 
in Youngstown, in the Democratic Primary.211 Others believed that the city’s poor and working-
class residents – perhaps even including, or especially, black ones – either did not value 
education or were expressing some type of anger against the schools or local government by 
defeating the levies. Regardless, all observers wondered why voters had, seemingly irrationally, 
spited their own schools. In an interview with NBC’s Del Donahoo, Superintendent Zinser 
speculated that “white ethnic groups” were to blame for the levy defeats.212 Likewise, he told the 
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Pittsburgh Post-Gazette that the levies were failing because white ethnics were refusing “to 
spend any money for other minority groups.” 213 Paradoxically, however, local black leaders 
worried that the city’s African American voters were the ones who were failing to support the 
levy. Rumors circulated that some African Americans in the city were voting against the levy en 
masse, perhaps as a form of social protest at the ballot box.214 In response Reverend Lonnie A. 
Simon, the Vice Chairman of the School Levy Campaign, had published a letter in the 
Vindicator before the sixth vote urging the city’s African Americans to vote for the levy. 
Likewise, the city’s black newspaper, the Buckeye Review, had published two pro-levy editorials, 
on of which argued, “Negroes without question should vote for the school levy…. We say that 
because Negroes are poor. And the poor are the ones who are in greatest need of public 
schools…. Youngstown Negroes should not cut off their nose to spite their face by ignoring the 
school levy.”215 No one, it seemed, had a clear idea what was happening.  
The few observers who came to the conclusion that taxes were the root cause of the “tax 
revolt” came to it slowly and tentatively. The NBC correspondent covering the Youngstown 
crisis explained in one segment that “there is a theory the defeat of many school levies lately 
represents more than just opposition to school financing, that the schools are being used as 
whipping boys in a general protest against all forms of taxation.”216 Yet, even that conclusion 
contained its own vagaries. Assuming voters were upset about taxes themselves, it was still not 
clear why they were angry about taxes. Some conservatives claimed, for example, that voters 
opposed the levies because they were in revolt against coddled public-sector workers. For 
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example, the New York Times placed all the blame for Youngstown’s school closing on the 
teachers in a lengthy front-page story. In it, reporter Anthony Ripley wrote that the teachers used 
a “reverse strike” – “a new shock tactic” that “has been widely used by affiliates of the Ohio 
Education Association” – to force the school’s closings, which the union would scare voters into 
approving tax hikes.217 The conservative National Review likewise gleefully predicted that 
Youngstown represented the “new mood” – an increasingly “conservative mood” – of voters 
when it came to taxes.218  
One theory rarely voiced throughout the early defeats was that voters were expressing 
distaste with regressive taxes, in particular – a development that could be a boon to the left. The 
approval of the safety services’ income tax had already given a hint that the distribution of the 
tax burden, not all taxes, was the subject of voters’ ire. Regardless, such debate and speculation 
was common in the face of levy defeats. Without a comprehensive study, however, it was 
difficult for local officials to know exactly what voters were thinking when they cast their ballot 
against the levy. The city would eventually have such a study, but not until after the levy crisis 
was already over. Even before the study, however, Youngstown voters never shied away from 
explaining the relationship between taxes and their votes on school finance referenda. Nearly 
every levy opponent who voiced his or her views in letters to the Vindicator called attention to 
taxes and the cost of living. One explained how “a great number of [Youngstown] taxpayers are 
presently living (or existing) on fixed incomes, pensions, Social Security, low wages, or even 
unemployment.” Low-income residents “are unable to bear this additional burden no matter how 
good the cause may be.” Asking cash-strapped Youngstowners to support the cash-strapped 
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schools, the writer concluded, is “like robbing Peter to pay Paul.” 219 One man wrote to the 
Vindicator days before the third levy vote complaining, “I work four days a week [a common 
occurrence for steelworkers], and I can’t afford to pay more taxes.”220 Many letter writers, in 
fact, made distribution-based fairness arguments. “We must have education for our 
children…but it its not necessarily so that it must be borne on such an unequitable basis,” one 
resident wrote. “[L]awmakers must change our present laws…[to place the tax burden] where it 
rightfully belongs – [a] tax on income according to ability to pay.” 221 Another argued: “It has 
been stated many times that the lawmakers must change our present laws if the burden is to be 
relieved from the taxpayers and placed where it rightfully belongs – tax on income according to 
ability to pay…. Failure of this levy should help to wake up the lawmakers to the injustices as 
they now exist.”222 
Late in the levy crisis, some local officials, levy advocates, and media outlets would also 
come to the conclusion that the distribution of the tax burden and the perceived fairness of the 
tax system were to blame for the levy defeats. One pro-levy speaker in city’s seventh ward – 
which Zinser and other claimed was the center of the white backlash in the city – pleaded with 
residents not to “sacrifice the schools in our disgust with the taxation system.”223 In public 
statements, school board member Abe Harshman concluded that “many people are revolting 
against taxes in general and against specific taxes in particular.” Specifically, he said, 
Youngstowners felt “that the 12-mill levy was a regressive and unfair tax.” 224 Its “unfair burden” 
hurt retired, disabled, and other low-income Youngstown residents, in particular. Even the 
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supposed aristocracy of Youngstown’s blue-collar labor force, the steelworkers, felt “a sense of 
insecurity” that the property tax exacerbated, Harshman argued, because many could not count 
on steady five-day work weeks.225 Similarly, even as it endorsed Youngstown’s levy, the 
Chesterson Club, a Catholic lay group, “strongly recommend[ed] to all who are working for 
passage of the levy to expend equal energy and attention to redress the inequities of the present 
system of taxation with an end toward affording relief for those on retirement, Social Security, or 
other fixed limited income” – a recommendation that underscored the link between the levies and 
the injustices of the entire tax system in the minds of many Youngstowners.226 Late in the levy 
crisis, the Buckeye Review also began arguing that voters were defeating the levies for clear-cut 
pocketbook reasons. “The defeat was caused…by the attitude of the public against taxes in 
general, and more specifically a rebellion against property taxes,” as the paper put it in one 
editorial. “Property owners feel that the 12 mill levy would be paid by them only, while other 
would be exempted from the tax.” 227 In another article, the Review called the “already heavy 
financial burden” on homeowners the “principal reason” for the levy failures. Specifically, the 
Buckeye Review faulted the property tax for falling on those who “can least afford to pay extra 
taxes.” The paper noted that many Youngstowners argued, “and probably justly so, that the tax 
should be more equitable and in some other form – a sales tax or income tax.”228  Despite these 
inequities, the Review hoped voters would approve the levy “even though the property tax may 
seem inequitable.”229 However, the paper noted that, even if Youngstown passed its levy, the 
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“taxpayers’ revolt” would not be stopped. “The man in the middle is really feeling the bind,” the 
Buckeye Review concluded.230  
Now the word “revolt” was in regular use when describing the situation in Youngstown, 
and local officials wanted to end it more than ever. Following the sixth defeat, Vindicator’s 
political editor Clingan Jackson wrote only that “the politically-minded are getting more and 
more cautious as some evidence develops of a taxpayers’ revolt.” The only wonder was why 
Jackson believed that six defeats constituted only “some evidence” of a tax revolt. 231 
Nonetheless, the city’s leaders were determined to end Youngstown’s tax revolt at six defeats. 
Pro-levy messages flooded the city like never before in the run-up to the seventh vote. Local 
media put aside any pretense of objectivity and aggressively supported the levy, while 
advertisements and a variety of door-to-door campaigns ensured that no Youngstown resident 
could miss the upcoming vote. The idea that gave the campaign shape came from two senior 
girls at Chaney High School. They proposed something called “Operation Armband” to drum up 
sympathy for the levy. Organized with the full support of Cheney’s administration, Nancy 
Cossler and Marianne Rubbo received 6,000 yards of red ribbon donated from a local department 
store, McKelvey’s, to create armbands for all 7,000 of the city’s high-school students. In their 
letter to principals of the city’s six high schools – partially reprinted in the Vindicator – Cossler 
and Rubbo wrote that the red armband “symbolizes our appeal, as students, to the heart of the 
community…. [It] is not a negative symbol of dissent or protest. It is rather a positive symbol of 
hope.”232  
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What began as a heartfelt, emotional appeal by two motivated high school girls quickly 
morphed into an expensive media campaign in the hands of city leaders eager to publicize a 
genuine grassroots appeal after so many failed top-down strategies failed. Reporting on the 
newly professionalized efforts, the Vindicator predicted, “Youngstown is really going to be 
painted RED in the coming few weeks.” It explained how “the red armband theme launched last 
week by high school students themselves is being adopted as the official theme of the levy 
campaign with the permission of the young originators.” 233  School board president Abe 
Harshman served as the coordinator for a coalition of affiliated “red ribbon committees.” The 
committee met at the YMCA with school administrators, board members, students, and business 
and government leaders to plan the armband campaign. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube’s “advertising men” pledged their expertise and the 
company’s resources in making the armband campaign successful. They told the community 
leaders gathered at the YMCA that the girls’ appeal “makes great copy.” Even though the 
armband campaign was less than a week old, the ad men had already produced mock-ups of 
large “Join the Arm Band” advertisements, along with smaller “mats” for individual merchants 
to incorporate them into their own ads. They also outlined a plan for 20 armband-themed 
billboards throughout the city and widespread radio and television interviews with pro-levy 
students. Finally, the ad men asked the students in attendance to ensure that all of the city’s 
students wore the armbands from April 16 through the May 6 levy vote.234   
The YS&T-backed ad campaign would be just the beginning. Cossler planned for 
students to distribute pro-levy literature throughout the city with the aid of student service 
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organizations and for employed students to wear their armbands at work.235 The Youngstown 
PTA planned to distribute bumper stickers and literature. The NAACP had begun planning a 
giant door-to-door and telephone campaign in support of the levy even before the school board 
decided on a date for the seventh vote. The organization met with Zinser to go over their plan, 
which included gathering “mostly housewives, assisted by high school seniors and juniors” for 
the phone bank and other 150 volunteers  “to conduct a door-to-door canvass on behalf of the 
levy and plead for citizen support.”236 A ministerial group planned studies of local referenda in 
other cities to look for lessons that could be applied to Youngstown’s campaign.237 With 
Harshman already the coordinator of the armband campaign, the PTA’s Benjamin Donahue was 
named chairman, and Chamber of Commerce’s George Fried was named treasurer.238 A church 
coalition planed – as Revered Richard Braun put it – “to get off its knees and start knocking on 
doors.” 239 Clarence Barnes of the Urban League instructed critics to put aside issues of racial 
discrimination in the city’s school and fight for the levy, saying that black leaders “recognize that 
we must fight one battle at a time and the present one is to pass the levy.”240 
The overarching goal of the armband campaign became creating the image that the levy 
had vast popular support. With the support of Zinser, Harshman, and other levy leaders, the PTA 
and the NAACP also planned “a giant sign-up campaign,” where volunteers from the two 
organizations would “canvass every home asking for signers, whose names will be printed in 
advertisements backing the levy.” PTA mothers also manned distribution centers every day from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 Ann Przelomski, “Rival Parties Join Giant Levy Campaign – City Uniting Behind Schools,” Youngstown 
Vindicator, April 13, 1969. 
236 “NAACP Plans Campaign for Next School Levy,” Youngstown Vindicator, January 24, 1969; “NAACP To Push 
School Levy,” Buckeye Review, January 31, 1969. 
237 Ann Przelomski, “Rival Parties Join Giant Levy Campaign – City Uniting Behind Schools,” Youngstown 
Vindicator, April 13, 1969. 
238 Ann Przelomski, “Rival Parties Join Giant Levy Campaign – City Uniting Behind Schools,” Youngstown 
Vindicator, April 13, 1969. 
239 Ann Przelomski, “Levy Canvass Opens Friday,” Youngstown Vindicator, April 17, 1969. 






April 18 through the levy vote so that interested residents could pick up armbands, literature, and 
other materials at their leisure.241 Local Democratic Party leaders passed out circulars endorsing 
the levy, and Republican 3rd Ward Councilman Emanuel Catsoules pledged similar action from 
his party, saying, “This matter is beyond politics. It is a matter of life and death.”242  
The pro-levy campaign’s biggest asset remained the city’s students. Student coordinators 
dubbed the 16th a “RED LETTER DAY” to kick-off the campaign, and the Vindicator noted 
sunnily that “if Youngstown is painted RED in the next few weeks, everyone will know it’s to 
represent courage of convictions about the needs of the school and a bright hope for passage of 
the levy.”243 The day before the “red letter day” saw a flurry of activity. The “grass roots 
committee” briefed reporters in a morning press conference at the board of education building.244 
Schools throughout the city dismissed students a half-hour early so teachers and school staff 
could attend a pro-levy rally headed by Harshman and Zinser. At the rally, the two school leaders 
asked for teachers’ enthusiastic support, and a YEA representative asked school employees to 
allow their names to be published on pro-levy petitions. The YS&T ad specialists also shared 
their campaign slogan – “27,000 Youngstown students ask you to keep our schools open. Please 
Join the Arm Band” – which they planned to plaster on newspaper, radio, and television ads, as 
well as on signs in buses, taxis, trucks, and store windows, all in addition to strategically placed 
billboards, whose numbers had been upped to 42 from 20.245 
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Levy campaign leaders also took pains to answer critics’ complaints this time around. 
The same day as school employees’ rally, the PTA president held a meeting at a local restaurant 
to inform business, labor, civic, and political leaders, as well as 100 interested citizens, about the 
door-to-door signature campaign and plans to distribute literature and stickers in conjunction 
with the NAACP. Harshman and Ray Horn, the coordinator of the signature drive, encouraged 
the canvassers to answer citizens’ questions or complaints about the levy and to take the names 
and addresses of concerned citizens whose queries they could not answer so that the board could 
contact them later. “We’re trying most to reach the 10 to 15 percent who didn’t vote on previous 
tries,” Horn told the crowd. 246  The PTA planned to distribute a “fact sheet detailing 
Youngstown’s school tax rate compared with surrounding communities and other big Ohio 
cities…and an explanation of how the householders can figure rapidly just how much the 12 
mills will raise his taxes,” which was just over $55 per year on an $11,000 house according to 
the sheet.247  
The armband campaign quickly became ubiquitous throughout the city. Eye-catching 
YS&T-designed ads ran in the Vindicator almost every day in the weeks leading up to the levy 
and also appeared with regularity in the Buckeye Review and other smaller publications. The ads 
implored “27,000 YOUNGSTOWN STUDENTS ASK YOU TO KEEK OUR SCHOOLS 
OPEN…PLEASE.” Below that message, the ad read “*Join the Arm Band* VOTE FOR THE 
SCHOOL LEVY MAY 6th.” An image of an interracial group of boys and girls smiling and 
talking filled bottom of the ad.248 Another version instructed Youngstowners to “FOLLOW THE 
*ARM BAND TO THE POLLS ON MAY 6th…VOTE FOR THE SCHOOL LEVY.” The text 
explained, “Your ‘Yes’ vote keeps our schools open/gives our young people a chance/maintains 
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your property values/insures continued business development (this means jobs) and provides 
your family with a secure future here,” before concluded with the question “Wouldn’t your 
parents have done as much for you?” and the same image of smiling interracial students.249 The 
Armband Committee took out yet another ad featuring the signatures of hundreds of the city’s 
teachers stating, “FROM THESE YOUNGSTOWN TEACHERS TO ALL THE 
YOUNGSTOWN VOTERS. WE DO OUR THING. WE TEACH. DO YOUR THING. JOIN 
THE ARM BAND. VOTE FOR THE SCHOOL LEVY MAY 6th.”250  
The “arm band” campaign seemed to bring with it a degree of positivity and enthusiasm 
that surpassed previous campaigns and overshadowed the harsh words for the city in the news 
coverage that accompanied the closing. The Vindicator reported that “help is coming from all 
corners of the city, from people at the grass roots and of different political persuasions as they set 
aside their difference and concentrate on keeping the doors open for the city’s 27,00 public 
school children.”251 Unlike sunny predictions of unity in the past, this time it seemed close to the 
truth. With this campaign, it seemed, no segment of Youngstown’s population wanted receive 
blame if the levy failed again. Superintendent Zinser met personally with the executive 
committees of the county Democrats and Republicans to secure their unqualified 
endorsements.252 The issue was especially sensitive for Republicans, who Mayor Flask had 
chastised for only allegedly only tepidly supporting previous levy campaigns. In response, 
Republican county chairman Elton W. Luckhart gave the levy his party’s formal endorsement at 
a city council meeting. Luckhart told the council, “A city can withstand many trials and many 
shortcomings, but it cannot stand without education for all its children…[and] cannot stand for 
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the defeat of another levy…. Passage of the levy at this time is more important than the 
nomination and election of any candidate.” Luckhart pledged to take out an advertisement in the 
Vindicator expressing his party’s support of the levy and noted that Nancy Cossler, one of the 
two high school girls behind the “Arm Band” campaign, was his niece.253 With both parties 
committed to unity on the levy, Luckhart and the Democratic county chairman made a joint 
appearance endorsing the levy for news reporters and television cameras. They posed with an 
interracial group of students holding “Join the Arm Band Vote for the School Levy May 6” 
signs.254 
In the most significant shift for the seventh levy campaign, the Greater Youngstown Area 
AFL-CIO announced at an April 21st meeting that instead of holding locals to neutrality, it was 
now giving each a “a free hand” to endorse and campaign for the levy. According to one 
account, some locals had forced the executive board’s hand by endorsing the levy despite the 
neutrality stance. Faced with the prospect it would be blamed again if the levy lost, the board 
decided to change its position.  “Labor is bigger than the school board,” one district AFL-CIO 
representative explained. “Even after a slap in the face from the board, we are willing to let the 
locals decide for themselves.” Even an AFT leader now argued that, in spite of “lost battles” with 
the board, “the future of education…comes before the principles of a minority organization.” 255 
For his part, AFL-CIO president Al Shipka reiterated his support of neutrality, but agreed to let 
the locals “act as you want.”256  
Freeing locals to endorse the levy marked a second phase in labor’s attempt to remove 
the cloud of doubt and blame that had hung over Youngstown’s unions since the levy failures 
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began. Defending labor’s past neutrality, Shipka explained that the city’s board of education had 
long been “dominated by the Chamber of Commerce and Mahoning Valley Industrial Institute, a 
group of manufacturers.” The board let the chamber distribute pro-business teaching materials 
and allowed for “no recognition in the curriculum of labor’s role in society.” The recent election 
of three more labor-friendly board members represented progress for unions. But business still 
held the balance on the seven-member board. Shikpa and other labor leaders saw the YEA-YFT 
skirmish as the latest in a long-line of battles between city government, business, and the unions 
where organized labor ended up getting the short end of the stick.257  
Despite lingering conflict between the school board and Youngstown’s unions, locals 
quickly came out in favor of the levy. The 1,200-member Northeastern Ohio Public Employees 
District Council No. 18 argued that the necessity of the levy “for the moment exceeds any 
temporary labor differences.” 258 The largest United Steelworkers local in Mahoning County 
came out in favor of the levy, at least partly because of labor’s shifting relationship with the 
board of education. “Labor endorsed and helped elected two outstanding members of the 
Youngstown Board of Education and therefore has an obligation to support them when they 
appeal for desperately needed money to operate our school system,” USW Local 1418 president 
Jack Kaminksy said, noting that he went out of his way to speak in favor of the levy in his 
neighborhood and on the job at YS&T’s Campbell Works.259 Calling education “the best 
guarantee we have for the future of our children, of ourselves, and the city of Youngstown, the 
Fraternal Order of Police endorsed the levy, as it had in the past, since the FOP had no formal 
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affiliation with the AFL-CIO.260 The Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 87 and its auxiliary 
endorsed the levy, too.261 
Some unions went even further, creating their won advertisements and publicity for the 
levy. The Teamsters Local 377 endorsed the levy, because, as the union’s secretary-treasurer put 
it, “kids [must] be able to compete for jobs when they become men and women.” Somewhat 
puzzlingly, the Teamsters’ pro-levy ad featured a drawing of a waving, smiling police officer 
standing behind smiling children.262 Operating Engineers Local 66 endorsed the levy and took 
out a personal ad in support.263 George Phillips, president of a 300-person public employees local 
that endorsed the levy, even posed for a photo opportunity at Roosevelt School, attaching 
armbands to the custodians in the boiler room – an image which the Vindicator fittingly 
captioned “Putting the Heat On.”264 The president of the Builders Association of Mahoning 
County and the chairman of the local AFL-CIO Building Trades Council created a photo 
opportunity in the support of the levy, too. Standing in front of a cement mixer with a “Join the 
Arm Band” banner, they presented a $10,000 check to help finance the pro-levy campaign to the 
PTA president. Not missing yet another opportunity for a pun, the Vindicator reported that the 
mixer “was a ‘concrete’ expression of the support of the construction industry for the 12-mill 
school operating levy.” The union’s donation “would fill the concrete mixer with 10,000 $1 
bills.” Keeping with the theme, the construction group also promised to send out pro-levy 
mailings to 10,000 Youngstowners.265 
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Not all unions jumped at the chance to support the levy. But even these reluctant unions 
failed to dampen the campaign’s sprits. Often, when a local voted to stay neutral, its leader 
would endorse the levy personally. Irwin L. Ferencak, of Steelworkers Local 1331, reported that 
his local had voted to remain neutral, but he told the Vindicator that personally endorsed the 
levy. “Today we are in a position where we have no choice,” he explained. “It’s close the schools 
or pass the 12 mills.”266 James “Zip” Sutherland, President of Laborers International Union 
Local 125 – and one of the city’s only African American labor leaders – endorsed the levy, too. 
He called the levy “Youngstown’s greatest need today,” noting that he had personally supported 
every school levy. “In today’s world, [students] need a lot more opportunities [than in the past] 
even though the cost is greater.”267 Steelworkers Local 7300 also officially stayed neutral, but its 
president endorsed the levy, too.268 
Religious leaders from around the city also touted the “Arm Band” campaign. The 
Youngstown Area Council of Churches dedicated the first two pages of the April 25th issue of its 
newsletter, Good News, to reasons why the levy should be passed. Editor Reverend Norman Parr 
explained that “Protestants, Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Jewish representatives got 
together…to shed some light on a great deal of information.”269 The American-Hungarian 
Federation of Churches and Societies endorsed the levy.270 Reverend Homer J.R. Elford warned, 
“A city which does not make adequate provision for the education of its children and youth of 
the community will, before long, be a dead city,”271 The Board of Rabbis of Greater Youngstown 
also threw its support behind the levy calling “quality education…the safeguard of America’s 
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freedom and tranquility” and necessary “to keep pace with the needs of business and industry 
[and] to prepare our children adequately for acceptance into colleges and universities.”272 The 
rabbis were joined by the local B’nai B’rith and National Council of Jewish women chapters.273 
Not missing the chance for another targeted ad, the Arm Band Committee ran a full-page ad with 
the names of dozens of local religious leaders. It asked, “YOUNGSTOWN’S CLERGY HAVE 
JOING THE *Arm Band, HAVE YOU? JOIN ON MAY 6th BY VOTING ‘YES’ FOR THE 
SCHOOL LEVY.”274 
Local businesses and professional organizations also enthusiastically joined the “Arm 
Band” campaign. Nearly every store and restaurant in the city placed “Join the Arm Band” 
placards in their windows. Many retailers, companies, and business associations put pro-levy 
messages in their own advertisements. Sav-Mor placed the message “Youngstown Schools Need 
Your Support…Deserve Your Support, Join the Arm Band, Vote for the School Levy May 6” in 
their ads advertising discount concrete mix and men’s dungarees.275 The West Side Merchants 
and Civic Association took out an ad asking Youngstowners to “Vote Yes For Schools…For a 
Progressive Youngstown…For the School Levy.”276 A local Volkswagen even dealer bought his 
own “Join the Arm Band” ad. 277  Endorsements rolled in from Mahoning County Bar 
Association, Mahoning County Medical Society, Mahoning County Society of Professional 
Engineers, Corydon Palmer Dental Society, Mahoning Valley Podiatry Society, the local chapter 
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of the Ohio Osteopathic Association, Youngstown Club of Negro Business and Professional 
Women, and the Downtown Board of Trade, among other business groups.278 
Business groups took divergent routes to persuade voters to approve the levy. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube took a positive approach. “The very survival of basic industry here 
begins on making Youngstown a desirable area which attracts new families and commercial 
enterprise,” YS&T president Robert E. Williams said. “A faltering school system makes it 
difficult…to keep property values up, as well as maintain a capable labor force.”279 The Arm 
Band Committee also took out a full page ad emblazoned with YS&T’s iconic logo and the text 
“THE YOUNGSTOWN SHEET AND TUBE COMPANY supports the School Levy because 
the future of our city…our employees and our industry depends on it. *Join the Arm Band, keep 
Youngstown’s schools open.”280 In contrast to the positive, altruistic themes of the “Arm Band” 
campaign, many business groups appealed to Youngstown homeowners’ self-interest. Once 
again, the Youngstown Area Board of Realtors pitched the levy as a necessary investment to 
protect property values – a matter in which the realtors clearly had a professional stake. This 
campaign, the realtors mounted their own door-to-door campaign. They YABR printed up 
50,000 flyers, which were brought to distribution centers at dozens of schools throughout the city 
where realtors and volunteers picked up stacks to take door-to-door. The blunt leaflets read: “IF 
YOU HAD TO SELL YOUR HOUSE TOMORROW? DON’T PAINT IT. DON’T FIX IT UP. 
DON’T CUT THE GRASS. IT WON’T BE WORTH ANTHING WITHOUT SCHOOLS. 
VOTE FOR THE SCHOOL LEVY.”281  
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The YABR also publicized its own study, which purported to show that another levy 
failure would decimate home values in Youngstown. In a “random survey of 402 sales their real 
estate offices,” two of the board’s past presidents found “that 80 percent of buyers of residential 
real estate are interested in homes for children and rearing a family.” Their report asked: “What 
would happen to the market if 80 percent of the buyers were eliminated because of lack of 
schools?” The study claimed that home values in Youngstown were down 20 percent compared 
to surrounding suburbs because of the failure of the six previous levies. “Neither of us has 
children in local schools, yet we pay city taxes because we believe in Youngstown [and] we 
support the school levy and urge the passage to protect our investment in property,” the two 
realtors said their statement. The levy – like buying insurance and keeping up repairs on one’s 
home – “costs money, yet we do it for selfish reasons and for pride in ownership.” Taxes, the 
two argued, provide services that ensure “the stability of the area and solidifies our property 
value.” The levy came down to “a safeguard to our investment…. None of us can afford to give 
away value in our property…. The way to stop this future loss is to buy our insurance now in the 
form of approving the school levy.”282 Current YABR president, William C. D’Amica put it even 
more starkly, “If the school levy fails…the present homeowner will face a serious decrease in the 
value of his home if, in fact, the property can be sold at all.”283 In a separate statement, the 
president of the Downtown Board of Trade framed the same problem from a business viewpoint. 
Levy failures, he argued, “have created an alarming trend of outward movement from the 
city…weaken[ing] the city’s tax base and threaten[ing] to increase the ultimate tax burden for 
those remaining.”284 Youngstowners, it seemed, could not avoid paying more, one way or 
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another. Either they paid more in taxes by approving the levy, or the lost money in the form of 
declining home values and increased assessments. 
If the pocketbook fears were not enough, some levy proponents tied its passage to public 
safety. Ohio Attorney General Paul W. Brown linked faulty education to unrest on campuses and 
the “drug problem.” Introduced by former mayor and levy committee chairman Charles 
Henderson, Brown – a Clevelander who had previously practiced law in Youngstown – told a 
crowd of more than 500 that he had resigned from the Ohio Supreme Court to accept Republican 
Governor Jim Rhodes’s offer to become the state attorney general because he was disturbed by 
the unrest of 1960s and the issues facing the country, including high taxes. But in spite of his 
concern with rising taxes and government spending, he urged Youngstowners to support the 
city’s schools. “We can afford it, and we have to do it,” he said. “Hard core unemployment and 
rising crime…are more ominous than dangers from abroad,” Brown noted ominously. “We 
won’t have a future if we can’t educate our children.”285 Echoing Brown’s claims, the local 
chapter of the Ohio Association of Social Workers endorsed the levy, because “many of the 
social problems of family and individuals are related to the lack of a sound educational 
background.”286 Despite its commitment to positivity, the “Arm Band” committee itself indulged 
in doom-and-gloom appeals to voters, too, when it reprinted an with a photo of an impoverished 
white family in a dimly lit room that blamed “the roots of poverty” on “cheap education.”287 
With lingering concerns about insufficient black support for the levy, the Buckeye Review 
enthusiastically pushed the levy in the final month before the election. The official “Arm Band” 
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committee ran its standard full-page ad in the Buckeye Review. 288 But the most eye-catching pro-
levy ads in the Review came from the “The Committee Concerned for Children,” whose 
secretary was Dr. B.B. Burrowes, a Jamaica-born, Howard University-educated physician, who 
also happened to edit the Review.289 Like the “Arm Band” committee’s ads, the CCFC’s ads 
featured interracial group of students around a long table. The text read “VOTE VOTE, PLEA 
OF THE CHILDREN, PLEASE DON’T STOP THE PROGRAM OF OUR COMMUNITY, 
VOTE FOR The School Levy, VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE.”290 Another version concluded 
“Don’t Let Our Children or Our Schools Deteriorate, Cast Your Ballot in Favor of the School 
Levy.”291 Yet a third version featured a black music teacher directing a neatly dressed girls-and-
boys choir and the same message as the others.292 If the CCFC and “Arm Band” committee’s ads 
were not enough, the Review also funded its own “Arm Band” ads, as well as smaller ads that 
asked, “If the schools have to close who loses, the Board of Education or the school children? 
Vote for the school levy.”293  
While the Review worked on shoring up black support for the levy, white community 
leaders made extra efforts to reach out to the working-class white ethnics’ many blamed for the 
levy defeats. Levy supporters focused specifically on the largely foreign-board white seventh 
ward, which Zinser had repeatedly singled-out for criticism.  Harshman and Zinser recruited 
several prominent ward residents – including the city council president, a judge, the county 
auditor, and a court clerk – to appear at a pro-levy rally at a school in the district and asked a 
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local eight grader to serve as “master of ceremonies.” Echoing the realtors’ arguments, speakers 
advised the seventh ward’s oppositional residents that property values would plummet and taxes 
would actually go up if the levy lost, since business and industry would leave the city.294 Despite 
these appeals, outside events seemed to conspire against the levy if the main opposition was, in 
fact, coming from a white backlash.  
Only a few weeks before the seventh levy vote, the Youngstown Welfare Rights 
Organization revived its protests. Unlike the October 1968 sit-in, which received only brief 
coverage from the Vindicator, the April 1969 protests received extensive coverage in local 
media. In many cases, reporters described the protests and protestors using unmistakably racial 
terms. The Vindicator played up the drama in “sometimes stormy” meeting between the WRO 
and the county commissioners. Welfare activists asked the commissioners to increase the 
county’s payments, which sat at only 80 percent of the 1959 standard.295 With commissioners 
divided on the issue of even exploring use the use county “permissive” taxes to finance increased 
welfare payments, the meeting descended into a “storm of words and gestures of disgust” that 
resulted in “WRO people stalk[ing] out” and “the commissioners walk[ing] out.”296 Less than 
two weeks later, WRO protestors staged a sit-in at the Mahoning county jail and office building. 
The peaceful overnight sit-in eventually resulted in 23 arrests. It made the Vindicator’s front 
page, accompanied by several images depicting frazzled county administrators, a protester with a 
young child asleep on her lap, and a browline glasses-wearing Reverend Douglas Shamburger 
jutting his index finger forward to emphasize a point to the crowd. For a day at least, the 
importance of the levy fell, as the Vindicator devoted several articles and spread dozens photos 
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over multiple pages to document the peaceful, if contentious, sit-in. The paper’s coverage 
vacillated between portraying the protestors as disrespectful, cigarette-smoking rabble-rousers 
and harmless annoyances that did not need to be taken seriously. One article explained how 
“shouted, clapped hands, argued and threatened public officials” during commissioners’ 
Monday-afternoon meeting.297 But another made light of the events, focusing more on what the 
protestors ate during their overnight stay than what they asked of the commissioners. 298 
Reiterating demands from the October protest, WRO activists asked the commissioners to 
increase benefits. The protestors circulated a “position paper” questioning the use of two million 
dollars of welfare funds over three years, which they claimed the commissioners could not 
account for and indicated that they would lessen their benefit demands to 91 percent of the 1966 
welfare standard, which would mean an additional $40 per month for most recipients.299 Insisting 
that they could not promise any increase in welfare payments, the commissioners left the room, 
but not before passing resolutions putting Mahoning County Sheriff Ray T. Davis in charge and 
asking him to clear the room and the arrest protestors. But rather than remove the protestors 
immediately, Davis allowed them to continue their sit-in and negotiations with the 
commissioners by personally relaying messaged between the protestors and the commissions, 
who were now safely ensconced in their offices. The sheriff also stationed guards around the 
building, informing the protestors of their presence and explaining that noting that the guard’s 
records of the protest would ensure that “no one can accuse you or taking anything or damaging 
anything.” Davis told the protestors that they could stay overnight, but that some of those who 
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chose to stay would need to be arrested in the morning for trespassing. Some protestors chose to 
leave, but many stayed throughout the night.300 
The spectacle of this almost wholly African American crowd staying after hours in the 
county building seemed to fascinate Vindicator reporters. The paper noted how protestors sang 
“We Shall Overcome” and spirituals with altered lyrics to reflect their cause. At night, Davis 
allowed protest leaders to leave the building to gather blankets and food for the rest of the 
protestors. Noting in a headline that “chicken is ‘sit-in’ menu,” the paper told readers in the first 
paragraph that “the county commissioners’ conference rooms deteriorated into a confusion of 
orange peels, chicken bones, wax paper, and sleepy children late Monday night.” Young children 
“lay on the floor, intent on crayons and coloring books…. [while] some of the older children 
frugged to lively radio music [and] adults sat playing cards.” 301  Throughout the evening “the 
soft drink machine in the hall got considerable workout from the children.”302 The Vindicator 
also reported with interest on the “lone white mother” among the protestors. A fiery character, 
she loudly told some of the men in the group to “get off your fat [expletive] and bring these 
children some blankets.” When asked by the Vindicator how she felt being the only white mother 
there, she told the reporter that she “was not embarrassed because she considered this matter 
economic, not racial [and that] there are many other white women in a similar plight.” 303 
The chairman of the Youngstown Urban League, Clarence Barnes, chided reporters for 
their focus on trivial issues related to the protest. “You shouldn’t be talking to us,” he said. “You 
should be talking to the commissioners. Tell the public how they’re misusing public welfare 
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funds.”304 The WRO protestors understood the risks of such bold protest measures. “Such actions 
as these may be regrettable but they are necessary to dramatize the plight of these people for the 
public,” Reverend Reginald Dockens explained to the Vindicator. One mother told the paper, “If 
they take me to jail, they [are] going to have to take my kids, too.” She simply could not support 
her children on $110 a month. “By the time I pay rent and my utilities, there’s just no money left 
for groceries.” 305 The protestors greeted workers arriving early Monday morning with “singing 
and clapping.” By 9:00 a.m., the commissioners began discussing legal action to force the sheriff 
to begin making arrests. In response, Davis, his deputies, and several city police officers 
peacefully arrested 23 protestors, including several local pastors and reverends. Davis walked the 
arrested protestors a few blocks to the courthouse, where they pleaded innocent to charges of 
trespassing and were released on their own recognizance before noon.306 
The welfare protests undoubtedly captured the Youngstown public’s attention. The 
Buckeye Review reported that “much of the white community appeared to be shocked over the 
welfare protests” and described how “persons who telephoned the various ‘talk’ radio programs 
[to discuss the protests] expressed everything from concern to outfight racial bigotry.”307 While 
some whites undoubtedly supported the protest – as the efforts of Al Shipka and some white 
community and religious leaders showed – the tone of media coverage of the events seemed 
unlikely to garner support among those not already inclined to look favorably on welfare 
recipients. Simply put, if working- and middle-class whites’ voted against taxes because of rising 
race-based anti-welfare sentiment, as many pundits suggested, then the WRO protests were 
serious setbacks for pro-levy efforts. 
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Levy supporters could only hope that the “Arm Band” blitz of the final weeks would 
overwhelm controversies like the welfare protest. The Vindicator dubbed Tuesday May 6th the 
schools’ “D-Day” for a fourth-month closing, and in the weeks leading up to that “D-Day” levy’s 
supporters – and the Vindicator itself – seemed determined to pass the levy by sheer force of 
action. 308 Schools across the city planned “Join the Arm Band” events. Thorn Hill school made 
the week leading up to the election “Pass the Levy Week,” complete with daily levy-related 
activities. Principal George Kesner and Thorn Hill also used their afterschool hours to go door-
to-door in support of the levy.309 Three hundred Youngstown State University students spent the 
Saturday before the election going canvassing all seven of the city’s wards as their contribution 
to the pro-levy “Arm Band” campaign.310 Boosters opened a booth in Youngstown’s Central 
Square to distribute information about the school levy to passersby.311 On the Saturday before 
the election, students gathered outside the “Arm Band” information distribution center in 
Youngstown’s public square. Below a giant “Join the Arm Band, Vote for the School Levy May 
6” banner, the students held hand-made signs with messages like “Please Help,” “Vote Yes,” and 
“We Need Books.” Karate students even broke blocks with their hands in front of the 
demonstration to help draw the attention of passersby. 312  The Youngstown Education 
Association turned its 14th annual dinner into a pro-levy extravaganza, adorning the meeting’s 
venue, the Ohio Hotel, with a huge “Keep Education Going, Vote Yes” banner. 313 
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Completely abandoning any veneer of objectivity, the Vindicator now devoted much of 
each issue to advocating for the levy. In a series that culminated a few days before the seventh 
vote, the paper profiled every one of the city’s 46 schools. It even included a 47th article covering 
the city’s bus garage and stockroom. Filled mostly with effusive praise for the schools and 
cataloged lists of areas of need that could be helped by additional funding, the series also 
featured numerous photos of smiling black and white students enjoying their schools together, 
which seemed designed to emphasize the benefits of the school system to both blacks and whites 
in the city. Even it was not labeled as such, the series served as an unmistakable plant in the pro-
levy platform.314 The Vindicator also announced that it would print a series of “cartoons 
illustrating the plight of Youngstown’s public school children.” Titled “Bottled Up,” the stark 
series of cartoons aimed at the heartstrings of anti-levy voters.315 The first full-page spread in the 
series asked, “What will Youngstown do with 27,000 public school children? Squeeze them? 
Bottle them up? Drown them?” Each question featured an accompanying cartoon. The first 
showed an anti-levy voter pushing a child into an inadequate school, the second depicting a sad-
looking boy reading an “outdated” text book trapped inside a bottle covered in cobwebs, and the 
third pictured students and teachers on a rickety school-shaped boat, faring rocky seas. The tag 
line at the bottom read, “Vote in Favor of the Levy, For the Good of the Children…for the Good 
of Youngstown.” The accompanying text asked, “Does a child’s parent deliberately shorten his 
offspring’s life? Or send him out in the world…badly prepared?.... Youngstown voters…will be 
doing just that if the do not…vote for the 12-mill school levy.” Running through a laundry list of 
reasons proving the necessity of the levy, the ad explained, “Youngstown students already are in 
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a partial education vacuum, bottled up with old textbooks that say ‘some day man may explore 
the moon.’” This line – not coincidentally – was the one picked up by Rowan and Martin for 
their “Fickle Finger” Laugh-In big on Youngstown, illustrating the Vindicator cartoon series’ 
outsized impact.316 The next cartoon in the series was a full-page drawing of a huge, Huck Finn-
like schoolboy carrying a stack of books in a book strap over his shoulder. The boy towered over 
a man in a shirt, tie, and sports jacket, carrying a newspaper advertising new spring suits. The 
words “27,000 NEEDY STUDENTS” hovered above the boy. Below him, a paragraph explained 
that “Youngstown doesn’t just have a couple of thousand or several needy children…[and] their 
educational ‘suit’ was bought by the voters five years ago…the last time voters approved any 
money for the schools. But in 1969, that 1964 suit has become frayed, the pant legs are shorter 
and the sleeves are too tight.” The ad’s text warned, “Unless Youngstown schools can keep pace 
with the knowledge explosion all over the world, they will send children out into that world ill-
equipped…using textbooks which say man MIGHT reach the moon someday…. Help 
Youngstown’s children stand up as tall as those in the rest of the United States.”317The third full-
page Vindicator ad, titled “Keep Education Alive in Youngstown,” featured two cartoons. The 
first, and most eye-catching, shoed a teacher rushing a sick student to the emergency room, only 
to find that the doctor is an angry voter wielding a butcher’s knife. The second showed a 
student’s giant foot, ready to step on an anti-levy voter holding a sign reading “Down with 
Education! Too Many Frills!”318 
The Vindicator also encouraged levy supporters to go to polls in an editorial. “Few issues 
in recent decades in Youngstown have been so effective [as the levy] in winning approval from 
so many diverse groups…[including] organizations which ordinarily might not be found working 
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together,” the editorial agued. But despite the appeals of diverse groups of community leaders, 
many voters stayed home or voted for other candidates without weighing in on the levy measure. 
Six months before Nixon’s famous “Silent Majority” speech, the Vindicator’s editorial board 
appealed to these “silent vote[rs].” The 5,000 people who failed to select any option on the levy 
ballot in 1968 “were not absolutely opposed to the levy or they would have marked their ballots 
that way,” the paper reasoned. But “there out to be little doubt” that “opponents of the school 
levy will vote,” meaning it was “the responsibility of those who want to keep the schools running 
[to] also cast their ballots.” The “greatest responsibility” of levy supporters would be “to see that 
the ‘Yes’ voters get to the polls next Tuesday,” including the great mass of previously “silent” 
voters.319 Another Vindicator editorial tugged at readers’ heartstrings and funny bones by 
printing quotes from junior-high students about the levy, “youngsters [who] don’t know much 
about millage…but are sure…that there’s not much ahead of them if they can’t go to school.” 
One seventh-grade boy wrote, “Education is important to me because I want to be something 
when I grow up and not just a dropout. If the levy doesn’t pass, I won’t have a chance,” a 
statement the Vindicator sized up as “a pretty accurate appraisal.”320 An editorial cartoon printed 
three days before the levy showed a variety of paunchy white men representing industry, 
business, construction, and property owners laughing heartily while standing over a tiny boy 
representing the levy, who asked, “Will I have a chance to grow, too?”321 
The paper also published numerous pro-levy photos, usually without any accompanying 
story or context. One striking photo showed a student, Nancy Zimmerman, surrounded by all of 
the teachers, administrators, and staff at Chaney High School who had educated her for $623 
dollars per year. They were “all smiles” because Zimmerman would graduate on time, unlike the 
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“lower classmen who may not graduate in future years if the 12-mill school operating levy fails 
May 6.”322 The Sunday before the election, the Vindicator’s tabloid-style “Rotogravure Section” 
featured a front-page overhead shot of hundreds of the city’s students in a field with the headline 
“A Generation of Dropouts?” and text that argued “unless Youngstown voters approve a 12-mill 
levy for their public schools on May 6 they may be helping to create a generation of school 
dropouts in reverse,” since if the levy failed and the schools did not open in the fall, 1970’s 
seniors would not graduate in time to begin college the following fall and “some might even be 
drafted into the Army right out of [what would be] their fifth year of high school.”323 A vote 
against the levy was a vote for a child to die in combat. 
In the days leading up to the election, pro-levy messages were inescapable. The 
combination of official “Arm Band” advertisements, pro-levy advertisements from smaller 
organizations, and various thinly veiled pro-levy photos and articles meant that in the days 
leading up to the levy, every third or fourth page of the Vindicator contained some kind of pro-
levy message. Out in the city, billboards, rallies, and marches reminded voters to pull the lever 
for the levy. Finally, the bevy of door-to-door campaigns and phone banks meant that thousands 
and thousands of Youngstown residents received personal contact about the levy. These strands 
of the campaign came together in a final – and powerful – advertisement. Marking the 
culmination of both the NAACP/PTA joint door-to-door campaign and the “Arm Band” 
committee’s levy push, the advertisement took up 10 pages in the Vindicator the day before the 
levy with the names of thousands of levy supporters in fine print. The first page read “*Join the 
Arm Band. WE DID! IT’S GROWIN AND GROWING… YOU CAN JOIN US ON MAY 6th 
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BY VOTING “YES” FOR THE SCHOOL LEVY.”324 If this campaign failed, it was hard to see 
what could top it. “We’ve done everything humanly possible to explain and clarify the issue for 
the people of Youngstown. Now it’s up to them,” Harshman told the Vindicator.325 
Luckily for its supporters, the levy passed. The victory understandably left many of the 
campaign’s organizers patting themselves on the back. But the voting statistics cast some doubt 
on their self-congratulation. In fact, a Vindicator “straw poll” conducted prior to the final 
campaign’s kick-off already showed public opinion shifting in favor of the levy.326 It is more 
likely that the combination of the closing – and all the problems involved with having children 
out-of-school all day for weeks on end – and the shaming attention directed at the city pushed 
enough previous opponents of the levy to either reluctantly support it or, perhaps more often, to 
simply stay home. After the record 53,000 turnout of the November 1968 election, the May 
special election saw less than 48,000 Youngstowners cast ballots. The levy received about 1,500 
more votes in May than it had in Decembers, but due to a whopping 8,500 fewer opposing votes, 
it passed by a substantial 57-43 percent margin.327 
Now that the city’s levy crisis was over, local officials would have clear answers for 
what, exactly, had caused the tax revolt – even if few paid attention to the results. After the sixth 
levy failure, representatives from Youngstown State University, the Board of Education, and the 
Chamber of Commerce all seized on the idea of a comprehensive study to assess the causes of 
the levy failures. With the Board of Education’s blessing and $3,000 of Chamber’s funding, two 
YSU professors – James W. Kiriazis, chairman of the Sociology Department, and Sanford N. 
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Hotchkiss, chairman of the Psychology Department – began designing a questionnaire based on 
complaints voiced in call-in talk radio shows, letters to the editor, and interviews with 
Youngstown voters. The two professors planned a 1,000-person survey broken into two waves so 
that the second wave could correct for any lack of representativeness in the first random sample 
and ensure that the final sample contained representative samples of “public vs. parochial school 
parents; union vs. non-union voters; Blacks vs. Caucasians; home owners vs. renters; the 
childless vs. those with school-age children; and other pertinent categories.” The two professors 
trained 80 undergraduates to conduct the survey, while the Chamber ensured the survey would 
receive “wide local coverage through the paper and, especially, over radio and TV” so that the 
public would believe “the legitimacy of purpose, the anonymity of responses, and the 
authenticity of the interviewers,” including showing examples of the students’ research 
identification cards.328 
 Though it purported to be purely investigative, the study’s main purpose was to provide 
levy supporters like the Board of Education and Chamber of Commerce with better data to craft 
their levy appeals in the final month leading up to the seventh vote. The manual given to the 
YSU students conducting the interviews instructed them to respond to questions about the 
purpose of the interviews by saying, “We are trying to find out the opinions of Youngstown 
citizens about the Youngstown schools.” It emphasized, “DO NOT say, ‘So we can figure out 
what approach to use to get the levy passed in May.’” That was the true purpose, though. As 
Kiriazis and Hotchkiss put it, “The survey was not an academic exercise but was designed to 
render some assistance to the community in helping to secure passage of the School Tax 
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Levy.” 329  Despite this intent, as well as the study’s extensive funding and planning, 
circumstances dramatically dulled survey’s impact in several ways. First, because analyzing the 
data involved transferring responses to punch cards, which then had to be processed at facilities 
provided by the Youngstown Technological Institute and the Youngstown Steel Door Company, 
only the results of the initial wave of interviews – which featured too-small samples of men and 
African Americans – could be reported before the final levy vote.330 Second, the results of the 
initial survey seemed almost self-defeating in terms of affecting strategies for the levy. They 
predicted that the levy would narrowly pass and contained no bombshell discoveries pointing to 
discontent or lack of support in one particular segment of the community. Kiriazis and Hotchkiss 
“comment[ed] upon the survey and the preliminary results before local groups and upon the 
news media and local television panels.”331 But the Vindicator dedicated only a brief article to 
the study. The article emphasized that the public trusted the school board and mentioned only in 
passing that “there was very little difference in attitudes on most questions between white and 
Negro groups but there appeared to be a little more favorable support among Negro groups.”332  
 Released after the levy had passed, the final report – titled simply “Community Attitudinal 
Survey of Youngstown Voters on the School Tax Levies” – failed to garner a mention in either 
not the Vindicator or Buckeye Review. But it offered the most complete and compelling account 
of the heart of Youngstown’s problems. Nothing in the study, the authors noted, demonstrated 
“organized resistance against the school tax levies.” Kiriazis and Hotchkiss also emphasized that 
the survey found “no evidence of a ‘white backlash’ or organized union hostility as proposed by 
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some diagnosticians of the school levy failures.” They also argued that level of black support for 
the levy “should place to rest any rumor that there was concerted Negro opposition to the school 
tax levy.” The survey found only small differences in support for the levy between African 
Americans and whites, dealing the white backlash thesis a blow, too. Approximately 59 percent 
of blacks said the voted for the levy, while 53 percent of whites did.333 Kiriazis and Hotchkiss’s 
analysis also suggested that the majority of those who declined to tell interviewers how they 
were voting actually planned to vote against the levy, and approximately 10 percent more 
African Americans than whites declined to indicate a voting preference, suggesting that even the 
six percent difference in voting between blacks and whites may have been exaggerated. 
Moreover, on a range of specific school and community issues the study found that “the attitudes 
of the Caucasians and Negroes were quite similar.” 334 Contrary to the conservative argument 
that the levy defeats portended an anti-government backlash generated by resentment of 
government workers, the Youngstown survey found that only 15 percent of respondents felt that 
either teachers or non-teaching staff like janitors made too much money. Finding no root cause 
of the resistance to the levies apart from taxes themselves, they predicted a rough road for future 
tax increases. “Resistance [to the levy] was due primarily to rejection of increased taxes,” the 
study concluded. The “rejection of increased taxes,” however, was not evenly distributed among 
the city’s economic classes. Both the 1968 and 1969 waves of the survey found a clear income-
based patter to voting. The lower one’s income, the less likely he or she was to vote for the levy 
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(Figure 8). 335  
 Viewed with the benefit of the survey, it seemed clear that most of the speculation as to the 
cause of the revolt has missed the point. Youngstown’s low- and middle-income voters were 
caught in the middle of a pocketbook squeeze. That squeeze was generated, in part, by the state 
government’s continued shifting of costs to localities like Youngstown. Combined with anti-levy 
voters’ preference for types of taxation they saw as fairer than the property tax, such as the 
income tax, local officials’ attempts to exhort these voters to pass the school levies seemed 
almost comically misguided.  
 The causes of the revolt were not to be found within the hearts and minds of individual 
voters. Instead, they could be found within voters’ household budgets, as well as budgets of the 
levels of government above Youngstown. Yet, while the causes of Youngstown’s levy defeat 
seemed clear in retrospect, more and more cities would find themselves in Youngstown’s 
positions and would, likewise, find themselves searching for answers and ways to quell to the tax 
revolt. 
 
From Local Shame to National Crisis 
When Youngstown’s levy finally passed, the community let out a collective sigh of relief. 
The Buckeye Review conceded that Youngstowners were “licking our political wounds” because 
of the “bad national publicity after the last couple defeats.” But the victory meant that the city’s 
residents could finally “lift our heads high after doing the decent thing.”336 Positive publicity 
mostly eluded the city, though. After years of column inches and nightly news broadcasts 
charting Youngstown’s levy crisis, few national outlets even bothered to note the levy’s passage. 
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The NBC Evening News’ short segment credited the “Arm Band” campaign with drumming up 
support for the levy and concluded that the school closing let voters know that they “had to 
choice” but to approve the levy, even if “they weren’t any happier.”337 With its levy crisis, 
however, Youngstown had become a national story. One national journalist wrote of “the lesson 
of Youngstown,” though the article did not make clear what the “lesson” was. 338 Many observers 
remained uncertain about the cause of the revolt. The Wall Street Journal, for example, 
speculated that the revolt “undoubtedly stem[med] partly from a general voter reluctance to 
approve new local taxes at a time when inflation and higher federal and state taxes already are 
pinching family budgets.” However, in the same article it reminded readers, “the reasons for the 
rebellion run deeper,” including  “white voter reactions against demonstrations by Negroes.”339 
What was clear, however, was that Youngstown had become the poster child for the local tax 
revolt.  
Commentators had no shortage of opportunities to invoke the city’s name. Ironically, a 
day of victory in Youngstown proved to be a day of crisis in the rest of the state. The executive 
secretary of the Ohio Education Association dubbed May 5th “black Tuesday,” because less than 
50 percent of the 181 tax and bond proposals on ballots around the state were approved, a record 
low in the state’s history. In Parma, Ohio, a Cleveland suburb, voters rejected a levy for the third 
time in six months, despite threats that the schools would close.340 In Ohio alone, Youngstown 
was only one of three districts that had to close in the fall of 1968 for lack of funds.341 In 
Columbus the following year voters defeated a school bond issue for the first time 30 years and 
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did so by a three-to-one margin. United Press International covered a “taxpayers’ revolt” in 
Freemont, Ohio, where levy defeats forced a seven-week “recess.” 342 By November 1970, the 
“black Tuesday” of the previous year was forgotten, as the Ohio Education Association issued a 
new statement dubbing that election “the most disastrous in Ohio school history,” with voters 
approving only 68 of 243 requests for increases in school taxes.343 In a survey of special school 
elections in Ohio, the Associated Press found only a few victories in the several dozen it 
covered.344 Every election, it seemed, marked a new low. The final 1970 tally found that Ohio 
voters had approved just 29 percent of proposed school tax levies, the fewest on record.345 In 
1971, 67 districts put previously defeated school issues – new or renewal property taxes and 
bonds – including 17 up for the fourth time or more, like Newton Falls, which had already 
defeated six previous attempts. Twenty-five schools applied to the state auditor’s office for a 
special audit, the first step towards closing the schools. In districts around the state “operating 
costs…have run ahead of property taxes.” But the prospect of school closings failed to faze 
voters the way it had in Youngstown. “The public seems in no mood to pay higher taxes,” the 
New York Times reported, referring to Ohio, in particular, “even at the expense of its children’s 
education.” 346  
Unfortunately for school administrators across the country, Ohio was not alone and its 
problems were not unique. A 1969 front-page Christian Science Monitor cheekily noted that 
“voters [were] in ‘no’ mood” for school taxes, pointing out that “the December shutdown of 
Youngstown, Ohio, schools for lack of funds may well prove pattern-setting rather than 
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exceptional. Right and left voters have been saying ‘no’ to local bond issues and tax hikes – this 
year at a staggering rate of 55 percent.”347 One 1968 report found that at least 150 school systems 
across the country had recently experienced a budget crisis.348 For the first time in 19 years, 
Grosse Point, Michigan, rejected a tax proposal, and it did so by a two-to-one margin. Over half 
of all local spending referenda in California were being defeated “and the percentage is rising 
every year,” as one observer put it. In New Jersey, 145 school budgets were rejected during the 
1968-1969 school year, a state record.349 U.S. News and World Report explained that the 
“taxpayer revolt ke[pt] on rolling” in 1969.350 Once again, the example of Youngstown was 
never far away. For example, schools in New York faced budget shortfalls and potential 
closings, reporters and public officials referenced Youngstown.351 By the time a Wall Street 
Journal reporter called the national epidemic of school levy and bond rejections a “taxpayer 
revolt,” the phrase had already become a cliché.352 Surveying the wreckage of fallen school 
levies and bonds in 1970, a New York Times reporter mused hyperbolically: “This year no one 
asked for a constitutional convention, but for reasons no one has explained voters said yes.”353 
The situation had become so dire by the late 1960s, that the U.S. Commission of Education 
Harold Howe II took the pages of Parents magazine to plead for votes and stress importance of 
passing school bonds. In an article titled “Why You Should Vote ‘Yes’ on School Bond Issues,” 
Howe despaired over “disturbing trend” of school bond failures and called on parents to do their 
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part to stem the tide.354 Increasingly, though, it became clear that the revolt was not limited to 
schools and all their attendant political controversies. Subsequent research would show that all 
municipal bonds – including infrastructure bonds – began a downward trend in the 1950s, which 
accelerated through the 1960s, not just school bonds.355 
For a time, many observers believed that the problem of the tax revolt would be 
contained to urban areas. Numerous studies showed a widening gap within metropolitan areas 
between older core areas with high tax burdens and newer suburban areas with relatively low tax 
burdens.356 The ACIR report put it bluntly: “Time is definitely working against most central 
cities with respect to relative tax burdens.”357 Specifically, ACIR argued that “heavy pressure on 
property and consumer levies poses sharp equity and fiscal problems.” ACIR found that “local 
taxes in the central cities average 7.6 percent of the personal income of their residents; outside 
the central cities they equal only 5.6 percent of income”358 Given the twin pressures on residents’ 
pocketbooks and policymakers’ budgets, the committee predicted that “unless the subsistence of 
low income families is shielded from the reach of property and sales tax collectors, the 
productivity of these powerful revenue instruments is bound to be jeopardized by growing public 
protest. The demand of elderly homeowners for property tax relief is becoming especially 
strident, and public opposition to bond issues is becoming more apparent.”359  
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However, the eroding tax bases and maxed-out “tax efforts” that crippled urban centers 
like Youngstown and Detroit spreading outward. “The older suburban communities are taking on 
physical, social, and economic characteristics similar to the central city’s…[they] are neither 
uniformly affluent nor free of fiscal woes,” one 1968 study concluded.360 By the mid 1960s, it 
seemed few areas were free of fiscal woes, except perhaps high-income suburban communities 
that could rely on nearly urban areas for key services. One survey found problems in “low-
income, rapidly growing suburban communities, where expansion of basic service facilities can 
cause tax rates to leap sharply to high levels despite concurrent growth in the property tax base,” 
as well as rural areas “where local tax rates are exceptionally high because – for one reason or 
another – the tax base has deteriorated.” It concluded, “high local tax burdens can crop up in 
individual communities under a variety of different economic circumstances.”361 
 Indeed, within a few years, many white suburbs faced serious financial crises. When four 
suburban districts north of St. Louis closed their doors to 46,000 students in 1970, the New York 
Times called the “major revolt of taxpayers…the biggest and most serious of its kind to date.” 
Strangely, the paper noted, all were “predominantly white, middle-class districts.” Here, the 
“backlash” explanation held no sway. Instead, the Times argued “the crisis appears to grow out 
of a tax structure that is widely criticized as placing to heave a burden of localities,” as well as 
“inflation and recession,” among other issues facing voters. In the Ferguson-Florissant district of 
“modest brick and frame homes on wide tree-lined streets” property taxes fell “most heavily on 
homeowners,” because the community had little in the way of industry. Blue-collar workers had 
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recently been moving into the district and, after the financial stretch of affording a suburban 
home was taken into account, few could afford additional taxes. Structural issues likewise played 
a key role in Ferguson-Florissant’s crisis. The state had recently considered an income tax to 
help relieve the local property tax burden, but mostly rural voters defeated the measure, while it 
carried in suburban areas like Ferguson-Florissant. “If the state money had come through,” the 
Ferguson-Florissant superintendent Dr. Warren M. Brown said, “we wouldn’t have had to ask for 
a local tax increase.” Brown also blamed rising inflation, which he said both drove up school 
costs and hurt residents’ pocketbooks, making them less likely to support finance measures. 
“Don’t they stop to consider how hard it is on us retired folk when they raise taxes,” 73-year-old 
Leroy Kapller asked.362 In nearby Hazelwood, one senior girl mused, “I never thought we’d have 
to campaign to stay in school.” Like Youngstown, students tried to convince voters in their 
communities vote for a school tax levy. “We’ve been parading, ringing door bells, and talking 
with older folks…to get them to approve a tax.”363 Looking at a similar tax revolt in suburban 
Pacifica, California, one report concluded that “the fiscal crisis has come to suburbia, the land of 
milk and honey.” Urban problems could be ignored. Suburban ones could not. “Now that fiscal 
crisis has come to suburbia, the land of milk and honey, perhaps drastic financial reforms – 
reforms long urged by schoolmen from bankrupt cites and impoverished rural areas – will at last 
be engaged by sluggish, shortsighted state legislatures,” the study concluded.364  
As in Youngstown, academics and civic boosters across the country began undertaking 
studies that sought to identify and explain the typical anti-levy or anti-bond voter. Even as late as 
the 1950s, few examinations of the dynamics of a local finance election even existed. Now, cities 
funded surveys, scholars drafted monographs, government agencies issued reports, and think-
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tanks published large-scale analyses.365 Many of these studies took an almost anthropological 
stance to these “no” voters that belied their status as neighbors and fellow community members, 
rather than some strange and foreign culture. Relying on popular sociological theory of the time, 
some social scientists in the late-1960s approached local finance elections as opportunities to 
examine “alienation,” usually of lower-income, less-educated citizens. 366  Alienation, some 
sociologists believed, was related to “quasi-paranoia,” but it was “most accurately understood as 
an emergent response to social structure in action, a reaction to perceived relative inability to 
influence or to control one’s social destiny.”367 According to this definition, the alienated would 
agree with statements that were implied to be irrational, like “it doesn’t matter which party wins 
elections, the interests of the little man don’t count.”368 Most “alienation” studies tapped into 
long-standing fears of “a reservoir of discontent among the usually inarticulate and seemingly 
powerless masses, a discontent which may explode into radical protest whenever the powerless 
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exercise their power.” For better or worse, the literature on working-class alienation was 
inextricably linked with studies of working-class “authoritarian” personality undertaken in the 
1950s. These studies linked the alienated mass of working-class voters with the rise of 
totalitarian regimes in Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.369 To say the least, these were not 
the people one wanted in a nearby voting booth pulling the lever against the next school tax hike.  
 These studies reported that whites with low socioeconomic status were most likely to 
experience “alienation.” While alienated voters might sit out national elections, “in local 
referenda it is possible for voters more clearly to perceive their action as participation in the 
decision-making process…provid[ing] the opportunity to express their alienation…. [V]ery often 
the rallying cry of these voters is not so much concerned with the issue at hand as with 
preventing an ill-defined ‘them’ from putting ‘this’ over on ‘us.’”370 Alienated voters “translated 
[their discontent] into either an undirected vote of resentment or an organized vote of 
opposition.” 371  In local finance elections, then, alienating acted as “a kind of desultory 
conservatism which nevertheless has impact upon the course of development of the community, 
in the form of a brake if nothing else.”372 Another study linking alienation and voting on local 
school bond issues found that anti-bond voting “does not represent an organized, class-conscious 
opposition, but a type of mass protest, a convergence of the individual assessments of the 
powerless who have projected into available symbols the fears and suspicions growing out of 
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their alienated existence.”373 Voting against local issues was less an opposition to the particular 
initiative than an “expression of general discontent on the part of the politically alienated.”374 
Simply put, “both alienated and non-alienated taxpayers went to the polls; however, the non-
alienated taxpayer voted ‘yes’ and the alienated taxpayer ‘no.’”375 
 Though, in the wake of the survey data collected by Youngstown State, it would seem 
misplaced, Youngstown’s levy crisis was subjected to the “alienation” framework, too. An 
unpublished pilot study carried out in Youngstown by a Kent State University doctoral student 
during the levy crisis attempted to identify patterns in voters’ attitudes. The study asked several 
small – and unrepresentative – focus groups of Youngstown voters to order 54 statements about 
the levy – designed to represented “expressions of feeling and cognition derived from monitoring 
press, radio, and conversations in Youngstown, just prior to and immediately following the fifth 
referendum” – based on how much the sorter agreed with the statement.376A “Q-factor analysis” 
of the focus groups’ statement sorting generated several “empirical constructs.” Though not 
meant to represent “ideal types” of voters, each clearly evoked certain stereotypical groups, 
including upstanding white upper-middle-class pro-levy voters and irrational blue-collar whites. 
The “good citizenshipping” construct was associated with support for school authorities and the 
school system, rejection of racism sentiments, and “distrusted ill-informed, emotional voters.” In 
contrast, the “alienating” construct represented strong reaction against taxes, “parochialism,” 
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“ethnocentrism or super-patriotism,” and “distrust of authority,” among other opinions.377 
Needless to say, these conclusions were much different from the relatively simple idea that many 
low- and middle-income voters felt too economically squeeze to afford another increase in a 
regressive tax. 
 Faced with implacable, possibly alienated and irrational, voters and the need for more 
revenue, local officials tried to shift voters’ opinions on finance measures, anyway they could. 
Though Youngstown’s pro-levy campaigns may have seemed excessive to many observers at the 
time, by the late-1960s, extensive levy campaigns like the one waged in Youngstown became the 
norm.378 In Sylvania, Ohio, a subcommittee of the main levy committee, dubbed the “Small 
Group Discussion Committee” deployed 200 volunteers to speak to groups of 8 or 10 
neighborhood residents at a time, with the goal of reaching more than 8,000 homes in the school 
district. The campaign was coordinated with the “In-service Training and Audio-Visual 
Materials” subcommittee, which provided materials to others interested in pitching the levy to 
friends, relatives, and small groups. Finally, the levy committee set up a telephone hotline that 
rang the superintendent’s office in case any volunteers ran into unexpected questions.379 
With local officials grasping for public relation’s solutions to what was, in truth, a 
structural problem, a flood of reports and handbooks explained to school officials how to pass 
initiatives in the face of the taxpayers’ revolt. This school-finance literature ignored structural 
issues like the level and mix of taxes, and instead argued that better campaign strategies, 
improving public relations, and the like, maybe school measures would once again find favor 
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with voters.380 With titles like  “How to Pass a Bond Issue, “Four Things to Do When the Public 
Votes No,” “Get the Taxpayers on Your Team,” and “Take These Six Steps to Pass a Bond 
Issue,” many articles and reports billed themselves plainly as instruction manuals for how to a 
pass measure.381 When print material mentioned costs at all, experts urged that it be put in the 
smallest amounts possible – weekly or daily amounts, rather than yearly totals.382 The American 
School Board Journal even published a tongue-in-cheek 1970 article titled “How to Lose Your 
Next Referendum,” which advised school leaders to “carefully time the bond issue vote to 
coincide with political elections, and stir, making sure that local politicians take a stand on the 
bond issue amount and resultant tax rate,” “place communications responsibility in the hands of 
an advertising firm with a good record in marketing toothpaste or eye shadow,” and “suddenly 
approach those church leaders you’ve been ignoring all along and ask them to promote the bond 
issue,” among other approaches. Finally, “when the bond issue fails, rationalize the failure in 
terms of voter apathy, student unrest, or tight money.”383 Some articles went so far as to print 
general campaign materials that could be used in campaigns across the country. One “worksheet” 
to help superintendents or school boards guide principals began: “Each principal should schedule 
at least three coffee klatches between ________ and ________.”384  
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Keeping with a variant of the “backlash” thesis, many of these often surprisingly data-
free guides argued that there existed a “large reservoir of potential pro-voters” comprised of 
women, blacks, who needed to be motivated to get to the polls. In contrast, they instructed 
officials to appease or demobilizing the “white, working class, residents of single dwellings, with 
moderate or low incomes” who consistently showed up at polling places to vote down school 
issues. 385 Given the omnipresent power of “alienated” blue-collar whites, local finance experts 
encouraged levy and bond campaigners to reach out to “alienated” average voters and win their 
trust.386 Typical advice to school administrators encouraged simple, emotional appeals focused 
on children. “Graphs, charts, tables – these hold little interest for the bridge devotee, the factory 
worker, the housewife, or many professional people. Keep the language simple and to the point. 
Pitch it to the man on the street…and remember that the public has little idea of what the term 
‘mill’ means.” In many cases, this advice was unwise. One teacher canvassing an area with low 
educational levels in Columbus, Ohio, “tried to achieve rapport by using the language of the 
people.” But this stab at affability backfired. “That man who came down here to talk to us talked 
so bad and seemed so stupid that we figured if he was educated, we didn’t want our kids to have 
none of it,” the parent explained.387 
Indeed, when taken together, the studies, manuals, and articles often offered confusing and 
downright contradictory advice to local officials. For example, many studies seemed to show that 
renters actually helped pass levies and bonds.388 But local officials in Youngstown and elsewhere 
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seemed convinced that limited the vote to property would bring greater success. Some studies 
claimed high turnout helped finance referenda, while other suggested low turnout aided 
victory.389 This type of confusion resulted from the fact that both local officials and many 
academic studying the school finance crisis of the late-1960s labored under the same set of 
misapprehensions about who opposed school levies and bonds and why they suddenly began 
voting them down. In fairness to the advice-givers, however, there was little that most local 
officials could do to solve the structural problem of the pocketbook squeeze.  
 
Conclusion 
By the early-1970s, the speculation over the causes of the tax revolt could be put to rest 
by all but the most hardened ideologues. New studies demonstrated that the link between the tax 
revolt, income, and the pocketbook squeeze was clear not just in Youngstown, but also 
nationally – even if many observers still missed it. National polling done by Gallup for Phi Delta 
Kappan would echo the Youngstown survey’s results. The willingness of white and “non-white” 
Americans to support a local school finance initiative were remarkable similar (Figure 9). 
Likewise, Youngstown’s class-based voting held up nationally, too (Figure 10). Moreover, the 
Gallup survey showed that nationwide less than 10 percent of Americans felt teachers were being 
paid too much.390 Additionally, local studies in areas as diverse as Austintown, Ohio, Bowling 
Green, Ohio, and Dekalb County, Georgia, displayed similar linear relationships when it came to 
income and voting – the lower one’s income, the less likely he or she was to vote in support of 
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the levies or bonds.391 More in-depth studies found that, in general, lower-income voters worried 
more than upper-income voters that their tax bills would become “excessive” if school finance 
measures passed.392  
Low-to-middle income Americans had good reason to resent the property tax. An ACIR 
study of local property tax burdens found that local property tax could eat up over 16 percent of 
poor homeowners’ incomes, between four and seven percent middle- or working-class 
homeowners’’ incomes, and less than 3 percent of rich homeowners’ incomes. The committee 
concluded that “no other major tax in our public finance system bears down so harshly on low-
income households, or is so capriciously related to the ability to pay taxes.”393 In 1974, the Ford 
Foundation and RAND Corporation undertook what was arguably the most intensive study of 
school finance referenda, comprising 1,600 California school tax elections from the mid-1950s 
through the early 1970s. Linking rising tax rates to falling approval rates, the Ford/RAND study 
noted that, between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s, “electoral success rates dropped from 80 
percent to 50 percent while tax rates rose from an average of slightly over $1.00 per $100 of 
assessed value (one quarter of market value) to somewhat more than $2.00.” In the early-to-mid 
1950s, “the proposed tax rates were lower and voters were more willing, in general, to assent to 
higher taxes.”  But that changed as tax rates rose in the following years. To test the significance 
of taxes on approval rates, the authors of the Ford/RAND study attempted to predict the percent 
of “yes” votes a levy would receive using only a district’s on change in taxes, household income, 
and turnout. In fact, the model predicted the approval level with surprising accuracy. After 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 Sylvan Cohen, “Voting Behavior in School Refereda: An Investigation of Attitutes and Other Determinants by Q 
Technique and Survey Research” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Kent State University, 1971), 184. 
392 Robert E. Jennings and Mike M. Milstein, “Citizens’ Attitudes in School Tax Voting,” Education and Urban 
Society 5 (1973), 299-319. 
393 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Financing the Schools and the Property Tax: A State 






considering its wide array of evidence, the study concluded: “We can say with confidence that 
the proposed tax rate and the increase in tax rate are the strongest and most consistent correlates 
of tax election passage.” 394 The undeniable conclusion from the data, in other words, was that 
taxpayers’ revolt against school levies and bonds was inextricably linked to income – the so-
called “ability to pay.” As the blue-collar black worker had told both NBC cameras and the 
Youngstown State survey, “I earn approximately seven-to-eight thousand dollars a year…. I have 
five kids, and we don’t have any new automobiles… [and] we can’t save money because I think 
the taxes are too high.”395 
The only question that remained was whether the local property tax revolt was over and 
whether the federal government would intervene. To the latter question, most public officials in 
the late-1960s continued to answer a decided “no.” The Johnson administration’s Commission of 
Education, Harold Howe II, flatly rejected calls for federal intervention into local finance reform. 
Instead, he called on “citizens in every community to accept the responsibility for the quality of 
their schools.”396 Many conservatives’ shared Howe’s conclusion, if for different reasons. 
Hoover Institution economist Roger Freeman – who would go on to serve as a local finance 
expert in both Richard Nixon’s presidential administration and Ronald Reagan’s gubernatorial 
administration – dismissed public complaints about the unfairness of the property tax. Battling 
against the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Freeman argued that the property tax was 
“substantially proportional” and that claims of its regressivity were little more than the 
ideologically-driven complaints of those “who believe that the present American tax structure is 
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not sufficiently progressive.” 397 To the former question, the Ford/Rand study had a confident 
conclusion. The tax revolt was over, the authors argued. “Taxpayers have revolted,” the study 
declared. “But recent years in California have been characterized by stability…. 1966-1972 
[were] years of revolt, but not for taxpayers.”398 
As later events would demonstrate, there was still plenty of tax revolt to come in 
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The Tax Revolt Goes to Washington 
 
 President Nixon’s first inaugural address on January 20, 1969, contained only a single 
reference to the economy. Echoing the triumphalism of the 1960s “New Economics,” Nixon 
declared, “The second third of this century has been a time of proud achievement. We have made 
enormous strides in science and industry and agriculture. We have shared our wealth more 
broadly than ever. We have learned at last to manage a modern economy to assure its continued 
growth.” The problems facing the country, Nixon argued, were not material. “We find ourselves 
rich in goods, but ragged in spirit; reaching with magnificent precision for the moon, but failing 
into raucous discord on earth…,” Nixon intoned. “To a crisis of the spirit, we need an answer of 
the spirit. And to find that answer, we need only look within ourselves.”1 But even before Nixon 
delivered his inaugural address, events were conspiring against the new president’s hope that 
economic policy would continue to play second fiddle to issues where Nixon was on surer 
political footing, like Vietnam and law-and-order. The president may have been calling on 
Americans to “look within” to solve the nation’s spiritual crisis, but soon they would be looking 
to Nixon to solve a growing tax crisis – and to do so at the same time that he was fighting rising 
inflation and the fear of unemployment.  
By the time Nixon took office, the “tax revolt” had been gaining steam at the local level 
for a decade. But few national politicians were aware of it. That all changed in 1969. By the end 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






of the year, no one could miss the existence of the tax revolt. Yet, attempts to address the tax 
revolt at the federal level were complicated by rising inflation. Together, taxes and inflation were 
increasingly recognized as creating a “pocketbook squeeze” on lower- and middle-income 
Americans.  The meaning of the tax revolt remained hotly contested, however. Some observers, 
including the president, doubted whether the public really wanted tax reform. Many moderates 
and conservatives in both parties believed that inflation was a more pressing issue than tax 
reform. They hoped to quell the public’s discontent with minor, piecemeal reform and relief, 
rather than with sweeping changes to the tax code. In the end, that is exactly what the public 
received. As a result, the legislative and political outcomes of 1969 – including Tax Reform Act 
of 1969 – failed to end the revolt. But they did shape the debate over tax reform and the meaning 
of the tax revolt for years to come. 
 
Announcing the Revolt 
 Just three days before Nixon’s inauguration, President Johnson’s outgoing Treasury 
secretary, Joseph Barr, dropped a political bombshell in front of the congressional Joint 
Economic Committee. “[I]n the year 1967, there were 155 tax returns in this country with 
incomes over $200,00 a year and 21 returns with incomes over a million dollars a year on which 
the ‘taxpayers’ paid the U.S. government not one cent of income taxes,” Barr declared in 
testimony ostensibly dedicated to the Economic Report of the President – not tax reform.2 In a 
measured tone and with little drama – save for taking off his thick glasses and gesturing with 
them for emphasis – Barr predicted an imminent “taxpayer revolt.” The revolt, Barr said, was 
“going to come from the middle class…who pay every nickel of the going rate” and who “don’t 
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have the loopholes and the gimmicks to resort to.”3 In his invocation of middle-class anger Barr 
echoed Nixon’s nomination acceptance speech from the previous summer, which had been a 
hosanna to the “voice of the great majority of Americans, the forgotten Americans – the non-
shouters; the non-demonstrators.” “They are good people, they are decent people,” Nixon said, 
“they work, and they save, and they pay their taxes, and they care.”4 The forgotten Americans 
were paying their taxes, Barr said, but the rich were not.  
The release of the Johnson Treasury Department’s full tax reform report a few weeks 
later further exposed the various tax avoidance strategies available primarily to the rich. By 
calculating effective tax rates as a percentage of “amended taxable income” – a measure that 
added in excluded capital gains and some other deductions to provide what the Treasury 
considered a more accurate picture of real-world income – the Treasury revealed wide inequities 
in the tax code.  Except for the very poorest – those making between zero and three thousand 
dollars – most taxpayers making less than $10,000 paid between 15 and 20 percent in income 
taxes, but so did nearly 30 percent of those making between $20,000 and $50,000, as well as five 
percent of those making $50,000 to $100,000, and small fraction of those who made even more. 
In fact, four percent of millionaires paid less than five percent in income taxes. More than 30 
percent of millionaires paid between 20 and 25 percent, but so did more than five percent of 
those making between $7,000 and $10,000 and nearly seven percent of those making between 
$10,000 and $15,000.5  
The Treasury report included real-world examples of a variety of strategies the rich used 
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to avoid taxes. Among all the various deductions, exemptions, and other “loopholes” benefitting 
upper-income taxpayers, the preferential treatment of capital gains was the largest.6 Charitable 
contributions, large itemized deductions, the oil depletion allowance, farm losses, and real estate 
deductions, among others, could also dramatically reduce or eliminate upper-income taxpayers’ 
income tax burdens.7 The report found that high-income taxpayers tended to fall into two groups 
– those who paid high rates year-after-year and those who paid low rates year-after-year. In other 
words, they found that the rich taxpayer who paid low rates one year rarely had that low rate 
balanced out by a higher rate in one of the next several years.8 Through a series of anonymous 
case studies, the report revealed specific examples of how rich taxpayers sometimes ended up 
paying much less than lower- and middle-income taxpayers. “An individual had a total income 
of $1,284, 718 of which $1,210,426 was in capital gains, the remaining $74,292 from wages, 
dividends, and interest. He excluded one-half of his capital gains, which he is allowed to do 
under present law, thereby reducing his present law (adjusted gross) income to $679,405 (after 
allowing for the $100 dividend exclusion),” the report explained. “From this income he 
subtracted all his personal deductions, which amount to $676,419 and which included $587,693 
for interest on funds borrowed presumably for the purpose of purchasing the securities on which 
the capital gains were earned. As a result, after allowing $1,200 of personal exemptions his 
taxable income was reduced to $1,786 and he paid a tax of $274. His overall tax rate, therefore, 
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was about two-hundredth of one percent.”9  
Barr was an unlikely candidate for the role of the Paul Revere of the tax revolt. Far from 
having his finger on the pulse of the average taxpayer, Barr based his populist pronouncement on 
an unlikely, elite source. As a result, his interpretation of the revolt proved to be idiosyncratic 
and largely inaccurate. In his testimony, Barr referenced “taxpayers’ letters to the Treasury” 
complaining about loopholes. But in an interview with Newsweek, he told a different story. “You 
know where I got this idea about the possibility of a taxpayer’s revolt?” Barr asked rhetorically. 
“It was from talking to a lot of bankers who were tired of financing fellows who were paying no 
taxes.” Not surprisingly, given his source, Barr’s analysis of the revolt missed the mark in 
several significant ways. Barr told Newsweek that the revolt was “strictly a middle-class 
phenomenon.”10 But Barr’s concept of “middle-class” was startlingly broad and inconsistent. In 
1969, the median household income was less than $8,500. It took less than $23,000 to be in the 
top five percent of American families, and less than $22,000 to be in the top five percent of 
households. 11  Yet, Barr told Newsweek that the middle-class stretched “from $7,000 to 
$50,000.”12 In his prepared JEC testimony and in a subsequent Saturday Review article he 
penned, Barr put it at $7,000 to $20,000. In his actual spoken JEC testimony, he said $7,500 to 
$25,000.”13 At another point, he offered $10,000 to $25,000 as the range.14 The only consistency 
in Barr’s analysis was his insistence that low-income taxpayers were not part of the revolt. 
“[T]he revolt is not going to come from the poor,” Barr testified. “They do not pay very much in 
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taxes.”15 But, in fact, low-income Americans were perhaps the most likely to be in revolt over 
taxes.  
Far from being motivated by the frustrations of lower- or even middle-income taxpayers, 
Barr’s testimony began with the complaints of those comfortably ensconced in the upper-reaches 
of the American income distribution. “I have met a lot of people in the $50,000-to-$100,000 
brackets in the past few years...lawyers, bankers, corporate executives, etc....  I am continually 
amazed at the fact that so many of these people complain that they are living from hand to 
mouth…,” Barr wrote in the Saturday Review. “It seems that many of these people, while they 
have very high incomes, do not have the capital to take advantage of [loopholes]…. [I]t is not 
hard to understand why they are complaining – especially when they see all around them people 
with much larger incomes paying far less in taxes than they.” Barr noted that his “personal 
experience” made him sympathetic to this group’s complaints, and he suggested lowering the top 
income tax rate from 70 percent – not including the surtax – to “40 percent or 45 percent” in 
compensation for plugging loopholes, which was a far different proposal than the assistance to 
low- and middle-income taxpayers suggested by left-leaning reformers. 16  In part, Barr’s 
mistaken analysis resulted from his total lack of attention to the role that state and local taxes 
played in the frustrations of low- and moderate-income taxpayers. Few of the “lot of bankers” 
with whom Barr discussed taxes would have even considered mentioning the usually regressive 
state and local tax load. In his Saturday Review article, Barr did acknowledge that state and local 
taxes frustrated “people in the $7,000-to-$20,000 group.” For that group, Barr speculated, the 
overall tax load was of primary importance, even if they were “probably” also upset about upper-
income people’s “loopholes.” In contrast, those who were really upset about loopholes and 
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horizontal inequities – two individuals with the same income paying different rates – were “the 
taxpayers in the income brackets between $50,000 and $100,000.”17  
Despite his later, seemingly contradictory, clarifications, the media took Barr’s testimony 
to mean that moderate-income Americans – not “lawyers, bankers, corporate executives, etc.” – 
were about to explode with tax anger. In some ways, the attention to Barr’s testimony was 
surprising. As discussed in Chapter 1, tax experts and labor unions, among other activists, had 
pushed for tax reform for nearly a decade, but both JFK and LBJ and dodged calls for tax reform 
as they passed tax cuts and tax surcharges. With Vietnam, the Great Society, and the myriad 
foreign and domestic dramas of the 1960s, tax reform always seemed to get lost in the legislative 
shuffle. Barr’s testimony was, in fact, less a sign of the inevitability of tax reform than a product 
of its political unlikelihood. The revelations of tax-free millionaires offered by Barr came about 
as a result of Johnson’s agreement to submit tax reform proposals to Congress within a year of 
his surtax’s approval. Congress required the Treasury study in exchange for passing the surtax. 
But Johnson had buried his Treasury’s tax reform study, preferring not to begin the messy 
process of reform with only a few months left in office.18 Barr’s testimony could have marked 
the end of that saga – a last plea for reform before passing the torch to a new administration and 
a new Congress that might have delayed reform just as Kennedy and Johnson had. There was no 
reason to expect that this call for tax reform would be any different. In fact, the IRS had released 
similar revelations of tax-free millionaires in previous years. And influential Wisconsin 
Democrat Henry Reuss and author Philip Stern, among other public figures, had publicized the 
offending loopholes throughout the 1960s. But they had little success in generating much interest 
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in the media or among lawmakers.19  
What made Barr’s testimony different? The word “revolt,” in particular, seemed to 
capture the attention of journalists. An NBC Nightly News report on Barr’s testimony noted the 
“harsh terms” in outgoing Treasury secretary’s warning.20 Newspapers across the country 
foregrounded the rhetoric of “revolt” in headlines and lead paragraphs. The United Press 
International report on Barr’s testimony placed the warning of a revolt in the first sentence and 
the newspapers that picked up the wire story put the term in their headlines.21 The St. Petersburg 
Times titled an in-depth analysis of Barr’s testimony and the factors that motivated his warning 
“Tax Reform – Or a Taxpayers’ Revolt.”22 Such was the press’s fascination with the idea of a 
revolt that, at times, the revelation of tax-free millionaires got buried in the accounts of Barr’s 
testimony.  Indeed, it seemed that the combination of Barr’s “revolt” rhetoric and the prominent 
setting for his remarks combined to bring attention to the public’s tax discontent. However, 
media coverage alone was little guarantee of action for a Congress that had neglected reform for 
years. More than anything, the public’s response to Barr’s testimony would force tax reform to 
the front of the domestic agenda.  
Within days of Barr’s testimony, thousands of angry letters calling for loophole-closing 
tax reform began pouring into the nation’s capital, and the torrent showed no signs of stopping in 
the weeks and months that followed.23 “There’s a big black box ticking away in Congress,” the 
Washington Post reported in April. “It’s made from cardboard and loaded only with letters. Yet 
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it packs the wallop of dynamite. The box symbolizes a ‘tax revolt’ brewing in America.” Placed 
in front of the entrance to the Ways and Means Committee’s room, postal workers dumped 
hundreds of letters into the box several times a day for months after Barr’s comments. They all 
had the same message: “[D]o something about the tax system to make it fairer.” Members of 
Congress were overwhelmed by the public outcry. “I’ve never had more mail on a subject than 
I’ve had on tax reform,” Henry Reuss said.24 Congress was not the only government agency that 
heard from the public either. The Treasury Department, by one estimate, received 1,930 tax 
reform letters in February 1969, 20 times more than in February 1968 and more than it had 
received in all of 1968.25 The president was not spared from what columnists Rowland Evans 
and Robert Novak called “torrents of spontaneous mail demanding tax reform.” 26 One White 
House staffer called the amount of tax reform mail “almost incredible.”27 “I hope that one of 
your first important requests for legislation to the congress will deal with taxes…,” one taxpayer 
wrote to Nixon. “I am referring to a statement that was made on January 17, 1969, by Mr. Joseph 
Barr, Treasury Secretary, quoting some startling figures about the 155 people in this country 
whose tax returns for 1967 was above $200,000.00 adjusted gross, on which they paid no federal 
income tax, and twenty-one of those whose income exceeded one million dollars. It is hard to 
believe these things exist. Wouldn’t it appear that…‘loop holes’ that allow this type of action to 
prevail could be eliminated[?]”28 Another frustrated taxpayer wrote to Fred Harris, an Oklahoma 
Democratic Senator and the Democratic National Committee’s chair, “I as a taxpayer am sick 
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and tired of all these loop holes in taxes that have been appearing in the newspaper…. Myself as 
a small income taxpayer knows that the big money earners don’t pay the tax they should and 
would like this stopped.”29 The phenomenon amazed even veteran political reporters. “After 
years of confining their complaints to gin mills and Saturday afternoon barbecues, the forgotten 
middle American taxpayers have directed them, in letters and telegrams, to their representatives 
on the Hill,” syndicated political columnist Andrew Tully commented. “It finally got through to 
Congress that this year the working stiff will not be satisfied with more promises.”30  
Indeed, many letter-writers cast themselves as members of the beleaguered “forgotten 
Americans” whose votes Nixon and the Democrats were vying for. They also made clear the 
blurry lines separating the local and the federal when it came to taxes. “It is a real injustice when 
there were people who made a million dollars, but paid no income tax,” one Baltimore taxpayer 
wrote. “I make approx[imately] $7,000 and paid about $2,000 of that in taxes. I have a wife, two 
small boys, and a little bungalow with a big mortgage…. [I]n Maryland…in addition to federal 
taxes we must pay Maryland income tax, county income tax, almost $4.00 per $100 property tax, 
3% sales tax (will go to 4% shortly)….” The letter-writer said he had no problem paying taxes, 
but found it “depressing” that the government asked for more from middle-income taxpayers at 
the same time that “those who could pay more escape through various loop holes.” Middle-
income taxpayers were “being pushed to the wall,” he argued. Referencing the male-
breadwinner, middle-class ideal, the letter-writer noted that, because of the pocketbook squeeze, 
either wives had to go to work or husbands had to take a second job. Both options cut into “the 
necessary time it takes to raise a family.” The problems of the middle-class were “only getting 
worse.” Taxes on the rich should be raised if the government by closing loopholes that benefitted 
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the wealthy, he concluded. “[S]omething has to be done to lighten the burden of the middle 
income taxpayers,” such as increasing the $600 personal exemption.31 In part, taxpayers’ angry 
reactions to revelations of the extent of tax-free rich reflected a growing public cynicism towards 
authority and established institutions that extended well-beyond anti-war and civil rights protests 
and into the heart of the “Silent Majority.” So deep was the discontent, that the Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report noted that the public response to Barr’s revelations “rivaled the student 
protests against the Vietnam War.”32 It was only a slight exaggeration. “[T]he only time the 
politician seems to be concerned about the little people is at election time,” a Washington letter 
writer despaired. “I am not surprised at this this [loss of faith in political leaders] by a good 
number of the people when they see the legal loop holes the wealthy use to avoid paying their 
just share of taxes. I realize the middle class citizen contributes very little (except his vote) to 
help the politician get elected, while the wealthy contribute generously to the campaign 
funds…[which] I surmise has a great deal to do with the legal loop holes written into the tax 
laws.”33 Combined with frustrations over their own tax bills, this cynical view of the lawmaking 
process proved to be a potent recipe for tax discontent.  
The public’s support for tax reform was more than merely anecdotal or an artifact of 
unrepresentative letter-writers. A Harris Poll confirmed that “a big tax revolt is taking place.” 
The Harris survey was itself a sign of the times, since few pollsters had asked the public 
distribution-related tax questions since the 1930s.34 According to the Harris study, 72 percent of 
Americans felt that their total tax burden – local, state, and federal – was too high. “The heart of 
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the revolt is among lower and middle-income people who most feel the pinch of inflation but 
who are unwilling to see the spiraling cost of living halted by taxation,” Harris reported. The 
anger was palpable. “Taxes are killing us,” a 38-year-old steelworker in Hammond, Indiana, 
said. “We can’t meet our payments on the house and the car and pay our taxes.” Sixty-three 
percent of respondents also favored ending the anti-inflation surtax enacted by Johnson. They 
objected to it, in part, because they felt that “there are too many loopholes for the rich and big 
companies which ought to be tightened.” Only the affluent, Harris found, believed that their tax 
load was reasonable.35  
After reading the public’s anger in letters and seeing it measured in polls, members of 
Congress experienced it first-hand during a “pulse-taking Easter recess.” Across the country, 
senators and congressional representatives encountered angry voters “discontented over Vietnam 
and disgruntled about taxes and inflation,” as the New York Times put it. The members of 
Congress surveyed by the Times said that taxes were “becoming the No. 1 issue.” The 
resentment cut across governmental levels. “[T]he legislators found resentment over the tax load 
– federal, state, and local,” the Times reported. 36 Taxes were “on everybody’s mind,” as Jamie 
Whitten a Mississippi Democrat put it. “The middle income man feels he is paying more than his 
share,” Arkansas Democrat David Pryor said. “They say, ‘What are you going to do about it, me 
paying all these taxes and these big millionaires getting off with noting?’” Few lawmakers 
encountered any evidence that this tax anger was directed at Great Society programs or 
portended rising anti-government conservatism. In fact, many members of Congress who 
represented working- and middle-class districts in states like Ohio were also reporting a 
“surpris[ing]” concern among their constituents about the possibility of anti-poverty programs 
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being dismantled. While liberal Democrats were the most likely to see the “tax revolt” as a 
distributional issue, in the face of overwhelming public outcry, many Republicans understood it 
that way, too. “Feeling among my constituents is running at an all-time high on the paramount 
issues of inflation and needed tax reform,” Michigan Republican William Broomfield said. “I 
cannot recall when my people felt as strongly as they do now on these two points.” Texas 
Republican George Bush noted the same. Taxpayers in his district, Bush reported, “feel like they 
are overburdened and don’t like the fact that some don’t pay taxes at all.”37   
The public response to Barr’s testimony surprised lawmakers, commentators, and Barr 
himself. “Frankly, I was amazed at the response,” Barr wrote in his Saturday Review article. 
“The idea of a middle-class taxpayers’ revolt caught the attention of the press, and the story was 
played up heavily around the country for a few days. Then the letters began to pour into the 
Treasury and Congress.” “I just touched a very sensitive nerve,” he concluded in Newsweek.38 
Commentators agreed. Editorials in local newspapers across the country called for sweeping tax 
reform in the wake of Barr’s testimony and the public response. “Now a tax revolt by middle-
income Americans has been predicted,” a Eugene, Oregon, Register-Guard editorial noted. “And 
it may become a reality,” the paper suggested presciently, “if sparky leadership emerges to 
champion this cause in the hard-hitting fashion [of] Ralph Nader…”39 The Florence, Alabama, 
Times Daily argued that Barr himself was at least partly to blame for the public’s simmering tax 
anger. “The matter of the extremely wealthy escaping their fair share of taxes, if not escaping 
them altogether, has been going on for years now..,” its editorial read. “The time for action has 
long since past.” The paper encouraged its readers to “ask your Congressmen, Senators, and 
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President Nixon what they intend to do about these greave economic and social injustices.”40 
Even conservative columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak came to accept that public 
resentment with tax unfairness was at the heart of the “tax revolt” and the need for reform. “The 
much-quoted warning of a tax revolt from Joseph Barr, Mr. Johnson’s last Secretary of the 
Treasury, was merely new gasoline in a fire already roaring,” they wrote in a February column, 
citing as evidence the “protest mail pouring into the Hill.”41 Just at the UAW predicted in 1967, 
forcing loophole-closing tax reform depended on “mail from back home.”42 
Suddenly politicians in both parties were scrambling to claim that they, too, were fighting 
for reforms that would benefit the “forgotten Americans.” House Ways and Means Committee 
chairman Wilbur Mills, a moderate-to-conservative Arkansas Democrat, had declared tax reform 
dead in December.43 Earlier in 1968, Mills had gone back on a promise to examine closing 
loopholes instead of instituting the surtax, and – with Johnson’s delayed reform 
recommendations – little hope seemed to exist that the reform process could begin anytime 
soon.44 In an editorial slamming President Johnson for failing to offer reform proposals before 
leaving office, the New York Times also blamed Mills for the tax code’s poor state. “In the past 
ten years, Mr. Mills has talked more and done less about tax reform than any man in the history 
of the Republic,” the editorial quipped.45 Indeed, mainstream Democrats had stalled on reform 
during the Kennedy-Johnson years, despite pushing for reform under Eisenhower.46 Significantly 
for the fate of tax reform, conservative-leaning Democrats controlled the most important tax-
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related committees in both chambers, with Mills heading the House Ways and Means Committee 
and Russell Long heading the Senate Finance Committee.47 As discussed in the previous chapter, 
a wide variety of groups and individuals on the left encouraged Johnson to close loopholes, 
rather than institute the surtax. 48 Wisconsin Democrat Henry Reuss had even attempted to force 
a tax reform bill before Johnson’s surtax bill, to no avail.49 And after Johnson requested the 
surtax, the Democratic Study Group had explored the possibility of closing a wide variety of 
loopholes and raising the personal exemption to as high as $1,000.50 But moderates like Mills 
consistently shot down these proposals. However, just a few weeks after Barr’s testimony and 
the publicity it generated, even centrist members of the Ways and Means Committee began 
talking reform. Republican John Byrnes used Barr’s pronouncement to demand reform in a 
January 30th speech before the tax section of the American Bar Association.51 Byrnes, the 
ranking Republican on the Ways and Means Committee, declared that “a review and reform of 
the [tax] code is essential.”52  And, “responding to a mounting clamor for reform,” as the 
Associated Press put it, Mills announced reform hearings would begin in February.53 But he also 
cautioned that any substantial reforms would likely have to wait until 1970, at the earliest.54 
Washington’s newfound interest in tackling loophole-closing reform, Evans and Novak reported 
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in another column, “reflect[s] how much public opinion has stampeded tax reform,” with middle-
class taxpayers busy comparing “their fate[s] with that of millionaires excused from most or all 
taxation.”55 But, despite Byrnes comments and Mills’s change of heart, not all moderates and 
conservatives embraced reform. 
From the beginning, Nixon and his team were behind the curve when it came to 
understanding the public’s growing tax anger. On the campaign trail in 1968, Nixon spoke only 
vaguely about taxes without offering any specific proposals.56 Nixon’s 1968 campaign was 
dominated by “partisan generalities” punctuated by somewhat more substantive – and more 
liberal – speeches designed to position Nixon as a moderate.57 In stump speeches, Nixon blamed 
Democrats free-spending ways for inflation and high taxes. “If Mr. Humphrey is elected the 
American people will be forced to pay that $50 billion [in Humphrey’s proposed programs] tab 
in higher taxes and higher price,” Nixon told audiences. “In my view, the tax rate is too high; the 
spending rate at the federal level is too high – both should come down.”58 The idea that some 
taxpayers were struggling more than others or that the distribution of the tax burden needed to be 
addressed was not an argument made by Nixon. In fact, Nixon never mentioned tax reform in the 
1968 campaign. His only distribution-related tax statements were in favor of additional special 
incentives – “loopholes” – for various projects and industries. Asked just before his inauguration 
about tax reform, the president elect quipped, “On any realistic list of our priorities, I would 
think tax reform would be pretty close to dead last.” 59  
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Indeed, as Nixon approached the issue of tax reform in the wake of the post-Barr 
testimony public outcry, some observers suspected that Nixon was primarily intent on avoiding 
blame, and therefore was more than happy to let Democrats take the lead when it came to the tax 
reform bill.60 Someone needed to get hurt by reform, Nixon reasoned, and that meant that tax 
reform was just one more opportunity to create political opposition – especially among 
conservatives who were less-than-enthusiastic about a Democratic Congress with the charge to 
close “loopholes.” Hoping to capture some of the political benefits of tax reform while avoiding 
blame for any unpopular measures among conservatives, Nixon met privately in February with 
Mills and Byrnes to let them know that the White House would cooperate with their tax reform 
efforts. Nixon was optimistic about the legislative prospects for reform, telling Mills and Byrnes, 
“We think alike on these matters.”61 Eventually, Nixon would come to regret this hands-off 
posture to tax reform. In the short term, though, Nixon was more concerned with another issue 
that was irking the public – inflation.  
 
Curing the “Cruel Tax” of Inflation…with Taxes 
In January 1966, the Consumer Price Index sat below two percent. But by the time Nixon 
was inaugurated, inflation was 4.7 percent – and rising.62 Nixon and his economic team set out 
on a policy of “gradualism” to deal with inflation, which, they hoped, would slow the economy 
enough to combat rising prices, but not so much as to cause high unemployment or a recession. 
The two aims of “gradualism” were a balanced budget and stable monetary growth. The latter 
goal was influenced by University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman, whose argument for 
the primacy of monetary policy – rather than fiscal policy – in macroeconomic management was 
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dubbed “monetarism.” In Friedman’s view, the private marketplace was inherently stable. Unlike 
the Keynesian practitioners of the “New Economics” in the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, who argued that the government should intervene to counteract booms and busts 
by altering the level and mix of taxes and spending, Friedman argued that fiscal policy was 
ineffective and that interventions of any kind only served to exacerbate things. He believed that 
government policies introduced instability into the system, which – if left alone – would always 
correct itself. 63  The crux of Friedman’s argument when it came to inflation was that the 
“Phillips Curve” – which posited a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment (as one went 
up the other would go down, and vice versa) – was wrong, at least in the long run. The only way 
to stop inflation, Friedman argued, was to manage the money supply.64 The goal for monetary 
policy, according to Friedman, was smooth, consistent growth, not expansion and contractions 
done in an attempt to counteract shifts in the private economy. 65 As he put it famously in 1962, 
the Federal Reserve should ensure that the money supply “rises month by month, and indeed, so 
far as possible, day by day, at an annual rate of X percent, where X is some number between 3 
and 5.”66   
Several of Nixon’s key economic advisers – especially CEA Chairman Paul McCracken 
and Labor Secretary George Schultz – as well as the president himself were close with Friedman 
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and believed, to varying degrees, in the core tenants of monetarism. “There was general 
agreement that the thrust of economic policy should be in the direction of cooling down the 
overheated domestic economy,” McCracken noted, summarizing the first meeting of the 
“Quadriad” (McCracken, Treasury Secretary David Kennedy, Budget Director Robert Mayo, and 
Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin), “though it was recognized that this 
would have to be done carefully and gradually to minimize the adverse effect of these actions on 
unemployment.”67 In practice, this meant restraint in monetary policy and – because Nixon’s 
advisers were not completely sold on Friedman’s “monetarism” – fiscal policy, too, until 
inflation was brought under control.68 By mixing monetarism with their residual faith in 
Keynesianism and dubbing it “gradualism,” Nixon and his economic team temporarily created 
the impression – for themselves, most of all – that they were trying something new and novel in 
the fight against inflation. In reality, “gradualism” resembled nothing so much as the old-
fashioned sound-money Republican economics Nixon blamed for his loss to John F. Kennedy in 
the 1960 presidential race. And it did not take long for the president to come to this conclusion 
himself. 
Nixon was a reluctant inflation fighter. As a candidate, Nixon recognized that inflation 
had the potential to become a political issue – which is why it was the main economic matter on 
which Nixon criticized his Democratic opponent Hubert Humphrey in the 1968 campaign. Most 
Republicans expected that Nixon would carry his anti-inflation fiscalism into the White House. 
For party traditionalists like Dwight Eisenhower, the idea that a conservative would do anything 
other than place fighting inflation first was unthinkable. “I think Dick’s going to be elected 
President,” Eisenhower told a Nixon adviser during the 1968 campaign. “But I think he’s going 
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to be a one-term president. I think he’s really going to fight inflation, and that will kill him 
politically.” But, even upon taking office after excoriating Democrats for inflation during the 
campaign, Nixon was ambivalent about his role as a potential inflation fighter.69  
The new president was leery of any attempts to fight inflation that might cause 
unemployment to rise. Rather than carry on Eisenhower’s anti-inflation fiscalism, Nixon hinted 
early in his presidency that he might prefer to pursue the type of growth fiscalism pushed his 
Democratic predecessors. Nixon had long believed that Eisenhower and the Federal Reserve’s 
excessive concern over inflation had created the sluggish economy in 1960, which Nixon blamed 
for his narrow loss to Kennedy.70 Unemployment, Nixon concluded, was far more politically 
damaging than inflation. “Let’s never get into the position where we accept unemployment as a 
certainty,” Nixon explained to the newly created Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy in 
February. “I don’t go along with the ideas that will see us as heroes on inflation and villains on 
unemployment. That will take us to the point where no conservative will ever be elected again. 
The public has had eight years without a recession and now we have a new Administration and it 
has promised better management. We can’t allow – wham! – a recession. We will never get  in 
[elected] again.”71 Though Nixon did not mention his own presidential fortunes in 1960, he used 
an example from the Eisenhower years to make clear to the committee that there were political 
costs for Republicans to be seen as the low-inflation, slow-growth party. “I remember ‘58,” 
Nixon said. “We cooled off  the economy and cooled off 15 Senators and 60 Congressmen at the 
same time. I recognize the danger of inflation – but there is no way to get a deficit faster than to 
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bust the boom.”72 Indeed, this was an anecdote Nixon would use on multiple occasions to 
illustrate the perils of slow-growth policies.73 “Gradualism,” at least initially, held out the hope 
for Nixon that he could claim credit for solving inflation without paying the political price of 
obviously slower growth or higher unemployment. But abstract economic arguments would not 
win over Nixon for very long. “You can make every argument in the world economically, but 
you have to consider political timing,” Nixon told the committee in April. “Whenever political 
considerations are not present, we can afford to look at things purely from an economic 
standpoint. But that will not be often.” 74  Indeed, those moments were exceedingly rare 
throughout Nixon’s presidency.  
The biggest obstacle facing Nixon and his economic team upon taking office was the 
Federal Reserve and its chairman, William McChesney Martin, whom Nixon inherited from 
Lyndon Johnson. Ostensibly, the Federal Reserve is wholly independent of the White House and 
Congress. But presidential appointment of Fed chairs often ensured close relationships – 
especially ideological similarities and policy cooperation – between chairs and presidential 
administrations. Most importantly, presidents felt dependent on the Fed to pursue policies that 
would dovetail with their domestic objectives and help – or at least not hurt – their political 
fortunes by ensuring a healthy economy. In practice, this meant informal coordination of an 
administrations’ fiscal policies and the Fed’s monetary policies. But this relationship still 
operated with the clear understanding that the Fed was an independent body. If the White House 
or Congress disagreed with the Fed’s actions, it had no legal recourse to shift it. And the 
expectation existed that the White House would not attempt to do so – or even publicly express 
its disapproval with the Fed’s choices. Perhaps more than any other administration before or 
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after it, though, the Nixon team did not believe in the Fed’s independence. In February 1969, 
Nixon explained to his economic team that they needed to “influence the Fed.” Arthur Burns – 
Nixon’s closest confident on economic policies dating to their time in the Eisenhower 
administration – agreed with the president. Burns recalled how the anti-inflation Eisenhower had 
always talked about the independence of the Fed. There was a problem with that, though, 
according to Burns. “They begin to believe it,” he quipped. “Let’s not make that mistake and talk 
about the independence of the Fed again.”75  
Nixon would not repeat that mistake. But Federal Reserve Chairman Martin did not seem 
willing to relinquish his independence. Martin believed that a determined effort of tight money 
was the only way to restrain upward pressure on prices and break the country’s “inflationary 
psychology” – the expectations of businesses, consumers, and workers that inflation would 
continue. When Nixon took office, Martin and the Fed were raising interest rate – making it 
more expensive to borrow money. The Federal Funds Rate – the interest rate most directly 
controlled by the Fed – had been climbing steadily throughout 1968, but it shot up quickly after 
Nixon took office, from just over six percent in January to nearly nine percent in June. The 
money supply was flattening out, too, and the annual rate of growth in the money stock was 
falling.76  
Martin’s commitment to fight inflation at all costs frustrated Nixon. Tight money meant 
high interest rates, which impacted the housing market and consumer borrowing – a significant 
political concern. The “Federal Reserve squeeze” of a rising Federal Funds Rate was gradually 
working its way into the economy. By mid-January, banks had raised their prime rate – the 
minimum rates charged to loans on businesses – three times in five weeks, driving it to 7 percent, 
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the highest level in its 40-year history.77 Banks continued raising their rates. By March the prime 
rate hit 7.5 percent.78 “Bankers expect higher charges to spread to all types of consumer and 
mortgage loans,” U.S. News and World Report noted, suggesting that “the squeeze on borrowers 
seems likely to get even tighter.” 79 That was exactly what worried the Nixon team. In late-
January, HUD Secretary George Romney announced an “emergency” increase in the interest rate 
ceiling on government-backed mortgages, from 6.75 percent to 7.5 percent in order to increase 
the flow of mortgages into the housing market.80 But some states had usury laws with limits 
lower than the new 7 percent federal ceiling, meaning that HUD’s change had little effect on 
increasing the flow of money into housing markets in states like Michigan, Illinois, and New 
York.81 Even in states that could accommodate the new FHA ceiling, the situation was far from 
ideal, especially for working- and middle-class Americans, who were seeing the dream of home 
ownership climb further out of reach with each upward tick in the interest rates. “High interest 
rates have eliminated the lower class from the housing market and are quickly eliminating the 
middle class from the market too,” a Fairfield, Connecticut, homebuilder explained at the 1969 
meeting of the National Association of Homebuilders. Hikes in interest rate ceilings made 
buying a home “easier but more costly,” as the Associated Press put it.82 “People will now have 
to earn about $1,000 more a year to qualify for FHA loans,” a D.C. homebuilder told the U.S. 
News and World Report. “And those previously on the border line will be cut off from buying 
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homes they need.” 83 The situation was hardly promising for a presidential administration hoping 
to woo the “forgotten Americans,” many of whom lived near that “border line.” 
The White House hoped that if it demonstrated an unswerving commitment to fiscal 
responsibility that Martin would loosen his grip on the monetary reigns. “The administration is 
determined to contain the inflation that pushed interest rates to the highest level in history,” 
Romney said when he announced the hike in the interest rate ceiling. “As the anti-inflationary 
budget and monetary policies take effect and the excessive steam is removed from the economy, 
all interest rates – not just mortgage rates – can be expected to return to more normal levels.”84 
Unfortunately for Nixon, securing the budget half of that “anti-inflationary” plan meant securing 
an extension of Johnson’s inflation-fighting 10-percent income “surtax.” Nixon had run against 
the unpopular tax during the 1968 campaign. But, even before taking office, the new president 
had reluctantly agreed to support its extension, at least in part due to personal appeals from 
Johnson and Wilbur Mills. True to his word, immediately upon taking office Nixon began 
working behind the scenes to secure congressional support for an extension of the surtax through 
June 1970.85  
But it quickly became clear to Nixon that ushering the surtax through Congress would not 
be easy. Nixon’s surtax extension was even less appealing than Johnson’s original, since it was, 
in effect, more than three percent higher than LBJ’s. Johnson’s 10 percent surtax only applied to 
nine months of 1969, while Nixon’s would apply to all 12 months of 1970.86 Burned once by a 
president who had promised reforms in exchange for a surtax and buoyed by the public outcry 
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for reform, some congressional Democrats were now hinting that they would not accept a delay 
in tax reform any longer – especially after Barr’s embarrassing testimony – no matter how badly 
Nixon wanted the surtax extended.87 In a speech to the Detroit Economic Club in April, Ted 
Kennedy, one of Nixon’s biggest political enemies, grabbed headlines by pledging to make 
extension of the surtax conditional on tax reform.88 Kennedy was only one of many Democrats 
linking the two issues. Rumors had swirled for weeks that Henry Reuss would attempt to delay 
the surtax until reform had passed the House. And it seemed clear that Kennedy and Reuss were 
not the only Democrats with the idea. 89  Nixon’s only path to the surtax, it seemed, was through 
reform. 
 
The Left, the Center, and the Case for Bold Reform 
Labor unions, left-leaning activists, and populist Democrats – all of whom had been 
pushing progressive reform for years – enthusiastically welcomed the sudden attention to the 
unfairness of the U.S. tax system. Barr’s testimony and the public backlash that followed 
provided the type of opening for which left-distributionist reformers had been longing since the 
failed reform efforts surrounding the Kennedy tax cuts and the Johnson surtax. Now, the 
reformers hoped, the tax discussion could be moved away from fiscalism, of either the 
Eisenhower or Kennedy variety, and towards a more distribution-conscious framing.  
Sensing opportunity, left-distributionist reformers moved to amplify the public’s 
discontent and propose alternatives to fiscalism. The liberal Democratic Study Group publicized 
the revelation that 24,084 Americans with incomes over $10,000 paid no income taxes, including 
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21 millionaires, by dubbing the latter the “Twenty-One Club.”90 As tax reform hearings began in 
Mills’s House Ways and Means Committee and the media, the labor-liberal coalition made its 
case for sweeping loophole-closing reforms and relief for low- and middle-income taxpayers. 
Labor unions, in particular, pushed hard for radical reforms in 1969, especially the UAW. 
“Americans have tax reform running out of their ears these days…,” the UAW Washington 
Report declared in February, before hearings began. “It’s a whole new legislative ball game. Tax 
reform is in the air…. And thus everybody from Nixon to Wilbur Mills, from John Byrnes to 
Sen. Ted Kennedy is coming on strong with tax reform.” Finally, after pushing for years, it 
seemed reform was certain. The big questions, the UAW told its members, were “how much and 
how far.” The UAW warned that “special interest lobbyists will troop to Capitol Hill in droves 
with hard luck stories about how tax concessions are in the national interest,” meaning that “the 
voice of the average American taxpayer may get lost in the shuffle during the hearings.”91  
UAW president Walter Reuther advanced a distributionist understanding of the tax revolt 
and called for sweeping reforms in his long, detailed Ways and Means testimony. In discussing 
taxpayers’ discontent, Reuther painted a portrait of justifiable outrage, rather than nascent 
conservatism. With the surtax and other recent tax increases, “the ordinary taxpayers’ burden is 
becoming increasingly difficult for him to bear,” Reuther said. The issue was not simply the 
level of taxes, but the distribution of the tax burden across all levels of government. State and 
local taxes, were “especially onerous,” Reuther said, because they were “regressive in nature.” 
When combined with the level of taxes and the tax mix, the loopholes in the tax code proved to 
be too much for average taxpayers to tolerate. Yet, Americans were not inherently anti-tax or 
anti-government, Reuther argued. “American taxpayers…[who] find them [taxes] going up at the 
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state and local level, at the federal level…would carry that heavy burden if they 
believed…everyone else was carrying his proportionate share,” Reuther said. “But when you 
have a system that taxes the poor deeper into poverty, that places a disproportionately heavy 
portion of the tax burden upon low-income families, moderate-income families and middle-
income families, while permitting many wealthy families and wealthy individuals to escape their 
tax obligations and providing wealthy corporations with large tax loopholes…then you have 
what we believe to be an intolerable and indefensible tax structure.” For decades, taxpayers had 
been told that rising taxes were essential to pay for the war in Vietnam or vital services, Reuther 
continued, but now “they look about them and they see people with very large incomes…who do 
not pay their taxes.” That, Reuther testified, was “the essential source of the growing taxpayers’ 
revolt.”  
To illustrate his point, Reuther presented a graph of effective federal income tax rates 
culled from the Johnson administration’s Treasury studies that showed how the difference 
between the effective rate and the statutory rate grew as income rose. Low- and middle-income 
taxpayers paid what the law called for, Reuther said, while the rich used loopholes to pay far 
less. Reuther also cited the December 1968 U.S. News & World Report estimation of the total tax 
burden that showed that low- and middle-income taxpayers paid higher average tax burdens than 
the rich when taxes from all levels of government were considered. For a time, the public just 
suspected that this was the case. Now, testimony like Barr’s and reports in the media were 
confirming Americans’ suspicions that something was fundamentally rotten in the U.S. tax 
system. “[T]he American people at one time believed that we had essentially a tax system that 
was progressive…and now they find out differently – and this is every day in the press,” Reuther 






and more the American people understand that while they are paying their taxes, that there are 
more than 12,000 taxpayers based upon the 1966 figures who had an income averaging over 
$35,000 a year and paid no taxes whatsoever.” Americans understood “for the first time,” 
Reuther said, that the tax system was “in theory progressive,” but “in practice regressive,” and 
they were not happy about it. “The people see these tax inequities and they are justifiable angry. 
They are going to get angrier unless Congress acts…,” Reuther warned. “The deep rumblings of 
a taxpayers’ revolt are becoming more audible as the small- and middle-income homeowner is 
forced to carry a disproportionate share of the tax burden while the rich, by taking advantage of 
the many tax loopholes available to them, escape paying their fair share.”  
Like his diagnosis, Reuther’s solutions were decidedly left-distributionist. The UAW 
head proposed providing tax relief in the form of tax credits targeted to low- and middle-income 
taxpayers, instead of deductions that benefitted the rich, too. He also proposed an increase in the 
personal exemption – from $600 to $1,800, plus $900 for each dependent. To finance these relief 
measures, Reuther called for closing numerous loopholes, including ending the preferential rate 
for capital gains and deductions for “fictitious farm losses.” Conservatives, however, objected to 
the idea that inequities were really what was upsetting most Americans. Ranking Republican 
John Byrnes argued to Reuther that the “tax revolt” had more to do with the level of taxation 
than with its distribution. “I don’t find many people paying taxes that aren’t saying that the 
burden is heavy,” Byrnes quipped.92 But neither Reuther nor other labor leaders argued that the 
level of taxes had nothing to do with the public’s resentment. Rather, they were making a more 
nuanced argument about the combination of rising – often regressive – taxes with the drumbeat 
of revelations illustrating the unfairness of taxes at all levels of government.   
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Other unions echoed Reuther’s diagnosis of the “tax revolt” and his calls for reform. 
Joseph Beirne, the president of the Communications Workers of America, wrote to Nixon in 
March to advocate for tax changes titled toward low- and middle-income taxpayers. Merely 
tinkering with the current flawed system, Beirne argued, would do little to tame the nascent tax 
revolt.  “Our reading of the sentiment of CWA members indicates that a tax rebellion may soon 
be the product of gathering discontent over the lack of equity in the tax laws…,” Bierne 
explained. “Working people…must endure an unfair tax burden, and they resent it. The 
American people need a fair tax system – not some day, but now…. During the year of the 
surtax, the rich have continued to enjoy tax favors – while the pressure of inflated prices and 
even heavier taxes has rested on the shoulders of wage earners…. This lack of balance erodes the 
morale of working people, it breeds suspicion and distrust.” The CWA called for an increase in 
the standard deduction and the personal exemption and an end to the preferential rate for capital 
gains, among other reforms. 93  
Jacob Clayman, the director of the AFL-CIO’s industrial union department, also argued 
in his testimony before the Ways and Means Committee that concerns about rising tax burdens 
and the system’s unfairness were intertwined causes of the “tax revolt.” “To be completely 
candid, the tax burdens, federal, state, and local, imposed upon our members are already so great 
we can, indeed, anticipate a widespread revolt unless reforms are achieved and public confidence 
is restored,” he testified. “I get around the country speaking to our members, and I think that I 
can report a noticeable, perceptible restiveness, and frankly a growing sense of indignation. 
Now, it is not altogether against taxation per se, although that is probably part of it, but against 
what they believe to be the uneven and unfair weight of taxation.” Clayman called for an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






increase in the personal exemption, which had been eroded by inflation, to move it closer to its 
original purpose when enacted – allowing for “essential needs.” He also suggested the 
reinstitution of the earned income credit, which had existed prior to World War II. While average 
Americans had seen their wages eroded by inflation and higher taxes, Clayman argued, the 
wealthy and corporations had “been the beneficiaries of a series of ‘Christmas tree’ tax bills.”94 
While most unions supported the same loophole-closing reforms, they differed on the 
balance of tax cuts and spending increases that should follow. Compared to the UAW, the AFL-
CIO supported using the money raised from loophole closing less for tax relief than for federal 
spending. While somewhat vague, overall the UAW’s relief proposals exceeded even the most 
generous relief proposals offered by left-leaning Democrats. In contrast, the AFL-CIO’s 
proposals offered less generous tax relief than the UAW’s plan – though more generous than 
most Republicans and conservative Democrats supported – and earmarked more of the money 
saved from loophole-closing for federal spending. Andrew Biemiller, the AFL-CIO’s legislative 
director, and Nathaniel Goldfinger, the union’s research director, presented testimony on behalf 
of George Meany. “The 13.5 million members of the unions of the AFL-CIO are, almost without 
exception, taxpayers…loyal Americans,” Meany’s prepared testimony began, in almost Nixonian 
language. “They appreciate the value of government, the services of government, the need for 
paying for government. They are willing to pay their share. But they are tired…of having to pay 
the share of…those Americans whose income are greater and whose taxes are lower – the 
loophole set in today’s society.” The AFL-CIO was, Biemiler and Goldfinger testified, “the 
largest organized group of taxpayers in America.” The AFL-CIO’s loophole-closing proposals 
were similar to the UAW’s, including ending the capital gains preference and the oil depletion 
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allowance. The union projected that its proposals would raise between $15 and $17 billion, $6.7 
billion of which it suggested be used for tax relief and the rest for spending.  
Like Reuther, the AFL-CIO pointed to rising state and local taxes as a reason for enacting 
relief targeted at low- and middle-income Americans. “Federal income taxes are not the only 
taxes American must pay,” Meany’s statement noted. “In fact, though federal income tax 
revenues have grown and still loom largest among the taxes paid by most individual, state and 
local taxes have grown at a faster pace.” These state and local taxes, especially “levies on 
property and sales,” hit “those whole ability to pay is the least.” An AFL-CIO study presented to 
the Ways and Means Committee found that between 1963 and 1968 only those making more 
than $35,000 saw a real increase in income after federal, state, and local taxes were taken into 
account, and the lower one’s income, the more one fell behind, with the poorest seeing a 14 
percent fall in income and a worker making $10,000 seeing a 3 percent fall in income. What was 
needed, Biemiller said, was “tax justice.”95 A month after the AFL-CIO’s testimony, the union 
reprinted its tax proposals in its American Federationist newsletter and published it as a 
standalone pamphlet titled “The Case for Tax Justice.”96 It also released a fact sheet, “The 
Urgent Need for Tax Justice” outlining the loopholes the union wanted closed and the relief 
measures it wanted enacted. Like the union’s congressional testimony, the fact sheet made the 
link between loopholes and high taxes on low- and middle-income taxpayers clear. “The biggest 
legislative issue before the 91st Congress affecting the average worker’s pocketbook is the 
federal income tax; particularly, its shortcomings…,” the AFL-CIO “Fact Sheet” declared. “A 
multitude of tax loopholes, exceptions, and special provisions enable high income Americans to 
escape their fair share of taxes – totally escape in some cases – and thereby cause a heavier tax 
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burden to be borne by the wage and salary American. The need for tax justice…is long overdue 
and critically urgent.”97 
As their leaders were testifying before Congress, union locals were taking matters into 
their own hands to press for reform. Reuther pointed to a tax reform petition addressed to Wilbur 
Mills circulated by a Ford UAW local in Detroit. In two short paragraphs, it called for closing 
loopholes like the depletion allowance, the investment tax credit, hobby farm deductions, and 
unlimited charitable deductions in order to aid “low and middle income workers,” including 
increasing the personal exemption from $600 to $1,200. Reuther noted that the petition was a 
“spontaneous local union effort” – some of its suggestions differed from the national UAW’s – 
which proved that the public was genuinely angry. “Members of Local 600 began showing the 
petition to their neighbors and they wanted to sign it, too,” Reuther said. The local received over 
100,000 signatures in just a few weeks from “Ford workers, other workers, housewives, retirees 
– men and women who are angry at the injustice and inequity they see in our present tax system, 
and who are petitioning you, as members of Congress, to do something about it.” Reuther argued 
that the “taxpayers’ revolt” in the U.S. had loose parallels with the “revolution of rising 
expectations” among “have-nots” in countries around the world, including “the emerging nations 
of Africa and Asia.” Both were rooted in the realization that the economic injustices that existed 
were “not something ordained by almighty god,” and could be addressed by action. American 
taxpayers had been “kept in the dark” when it came to the “glaring fact that they were are paying 
their taxes and part of somebody else’s taxes,” but now that they knew, it was causing the tax 
revolt.  
And the Detroit Ford UAW local Reuther cited was not the only local union organizing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







around taxes. Many unions were actively encouraging the “tax revolt” and calling for their 
members to get involved in advocating for bold reform. The 169,000-member New York City 
council of the Teamsters Union was typical. On tax day, the union published a pamphlet on tax 
reform titled “Collective Bargaining Is Not Enough,” which quoted sources like Philip Stern’s 
1964 muckraking book The Great Treasury Raid on the inequities in the tax code. Inflation was 
eating away at workers wages while simultaneously making them pay higher taxes, the union 
charged. “The tax collector does not pay dues to the union, walk the picket line or risk anything, 
but nevertheless extracts his greedy share from every collective bargaining gain made by the 
workers, even when the inflationary spiral alone devours most or all of that gain,” Nicholas 
Kisburg, the union’s research and legislative director, explained. The union calculated that 
between 1956 and 1968, its members received a nominal $30 increase in weekly wages, but 
taxes took $16 of the increase and inflation took an addition $13, leaving a real gain of only 
slightly more than a dollar per week. “Plainly, collective bargaining by itself no longer enables 
the workers to even hold his own, let alone forge ahead and bring about a more equitable 
distribution of the national income and wealth,” Kisburg declared. The “grossly inequitable tax 
structure” was to blame. “It is sheer fantasy to believe that the truly rich are being taxed to 
provide welfare state financing to the very poor,” Kisburg wrote. “On the contrary, it is the 
employed poor, those workers just above the poverty level and the few who have reached a 
moderate level of living, who are footing the bills for the very poor, leaving the rich and the very 
rich relatively untouched.” The rich were “avoiding their fair share,” the pamphlet explained, by 
using the capital gains preference, hobby farming, and oil depletion, among other loopholes. 
“The loopholes and, even more, the tractor-trailer breaches in the tax structure can be plugged up 






the challenge is bringing more dues payers into the fold,” Kisburg concluded.98 Smaller locals 
across the country got into the act, too, including an Oklahoma local of the Communication 
Workers of America, which sent copies of petitions asking for the elimination of the surtax and 
for “Congress [to] take steps to change the federal tax structure to close loop hopes, legal and 
illegal, by which certain people use to avoid their fair share of income taxes” to their state 
representatives, as well as Wilbur Mills, among other lawmakers.99 Labor unions’ bold reform 
proposals, it seemed, had the weight of the rank-and-file behind them. 
 A more modest, yet clearly left-distributionist, reform proposal came from Henry Reuss, 
who distilled many progressive Democrats’ views on tax reform in his Ways and Means 
testimony. Reuss argued that – instead of extending the surtax – Congress should raise the same 
amount of money by closing loopholes, including cutting the oil depletion allowance and 
limiting farm losses, among other reforms. Reuss said the “taxpayers revolt” required a new 
approach to tax policy. Tax reform could be used to fight inflation, Reuss argued. Accelerated 
depreciation, the hobby farm loophole, and the investment tax credit, among other special 
preferences, artificially boosted the demand for – and prices of – certain capital goods, like 
farmland and real estate. The investment tax credit also contributed to high interest rates and 
tight money, he testified, by lowering real borrowing costs for businesses and boosting the 
demand for loans. “It is not fair to ask the less fortunate in society to bear the burdens of 
stopping an inflation in the form of mounting unemployment,” he said. Raising revenue through 
closing loopholes was a fairer way of fighting inflation that cutting the budget and slowing 
growth.100 
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As the Ways and Means Hearings progressed, a flurry of exposes in newspapers and 
magazines reiterated – and, often, amplified – the arguments made by left-leaning reformers. 
Most of the these reports also – often overtly – indicated their sympathy for the nascent tax 
revolt. Time ran a lengthy piece on taxes in April, making it clear that the newsweekly approved 
of the revolt. “In a spontaneous outpouring of popular indignation, citizens by the thousands 
have deluged Washington with complaints about rising taxes,” the magazine noted. “With much 
justice, they insist that the whole U.S. tax structure is inequitable, capricious and economically 
damaging.” Cast against the revelation that millionaires were escaping taxation, the surtax 
extension seemed cruel to many Americans, according to Time, especially when considered 
against the rising tide of state and local taxes. “Last fall, voters showed their ire by turning down 
55% of local bond issues, double the rate at which such borrowing has been rejected in recent 
years,” Time noted. “Youngstown, Ohio, for example, was forced to close its public schools for a 
month because voters defeated tax increases six times.” While rising taxes at all levels of 
government were part of the problem, hikes alone could not explain the tax revolt. According to 
Time, “What upsets Americans most is the feeling that they are being cheated.” The government 
could no longer afford to put off reforms.  By the end of the piece, the centrist newsweekly 
sounded like it was writing copy for one of the angry union locals’ tax petitions. “Inaction 
will…have a corrosive effect on morals as well as public attitudes…,” it argued, “[because] tax 
inequities can only increase today's growing disrespect for institutions and laws of all kinds.101 
And the Time article was only one of many reports on the “tax revolt” that hit newsstands in 
early-1969. 
Like the UAW or the AFL-CIO, Newsweek saw the revolt as the result of both rising tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






burdens on average Americans and the inequity of the tax code. With a cover announcing 
“TAXES: How to Ease the Squeeze” – accompanied by an illustration of a distressed man been 
crushed by a nutcracker held by Uncle Sam – Newsweek ran a series of articles in February 
recounting the rising tax burden on moderate-income taxpayers and the “loopholes” that allowed 
the more well-off to escape taxation. Newsweek’s account was a rejoinder to skeptical 
commentators and members of Congress who dismissed the “tax revolt.” Rising tax burdens, the 
newsweekly noted, were a result of rising living standards and expanded services that the public 
liked. But it was “difficult to sell” rising tax burdens to average Americans because of “the often 
absurd inequality of the present tax structure.” The “middleclass taxpayer…is gouged on one 
side by the federal surcharge, nicked on another by a city income tax and squeeze on a third by a 
new tax levied by the hard-pressed government of his state.” This mass of angry middle-income 
Americans were, as one taxpayer quoted by the magazine complained, “too rich for welfare, too 
honest or too afraid to cheat, too poor to afford slick tax lawyers.” The poor were “soak[ed],” 
too, Newsweek noted, especially by state and local taxes. Corporations and the wealthy, in 
contrast, used their money to “exploit” the U.S. tax law’s “for private profit.” The “biggest” 
problem with the tax code, the magazine explained, was “the perfectly legal way the rich and 
superrich shortchange the IRS with financial razzle-dazzle,” including straightforward methods, 
like taking advantage the “preferential treatment” for capital gains, municipal bonds, or the 
charitable deduction. Average Americans, therefore, had “righteous reasons to complain,” 
Newsweek concluded.102 
An accompanying article, titled “How to Make Millions and Pay Not a Cent” provided a 
biting analysis of the “loopholes” that riddled the tax code, buttressed by anonymous case studies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






in the style of the Johnson Treasury’s report to Congress.  “A loophole, in military parlance, is a 
small opening in the walls of a fortress that permits a defender to fire upon besiegers without 
unduly exposing himself,” the article began. “To the rich man, the tax loophole is a means of 
defending his fortune and income from the depredations of raiding tax collectors. To the 
collectors and many ordinary citizens who have no loopholes of their own, it is an abomination.” 
In an even clearer explication than Barr’s testimony, Newsweek explained that IRS data showed 
that in 1967, “there were scores of people with incomes in six figures who paid no income tax at 
all because of legal loopholes and some were millionaires.” The magazine provided its readers 
with a helpful contrast, noting that “the tax on an unmarried person with a bare-subsistence 
income of $1,700 was 117.40, almost 7 percent of his income.” The story then outlined in plain, 
clear language a variety of the most important “loopholes”  – including the effective 25 percent 
maximum rate on capital gains, the depletion allowance, and tax-loss farming – that allowed 
some of the rich to pay such low rates. Then it turned to a series of case studies. “Taxpayer ‘C’ 
had a total income of $2.3 million. Part was capital gains, the deductible portion of which 
reduced taxable income to about $1.9 million,” one outlined. “Against this, taxpayer ‘C’ had a 27 
½ percent oil and gas depletion allowance of $900,000 which brought taxable income down to 
$1 million. Taxpayer ‘C’ also had a farm ‘loss’ – most of it resulting from a heavy investment in 
new breeding cattle – of more than $800,000. This ‘loss,’ together with nearly $200,00 in normal 
personal deduction, reduced taxpayer ‘C’s’ taxable income to zero.”103 
In April, the New York Times printed a long expose of tax loopholes written by Philip 
Stern – the author of The Great Treasury Raid – provocatively titled “How 381 Super-Rich 
Americans Managed Not to Pay a Cent in Taxes Last Year.” Spread over eight pages, Stern’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






muckraking report was accompanied by cartoons depicting the cigar-smoking, mink-wearing 
wealthy sheltering themselves from the downpour of the tax code with umbrellas made of oil 
depreciation allowances and farm losses. The “tax avoidance exploits” that allowed the “super-
rich” to escape taxes were “dramatically on the rise,” Stern reported. “In just 12 years’ time, 
taxlessness among those with incomes of more than $1-million has increased five-fold,” the 
report noted, “for those with incomes greater than $200,000, there has been a seven-fold increase 
– far outstripping the number of people in each category.” Barr’s “now-famous” testimony 
revealed nothing new, Stern wrote. In fact, it understated the problem. Like the Newsweek report, 
Stern’s Times article went through a series of case studies – some named, some left anonymous – 
outlining the various strategies used by upper-income individuals to avoid most or all of their 
income-tax obligations. By generating paper losses through various deductions and depreciation 
write-offs, Stern wrote, “multi-millionaire tycoons…suggest they are atrocious businessmen” to 
the IRS. Firms facilitating the legal avoidance of taxes had become so brazen that they openly 
advertised that average taxpayers were subsidizing the wealthy. Stern delivered a stinging 
indictment of the political system that allowed these inequities to persist. “Loophole-closing has 
never been a favored political pastime in America,” Stern noted. “Congress has behaved as 
though it had a phobia against it…” Except for a few “modest efforts” by FDR, presidents had 
failed to deliver reform, too. Even LBJ, “with nothing political but his name in history to worry 
about,” declined to submit his Treasury Department’s reform suggestions, even though they were 
so modest that they “sidestepped virtually every tax favor of any consequence.”  
Ultimately, Stern presented the inequities of the tax code as a political problem, above 
all. The rich who benefitted from loopholes were “cohesive, well organized, superbly financed 






millions of dollars can provide.” Average citizens, in contrast, were disorganized. The groups 
that had generally favored “loophole-closing efforts,” like unions, had not pushed hard enough 
for reform. Meanwhile, even the most reform-minded Democrats, like Reuss, only tinkered 
around the edges by suggesting limits to the depletion allowance or capital gains preferences, 
rather than challenging the faulty “principle[s]” behind the loopholes. The question that needed 
to be asked, Stern argued, was, “Why should the work of money be so vastly favored over the 
work of men?... Why is a dollar of capital-gains income different from the dollar of earned 
income when it comes to buying food or shoes – or yachts – or, for that matter, paying taxes?” 
While moderate reformers – such as centrist Democrats like Wilbur Mills – said that “frontal 
assaults” on “sacred cows” were “politically unrealistic,” Stern suggested that the opposite was 
true. “[T]he dismal fate of most reform efforts suggests that…it is the indirect and cautious 
approach that is politically impractical,” he argued, “by its failure to pose questions and issues 
simple enough to spark widespread public protest against loopholes.” Perhaps the only way that 
reform could come to pass, Stern concluded, was “a broad public protest against the tax favors 
enjoyed by the wealthy and large corporations.”104 And, in early-1969, as angry letters continued 
to pour into Washington, it seemed that might just be what was transpiring. 
But perhaps no article seemed better designed to continue stoking the fires of the public’s 
tax anger than New York magazine’s provocative expose of “tax shelters.” Its cover photograph 
showed a businessman siting casually in a white modernist tulip chair. A large cow stands behind 
him on a delicate-looking rug. “It’s murder on the rug,” the cover quote announces, “but it saves 
me $6,000 a year in taxes.” The accompanying article provided a detailed – and entertaining – 
account of tax-dodge schemes, including tax-loss farming. Titled “This Way to the Tax Shelter,” 
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it began with a recounting of a chance discussion the author, Jeanne Webber, had with a “very 
glum-looking man” in an elevator. He was worried that a storm was going to kill his cows. “I 
hope they’re all right,” Webber replied. “I love animals myself.” But the glum man went on to 
explain that it was “not love,” but a “tax shelter” that caused him to purchase the cows. The cows 
needed to live, he explained, so that he could depreciate them. “[T]hey’ve got to eat all the feed I 
paid for to get my 1968 expense deduction!” he exclaimed. Based on her conversation with the 
glum businessman, Webber went to her accountant claiming that she expected a huge windfall of 
money the next tax year. She inquired about “tax shelters” she might take advantage of and 
asked about cattle specifically. “There are lots of tax shelters besides cows,” the accountant 
explained. “Airplane leasing, railroad cares, citrus groves, oil, gas, commodity straddles. It’s a 
funny thing, the appeal cows have. Must be the city dweller’s escape to playing cowboy. Wall 
Street brokers, bankers, big names in radio and TV like Jack Benny, Hugh Downs, Woody Allen, 
Chet Huntley, they’re all in the cattle business. By the way, don’t call these arrangement tax 
dodges. Or tax gimmicks. They’re tax preferences.” They all had the same goal, he explained. “If 
you can find a way to lose money and deduct it from your high income this year, and then get 
your money back in the future in some way that’s taxed at a lower rate, or exempt, you do it,” he 
explained. “[It’s] a very natural reaction.” The rest of the article was a tour through the various 
tax-avoidance opportunities available to the wealthy. Representatives of each avoidance strategy 
attempted to convince Webber that their opportunity was best. The cattle representative, for 
example, promised her $2 in tax savings for every $1 she invested. And all of Webber’s 
conversations with various loophole industries explained the process of tax avoidance in 
excruciating detail.105  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Even humorists found fodder in the inequities of the tax code, the tax revolt, and 
politicians’ struggles to respond to it. Editorial cartoonist Herblock portrayed the tax revolt as a 
1960s-style protest movement of the middle class. In a March Washington Post cartoon reprinted 
across the country, Block showed a frazzled middle-class homeowner hurriedly striding out his 
front door over a paper with the headline “10% Surtax Expected to Stay.” In one hand, he 
clutches a 1040 form, in the other he holds a protest placard that reads “TAX REFORM NOW! 
15th of APRIL MOVEMENT.” A scruffy, sunglass-clad protestor stands nearby. As the middle-
class man pushes past the peace-sign-wearing youth, he says, “One side, Sonny – make way for a 
real revolutionary.” It was one of several Herblock cartoons attacking tax inequities and calling 
for reform in 1969. Another showed a scuffed and beaten low-income taxpayer crushed below a 
giant bag of money with relaxed, cigar-smoking “Non-Taxpaying High Income” man perched on 
top. Nixon observes the scene, holding “tax reform studies,” as the low-income taxpayer holds a 
sign to Nixon reading “BRING US CLOSER TOGTHER,” a play on the famous “Bring Us 
Together” sign Nixon referenced in campaign speeches.106 Cartoonists in local papers offered 
similarly biting takes on the tax code. In a cartoon picked up by numerous publications, a Buffalo 
Evening News cartoonist depicted the tax code as a piece of large Swiss cheese with holes large 
enough to allow cigar-chomping Monopoly man with bags of money to jump through 
unscathed.107 
Like editorial cartoonists, satirist Art Buchwald returned again and again to the issue of 
tax reform throughout 1969. In a March column, Buchwald recounted his visit to a “tax shelter” 
in Texas. Buchwald tricked “Ralston Loophole” to let him look at his shelter by telling the 
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wealthy rancher than he was “doing a piece on the most beautiful tax shelters in America for 
Better Homes & Gardens.” Loophole let Buchwald peek at his “oil depletion tax shelter” – a 
room with “solid gold tables, crystal chandeliers…and a marble floor with a design in the center 
depicting a large loophole” – but it was only one of the ranchers’ many shelters, which included 
a cattle shelter, and a “real estate tax shelter,” among others. Loophole told Buchwald that “true 
American[s]” knew that these shelters were necessary; otherwise the country would be “hurting 
the oil” or making the cattle “miserable.” He had made $100 million last year, Loophole told 
Buchwald, and paid $800 in taxes. “I can’t figure out how it [the $800 tax bill] happened,” 
Loophole complained. “I thought I had all the loopholes covered.”108 In another column, a 
fictitious yacht-owning millionaire “Roger Carat,” explained to the Buchwald that he was not 
opposed to all taxes on the rich. “[T]here’s nothing wrong in paying sales tax on a Bentley or 
something like that,” Carat explained. “But when you start taxing rich people on their incomes, 
you’re getting too damn close to home.”109 For the left-distributionist reformers, loopholes were 
no laughing matter and, increasingly, it seemed that others were beginning to take progressive 
reform seriously, too.   
 
Nixon Begins to Turn 
With a finger to the political winds, it quickly became clear to Nixon and his advisers that 
the administration had no choice but to try to take the lead on tax reform. The White House’s 
sudden embrace of tax reform came about almost solely because of the public outcry following 
Barr’s comments.110 The Nixon administration feared that, if it continued letting Congress take 
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the lead on reforms, the result would be a bill that was both more generous than it wanted and 
one for which it would get no political credit. “Unless the Administration moves swiftly and 
forcefully with affirmative recommendations covering both ‘loophole closing’ and broad-based 
relief for low and middle income taxpayers,” Undersecretary of the Treasury Charls E. Walker 
warned the administration in early April, “the political initiative and leadership on this issue will 
be irrevocably lost to the Congress.”111 Without guidance from the White House, Democrats 
might deliver a reform too bold for Nixon’s tastes, all while garnering the political credit that 
Nixon wanted for himself. Maybe even more importantly to Nixon, Martin and the Fed had 
shown no signs of loosening monetary policy. “I had the impression that our strong action on the 
budget side would make it less necessary for them [the Fed] to go ahead [with tight money],” 
Nixon complained in April. 112 The only way to convince Martin that the Fed did not have to 
carry the entire burden of fighting inflation would be to get the surtax passed, and it seemed that 
for an increasing number of Democrats the two issues were linked. Nixon needed a message that 
would return focus to the surtax and fiscal responsibility, but that would also satisfy the public – 
and Democrats’ – demand for reform.  
Delivered in late-April, Nixon’s tax reform message to Congress began with a bold 
declaration. “Reform of our Federal income tax system is long overdue,” the president said. 
“Special preferences in the law permit far too many Americans to pay less than their fair share of 
taxes. Too many other Americans bear too much of the tax burden.” But, despite the populist 
opening, the rest of Nixon’s address actually betrayed a strong skepticism towards the very types 
of left-distributionist reform that both the left and the public desired.  “Much concern has been 
expressed because some citizens with incomes of more than $200,000 pay no federal income 
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taxes,” Nixon noted in his statement. “These people are neither tax dodgers nor tax cheats. Many 
of them pay no taxes because they make large donations to worthy causes, donations which 
every taxpayer is authorized by existing law to deduct from his income in figuring his tax bill.” 
There was no such thing as a “loophole,” Nixon argued, and tax reform was no place for 
redistribution. “In the debate to come on reform, and in the even greater debate on redirection, 
the nation would best be served by an avoidance of stereotyped reactions,” he continued. “One 
man's ‘loophole’ is another man's ‘incentive.’ Tax policy should not seek to ‘soak’ any group or 
give a ‘break’ to any other – it should aim to serve the nation as a whole.”113 Substantively, 
Nixon’s reform proposals were equivocal, at best. Rather than a full slate of reforms, Nixon 
suggested taking only “important first steps” in 1969, including enacting a minimum tax to 
ensure no one fully escaped paying federal income taxes, a low-income allowance that would 
remove two million poor taxpayers from the federal income tax rolls, and repealing the seven 
percent investment tax credit.  
Nixon’s “slapdash” proposals were the end result of a fraught process that began when 
Nixon tasked the Treasury with quickly drawing up a slate of fiscally responsible reforms. 114 But 
even the Treasury’s modest suggestions went too far for conservatives in the administration, who 
fought – usually successfully – to strip most of the more progressive loophole-closing measures 
from the Treasury plan. Arthur Burns, for example, strongly opposed the inclusion of capital 
gains income in the new minimum tax, and the provision was removed from the proposal. Both 
Burns and longtime Nixon economic adviser Pierre Rinfret opposed the administration’s 
proposed repeal of the investment tax credit, arguing that it actually fought inflation, since the 
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credit encouraged capital investment. “You lick inflation by increasing capacity,” Rinfret said, 
voicing a proto-supply side view, “and not by holding it back.”115 For right-distributionists like 
Burns and Rinfret, however, any measures likely to increase taxes on upper-income Americans 
and businesses were undesirable.  
Indeed, retaining the investment tax credit had been the standard line for the Nixon team 
for months. But the combination of inflation and the need to placate liberal reformers combined 
to sink the investment tax credit. 116 In January, Henry Reuss had called for the repeal of the 
investment tax credit as part of his own tax reform package. The Wisconsin Democrat argued 
that the investment tax credit was unfair and counterproductive. “The purpose of the tight money 
policy,” Reuss argued, “is to slow inflation, mainly in the capital goods sector….but 
[investment] is bountifully subsidized by the government through the investment tax credit, and 
is thus largely insulated from the effects of interest rate increases.” At the same time, Reuss 
argued, the housing industry, small businesses, and state and local governments bore the brunt of 
the suffering causes by tight money and the resulting high interest rates. Fighting inflation fairly 
necessitated scrapping the investment tax credit.117 More importantly – in terms of the Nixon 
team’s ultimate direction – anti-inflation fiscalist conservatives saw the repeal of the investment 
credit a way to fight inflation by raising revenue. Even though their recommendation for the 
repreal of the surtax was the same as Reuss’s, the ideological distinction was important. And it 
was fiscalist conservatives balanced budget-conscious anti-investment tax credit argument that 
carried the day in the Nixon White House – not Reuss’s – meaning that even the most 
progressive piece of loophole closing in the Nixon reform bill had conservative roots.  
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Ultimately, then, the combination of assaults from right-fiscalists and right-
distributionists ensured that the final reform slate offered by White House was an even weaker 
version of the already weak set of reforms presented initially by the Nixon Treasury.118 More 
sweeping tax reform, Nixon said, would have to wait until at least 1970. Any tax reform measure 
passed by Congress this year had to be “essentially neutral in its revenue impact,” according to 
the president. The latter, decidedly right-fiscalist, requirement was strongly linked to the real 
purpose of presenting tax reform proposals – securing an extension of the surtax. Indeed, Nixon 
did not hide this right-fiscalist goal in his statement. “Inflation is itself a tax – a cruel and unjust 
tax that hits hardest those who can least afford it,” Nixon said, perhaps unintentionally echoing 
Johnson’s own characterization of inflation as “cruel and unjust.” “In order to ‘repeal’ the tax of 
inflation,” Nixon continued, “we are cutting budget spending and have requested an extension of 
the income tax surcharge.” Inflation and surcharge – not tax reform – Nixon made clear, were the 
most pressing issues facing Congress.119  
Many in the press panned Nixon’s proposed reforms. Syndicated columnist Andrew 
Tully wrote that the Nixon proposal offered “virtually nothing for the country’s middle-income 
group.” The administration was “smug” in its insistence that its proposals were real reform, Tully 
argued, when its proposals, in fact, fell far short of substantive changes in the tax code. More 
loopholes needed closing, and average taxpayers needed a big hike in the personal exemption, 
from $600 to $1,000 or $1,2000. Moreover, the two issues – loophole-closing reform and relief 
for the middle-class – were related. “The only way the middle-income group can ever shed some 
of its outrageous tax burden is for the government to impose a fair tax on the fat cats,” Tully 
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wrote. But Nixon’s proposal did nothing to move the tax system in that direction.120 
Despite the timid nature of Nixon’s reform proposals, the president hoped they would 
satisfy the members of the tax revolt and mollify the Democrats’ who wanted reform before the 
surtax, all without alienating conservatives or sacrificing too much revenue. It was a tall order. 
But if Nixon succeeded, he would get political credit for championing reform and secure passage 
of the surtax, which would allow the Martin and the Fed to lower interest rates. Almost 
immediately, however, it became clear to the Nixon team that its proposal satisfied no one – even 
members of his own party.  
 
Right-Distributionist Conservatives Fight Back 
Despite the success of Burns and others in watering down the Nixon proposals, many 
Republicans, business groups, and small-government activists believed Nixon’s exceedingly 
modest reform suggestions went too far. Their critiques, both strategic and ideological, were 
grounded in questions of distribution. The most practical dissent came in the form of a private 
objection penned by the Republican National Committee’s chairman, Maryland Congressman 
Rogers Morton. Morton slammed the tax relief for low-income taxpayers, in particular. It made 
no sense, he argued, for a Republican to propose tax relief for low-income voters – who usually 
supported Democrats – while proposing reforms that would hurt the rich. The Nixon 
administration, Morton warned, should not congratulate itself for trying to outflank Democrats 
on tax reform. “Don’t feel you’ve hit a great blow for liberty and the Republican Party with this 
legislation…,” Morton told Nixon and Under Secretary of the Treasury Charls Walker. “[T]he 
bulk of the Republican support ha[s] come from individuals in the $6,000-$12,00 income tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






bracket, and this group of taxpayers ha[s] no enthusiasm for those who would benefit most from 
this legislation, mainly those ling below or just below the poverty line.”121 Indeed, Republicans’ 
most important constituency – business – wanted more preferences, not fewer, for corporations 
and upper-income individuals. 
During “tax reform” debates throughout 1969, business groups pushed for increases in 
many of the loopholes those on the left wanted closed, as well as lower rates for upper-income 
individuals and businesses. In their testimony, Robert W. Haack, the president of the New York 
Stock Exchange, and William Freund, the vice president of the NYSE, argued that more 
preferences for capital gains – not fewer – were what the country needed. “The major economic 
issue confronting the American economy in the late 1960s has, of course, been excessive demand 
and an insufficient supply of savings, rater than the reverse,” Freund testified. “The result has 
been an intensification of inflationary forces.” Whereas some economists argued that the country 
suffered from insufficient consumer demand, the NYSE argued that it suffered from insufficient 
investment. The problems facing the U.S. in the 1970s were on the supply-side, not the demand-
side, Freund argued. Citing economists Simon Kuznets, Freund noted that lower levels of 
economic inequality led to higher consumer demand and, therefore, lower levels of spending. 
What the country needed, Freund implied, was more inequality. The U.S. was “an emulative, 
consumption-oriented society” that was, in effect, being harmed by the economic power of the 
growing working- and middle-classes. High wages and high consumer demand were the 
problem. Encouraging capital investment would tip the scales away from labor and back to 
capital. “Larger savings can also reduce some of the pressures emanating from the wage-push 
side,” Freund noted. “Investments in productive plant and equipment increase productivity and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






technological advances. By narrowing the gap between wage settlements and productivity gains, 
savings help to limit the inflationary push coming from the wages side… [A]ny congressional 
policy which discourages savings compounds the problem of achieving noninflationary 
economic growth.” Lower capital gains rates and shorter holding periods, the NYSE argued, 
would spur “capital formation,” leading to lower inflation and higher growth.122  
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also argued that the tax code should be tilted away from 
progressivity. In the January issue of the Chamber’s publication, Nation’s Business, Princeton 
finance professor Harley Lutz slammed the progressive income tax, arguing that it created a 
slippery slope to socialism. “[F]ederal progressive taxation…tempts the budgeter and central 
planner into daring excursions to regulate the economy and redistribute wealth,” Lutz wrote. 
“With the prospect of a great debate over…so-called tax loopholes…it is time to take a cold look 
at the whole concept of progressive taxes…” The “only justification” for progressive taxation 
was “some political, moral, sociological, or socialist ground.” Those who believed otherwise had 
been “brainwashed.” Therefore, the only way to reasonable “tax reform would involve complete 
elimination of tax rate progression and substitution of a flat rate of tax across the board.”123 The 
Chamber’s vice president and taxation chairman Walter Winter delivered the same anti-
progressivity message to Congress in his testimony. Winter expressed the Chamber’s “opposition 
to the highly progressive income tax rates,” which he said “discourage[d] individual initiative” 
and “impede[d] economic progress.” Instead of the progressive income tax, the Chamber 
suggested the U.S. enact a national Value Added Tax – a form of sales tax widely regarded as 
regressive – and use the revenue to lower income tax rates. Besides supporting an increase in the 
standard deduction, the Chamber opposed even the most modest reforms being discussed, 
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including a “minimum tax” to prevent the wealthy from escaping taxation entirely, lowering the 
oil depletion allowance, tightening regulations on farm losses, and raising capital gains rates.124 
Despite the mail pouring in from average Americans calling for tax reform, most Republicans – 
and some Democrats – seemed sympathetic to the right-distributionist arguments presented by 
the NYSE and the Chamber. Others simply disagreed with the idea that the public was in revolt 
over unfair taxes.  
These right-leaning critics rejected the fundamental premises of tax reform. Instead of 
being angry with the tax-escaping rich, they argued, the public disliked big government and high 
taxes, in general. In the New York Times’ survey of legislators returning from Easter break, 
Florida Republican Louis Frey sounded a contrarian note.  The public, he argued, was upset not 
about unfair taxes, but because they “feel they’re over-legislated and they want a break.”125 Even 
some moderate Republicans agreed that inequities had relatively little to do with the public’s tax 
frustrations. Americans might not want to see millionaires escaping taxes, George Bush argued, 
but they did not want the sweeping reforms pushed by Democrats. “[W]hat the people want more 
than reform is tax relief,” he said.126 This view had support among mainstream commentators, 
too. In an April editorial, NBC Evening News anchor David Brinkley compared Walter Reuther 
and other unionists angry about taxes to “fat cats in $300 suits lounging about corporate 
boardrooms telling each other how the taxes were ruining business incentive.” The spectacle of 
“factory workers, truck drivers, and others complaining bitterly about their taxes” was “a new 
American phenomenon.” With no mention of regressive state and local taxes or Reuther and 
other union leaders’ arguments about tax loopholes, Brinkley pointed to blue-collar workers’ 
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prosperity as the cause of their tax discontent. Thanks to rising wages “more and more union 
members have discovered the joys of higher tax brackets.” Tax resentment, once confined to the 
“rich” had now spread down the latter. Brinkley argued that this working-class tax discontent 
could spark a political “revolution,” and the implication was that the revolution would be only 
about lower taxes, not fairer taxes.127 
The notion that big government was fueling the tax revolt found support elsewhere in the 
media, too. A Seattle Post-Intelligencer column attributed the “taxpayers revolt” to resentment of 
the bloated federal bureaucracy. Rather than close loopholes, “the first thing the Nixon 
Administration should do is fire about four out of five of these flacks,” the column 
proclaimed.128 U.S. News and World Report – the most conservative of the three major weekly 
newsmagazines – provided perhaps the most ammunition for the conservative interpretation of 
the tax revolt. Throughout the year, the magazine interspersed articles about the tax revolt with 
stories about the rising costs of government, from welfare to public employees. “RUNAWAY 
RELIEF COSTS,” one of its headline’s blared in January, “More Millions on Relief…More 
Billions in Costs.” Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Medicaid were expanding, the 
magazine argued – drawing on Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s research – because of irresponsible 
poor fathers and the broken families that they created. While most families on AFDC used to be 
white, it added, “by 1967 almost half of all families and more than half of all children on ADC 
rolls were Negro.”129  
The right-distributionist interpretation of the tax revolt often depended on a skewed view 
of the tax data. In its early February issue, when most newsmagazines were dedicating long 
features to the loopholes in the tax code that allowed for tax-free millionaires, U.S. News and 
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World Report buried its short story on Barr’s revelations near the end of the magazine. But an 
eye-catching table of tax rates by income class accompanied the article. Contrary to Barr’s 
warning and numerous other reports, the U.S. News table depicted extremely high rates for 
upper-income taxpayers. But those who made it to the last three paragraphs of the article would 
discover that the magazine not only used adjusted gross income – which, as the article 
acknowledged, was actually a small percent of one’s total income – but had also removed those 
with high incomes who paid no tax, because, according to the magazine, “inclusion of those who 
escaped [taxes] entirely would reduce the average.”130 If the message was not clear enough, 
earlier in the same issue, the magazine offered yet another graphics-heavy, in-depth reports on 
the “RUNAWAY WELFARE BOOM.” It warned against the New Deal and Great Society 
promise of “cradle-to-grave security.” “Adequate medicate care” and “a decent standard of 
living,” the magazine despaired, was “now being portrayed by federal officials as a ‘right’ of 
every man, woman and child.”131 The magazine continued beating the same drum throughout the 
year. Subsequent issues included an account of the tax revolt at the local level, which it attributed 
the phenomenon to taxpayers’ resentment of wasteful government spending.132 To help make 
sure that was the conclusion that Americans’ reached, another issue featured an account of the 
“skyrocketing pay” for government employees, like police officers and teachers, titled “ONE 
REASON YOUR TAX BILL IS GOING HIGHER AND HIGER.” “More money for policemen, 
fireman, teachers, [and] other public employees,” it explained, “is the trend all across the country 
– often adding measurably to your total tax bill.”133 After all, according to the conservative view, 
what else could explain the “tax revolt”? 
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 In its purist form, this interpretation of the “tax revolt” as a reaction against high taxes 
and big government shaded into the libertarian-conservative view of government that the 
Republican Party had been attempting to distance itself from since Barry Goldwater’s 
overwhelming defeat in the 1964 presidential election. Libertarian-leaning conservatives saw the 
public’s newly publicized tax frustrations as a vindication of their long-held prediction that 
Americans would reject big-government liberalism. This reading of the “tax revolt” was 
tendentious, but it was consistent. Far from disappearing in the wake of Goldwater’s defeat, by 
the late-1960s, it seemed to be gaining adherents. In 1964, small-government Republicans 
rejoiced at Goldwater’s promise to cut both personal and corporate income taxes by a whopping 
25 percent over five years as “one of my first actions actions in the White House,” as Goldwater 
put it. 134 Announced to a “cheering” crowd of 53,120 at Dodger Stadium, Goldwater contrasted 
his “fiscally responsib[le]” plan to Johnson’s 1964 tax cut, which the Arizona Republican had 
denounced as inflationary and voted against – even though it was smaller than Goldwater’s 
plan.135 The difference, Goldwater noted, was that his plan would also freeze government 
spending at 1964 levels. By combining sweeping tax cuts and stringent expenditure limitation, 
Goldwater said, he would “curb the growth of central government” and “prevent the spread of 
federal bureaucracy to the point where it cannibalizes us all.” Under his plan, Goldwater 
predicted, the resulting fantastic economic growth would finance across-the-board tax cuts and, 
eventually, balance the budget.136 In contrast, Johnson would use growth to finance new 
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spending.137 The 25-percent cut was billed as a first-step toward a complete overhaul of the tax 
structure. Goldwater had long used right-distributionist language when discussing taxes, calling 
the graduated income tax “a confiscatory tax” and pledging to “abolish” it “the sooner…the 
better.”138 While Goldwater attempted to finesse his position a little during the 1964 campaign, 
he never backed away from the idea that the progressive tax was, in effect, socialistic, and his 
promised eventual overhaul of the tax structure was understood as the elimination of the 
progressive income tax.139  
By placing tax cuts before spending cuts, Goldwater’s proposal marked a sea change in 
his understanding of the relationship between taxes and spending. Most importantly, Goldwater’s 
shift hinted at the right-distributionism that would overtake the Republican Part in the coming 
decades. For both Goldwater and other right-distributionists, this shift involved a renunciation of 
right-fiscalism. In Conscience of a Conservative, Goldwater had insisted that “principled” 
conservatism dictated that “spending cuts must come before tax cuts.”140 This was the position 
that had been held by Republicans for decades, from Congressional Republicans’ discomfort 
over FDR’s deficits to the Eisenhower administration’s insistence on balanced – or nearly 
balanced – budgets to fight inflation throughout the 1950s. It was a view that was being 
continued in Nixon’s attempt to extend the surtax. In contrast to this anti-inflation fiscalism, 
Goldwater’s 1964 tax plan made Johnson “look like the very model of a fiscal conservative,” as 
the New York Times put it. It represented a dramatic shift away from viewing taxes as a way to 
manage the macroeconomy to viewing them as a method to limit government, regardless of the 
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underlying economics. “It is the first time a candidate for the presidency has proposed fixed, 
automatic tax cuts, rain or shine...,” observed the Christian Science Monitor. “It is noteworthy 
that the senator is not promising a balanced budget every year.”141 This new tax-cuts-first 
approach was credited to Milton Friedman.142  
 In its most idealized terms, Goldwater and Friedman’s intellectual project was smaller, 
less active government. For the GOP’s fiscalists, it was a radical view. The notion that the 
government could accommodate five years of “automatic” across-the-board five-percent tax cuts, 
all while tying the hands of the Federal Reserve to steady monetary growth between three and 
five percent, seemed absurd even to many Republican economists, since it essentially decimated 
the ability of policymakers to counteract ups and downs in the economy. But that was exactly 
what Friedman, Goldwater, and the growing legions of libertarian-inclined conservatives 
wanted.143 When Goldwater presented his plan to the adoring Dodger Stadium crowd, he 
proclaimed, “This proposal offers you a clear choice when you go to the polls this year – a way 
to control government’s spending, a way to keep control of your own purse strings…. 
[G]overnment’s hands do not belong in your pockets.”144 Small-government conservatives and 
libertarians were disappointed when the pubic chose Johnson’ Great Society over Goldwater’s 
starved state. But they kept the faith as Johnson’s Great Society seemed to unravel in the years 
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that followed. From his pulpit in the pages of Newsweek, Friedman continued sounding the call 
for lower taxes, no matter the costs. When other economists said that Johnson’s surtax was 
necessary to reduce the deficit, slow government borrowing, and lower inflation, the title of 
Friedman’s column made his views clear, “Higher Taxes? No.” While Friedman’s “fellow 
economists” told him that he was mistaken, Friedman disagreed. “I oppose a tax increase 
because I believe that the Federal government is already absorbing too much of the community’s 
resources,” he wrote. “We need lower taxes, not higher taxes.”145  
The distribution of taxes, not simply the level of taxes, also concerned Friedman and 
Goldwater, too. The notion that Friedman and Goldwater simply wanted “lower taxes” was a 
perhaps purposeful oversimplification of their ideology. Implicit – and, often, explicit – in the 
right-libertarian view of small government and low taxes was the notion that tax cuts should be 
directed primarily at upper-income taxpayers and businesses. Tax progressivity, they argued, was 
inherently socialistic. Indeed, the Goldwater-Friedman tax plan reflected a clear right-
distributionist view. Compared to other tax-cut plans, the Christian Science Monitor noted, 
“Senator Goldwater’s proposal would have the effect of giving high-income persons and 
corporations a relatively bigger tax break than middle-bracket taxpayers.” 146 Ultimately, for 
Goldwater and Friedman, who got the tax cuts was as important as the cuts themselves.  
Right-libertarians’ views on taxation were related to a larger critique leveled by “public 
choice” theorists of government itself. Rather than motivated by altruism or a desire to provide 
essential services, conservative-libertarian inclined “public choice” adherents argued, 
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government bureaucrats self-interestedly pursued more money and more power. 147 Far from 
being limited to academic theorists, this “public choice” perspective was embedded in the 
conservative worldview offered by publications like U.S. News and World Report. The headline 
for a March 1969 article screamed, “BIG GOVERNMENT – Is It Out of Hand?” and the 
resounding answer was “yes,” for precisely the reasons offered by “public choice” theory. 
Whatever his good intentions, Nixon would not be able to limit the size of government, or even 
make it more efficient, the magazine argued. The government was “impenetrable,” “vast,” and 
“swollen,” all because government employees sought to “expand the importance – and resulting 
pay – of their jobs.”148 Quoting New York University management theorists Peter Drucker, the 
magazine said that government expansion was driven by bureaucrats’ “desire for power [and] 
their own narrow vision.”149  
This view was echoed in other right-libertarian publications. In the Foundation for 
Economic Education’s The Freeman, journalist and Wall Street Journal contributor William 
Henry Chamberlin argued in a February 1969 article that was picked up by a few local 
newspapers across the country that “the squeeze on the middle class” was caused by high-taxes 
that resulted from bloated government. “[T]he middle  class finds itself more and more ground 
between the two millstones of inflation and ever higher taxes at all levels…,” Chamberlin wrote, 
all because “government bureaucrats [believe they] can spend an individual’s money better than 
he would spend or save that money himself it were not siphoned off in taxes.” This 
“backbreaking [tax] burden” was a “ingenious schem[e] for taking what other have earned.” That 
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money went to fund “people on the welfare rolls,” public employees who “hold up an almost 
empty municipal treasury for raises all out of proposition with the rising cost of living,” and 
“such sociological experiments as busing children for miles from their homes and rebuilding 
slums he never made.” The only solution was “dismantling the bureaucratic monster.”150 It 
seemed the only way to restrain government, according to small-government conservatives, 
public choice theorists, and libertarians, was to slash it.151  
The conceit of Republican fiscal responsibility – exemplified by Eisenhower 
Republicanism – was built on a fallacy, these libertarian-conservatives argued. “The standard 
scenario has been that the Democrats – in the name of the New Deal, the Fair Deal, or the Great 
Society – push through large spending programs… and produce deficits,” Friedman wrote in 
Newsweek in 1968. “The Democrats then appeal to the Republicans’ sense of fiscal responsibility 
to refrain from cutting tax rates or, as in this case [the surtax], to raise them. The Republicans 
cooperate, thereby establishing a new higher revenue base for further spending. The Democrats 
get the ‘credit’ for the spending; the Republicans, the ‘blame’ for the taxes; and you and I pay 
the bill.”152 Democrats, in other words, were successfully using the government to distribute 
money to their base, while Republicans were failing to do the same. There was only one way out 
of this quagmire for the political right, according to right-libertarians. Government needed to be 
cut at any cost, including deficits or other previously taboo, “irresponsible” outcomes.153 By 
shifting responsibility for controlling inflation to monetary policy, Friedman and his monetarist 
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followers sought to remove inflation – the fear of which scared Republicans into voting for tax 
hikes like Johnson’s surtax – from the realm of fiscal policy, freeing Republicans to slash taxes 
at will. Needless to say, right-distributionist conservatives would direct these tax decreases to the 
upper reaches of the income ladder. If right-libertarians like Friedman had their way, 
distribution-conscious tax cuts would replace the GOP’s anti-inflation fiscalism. “True fiscal 
responsibility,” Friedman argued, “requires resisting every tax increase and promoting tax 
decreases at every opportunity.”154  
 For many conservatives, the tax revolt seemed to indicate just such an opportunity. 
Nearly a year before Barr’s denunciation of the unfairness of the federal income tax code, 
Friedman adopted the critique of the income tax offered by Reuss, the UAW, and others, but 
refigured it for right-distributionist ends. Like left-leaning critics, Friedman argued that the 
progressive income tax was “an elaborate façade…riddled with so many loopholes.” Despite 
progressive rates, total income tax burdens were “much smaller for persons in very high income 
classes…than for persons with incomes of middle size.” Echoing the critique of capital gains 
viewed as beyond-the-pale by even many mainstream Democrats, Friedman noted the inequity in 
the fact that “two men with the same income may pay vastly different taxes – because one’s 
income is wages and the other’s interest on tax-exempt securities or capital gains.” Friedman’s 
solution, however, was not closing the loopholes in the progressive tax structure or taxing capital 
gains and ordinary income at the same rates – it was demolishing the progressive structure itself. 
Loopholes in the current code, Friedman argued, were necessary because of the “steeply 
graduated” rates. Actually enforcing those rates without loopholes “would have a disastrous 
effect on incentives.” Instead, Friedman argued, the country needed to substitute a flat income 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






tax with a single, low rate for the current progressive code. Loopholes proved that “social policy 
directed at eliminating the extremes of wealth and poverty” were doomed to fail. By abandoning 
the notion of government intervention and redistribution, the U.S. could adopt Friedman’s low 
flat-tax, which would be, he argued, “more equitable, vastly simpler, and far more efficient.”155 
Public discontent with an unfair tax code, Friedman hinted, could provide conservative- and 
libertarian-minded activists and politicians with the opportunity to fundamentally transform the 
tax code in a way that would actually benefit the well-off. 
To these small-government true-believers, evidence of the public’s demand for lower 
taxes and smaller government could be found in the nascent revolt announced by Barr and 
experienced by local officials across the country, at least if one looked hard enough. On the same 
day that unions invoked the “revolt” to push loophole-closing progressive reforms – April 15, 
1969 – the growing anti-tax adherents on the right attempted to claim the revolt for themselves. 
The Libertarian newsletter, edited by Murray Rothbard, dedicated its tax day issue to the 
“growing legion of Americans who are engaging in various forms of that one weapon, that one 
act of the public which our rulers fear the most: tax rebellion.” Like those on the left, the 
Libertarian’s staff saw taxes as a potent political issue that had the power to cut across existing 
political coalitions. “Here is a burning issue which could appeal to everyone, young and old, 
poor and wealthy, ‘working class’ and middle class, regardless of race, color, or creed,” the 
magazine declared. For the Libertarian, taxation was “simply robbery” and the tax revolt 
represented Americans’ desire to “cu[t] off the funds by which the host public is sapped to 
maintain the parasitic ruling class,” which was, of course, populated by government bureaucrats 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






– “a gang of thieves.”156  
Given the right spin, the top-heavy, right-distributionist tax cuts favored by Goldwater, 
Friedman, Rothbard, and others on the right could be portrayed as a populist revolution. Writing 
in the Freeman, Lemuel Boulware – Ronald Reagan’s mentor at General Electric – argued that 
taxes on business and inflation both fell on consumers. “The further down the income, savings,  
and even the  relief  scale a  citizen  is – that  is,  the  poorer he is,” Boulware wrote, “the greater 
is the  relative impact  on him of  the  taxes  levied on business  and of  the  tax  of  inflation  
levied  on him through  government  cheapening  his  money.”157 Cutting taxes on business and 
fighting inflation by slashing government, therefore, really benefitted the poor, not the rich. And 
the “tax revolt” predicted by Barr seemed, to many likeminded observers, to be the proof that 
average Americans were beginning to understand this fact. 
Karl Hess – the Goldwater speechwriter credited with the (in)famous line, “Extremism in 
the defense of liberty is no vice; moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue” – contributed a 
rumination on the tax revolt to the Libertarian’s theme issue. “A substantial tax rebellion is 
underway,” Hess wrote. “Far and away the largest share of mail to Capitol Hill as well as to the 
White House concerns taxes – not comments on them, but angry statements of refusals to pay 
either some or all of the state’s lootish tribute.” The idiosyncratic libertarian connected this 
newly discovered federal revolt to the tax crises taking place at in cities across the country. “The 
same thing is happening at local levels in the 50 states where, as a matter of fact, taxation has 
been growing overall at a more rapid pace than even at the Federal level,” Hess continued. 
“Farmers in Pennsylvania, householders in Brooklyn, housewives in the southwest, all have 
mounted direct assaults against organized theft by the state. At the local level the success of tax 
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rebellions is astonishing.” In a dig at Nixon’s “Silent Majority” rhetoric, Hess predicted that 
Nixon would “extol for the ‘quiet majority’ the patriotic, humble, and holy virtues of submitting 
to taxation without so much as a whimper and certainly not a groan.” But Nixon would fail, Hess 
predicted. The current revolt was only the first step in an “evolutionary” process, whereby the 
current anti-tax “rebellion” would eventually become a “revolution.” Now it was only a matter of 
time before the public demanded an end to the terror of taxation. “[T]here seems to be little that 
the state could do about it…,” Hess concluded. “[I]t is the nightmare of the state today.”158 But 
libertarians and small-government conservatives were misreading the public, sometimes almost 
willfully. 
 
The Wisconsin Revolt  
In its special tax day issue, the Libertarian covered the “Tax Revolt in Wisconsin,” its 
name for the April 1st victory of Democrat David Obey in a special election to fill Defense 
Secretary Melvin Laird’s old congressional seat in Wisconsin’s 7th district. To the Libertarian, 
the cause of Obey’s victory was simple. “Everyone is agreed on the major reason for the upset,” 
the Libertarian declared, “the great issue which Obey hammered at again and again – high and 
crushing taxation.” Obey was victorious, the newsletter explained, because Republican Governor 
Warren Knowles raised taxes. Obey attacked “high taxes” and, therefore, won. Candidates who 
hoped to win, too, needed to follow suit and “articulate the people’s deepest wishes” for lower 
taxes.159 The Libertarian was undeniably correct that taxes were the central issue in Obey’s 
victory. But the Libertarian’s reading of how the issue of taxes operated in what it called “the 
most significant American election since last November” was strained and error-ridden. It 
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drastically oversimplified the political dynamics of that particular election, as well as the larger 
politics of taxes in the late 1960s. However, degree of the libertarian right’s misinterpretation of 
Wisconsin special election illustrates just how powerful the small-government ideology was, and 
why – in the face of conflicting evidence – it would persist as a popular interpretation of the tax 
revolt among conservatives and a growing number of mainstream Republicans. 
 While Obey’s victory was attributable to tax politics, it was his call for fairer taxes and 
better services – not lower taxes and fewer services – that allowed him to become the first 
Democrat to win Wisconsin’s 7th district.160 Obey faced an “uphill battle” against Walter 
Chilsen, a Republican “well-known” district, at least in part to his time as a television 
newscaster, which made him “the Walter Cronkite of central Wisconsin,” as a special assistant to 
Senator Gaylord Nelson put it.161 Moreover, few voters in the historically Republican district 
could have mistaken Obey for a small-government conservative.  During his time in the state 
assembly, Obey was known as a “liberal legislator working for welfare programs for the poor, 
medical assistance, vocational education, and more aid to local schools,” as the Milwaukee 
Sentinel summarized during the campaign. Nor did Obey attempt to distance himself from 
Democrats or traditional liberal interest groups. Obey convinced new DNC chair Fred Harris, 
other major Democrats, and liberal interest groups that his long-shot candidacy was worth 
investing in.162 In addition to appearances by Wisconsin Democratic senators Gaylord Nelson 
and William Proxmire, Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy and former Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey campaigned for Obey as part of what the Obey campaign said was an attempt to court 
the “labor and farm vote.” Obey openly acknowledged his ties to labor and support from the 
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AFL-CIO’s COPE. “I couldn’t ask any more of them,” Obey said of organized labor.163 Far from 
running away from Great Society liberalism, Obey embraced it, criticizing Chilsen for opposing 
programs for the urban poor suggested by Wisconsin’s “Little Kerner Commission” because they 
were too expensive and, according to Chilsen, might result in higher taxes. “I’m for open 
housing,” Obey declared. “I’m for the kinds of programs that will enable Negro kids to get the 
kind of education white kids get.”164 
Chilsen, for his part, ran a law-and-order campaign and explicitly tied himself to Nixon 
Republicanism, with some help from the Nixon administration itself. The Republican’s “favorite 
issue,” as the New York Times put it, was campus disorder. Chilsen slammed Obey as an 
“overpermissive” coddler who consistently displayed a “softness toward campus rioters,” like the 
those at the University of Wisconsin. In their only debate, Chilsen declard that Obey “sided with 
the revolutionaries, the disrupters” on campuses.165 Throughout the campaign, he called out 
Obey for his criticism of Chicago Mayor Daily’s handling of the antiwar protestors at the 1968 
Democratic National Convention. Chilsen also grabbed attention with discordant, law-and-order 
themed television ads linking Obey to the “revolutionaries” on campus.166 Many Republicans 
viewed the special election as a key barometer of Nixon’s strength going into the 1970 midterms. 
Chilsen called the special election “a referendum on the Nixon administration.” 167  And 
Oshkosk-area Republican Representative William Steiger agreed. “Let’s not kid ourselves about 
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this election,” Steiger declared while campaigning for Chilsen. “This is really the first test of the 
Nixon administration.”168 The White House concurred. Laird filmed ads endorsing Chilsen, 
while Nixon filmed footage with Chilsen in Washington, which was used for a Chilsen campaign 
commercial. 169 Running strong on Nixonian law-and-order, the trickiest remaining issue facing 
Chilsen was Republican Governor Warren Knowles’s tax plan, which Chilsen had ambiguously 
praised, at least initially.  
Knowles had begun his 1968 gubernatorial reelection campaign by touting his ability to 
balance the state budget without raising state taxes. But his Democratic opponent, Bronson La 
Follette, and Democrats in the state legislature – including Obey – blamed Knowles for local 
property tax increases. In order to balance the budget, Knowles had used “a number of one-time 
gimmicks that could not be repeated,” as Obey put it, “including shifting costs to local 
governments.” 170 At the same time, Knowles cut the amount of state tax dollars returned to 
localities. As a result, Obey, La Follette, and other Democrats argued, localities had to increase 
property taxes by more than $100 million statewide. Instead of forcing localities to increase 
regressive property levies, they said, Knowles could have raised more progressive state taxes. 171 
Finessing the tax issue, Knowles sounded notes of both progressive reform and conservative 
small-government. Knowles backed greater aid to localities, dubbed local property taxes unfair, 
acknowledged “inequities” in the state’s revenue system, and called for tax reform.172 Knowles 
ran misleading ads titled “Sharing,” which proclaimed that “under Governor Knowles more state 
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funds have gone to local government than ever before in history.”173 But he Knowles also 
blamed higher property taxes on profligate local governments.174 Knowles was able to defeat La 
Follette, at least in part because he successfully played both sides of the tax debate. But La 
Follette also suffered from minimal support from state and national Democrats, since many knew 
that former Lieutenant Governor Patrick Lucey planned to run in 1970 – a plan that a La Follette 
victory in 1968 would foil – and, as a result, Knowles’s spending on campaign staples like 
advertising swamped La Follette’s.175 
Democrats like Obey and La Follette predicted that Knowles would have to raise taxes in 
1969.176 They were correct. In the budget released after his reelection, Knowles proposed a 
regressive set of tax increases. Knowles’s proposal did not include any increases in corporate 
taxes and its personal income tax increases were concentrated on the first $14,000 of income, 
with no increases above that level. Obey slammed Knowles tax plan as unfair to low- and 
middle-income Wisconsinites.177 “I think it’s a rich man’s tax plan,” Obey told reporters. “It flies 
in the teeth of the La Follette tradition that those with the most ability to pay should bear the 
greatest sacrifice.”178 After making a vaguely supportive comment about Knowles’s plan being 
“realistic,” Chilsen backtracked, going out of his way to distance himself from Knowles and his 
tax plan. The governor “did not make a single campaign appearance or television tape for 
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Chilsen,” as the Madison Capital Times noted.179 “The governor’s tax plan is not mine,” Chilsen 
said.180 Though Chilsen focused on law-and-order, it was not because he saw himself operating 
from a disadvantage when it came to taxes. In fact, the Republican believed that the tax issue 
would benefit him, not Obey, on election day. Chilsen even told the New York Times that he 
expected to win, in part, for a simple reason – the same reason, in fact, that the Libertarian 
would later say he lost. “[W]e are in the midst of a taxpayers’ revolt,” Chilsen explained.181 
Sounding a small-government theme, Chilsen blamed the country’s woes on LBJ’s welfare 
programs during his debate with Obey.182 
The Democrat, in contrast, believed that the “tax revolt” would help him, not Chilsen. 
Obey recognized that “the only issue that has as much emotional content as campus violence was 
taxes,” and he thought that “the lion’s share” of voters agreed with his progressive position on 
taxes, not Chilsen’s conservative stance.183 Obey’s campaign manager agreed, telling reporters 
that “the tax issue” was “overwhelmingly on our side.”184 Voters did not simply want lower 
taxes, according to Obey. They waned tax reform geared toward lower- and middle-income 
taxpayers. “The main battle that defined the election was the difference between Chilsen and me 
on taxes,” as Obey recalled, and Obey’s “main focus was tax equity.”185 Obey slammed 
Wisconsin Republicans for putting forward a tax plan that would fall most heavily on low- and 
middle-income Wisconsinites and touted his support for property tax relief. Obey predicted that 
“virtually every school bond issue in the state [will be] defeated in the next four or five years” 
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unless policymakers did something to provide more aid to local governments. 186 In the closing 
weeks of the campaign, Obey’s campaign ran a “simple black-and-white [television] spot 
describing the unfairness of the governor’s tax plan that Chilsen had endorsed.” Connecting the 
issues of local taxation to the national tax revolt, the commercial closed with the line, “A fighter 
for fair taxes in Madison will be a fighter for fair taxes in Washington.” It was a paraphrase of a 
line Obey had used throughout the campaign: “How much confidence can you have in a man to 
fight for tax reforms to help low income groups when he does the opposite at the state level?”187 
The tax ad was, Obey noted, “virtually the only spot we ran in the last ten days.”188  
Despite being outspent by Chilsen by a nearly 50 percent margin, Obey won the special 
election, becoming the first Democrat to ever represent Wisconsin’s 7th district. DNC Chair Fred 
Harris and other national Democrats hailed Obey’s victory as a major event, and the election’s 
outcome national television and print media coverage. Given that Republicans had framed the 
election as a referendum on the Nixon administration, it is not surprising that many media outlets 
portrayed the loss the same way. Representing the view of many media outlets, the Capital 
Times noted, “Voters rejected the law and order appeal.”189 But it was not clear that the press or 
even many Democrats – besides those who were already striking a populist stance on taxes – 
connected Obey’s progressive tax rhetoric to his victory. And the Republicans who connected 
the tax revolt to Chilsen’s defeat concluded that the party needed to move even further to the 
right on taxes. Providing the logical corollary to the Libertarian’s interpretation of the election, 
Wisconsin Republicans blamed Knowles’s tax plan for Chilsen’s defeat. But rather than blame 
the regressive distribution of Knowles’s tax plan, Republicans argued that it was the tax plans’ 
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very existence that sunk Chilsen. “I don’t think Governor Knowles could muster 29 votes in his 
own party for a tax increase in the assembly,” a “highly-placed” Republican quipped after 
Chilsen’s loss. 190  Wisconsin Republicans were not alone. At all levels of government, 
conservative Republicans were coming to conclusion that supporting any tax increase, of any 
type, for any reason, was political suicide. At the national level, Nixon was confronting a newly 
strengthened resistance to taxes among congressional Republicans as he attempted to pass his 
surtax extension. 
 
Tax Reform vs. Surtax 
 With a newly empowered populist left and an emergent small-government right, the 
debate over Nixon’s surtax extension increasingly became a debate over the direction of tax 
reform, more broadly. Nixon’s first obstacle was the coalition of populist Democrats and left-
leaning interests groups, especially labor unions, who wanted bolder reforms in exchange for the 
surtax. Even if his proposals were not as bold as the unions hoped for, Nixon believed he could 
win labor leaders over to his side, particularly when it came to fighting inflation. McCracken met 
in an off-the-record meeting with AFL-CIO chief George Meany, United Steelworkers president 
I.W. Abel, and more than 20 other union presidents in April, reminding them that it was “the first 
time in five years” that a CEA chairman had met with union leaders. But the results were not 
what Nixon wanted. “Generally, they felt, and I think with some justification, that the cost of 
aggregate measures (general fiscal and monetary policies) to ease inflationary pressures bears 
more heavily on working people,” McCracken reported to Nixon. The union leaders blamed high 
profits, not excess demand, for inflation. To curb “profit inflation,” they recommended a repeal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






of the investment tax credit. Despite Nixon’s appeals, the unions opposed extending the 
surcharge and recommended “a major overhaul of the tax structure.”191  
Just days after the meeting, Nixon delivered his tax reform proposals and the reaction 
from the unions was swift. Meany released a statement the same day declaring Nixon’s proposals 
“hesitant” and “nowhere near enough to achieve tax justice.”192 Within weeks, the ALF-CIO 
passed an official resolution stating its position and circulated it to members of Congress. “The 
president’s proposals fail to directly attack the major loopholes which unconscionably reduce the 
tax burdens on the wealthy, such as capital gains, depletion allowances, and state and local bond 
interest,” the AFL-CIO resolution read. “And, equally important, though the president’s 
proposals would effectively remove from the tax rolls those whose incomes are below 
government poverty standards, no relief is recommended for those of moderate and middle-
incomes, who bear the brunt of the tax burden.” The union declared its opposition to the surtax 
unless it was combined with “substantial” reforms, such as those suggested by the union its 
Ways and Means testimony.193 In yet another statement, Meany argued that simultaneous 
passage of the surtax and tax reform was “the only way to achieve tax justice – and that’s what 
America’s taxpayers want and need.” The union leader also directly attacked the administration’s 
political posturing, which cast bold reform as the enemy of the inflation-fighting surtax. “The 
administration’s campaign – predicting massive inflation unless this unfair surtax extension is 
passed at once – is pure political propaganda…,” Meany’s statement read. “[T]hose who fight to 
pass the surtax extension…without reforms are the foes of tax justice.”194 
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Behind the scenes, unions also lobbied for tying the surtax to tax reform. Many that had 
supported the enactment of the surtax under Johnson now felt burned after having been promised 
reform in exchange for their support. “Two years ago, this union gave conditional support to the 
surtax,” Communication Workers of America president Joseph Beirne wrote to Democratic 
House Majority Leader Carl Albert. “However…I believe the rebellion against the current [tax] 
system is so strong, a real change must be made before June 30th or the surtax should die.”195 
I.W. Abel, the president of the AFL-CIO’s Industrial Union Department, wrote to congressional 
representatives urging the defeat of the surtax. The time for reform was now, Abel argued, and 
Nixon’s reforms “d[id] not go nearly far enough toward genuine reform.”196 The Machinists 
union also wrote to representatives to make their opposition to the surtax without reform. “We 
consider the vote to extend the surtax without closing the absurd loopholes in the present tax low 
as a vote against the working people of the United States and in favor of tax evasion and 
inequality,” the union declared in the opening of its letter.197 Labor also enlisted the rank-and-file 
in its anti-surtax push. The AFL-CIO marshaled 200,000 members across the country as 
lobbyists, equipping them with “13-point tax kits” to help them make phone calls and send letters 
and telegrams to “virtually all” representatives.198 
Labor’s stance frustrated Nixon and his allies. Given the strength of the union’s 
influence, Nixon worried the tax reform bill would become too bold. “The problem with 
reform,” Nixon said, “is that everybody wants to reform the other fellow’s taxes to make his own 
lower and the rest higher.” 199 John Byrnes suggested that Nixon continue to press Meany for an 
endorsement of the surtax extension. If Meany resisted, Byrnes suggested, Nixon could threaten 
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the union leader by telling Meany that any cuts resulting from the surtax’s repeal would come 
out of “areas of interest to organized labor” and that the administration would purposely 
undermine comprehensive tax reform in 1970 in retaliation for labor’s intransigence on the 
surtax. Even though Nixon wanted the surtax, he was unwilling to torpedo his relationship with 
labor so early in his administration, and Byrnes’s suggestion was rejected. 200 Besides, it was 
increasingly clear to the Nixon team that its problems with the left extended well beyond labor.   
Most left-leaning Democrats agreed with labor on both the reforms and the surtax. In 
early May, group of 54 House Democrats from the liberal Democratic Study Group sent a 
petition to House Ways and Means Committee chairman Wilbur Mills asking him to pass a tax 
reform package before granting a permanent extension of the surtax. The DSG recommended 
closing “loopholes” like the oil depletion allowance and the preferential rate for capital gains. In 
the past, the beleaguered liberals of the DSG had “rarely been ben able to prevail in the House on 
major issues,” the New York Times noted, at least in part because Mills controlled the purse 
strings. But with a torrent of pro-reform letters pouring into Congress, it seemed possible that 
this time the liberals might get their way.201 Byrnes warned Nixon that “Democratic support [for 
the surtax] was disintegrating all down the line.” Even worse, Senator Jon Williams, a Delaware 
Republican on the Senate Finance Committee, told Nixon that he thought the Democrats strategy 
was to “let the surtax lapse, then pass it, thus making it the President’s surtax.”202 The promise of 
a small package of tax reforms now and a complete overhaul later seemed insufficient to satisfy 
many Democrats’ demands for more sweeping reforms immediately.  
But conservative Democrats rushed to Nixon’s defense. Like Wilbur Mills and others, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Harlow to Cole, May 26, 1969, PNWH-2 
201 “54 in House Urge Tax Reform Drive,” New York Times, May 15, 1969; “Extension of the Income Tax 
Surcharge: Strategy and Tactic,” May 1969, WHCF EX FI-11 Taxation [1 of 18 January-June 1969] 






Hale Boggs, a conservative Louisiana Democrat who served as House majority whip, sided with 
the president, not the liberals in his party. Boggs told reporters in June, in an interview broadcast 
on the NBC Evening News, that the surtax extension would have been necessary even if 
Humphrey had been elected and argued that Democrats would be guilty of “fiscal irresponsibility 
at a time when the engines of inflation are really about to run wild” if it failed to help pass the 
surtax. Boggs said he intended to make the party stand for fiscal responsibility.203 Privately, 
Boggs suggested to Nixon that adding the low-income allowance to the surtax extension bill 
might convince reluctant Democrats that they could not oppose the measure.204 Nixon agreed. 
The low-income allowance and repeal of the investment tax credit were attached to the House 
surtax bill.205 But Boggs’s strategy suggestion came with a note of caution about what might 
happen when the real process of tax reform began. “Tax reform to one man is tax justice to 
another,” Boggs quipped to Nixon.206 Nixon wanted neither, but he would happily promise 
moderate reform if it meant getting the surtax. 
Treasury secretary David Kennedy, CEA chair Paul McCracken, and budget director 
Robert Mayo appeared before the Ways and Means Committee in late-May to explain that the 
reform proposals attached to the surtax extension “enjoy[ed] the full support of the president” 
and were meant to be a “substantial down payment” on “comprehensive tax reform.” Kennedy 
warned against pursuing any other reforms in 1969. “We recognize that additional tax reform 
proposals are needed…,” he said. But sweeping reforms in the midst of rising inflation were not 
appropriate. Attempts to use the surtax as leverage to get more reforms than the White House 
wanted were irresponsible. “Linking tax reform with the problem of restoring economic stability 
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through fiscal responsibility and restraint can only jeopardize both,” Kennedy concluded.207 
Luckily for the Nixon team, it had a friend in Wilbur Mills, at least when it came to the 
focus on inflation above sweeping tax reform and relief. In a long soliloquy during the question-
and-answer session following McCracken, Kennedy, and Mayo’s testimony, Mills lamented the 
need for the surcharge, blaming increased federal spending for the country’s budgetary problems 
and inflationary state. The budget needed cut, Mills argued in fiscalist terms. It was better to stop 
spending in the first place than trying to balance the budget after-the-fact with a surtax. He told 
the Nixon team to have their “knife out and sharpened” to make cuts. “For the life of me I do not 
see any greater problem today on the domestic front than stopping this increase in prices. I think 
that is the greatest problem we have,” the Arkansas Democrat said. “It enjoys paramount 
important to me, therefore, over most any kind of expenditure program on the domestic front.”208 
Publicly, the White House tried to portray left-leaning Democrats as obstructionists who would 
be responsible for any resulting inflation. “The president feels that a delay in the surtax will just 
continue to fan the flames of inflation and lead to a continuation of the rise in prices and interest 
rates,” press secretary Ronald Ziegler said in July.209 
But left-leaning Democrats were willing to gamble that the Nixon team was wrong. 
Instead, they argued that the public cared more about tax reform and relief than about the White 
House’s conception of “fiscal responsibility.” As James Burke of Massachusetts put it to the 
Nixon team during their Ways and Means testimony, Congress had attached a tax reform 
provision to the first surtax and now representatives were being asked to extend the surtax again 
even though they had not received the initially promised reform. “During the Easter recess, I had 
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the experience of going back to my district and taking to about 1,400 people,” Burke told the 
Nixon team. “The great majority of these people were concerned about the tax avoidance abuses 
of many wealthy people of this nation. They asked me not to vote for a continuation of the 10 
percent surtax unless tax reform was put through, unless this government kept is promise to have 
fairness and equity in our tax system.” Kennedy told Burke that he could tell his constituents that 
Congress would take up take reform as soon as the surtax was passed. Without immediate 
enactment of the surtax extension, Kennedy argued, there could be “irreparable damage to the 
economy.” “I don’t think that will be a very good answer, particularly to the people in my 
district. In fact, I don’t think it will be a good answer to the people in any section of the 
country…,” Burke responded. “Most of the mail that these members are receiving is from the 
people who don’t mind paying their fair share of taxes, but who object strenuously to seeing 
that…154 persons in this country, each with incomes of over $200,000, did not pay any federal 
tax in 1966.” The public deserved the reform it was promised, Burke agued, not another 
extension of the surtax.”210 Burke was not the only left-leaning Democrat to challenge the 
administration – and Mills’s – view of reform. In an affront to the authority of the powerful 
Ways and Means chairman, Ohio Representative Charles Vanik argued to the Nixon economic 
team, Mills, and the more conservative Ways and Means members that their attempts to stifle 
more sweeping reforms would be in vain. Vanik predicted that the Senate would take the 
House’s surtax bill, with its timid reforms, and turn it into a complete reform package before 
sending it back to the House. Mills interjected, telling him to “look at the record” of House 
reforms. But Vanik did not relent in his insistence that the Senate should make the House bill 
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bolder. “This is, I think, what is needed,” he concluded.211  
At the time, Vanik’s prediction seemed unlikely. With moderate and conservative 
Democrats like Mills on his side, Nixon turned to wooing the Republicans who were beginning 
to move away from Eisenhower-style fiscal responsibility to the libertarian-inflected anti-tax 
sentiment of Friedman and others. As discussed in the previous chapter, overwhelming 
majorities of Republicans had supported LBJ’s surtax bill in 1968.212 Johnson had successfully 
played on many Republicans’ sense of fiscal responsibility – the same one that Friedman blamed 
for sinking Republicans politically. But now that Nixon was coming back for a second round of 
the surtax, many conservatives within the party decided they had enough.213 Unlike even many 
moderate Democrats, who wanted reform, at least eventually, now many Republicans decided 
that they would fight higher taxes of any kind – even a surtax pitched as an inflation-fighting 
measures. “Don’t ask me to vote for a tax,” Republican Congressman Frank Bow of Ohio 
complained to McCracken and Nixon during a White House meeting. “Last year you told me that 
the surtax for a single year would be enough and now you’re asking me to vote for it again.”214 
Nixon’s overly optimistic budget projections – which projected a surplus – had backfired. The 
rosy projections provided ammunition to anti-surtax Republicans and made it difficult for more 
moderate Republicans to convince skeptical constituents that a continuation of the surtax was 
necessary. 215 Nixon had breakfast with rank-and-file Republican representatives on June 30 – 
the morning before the House vote on the surtax – to make a last-minute plea for their support 
for its extension. He explained that he was requesting an extension of the surtax, despite 
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opposing it during his campaign, because “the budget cannot be reduced enough and because 
[of] the inflationary situation.” He reassured the gathered Republicans that he would end the 
surtax “as soon as possible.” Even though it meant higher taxes in the short term, Nixon 
explained that he had reluctantly asked for the surtax extension because he was not willing to 
risk inflation. But, perhaps most importantly, Nixon also hinted that he was on the side of 
conservatives when it came to the debate over tax reform versus tax reduction, telling his fellow 
Republicans that he “considered the present taxes too high.” 216 But it remained unclear whether 
Nixon’s appeal would win enough Republican converts to the surtax to pass the measure and 
save the president the embarrassment of being rebuffed by the rank-and-file of his own party. 
In the House the night after Nixon’s meeting with rank-and-file Republican 
representatives, a heated debate on the surtax stretched on for hours. The addition of a few 
reform measures to the bill did less to convince skeptical Democrats to vote for the surtax than 
Republicans had hoped. Left-leaning Democrats argued that the surtax was unfair. Given the fact 
that it was calculated as an additional 10-percent of one’s federal income tax burden, it meant 
that the wealthy escaping taxation through loopholes would also escape the surtax. They also 
argued that passing the surtax with only a vague promise of reform later was insufficient. 
Positioning themselves as the champions of the taxpayers’ revolt, these Democrats argued that 
reform needed to happen immediately. “I have received thousands of letters and telegrams from 
Indiana and other state demanding that fabulous and, in some cases, fraudulent, loopholes 
depletions, credits, and tax deductions to corporate and millionaire tax dodgers be repealed…,” 
Indiana Democrat Ray Madden said. “Every member of this Congress knows that tax reform 
legislation on corporations and millionaire tax dodgers has been agitated for several years…and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






the leadership on both sides for some reason or other have ignored the appeal of the American 
people for federal tax equity and tax justice.” Had Congress passed tax reform earlier, Madden 
argued, the revenue raised by closing loopholes would have made the surtax would have been 
unnecessary.217 Missouri Democrat William Clay – a former civil rights activist, who would 
soon becoming one of the founding members of the Congressional Black Caucus – made one of 
the most impassioned statements against the surtax. Like Madden and other Democrats, Clay 
argued that closing loopholes would raise more money than the surtax. “As long as the powers 
that be are successful at raiding the pockets of…the low- and middle-income taxpayer…,” Clay 
wondered, “what incentive will there be to seek revenue from the fat cats of the country[?]” He 
argued that the tax revolt was justified. “We have heard a lot of talk about the taxpayer revolt,” 
Clay continued. “When there are 155 people with $200,000 incomes who do not pay taxes – why 
should the ordinary taxpayer not rebel? When he reads about 21 millionaires who do not pay 
taxes, I can understand his fury…. I understand and agree with the taxpayer revolt.”218  
Other Democrats cast the issue in left-distributionist terms, too, arguing that the 
combination of an unfair federal tax structure, rising state and local levies, and inflation pushing 
taxpayers into higher brackets justified the revolt. New Jersey Democrat Joseph Minish said that 
the surtax “merely serves to intensify the already inequitable tax burden borne by the average 
taxpayer.” With loopholes allowing millionaires to escape income taxes entirely, it was unfair to 
ask the “ordinary taxpayer” – who was already struggling – to pay the surtax. “In my own area of 
New Jersey, inflation, ever-increasing local taxes, and the 10-percent surcharge have put the 
great majority of taxpayers in a real financial bind,” he said. “[O]ur tax laws as presently 
constituted soak the last penny from the ordinary citizen while allowing privileged groups to 
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escape contributing their fair share to our national well-being.”219 Washington Democrat Floyd 
Hicks explained that he was opposing the surtax and supporting reform because a poll of his 
district found less than 20 percent in favor of continuing the surtax and more than 50 percent in 
favor of closing loopholes and making the tax system more equitable. “The recommendation to 
continue the surtax is a recommendation to postpone reform,” Hicks said. “In fact, it is a 
recommendation to raise taxes for the 35 million American taxpayers in the $7,000-to-$20,00 
income group…. [I]nflation and real growth [have] pushed these taxpayers into higher and 
higher brackets subject o higher and higher rates.”220 Missouri Democrat William Randall 
opposed the surtax, he said, because “to permit a federal tax structure to continue which lets the 
rich go free and penalizes go free and penalizes the wage and salary earner in these days of 
heavy local and state taxes is not only inequitable, it is intolerable.” Randall quoted 1968 
campaign speeches by Nixon opposing the extension of the surtax and concluded that Congress 
help Nixon “keep his word” by defeating the surtax.221 He was not the only Democrat to the 
surtax debate to score political points on the president. California Democrat John Tunney 
mocked Nixon’s flip-flop on the surtax and his tentative embrace of tax reform. “During the 
campaign the president, in appealing to the ‘silent majority,’ said over and over again that the 
middle class had no effective spokesman…,” Tunney said. “Today we see just how 
inconsequential President Nixon’s campaign promises were…. The administration has shown 
much more interest in the extension of the tax surcharge than they have in tax reform.”222  
Most pro-surtax Republicans and moderate-to-conservative Democrats – including key 
party leaders, such as Speaker John McCormack, Majority Leader Carl Albert, and Majority 
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Whip Hale Boggs – made a simple fiscalist case for the extension of the surtax.223 They argued 
that its extension was necessary to fight rising inflation. Even if the surtax was less than ideal, it 
would help stop “the inflationary spiral which has boosted wages and prices out of line and 
interest rates to one of the highest levels in history,” as Kansas Republican Chester Mize put it. 
Likewise, Virginia Republican James Broyhill argued that “failure to extend the surtax would 
fuel the fire of inflationary psychology,” though he somewhat incongruously argued both that the 
inflation was cost-push, not demand-pull, and that the surtax – which is designed primarily to 
skim off excess consumer demand – would be effective at fighting it.224 Republican minority 
leader Gerald Ford predicted doom for the nation if the surtax was defeated. “Nations have fallen 
in the past because they did not handle their finances properly,” Ford said. “Nations have 
deteriorated, become weak and impotent because they were unable to handle money matters 
successfully.” The Michigan Republican said that the inflationary consequence of failing to pass 
the surtax “terrifies me.” “We need this legislation if we are to continue the fight against 
inflation…the cruelest tax of all,” Ford concluded. “If we fail today, we fail the country.”225 
Like Nixon, the Republicans and Democrats who supported the surtax attempted to 
finesse the fact that they were supporting a tax hike by casting inflation itself as a tax – one that 
they were fighting to cut. “Inflation is the worst tax of all. It is cruel and it is hidden, and though 
it hits everybody, it hits the low-income people the hardest,” Texas Republican George Bush 
said. While letting the surtax expire “would give the average taxpayer a momentary sign of 
relief,” Bush argued, the resulting inflation “would more than offset the surtax relief.” It was not 
the right time to cut income taxes, but it was “the time to cut the inflation tax.”226 Conservatives 
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were angry that some Democrats were now insisting on tax reform as the price for the surtax 
extension. Bush blamed unions. “I am disappointed at the concerted drive by the big union 
official to gun down the extension of the surtax,” Bush said. “We have heard a lot about 
lobbyists today. The major lobbying on the Hill is by the unions.” 227 Bush did not mention 
another group lobbying Congress to oppose the surtax – the National Association of 
Manufacturers. Unlike unions, however, NAM opposed the surtax extension not because the 
business group wanted reform, but because it opposed one of the modest reforms attached to the 
surtax – the repeal of the investment tax credit.228  
Pro-surtax Republicans and business groups had powerful allies among the Democrats. 
“Talk about a cruel tax,” Boggs said on the House floor, echoing Bush. “Inflation is the cruelest 
of all.”229  In an hour-long speech, Boggs attacked both his fellow Democrats’ opposition to the 
surtax and their insistence on tax reform. He argued that the left’s portrayal of the tax code as 
one that punished average Americans and rewarded the rich and powerful was incorrect. Most 
tax loopholes, Boggs said, existed for good reasons, and most lobbyists were doing the public a 
service, not swindling the average taxpayer. “I do not know what a fat-cat lobbyist is,” Boggs 
quipped. Opposing the surtax – given the small reforms – was “like saying to a man who is 
starving to death, ‘Now, look. We would give you a glass of milk and a hamburger but you need 
a streak.’ So we let him starve to death because the steak will not be available until later.” Taxes 
were already lower and fairer than ever, Boggs argued. Congress had also given the public 
“significant reforms” over the previous 10 years, he said, and had cut taxes numerous times since 
WWII. He argued that the public’s complaints about taxes were exaggerated.230  
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Even further to the right, small-government, anti-tax conservatives opposing the surtax 
bill argued – like NAM – that neither the surtax nor the investment tax credit repeal were 
necessary. Instead, they said, budget cuts should be used to fight inflation. Iowa Republican 
William Scherle declared himself “totally and unequivocally opposed” to the surtax. Budget cuts 
– not tax increases – he said, were the “only way” to stop inflation.231 Virginia Republican 
William Scott agreed with Scherle. “If government spending were cut,” he said, “we would not 
have to add to the tax burden of our citizens.232 Echoing Friedman’s admonition that increasing 
taxes for any reason would only feed further spending – not fiscal responsibility – Ohio 
Republican Donald Clancy said on the House floor that he opposed the surtax “because without a 
meaningful and substantial cut in the budget, it will only serve as an encouragement for further 
spending.” Inflation and the “intolerable” tax burden were the result of “excessive spending” on 
social programs, according to Clancy. “We must correctly place the responsibility for our present 
problems at its source and reduce Federal spending…,” he argued. Unlike the surtax, cutting 
spending would not “break faith with the millions or people whose income is being dissipated by 
taxes increases and inflation.” Congress needed to cut its spending and place a “moratorium on 
new, unnecessary spending programs.” Placing “a restriction on the Federal Government” would 
force it to live “within its means,” just as was “expected of any individual or enterprise.”233 
Kentucky Republican M. Gene Snyder argued that an “objective” examination of the surtax 
would indicate that it had failed. Higher taxes drive inflation, rather than fight it, he argued, 
because businesses counted them as a cost and passed them on to consumers in the form of 
higher prices. If anything, the public – and businesses, in particular – faced “perpetual 
overtaxation.”  Congress should cut its “extravagant expenditures, Synder said. “I believe that it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Congressional Record, June 30, 1969, 17804 
232 Congressional Record, June 30, 1969, 17824 






is unjust and consummately unfair to require the American taxpayer to subsidize the furtherance 
of irresponsible spending, gigantic waste, and indiscriminate social experimentation…” he 
declared.234 
After hours of debate, the surtax squeaked through the House 210-205. Only 56 
Democrats voted in favor of the bill, while 179 voted against it. Republicans approved it 154-
26.235 Once it became clear the vote would be close, according to Newsweek, a group of reluctant 
Republican representatives drew straws to determine who would cast the decisive votes in 
support of the unpopular surtax. A relieved Nixon credited “Republican unity” and asked for 
“tender loving care” for the reluctant representatives who voted yes. “We didn’t twist any arms, 
but we did beat a few heads,” Nixon quipped to his cabinet. Like Bush, Nixon blamed George 
Meany and other unions’ opposition to the surtax for the “utter collapse of the Democratic 
leadership” and its failure to get more Democrats to vote for the surtax extension. The Senate 
was still delaying the surtax, but Nixon believed it would pass, because reluctant Democrats 
were getting “absolute assurance [from the White House] that a comprehensive tax reform bill 
will be next in line.”236 With the fiscal crisis seemingly on its way to resolution, Nixon and his 
team intensified their push to convince Martin and the Fed to change course. 
 
Trading Higher Taxes for Lower Interest Rates 
Throughout the summer and into the fall, Nixon and his team grew more and more fed up 
with William McChesney Martin’s insistence on slowing monetary growth. Martin had brought 
growth in the money supply to a near-standstill during the summer, and the yearly growth rate 
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continued to fall.237 Schultz – who was fast becoming one of Nixon’s most trusted economic 
advisers –  warned the president that the Fed’s tight money policy might drive the country into a 
recession that would consume the election year 1970. Inflation was no longer the main concern, 
according to Shultz, since “the policy of gradually cooling off the economy is beginning to 
work.” The bigger danger now was recession.238 It was time to turn from restraint to expansion. 
Nixon was disturbed by Shultz’s report, and he wrote to Burns – whom the president had already 
made clear he intended appoint to chair the Fed when McCracken’s term expired – to ask if it 
would “be too late [to change course] when you take [the Fed chairmanship] over.”239 Nixon and 
his advisers worried that it would be too late – that any easing of monetary policy undertaken by 
Burns would not ripple into the economy quickly enough to make an impact on the fall 1970 
midterm elections.  
In October, Nixon and his advisers met with Martin to make their case for easier money. 
The Fed chairman reiterated his determination to squeeze inflation out of the economy by 
breaking the country’s “inflationary psychology.” Martin told the Nixon team that he knew the 
money supply had flattened out, but that it was too soon to relax it again. “We shouldn't relax the 
pressure prematurely. The risk of underkill is worse than overkill. I personally discount the threat 
of recession,” Martin said. “A chronic inflation would be disastrous. In the long run the most 
important thing is to get rid of the expectation.” This was exactly what the White House did not 
what to hear. “The basic question is when should our policy be eased?...,” McCracken asked 
rhetorically. The Nixon team continued to push for easier money, while Martin demurred. Then, 
as William Safire recorded in the meeting minutes, “Shultz began to needle Martin on his tight 
money policy.” “We had one policy the first four or five months of this year, and another – 
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tougher – monetary policy for the last two or three months…,” Schultz said. “[M]aybe we are 
doing too much right now. I think the right policy is moderate restraint, the kind we had in the 
beginning of the year. Maybe we should go back to that.” When Martin did not respond, Shultz 
repeated himself: “Maybe we should go back to policies we had earlier – they worked – maybe 
the new policies are working too well.” After a long discussion of other issues, Shultz went back 
to “needling” Martin, saying, “I still think the Fed’s policy is too tight.” Martin finally replied to 
Shultz directly: “There's a disease called Statisticaliti[s] that could wreck us. This is not a 
statistical question, it's a judgment question and I have been at this at least as long as you.” 
Shultz conceded that Martin had “been at it a lot longer” and the meeting ended. 240 Two days 
later Nixon announced that Burns would replace Martin at the Fed when his term expired at the 
end of January.241 Nixon would have to wait to get a Fed chair who would provide the easy 
money needed to complement the administration’s fiscal restraint. 
But just as the Nixon team was complaining about Martin’s failure to have faith its fiscal 
responsibility, left-leaning Democrats in Senate – with a little help from their defeated colleagues 
in the House – were making it clear that they would not follow the House in giving Nixon the 
key piece of that restraint, the surtax, unless they got tax reform first. During the Senate’s 
summer hearings on the surtax, Henry Reuss echoed Charles Vanik’s call for the Senate to lead 
the way for reforms by holding the surtax bill hostage in exchange for more a full slate of tax 
reforms. In a quote picked up by newspapers across the country, Reuss implored his Senate 
counterparts to adopt the slogan, “No surtax without tax reform. No taxation without 
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reformation.”242The AFL-CIO also appeared before the Finance Committee also urging the 
rejection of the surtax unless reform came first. Andrew Biemiller told the committee that the 
AFL-CIO executive council had unanimously approved a resolution declaring, “We in the AFL-
CIO will not support any extension of the surtax until it is combined with immediately, 
substantial, and equitable reform of the federal income tax structure.” 243 The surtax, the union 
argued, only exacerbated inequities, since the federal tax code operated on a “triple standard” – 
taxing “ordinary income” at the full rates, taxing capital gains at lower rates, and leaving some 
other types of income untaxed. “A married worker taking the standard deduction whose sold 
income in 1969 is $8,000 in wages will pay a $100 surcharge,” Biemiller noted. “But a married 
investor whose sole income in the year is an $8,000 profit from selling a stock or property for 
more than he paid for it will have to pay only a $13 surcharge. And, if the same $8,000 came 
from interest on municipal bond holdings, the surcharge would be zero.”244 Increasingly, tax 
reformers would successfully marshal the language of working- and middle-class pocketbook 
frustrations to argued for left-distributionist tax reform.  
Though conservative and moderate Senators still viewed the surtax as an essential tool to 
fight inflation, left-leaning Democrats were stronger in the Senate than in the House. Senate 
Democratic leaders like Mike Mansfield and Edward Kennedy insisted that the surtax be blocked 
until reforms were passed.245 In contrast, Senate Republican minority leader Everett Dirksen 
tried to push Nixon’s preferred solution of extending the surtax now in exchange for an 
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agreement to address reforms in 1970. 246 As with Mills in the House, a conservative Democrat 
controlling the purse strings – Senate Finance Chairman Russell Long – stood between them. 
The Louisiana Democrat’s populism was “all-embracing,” as the Wall Street Journal put it when 
Long took over the Finance committee chairmanship. “More than once his considerable 
legislative skills have come to the rescue of some corporation that thinks it’s being downtrodden 
by an unjust paragraph in the tax laws,” the paper reported. “The senator’s skills with a tax 
loophole on occasion has infuriated his sometime liberal allies on the Finance Committee.” Long 
was an unsparing defender of preferences for the oil industry, but, when it came to other 
loopholes, he had idiosyncratic views on reform. On capital gains, for example, he was less sure 
that they deserved special treatment. “If your paycheck goes up because of inflation, you have to 
treat the increase as ordinary income,” he told the Journal. “But if the value of a so-called 
investment goes up because of inflation, you get to pay a lower tax on it.” There were two sides 
of Russell Long, it seemed. He had, in fact, had sounded the alarm on tax-free millionaires back 
in 1966.247  
But in 1969, the conservative side of Russell Long prevailed. Faced with the reform push 
in the summer of 1969, Long hoped, like Mills, to defuse the situation by adding a few 
uncontroversial reform measures to the surtax bill in his Finance Committee before sending it to 
the full Senate, a strategy he believed would mollify the demands of liberal Democrats for more 
sweeping reforms. But Nixon and Republicans opposed even the addition of Long’s minor 
reforms. Unwilling to go to bat for reformers or attempt to craft a comprise bill with the White 
House, Long let a totally reform-free version of the surtax come up for a vote in the Finance 
Committee. It passed with the help of moderate Democrats Clinton Anderson of New Mexico 
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and Abraham Ribicoff of New York.248 Though Long himself did not vote for the bill, some 
Democrats speculated that Long allowed the vote knowing the likely result in order to embarrass 
majority leader Mike Mansfield and, especially, leader Edward Kennedy, who defeated Long for 
the assistant majority leader spot.249 
But conservatives had overplayed their hand. A reform-free surtax extension was dead on 
arrival in the full Senate. Speaking as both a member of the Senate Finance Committee and the 
Democratic National Committee’s chair, Fred Harris threw his support behind the movement to 
block the surtax unless tax reform was passed first. “I think we either ought to attach real reform 
to it [the surtax],” Harris told the Boston Globe, “or we ought to refuse to extend it for a full 
year.” With Republicans unable to secure a full-year extension and left-leaning Democrats 
unable to force a full reform bill before passing any surtax extension, the two sides worked 
toward a compromise.  Neither side achieved a complete victory, but progressive Democrats 
were able to force their more conservative colleagues in the Senate to accept just a six-month 
extension of the surtax, with the understanding that a full year extension would not happen until 
comprehensive tax reform was passed. On August 4, the House abandoned its year-long 
extension, passed the Senate’s six-month compromise, and sent the bill to a very displeased 
Nixon at the White House. If the president wanted a full year, he would have to give Democrats 
more than the cursory reforms tacked on to the surtax as passed by the House.250 Now the anti-
inflation surtax and tax reform were one and the same. It was a fitting outcome given that both 
the media – and many political actors – were beginning to realize that inflation and taxes were 
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the two strands of a pocketbook “squeeze” that was increasingly frustrating all Americans, but 
especially the politically volatile, and electorally valuable, middle-class. 
 
The Tax Revolt, Inflation, and the Pocketbook Squeeze 
 Throughout the spring and summer of 1969, the lingering hesitancy and dismissiveness 
that some commentators viewed the “tax revolt” began to wane, and the idea that a pocketbook 
“squeeze” – not cultural frustration – was to blame for working- and middle-class anger began to 
take hold. While this new “squeeze” interpretation did not erase the old “Silent Majority” 
discourse that saw the white middle class – the “nonshouters” who were “cry[ing] out in 
anguish,” as Nixon put it – as the victims of racial and generation changes, it chipped away at 
this view, creating cultural and political space for a different narrative of working- and middle-
class discontent. Crucially, this new narrative was conducive to a left-distributionist view of the 
tax revolt.  
In April, the NBC Evening News ran a four-part investigation of the effects of the rising 
cost-of-living spread over two nights. For the Nixon team, staking out its place as tough inflation 
fighters, this report could have strengthened their arguments. Instead, taxation and inflation 
mingled in the report as two sides of the same cost-of-living squeeze facing low- and middle-
income Americans. Most significantly, David Brinkley – dismissive of union’s tax complaints 
just weeks before – now struck a sympathetic tone for Americans, including union workers, 
facing the two hands of the squeeze, inflation and taxes. “The government [inflation] figures 
don’t include tax increases. These have been numerous, and taxes often are the biggest single 
item in a family’s cost of living,” the anchor observed in his introduction to the series. “Among 






now being wiped out. The effects are even worse for those living on fixed incomes, mainly older 
people who cannot strike to get their pay raised.” 251 
Though speculative, Brinkley’s comments came close to the truth, and the Bureau of 
Labor statistics would soon document the impact of taxes on the cost-of-living for an average 
family. Though not calculated as a percentage increase by the BLS, individual taxes – state, 
local, and federal – were the fastest-rising item in a “moderate”-income family’s budget (just 
over $10,000 for a family of four) in 1969. Between the spring of 1969 and the spring of 1970, 
individual taxes rose nearly 14 percent for that “moderate”-income family, a much higher rate 
than the next-fastest rising expense, food, which increased seven percent. Individual taxes ranked 
third, behind housing and food, as the biggest single-category expenses for the “moderate” 
budget family. But, in fact, the BLS’s tax category included only income taxes and a few other 
individual taxes, such as the poll tax. Property and sales taxes – the two most regressive taxes – 
were not included in the BLS’ individual tax category. Instead, housing costs included property 
taxes, which the BLS estimated in 1966 to compose 20 percent of a family’s total housing costs, 
on average. But property tax rates varied widely – from a low of 5 percent of housing costs to a 
high of 30 percent – and tended to be lower in rural areas and higher in cities. Likewise, the BLS 
categories for food, clothing, and other consumer items included sales taxes. Taken together, the 
BLS’s individual taxes category and the tax components of housing, food, and other consumer 
good would have ranked as either the largest or second-largest expense (after food) for the 
“moderate” budget family, depending on the local property tax rate (Figure 11).252  
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The NBC series illustrated the intertwined nature of taxes and inflation. One segment 
profiled a Cleveland, Ohio, 33-year-old machinist, Norman Richards, making $10,000-a-year, 
thanks to working overtime in his auto plant. He was paying off a two-bedroom row house that 
he had owned for nine years and had just bought a new car. But thanks to inflation and 
disappearing opportunities for overtime, Richards was forced to borrow money from his 
company credit union to make ends meet over the winter, and he had reduced the amount he had 
been depositing into his retirement fund. Richards’s wife had begun making, rather than buying, 
clothes for their two young daughters, and the family had stopped eating meat. If things kept 
going the way they were going, she was planning to get a job, but she worried about being away 
from her small children. “We were thinking about buying a house in the last couple years but due 
to the rising cost of housing – houses – and the interest rates have gone up, we just can’t afford 
to buy another house right now,” he told the NBC cameras over a family spaghetti dinner. “And 
then you take all the other items that have been being raised: food, gas, clothing. We’ve got city 
taxes now that are added on. Payroll tax. We had a half-percent [city tax] to start with, then last 
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year they increased it to one percent. Ten percent surtax. You keep adding all these taxes onto 
the man’s paycheck and even though he has an increase in wages it’s not enough to compensate 
for the inflationary cost of living.” Like many Americans, Richard had written his congressional 
representative to complain. 
The series also examined the “painful” effects of inflation even on “more prosperous” 
Americans who, as Brinkley put it, were coming to “discover that whatever it was they were 
working to buy now costs too much – houses, for example.” This segment followed “successful” 
suburban Los Angeles attorney Martin Boren and his family, who were experiencing the 
increasingly typical “shock” of discovering that the house they hoped to buy would cost much 
more than expected. After two months of house searching, they discovered they needed to pay 
$10,000 to $15,000 more than they had budgeted. Fortunately, they could afford to pay more by 
reducing money from their entertainment budget and buying new cars less frequently. Many 
other Americans could not. “However much their own income is rising, the price of housing is 
going up much faster,” the NBC correspondent explained. “In southern California labor costs are 
up 15 percent in two years…, land costs more, interest rates and taxes are at record levels. When 
it’s all added up, many families found their dream home is out of sight.”253 
Poorer Americans fared even worse. The series’ segment on the fixed-income elderly 
struck a melodramatic tone. “Age and the high cost of living has reduced them to loneliness,” 
reporter Liz Trotter said as images of the elderly – reading newspapers at kitchen tables, resting 
on park benches – flashed across the screen. “They can’t afford to pay for entertainment. So they 
spend much of their time just sitting…. They are on fixed incomes frozen into standards of living 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






that cannot cope with rising prices.” 254 The average monthly Social Security benefit for a retired 
worker in 1969 was $112 per month and less than $72 for a widower.255 One retiree who 
received $150-a-month from Social Security recounted for NBC how he went to his local 
grocery store on Tuesday mornings to pick up free “damaged” produce and meat before it was 
thrown away by the market. A widow who also received about $150-a-month talked about her 
trouble affording meat, which led her to purchase low-grade meat that tasted “just like soap.” “I 
think it’s really ugly to…say you’ve got to live like this,” she said. “Why? We worked. We 
produced. We gave you children for the war. We vote. Why is it that we should be third-rate 
citizens? Because we are not even second-rate. I’d like to know if they would like to live the way 
we do.”256 A final segment examined the case of a Missouri dairy farmer who had to sell his herd 
a take a day job because of rising taxes and prices. 257  
In August, Life crystallized the pocketbook frustrations facing Americans and, implicitly, 
the political and policy conundrum facing the Nixon administration. Against a solid black 
background, Life’s cover showed a dollar bill tied in a knot, with three green drops of liquid 
falling from it. Titled ‘THE DOLLAR SQUEEZE,” the cover declared: “High Taxes and High 
Prices Make Everybody Feel Poor.” It was a far cry from the triumphal rhetoric of growth 
liberalism that had dominated the early years of the 1960s. Once portrayed as the great machine 
of middle-class progress, now it seemed the American economy – and the government tasked 
with managing it – was faltering. “For a decade, it’s been called ‘the affluent society,’” the 
article began, “but suddenly the U.S. public is beginning to think all those dazzling statistics and 
ever-rising curves are a giant con game.” The Life piece was far from an impressionistic account 
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of discontent. Instead, the magazine commissioned a Harris poll to measure the public’s 
frustrations, and it found “a deep, bitter national resentment over taxes and government 
spending” and the feeling among average Americans that the combination of taxes and inflation 
was eroding their “goals and dreams.” It was, Life argued, “a middle-class revolution in the 
making.” 258   
Americans’ discontent, the magazine demonstrated, was rooted in legitimate pocketbook 
concerns. Between inflation and higher taxes, a family of four needed to be making nearly 50 
percent more in 1969 than it had in 1959 to stay even.259 To be sure, many families were making 
this jump – or more. Median family income increased from just under $5,500 in 1959 to just 
under $9,500 in 1969. But the last years of the 1960s saw a slowing of the trend and, for the first 
time since 1953-1954, the median inflation adjusted family income actually fell between 1969 
and 1970.260 And, for those living on fixed incomes or those who could not count on wage 
increases that kept up with or exceeded inflation, the decade was worse. Even those that found 
themselves a little ahead of inflation were feeling the pinch of higher taxes and prices. A family 
making $10,000 in 1959 and $15,000 in 1969 saw all but $500 of that increase consumed by 
over $3,000 in inflation, a near-doubling of state and local taxes (from just under $600 to just 
under $1,100), and an 68 percent increase in federal taxes (from just over $1,200 to just over 
$2,000). 261 Reporting the findings of the controversial BLS family budget studies, Life noted that 
the financial concerns of most Americans were mundane. The most desired as-yet-unattained 
items for survey respondents were more retirement savings and money to send their children to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 “The Dollar Squeeze,” Life, August 15, 1969 
259 “The Dollar Squeeze,” Life, August 15, 1969 
260 Table 9, “Money Income in 1971 of Families and Persons in the United States,” Current Population Reports P-
60, Number 85 (November 1972). The same trend holds for household income. See Table A-1, Carmen DeNavas-
Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor, Jessica C. Smith, “Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United 
States: 2011,” Current Population Reports (September 2012) 






college. “The result [of the ‘dollar squeeze’] has been to bring most people to a sobering 
assessment of their ‘affluence’ and a gloomy assessment of their chances for fulfilling many of 
their cherished economic goals,” Life noted. The most common excision from the tightening 
household budget was recreation and entertainment, but many also cut back on food, clothing, 
and savings. The deferment – or abandonment – of plans to purchase new homes, cars, and 
appliances, or take a family vacation, led to feelings of being “let down,” according to 65 percent 
of respondents and “anger,” according to 41 percent. But the “real squeeze” was on those making 
less than $10,000-a-year (more than half of all families), many of whom had no discretionary 
income at all after taking care of essential expenditures.262    
The Life/Harris poll and the magazine’s interviews highlighted the complicated politics 
of these working and middle-class frustrations. While many of those interviewed fell squarely in 
“Nixon country,” as the magazine put it, their message was not conservatism, but an amorphous 
populism that, if anything, tiled more to the left than the right. The public reports of the tax-free 
wealthy had, indeed, affected Americans, Life noted, and the magazine’s spread featured images 
of frustrated Americans accompanied by a quotation expressing their feelings on the pocketbook 
squeeze. “The government is run by the rich…,” San Francisco’s Robert Forsberg declared. “I’d 
quit paying taxes tomorrow if there was someone to lead the revolt.” Chicago’s Levi McKissack 
echoed that sentiment. “Taxes are too high,” he said. “The poor person like me is getting hit the 
hardest.”263 The survey found that overwhelming majorities of the public were upset with 
politicians’ inaction on the tax issue, and most believed that the tax system favored the well-off: 
86 percent agreed that “politicians promise tax relief and then do nothing,” 84 percent agreed 
that “the big tax burden falls on the little man,” and 75 percent agreed that “taxes are set up to 
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give the rich tax breaks.” On inflation, Vietnam and federal spending received the most blame. 
Taxes came in third place, indicating the degree to which the public viewed taxes as part of 
inflation rather than as a bulwark against inflation, like policymakers argued. Further down the 
list, union wage demands (51 percent) and business profits (49 percent) were almost evenly held 
responsible.264   
The public’s spending priorities and opinion of Nixon did not indicate rising 
conservatism, either. The top three suggested spending cuts by respondents to the Life/Harris poll 
were foreign aid, Vietnam, and the space program, with more than half of respondents 
supporting reduced spending on each. The top three programs on which the public wanted 
spending maintained were education (60 percent), pollution control (38 percent), and poverty 
programs (34 percent).  Baltimore’s Dorothy Reynolds echoed many respondents’ support for 
domestic programs and opposition to other spending when she lamented, “I don’t like them 
taking money way from little children who need food and having it shot to the moon.” 
Conservatism it was not. Unsurprisingly, the respondents to the Life poll took a gloomy view of 
the Nixon administration’s economic efforts. Whether the issue was inflation, taxes, interest 
rates, or the economy, in general, less than 30 percent of Americans approved of Nixon, and 
more than 50 percent disapproved. 265 But Nixon was not the only one being told by the public 
that he was out-of-step with the public’s wishes when it came to pocketbook issues. 
Moderate and conservative Democrats were receiving pressure from constituents who 
compared their tax reform stances unfavorably to their more left-leaning counterparts, while the 
latter were receiving encouragement from the public to continue their campaign for bold reform. 
“I wish to commend to you the stand that Senator [and DNC chair] [Fred] Harris is taking 
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relative to the income tax situation,” one Oklahoman wrote to majority leader Carl Albert, a 
moderate who supported the surtax. “I have never been able to understand how any one can 
justify the 10 percent surcharge of the extension of it which makes it more and more difficult for 
wage earners like myself who have no loop holes or means to evade paying income tax while 
there are many wealthy people among us who pay no tax at all.”266 Another letter-writer framed 
the tax reform debate as a test of the Democratic Party’s commitment to middle America. “[T]he 
time has come to consider the plight of the harried ‘middle income’ taxpayer and do something 
about it,” a New Jerseyan wrote to Albert. The personal exemption needed to be raised from 
$600 to $1,2000, the taxpayer argued, “and the very rich must be made to share in the cost of 
running the gov[erment].”  “The Democratic Party likes to think of itself as the party of the 
people,” he concluded, “but it cannot lay claim to that title if it ignores the plight of the people 
who supply the funds to do good.”267 One letter to Harris distilled the conclusions of the Life poll 
into one sentence. “I feel there are too many loop holes in our present tax structure,” the letter 
writer argued. “The rich are getting richer, and the poor are getting poorer.”268 The growing 
frustration – and even radicalization – of the middle-class in response to the squeeze was 
palpable. “We are being eaten alive by taxes and the higher cost of everything…,” one woman 
wrote to Harris. “I say hurray for the few politicians in Washington who are really concerned 
about the middle man who is being hurt the most. Maybe everyone who made between $8,000 
and $11,000 last year should come to Washington and build us a ‘resurrection city’ and fight for 
rights for change.”269 
But in the House, the reform bill was not shaping up the way the public would have liked. 
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Wilbur Mills’s House Ways and Means Committee had continued to work on tax reform 
throughout the spring and summer, even as the surtax dominated the concerns of the White 
House and others in Congress. At first, the committee’s work seemed destined for legislation in 
1970. But now that the Senate had blocked the full-year extension of the surtax, the Ways and 
Means Committee’s worked assumed new importance and urgency. The direction of the 
committee reform bill, however, made it clear that, in many cases, the public’s pleas for reform 
and the lobbying of unions and other progressive groups were being overwhelmed by the 
pushback from the influential beneficiaries of existing loopholes and preferences. The oil 
depletion allowance – a standard 27.5 percent deduction from gross income – had long been 
considered one of the most egregious examples of a loophole, and liberal reformers in the House 
saw it as a prime candidate for plugging. Research showed that it was not only a costly loophole, 
but also one that also served little purpose other than to pad the bottom lines of already-profitable 
oil companies. However, the oil industry fought hard both to keep the depreciation allowance in 
place and to keep the public from knowing how little it did to actually encourage oil exploration 
or decrease prices for consumers.  
During the Johnson administration, the Treasury commissioned a $140,000 study by 
Pittsburgh’s CONSAD Research Corporation to investigate the cost and effectiveness of the 
depletion allowance. The study was completed in late-1968 and concluded that eliminating the 
depletion allowance would save taxpayers over one billion dollars in lost revenue. It also noted 
that the depletion allowance did little to actually encourage oil production, meaning that 
eliminating it would have only a modest impact, at most, on short term oil production. And, in 
the long term, the study found that eliminating the allowance would actually lead to more 






conclusions, explaining to the president “that the oil industry was not using its oil depletion 
allowance to reinvest in Big Oil, but rather to begin Big Oil's venturing into hotels and real estate 
generally.” While the oil-industry friendly Johnson accepted the study’s conclusions, he made it 
clear that he did not plan to act on them. “Fine,” Johnson quipped to Steger. “I now know how 
I’ll finance my next election.” Even though there would not be another election for Johnson, the 
administration still chose not to release the study.270 It remained under wraps when Nixon – 
himself also favorable to the oil industry – took office.  
But word of the study’s conclusions leaked in early 1969. Henry Reuss began publicly 
pushing for the study’s release, arguing that it was illegal under the Freedom of Information Act 
for the Treasury to keep the study secret. “Both people like myself, who oppose the present oil 
depletion allowance, and the oil industry, which supports it, are entitled to access to the 
CONSAD Study,” Reuss wrote to the head of the House Freedom of Inflation Subcommittee. “It 
may well be that the CONSAD Study is just what is needed to speed congressional action to plug 
the oil depletion loophole.”271 Within days, Reuss’s demands – and, in the process, the study’s 
conclusions – garnered the attention of the press and of unions like the UAW, who publicized 
both the findings and the controversy over the study’s release.272 The Nixon Treasury quickly 
relented, releasing the report to Congress.273 Reuss’s high hopes for the report’s effects would 
not come to pass, though. During the 1968 campaign, Nixon had made it clear to friendly 
representatives of the oil industry that he opposed any cuts to the depletion allowance. So it was 
no surprise that his reform proposals left it intact. Many powerful Democrats, including Hale 
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Boggs and Carl Albert, were also reliable allies of the oil industry. Wilbur Mills was sympathetic 
to the industry, too. But, realizing that leaving the allowance completely untouched would be 
politically dangerous, Mills quietly met with oil industry representatives to let them know that he 
would push for a small, “symbolic” in the allowance.274 Even then, the cut – from 27.5 to 20 
percent – discussed in the Ways and Means committee came under attack from the industry and 
its supporters. As a result, the committee settled on lowering it to only 22 percent, a number that 
represented a minor victory, at best, for reformers, especially in light of the CONSAD study’s 
conclusions that the allowance had no positive effects. So severe was the political reaction to 
even this minor infringement on the oil industry’s preferences, that the Treasury official who 
contracted with CONSAD and authored his own report damning the depletion allowance was 
demoted by the Nixon administration – an action the New Republic attributed to his role in 
undercutting the depletion allowance.275 
The final Ways and Means bill disappointed most reformers on the left. The package took 
Nixon’s proposals and added a potpourri of mostly minor loophole-closing reforms along with 
an increase in the standard deduction from $1,000 to $2,000 and modest rate reductions. Most 
reformers on the left favored targeted tax relief for working- and middle-class taxpayers, rather 
than across-the-board rate reductions. And, in fact, the rate reductions in the House did not kick 
in until the $8,000 to $12,000 bracket for married couples.276 As a result, a middle-class married 
couple with two dependents making $10,000 a year received only $95 in the final Ways and 
Means bill, while a working class couple with two dependents making $7,500 received only $70. 
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For families making between $3,000 and $10,000 per year, the low-income allowance and the 
increase in the standard deduction provided the “primary” sources of tax relief, as the Ways and 
Means Committee’s own report put it.277 Wilbur Mills moved to have the tax reform bill 
considered under closed rule in order to prohibit any amendments to the bill on the House floor, 
except by a majority vote of the Ways and Means Committee. This move seemingly ended 
liberal Democrats hopes of making the bill more progressive.  
Yet, the left-distributionist Democrats – emboldened by both the public outcry for reform 
and by Nixon’s struggles to pass the surtax – were not ready to give up their hope for a bolder 
bill, even in the House. Members of the Democratic Study Group regarded the Ways and Means 
plan as little better than Nixon’s initial timid proposals. The DSG wanted more substantial 
loophole-closing reforms, most of which seemed politically unlikely, given Mills and Long’s 
control of the reform process. The DSG also wanted greater relief for working- and middle-
income taxpayers, and that critique seemed to carry more political weight. Pro-reform Democrats 
saw the public’s reaction to Barr’s testimony as all the evidence necessary to foreground reform. 
The members of the DSG believed they had the public on their side, even if they did not have 
Mills and others. “Public demand for action increased at each new disclosure of tax avoidance by 
wealth taxpayers,” the DSG wrote in a “fact sheet” memo to its members. 278 The notion that the 
Democrats needed to woo “middle Americans” back from Nixon was gaining steam on the left, 
and tax reform seemed like the perfect opportunity. In mid-July, the liberal Americans for 
Democratic Action urged Democrats to focus on “average Americans” in the $6,000 to $10,000 
income range, echoing arguments of unions and others on the left.279 The ALF-CIO also had it 
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eye on that key demographic, and the union’s economists were monitoring the progress of the tax 
reform bill. When Ways and Means reported out its final bill, the union’s economists 
immediately noticed the bill’s paltry relief for middle-income taxpayers and fed the information 
to DSG liberals in the House.280 
On August 4, the Democrat Study Group released a report attacking the Ways and 
Means’ reform bill. The DSG charged that the bill left middle-income taxpayers stuck in what it 
called the “no man’s land” of relief. Under the Ways and Means bill, the DSG reported, those 
making more than $15,000, who represented only about eight percent of taxpayers, were slated 
to receive 88 percent of the $2 billion in rate reductions contained in the bill. These rate 
reductions more than offset the revenue raised by the bill’s modest loophole-closing. As a result, 
under the Ways and Means bill, upper-income taxpayers actually saw their tax burdens decline. 
Lower-income taxpayers benefitted most from the Ways and Means Bill, thanks to the low-
income allowance. Middle-income taxpayers – whom the DSG defined as making between 
$7,000 and $13,000 a year – meanwhile, received only slightly more relief than the rich, whom 
the DSG argued should not be receiving relief at all.281  
Armed with the DSG’s findings, Missouri Democrat Richard Boiling, a DSG member, 
confronted Mills during an August 5th Rules Committee meeting. The DSG’s report, Boiling told 
Mills, proved that his bill offered paltry assistance, at best, to the middle-class. Embarrassed, 
Mills claimed that the lack of middle-income relief was a mistake that resulted from a 
“misunderstanding” between the Ways and Means staff and Joint Taxation Committee staff. 
“That was a very remarkable misunderstanding,” Boiling quipped to Mills, who replied, “I’d say 
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so myself.” 282 The Ways and Means chairman was being disingenuous, however. In fact, the 
DSG’s claims were based on the Ways and Means Committee’s own analysis of the bill, and 
reform hearing witnesses had discussed the lack of middle-income relief earlier.283 In April, 
when Edwin S. Cohen, Nixon’s Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, appeared 
before the House Ways and Means Committee, Georgia Democrat Philip M. Landrum asked 
whether it was accurate to say that “we are using the middle income taxpayer to maintain a 
revenue base that will give the Treasury, give the government we hope, a surplus.” Cohen did 
not use the same phrasing, but he agreed. “It is perfectly obvious that the bulk of the revenue 
from the income tax in the country is coming from the people whose income ranges from $7,000 
or $8,000 to $15,000 or $20,000…,” Cohen responded. He rejected the idea of increasing the 
personal exemption – the publicly popular proposal offered by Reuther and other progressives – 
as too expensive. By definition, Cohen argued, middle-class taxpayers were “above the bare 
minimum necessities of life,” meaning that complaints about the low personal exemption were 
unfounded. While Cohen assured the committee that he was “vitally concerned about the middle-
income group,” he conceded that the only provision in Nixon’s tax reform proposal that would 
help middle-income taxpayers would be the eventual phase-out of the tax surcharge and that 
would only return rates to where they were before the enactment of the temporary measure.284 
 Following his embarrassing interacting with Boiling at the Rules Committee meeting, 
Mills moved quickly to fix the “mistake” that actually had been an integral feature of the bill 
from its inception. During the lunch recess after the Rules Committee meeting, Mills called an 
impromptu session of the Ways and Means Committee, which quickly agreed to an addition $2.4 
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million in rate cuts for middle-income taxpayers. 285  Left-leaning Democrats credited the 
Democratic Study Group’s “strong disappointment and intense concern” over the “critical 
omission” of relief for taxpayers in the $7,500 to $13,000 range for spurring the additional tax 
cuts. But some also expressed disappointment that the middle-income relief came in the form of 
additional tax cuts, rather than “shifting relief already in the bill from higher income to middle-
income taxpayers, leaving the total amount of relief constant,” as one Democratic congressional 
representative put it.286Even if it did not come in the form that Ways and Means liberals wanted 
it, they were hardly in a place to rebuff Mills’s quick conversion to middle-class tax relief.287 
Suddenly, Nixon had lost his balanced-budget ally, and the House package was now an 
additional $2.4 billion out of balance.  
After seemingly successfully navigating the treacherous terrain of the surtax and tax 
reform debates throughout the spring and summer, in the first week of August the combination of 
the DSG’s attacks on the House reform bill and Senate liberals’ attacks on the surtax quashed 
Nixon’s hopes of a speedy one-year extension of the surtax and a “fiscal responsible” set of 
reforms in 1970. All eyes turned to the Senate. 
 
The Populist Push  
 As the Senate turned to consider tax reform – and, by consequence, the full one-year 
surtax extension – both left-liberal reformers and conservative defenders of loopholes sensed 
opportunity. In terms of reform, the House bill was timid, and many businesses and upper-
income taxpayers believed they had dodged the reform bullet. But the DSG’s ability to force 
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additional middle-income relief, as well as Senate liberals’ ability to block a full-year of the 
surtax, gave reformers hope that they could find the success in the Senate that they missed in the 
House, just as Vanik had predicted to Wilbur Mills. But, with Russell Long once again 
controlling the pace of reform, reformers had their work cut out for them in the Senate, too.   
 Business groups immediately took aim at the tepid reforms already included in the 
already-passed House bill. “The limousines have been lining up on Capitol Hill lately as anxious 
millionaires have sought out their senators,” Washington Post columnist Jack Anderson reported 
in October. “Corporate executives, financial tycoons, oil barons, horse breeders, and bluebloods 
by the dozen have bestirred themselves from their plus parlors and paneled suits to protect their 
tax privileges. Others have been writing, phoning, and pressuring senators from afar.” Now, 
many elected officials were “caught between his campaign contributors and the voters.”288 
Perhaps no one was in a more difficult position than the president himself.  
From the beginning, corporations bristled at the administration’s proposal to repeal the 
investment tax credit, as well as every progressive element in the tax reform package. Though 
sometimes couched in anti-inflation fiscalist terms, businesses consistently called for right-
distributionist tax measures. When implored by a letter from Nixon to support the 
administration’s push for a full extension of the surtax, business leaders took the opportunity to 
let Nixon know just how displeased they were with even modest reform. “Repeal of the 
investment credit is economic nonsense,” Dow Chemical chairman Carl Gerstacker wrote to 
Nixon. “It will contribute to inflation. We need more investment in plant and equipment to offset 
higher wages, create more jobs, and provide a surplus of goods so that hungry competitors will 
keep prices down.” This was an argument that businesses would continue to make as the decade 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






continued. Echoing Pierre Rinfret’s earlier arguments to Nixon, advocates of “capital formation” 
insisted that business spending lowered inflation by increasing the supply of goods and services. 
But, they argued, spending by consumers, in contrast, raised inflation by increasing demand. 
Businesses needed more tax incentives, Gerstacker told Nixon, not fewer. Low-income 
taxpayers, however, did not need any tax relief. “The removal of some two million taxpayers 
from income tax liability is a bad step,” Gerstacker wrote. Providing tax relief to the poor only 
encouraged them to parasitically demand more services from the government. “People who have 
no tax to pay will gladly vote for more and more spending,” he argued, “and everyone should 
feel the discipline of some cost when they vote for more government.” Ironically, even though 
Dow was itself dependent on the government for contracts to make products like Napalm, 
Gerstacker argued that it needed more tax benefits. Dow’s dependence was good, he implied. 
But poor people’s dependence on the government for services like schools meant that they 
needed to be disciplined by high taxes. Gerstacker called both the House and Senate reform 
packages “terrible” and told Nixon to veto any bill passed.289 Coca Cola president J. Paul Austin 
made the same case to Nixon. Austin opposed the repeal of the investment tax credit as well as 
“the whole tenor of the present tax reform measures (especially the significant tax benefits 
proposed for the great bulk of the consumer sector and the penalties proposed for the investment 
or production sector).” Lowering inflation required raising productivity through capital 
investment. Businesses needed more tax breaks, not fewer, including the retention of the 
investment tax credit and new, faster depreciation policies, according to Austin. 290  Most 
executives that wrote to Nixon agreed.  
Nixon was frustrated by the added tax cuts for the middle-class included at the last 
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minute in the House bill, and now he was facing pressure from the right to roll back even its 
modest reforms. The Nixon administration was trapped.291 It had to choose not only between 
“fiscal responsibility” and tax relief, but also between the tax preferences of the “Silent 
Majority” and those of Republicans’ traditional upper-income supporters. “Basing its judgment 
on the angry mail from the public, it thought tax reform was a great issue last spring,” the New 
York Times reported.292 Now, the administration was getting an earful from angry upper-income 
Republicans, business, and Wall Street, who saw the reform proposals as “a terrible way to treat 
campaign contributors,” many of whom vowed “never to give another dime to the G.O.P.” 293 
Within the White House, Burns and other right-distributionist conservatives began lobbying for 
the Treasury to propose shifting some of the individual cuts into a one-percent cut in the 
corporate income tax. And, after only “perfunctory debate,” Nixon made Burns’s proposal the 
official administration line. Many politically astute Republicans regarded the idea of shifting 
relief from middle-income taxpayers to corporation as disastrous.294 But other Republicans 
believed it was more important to side with their wealthy donors than go along with the tax 
reform momentum. 295 RNC chair Peter O’Donnell contacted John Ehrlichman to express his 
concern that the bill was too anti-business. The modest cuts in oil depletion allowance, in 
particular, could “be very damaging to George Bush’s prospects in the senate race and ultimately 
to President Nixon in ’72,” O’Donnell warned.296 The White House leaned towards this view. 
Even though the administration worried about the political fallout of siding with business over 
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“middle America,” Nixon and his advisers rationalized it away by speculating that he Democrats 
would be more likely to get political credit for reform, anyhow, given that the administration had 
been fighting for a modest bill all summer.297 And so Nixon went forward with the plan to lobby 
the Senate for less middle-class tax relief and more corporate tax relief, reasoning that a “fiscally 
responsible” and business-friendly bill was more important than the middle-class politics of tax 
reform.298  
Carrying out the president’s orders, the White House economic team used the Senate 
Finance Committee tax reform hearings as an opportunity to reverse the momentum towards 
progressive reform. In early September, Nixon’s Treasury secretary, David Kennedy, and 
undersecretary Charls Walker testified before the Finance Committee to advocate for overturning 
some of the more progressive measures of the House tax bill. Kennedy’s testimony on behalf of 
the administration focused mainly on the bill’s “bias against investment” and its revenue losses. 
Kennedy suggested reducing some of the individual income tax changes that primarily benefitted 
low- and middle-income taxpayers, while at the same time adding cuts to the corporate profits 
tax and curbing the already modest decreases in the capital gains preferences. These changes, 
Kennedy argued, would tilt the bill away from consumption and back towards investment. 299 
While this may have been what fiscal conservatives and business executives wanted to hear, it 
was a clear political disaster with the general public.  
Populist Democrats on the Finance Committee pounced. They were eager to talk about 
the distribution of the tax burden, too, albeit in a way that challenged the administration’s 
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proposals. “Mr. Secretary, if I understand your recommendation, it is to take some of the tax 
relief provided by the bill for the low-income groups away from them and, instead, give tax 
reductions to corporations,” Tennessee’s Albert Gore began. “Would you explain to what extent 
that it true?” Kennedy dodged the question, and Gore pressed on, but Kennedy refused to frame 
it in the terms used by Gore. The secretary continued discussing the new investment-related cuts 
without mentioning the proposed reduction in individual cuts. Gore asked again whether the new 
corporate cuts were being financed by taking away cuts from low-bracket individuals. “We were 
trying to balance the bill…,” Kennedy relented. “So we went back to a rate structure revision 
basically and that balanced the bill out generally, and then we recommended the corporate 
change after that which imbalanced the bill.” “Which means, as I understand it,” Gore continued, 
“that you take tax relief away from the lower income bracket taxpayers and shift it by your 
recommendation to the corporations.” “Well, that is not quite the way I say it, but it is maybe 
your way of saying it,” Kennedy retorted. “I understand. We are sing different language but we 
are saying the same thing. I believe mine is easier for the people to understand,” Gore continued, 
provoking laughter. “Well, I think it is the way one looks at it,” Kennedy responded. “We are 
looking at it the same way,” Gore interrupted. “We are just describing it differently.” “Well, 
looks and description are somewhat the same,” Kennedy concluded, in a perhaps unintentionally 
apt summation of the Nixon administration’s increasingly erratic approach to economic policy in 
1969 and 1970. 300  The exchange made clear, however, that discussing taxes in right-
distributionist terms was not a political winner for the administration.  
Later, Gore returned to this left-distributionist rhetoric when making a pitch for an 
increase in the personal exemption, setting up another rhetorical trap for Kennedy and the Nixon 
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economic representatives. They argued that Gore’s idea was too costly and noted that the Nixon 
plan already removed low-income taxpayers from the rolls thanks to their low-income 
allowance. “I believe, Mr. Secretary, that the people hardest hit by the unfair distribution of the 
prevailing tax burden are the lower middle-income groups, say from $7,000 to $15,000,” Gore 
said, “people who are trying to meet the payment on a home and rear a family of children. This 
bill does nothing for them. The low-income allowance doesn’t reach them. An increase in the 
exemption would reach them.” With that, Gore effectively claimed the mantle of champion of 
the middle-class “Silent Majority” away from the Nixon team, at least in that hearing. He 
finished his self-described “time to interrogate” the Nixon economic team with a recent history 
of cuts for the rich. “I will just use the minute [left for Gore’s testimony] to state that your 
recommendation and this bill do violence to the system of progressive taxation,” Gore 
concluded. “We have done violence before…. This is an example of a corporate executive who 
has a salary of $200,000 and a tax exempt income of $100,000, a total income of $300,000. 
Before the tax reduction bill of 1964 this taxpayer would have paid $156,820 in taxes, or 53 
percent. Under the present law that taxpayer has a liability of $125,940, or 41 percent. Under 
your recommendation this taxpayer would have a tax liability of $96,030, a rate of only 32 
percent.” 301 
Indiana’s Vance Hartke continued the left-distributionist attack in his question-and-
answer period. “[T]he average forgotten American who is looking at this tax bill…thought they 
were going to finally have some redistribution of the payment of taxation,” Hartke argued, citing 
discussions with constituents in Indiana over the congressional recess. “They thought that the 
average forgotten American was going to be treated in a fair method and provide for taxation of 
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those people who heretofore had been in a position where they could avoid paying their fair 
share of taxes.” The Nixon administration’s proposals, Hartke charged, would not give them that. 
Instead, the administration was taking $1.7 billion in proposed individual cuts and giving $1.6 
billion in new corporate cuts. Worse, they were opposing the individual exemption proposed by 
Gore, which was the best hope for real relief for the “forgotten Americans.” When Kennedy and 
Cohen protested that they were making the bill more balanced between individuals and 
investment, which they had earlier characterized as “even-handed,” Hartke interjected. “What 
has happened here is you have taken $1.7 billion from the average forgotten Americans and you 
have given it to the corporations, isn’t that right? That’s right, isn’t it?” The Nixon team 
protested, but Hartke continued. “In other words, even handedness has been given and he [the 
forgotten American] got both the front and the back of the hand…,” Hartke chided. “[T]he 
ordinary person felt for a long time that he has been taking it on the chin and he wanted to stop 
taking it on the chin for the people who had been making the bulk of the wealth.” All Cohen 
could muster in response was a brief – and almost completely unrelated – comment about the 
inequity of the standard deduction, which was a point, ironically, that Gore had made to support 
the notion of an increase in the personal exemption.302 Even when New Mexico Democrat 
Clinton Anderson served the Nixon representatives a softball opportunity to side with the 
middle-class, they failed. Anderson asked Kennedy and Walker if they agreed that the Life 
“Dollar Squeeze” article showed how “discouraging” inflation was to “people of the middle-
income brackets.” Rather than simply agreeing, Walker distanced the administration from the 
Democrats’ middle-class focus by responding that inflation was discouraging to people in “all 
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During the second day of hearings, the Nixon team continued to defend the 
administration’s pushback against reform. Kennedy reiterated his criticism of the bill’s 
“preference to consumption as against capital formation,” and Gore continued to attack the 
administration’s proposals for more favorable treatment of corporations and capital gains. “[O]ne 
of my secretaries told me this morning that his marginal rate would reach 40 percent,” Gore told 
Kennedy. “Yet by your recommendation and this bill, Roger Blough’s salary would be taxed at a 
marginal rate of 50 percent.” Gore called it a “ridiculous extreme” and a “major assault on the 
principle of progression in the income tax” when a secretary had “only 10 percentage points 
difference” in marginal rate with a CEO who made more than $500,000 per year. Cohen 
responded by arguing that marginal rates were not the rate that really mattered. If that was the 
case, Gore retorted, it did not make sense to have lowered it from 90 percent to 50 percent in the 
past 15 years. Cohen said that high rates caused upper-income taxpayers to expend effort trying 
to avail themselves of loopholes to lower their tax burdens. So it was better to just lower the top 
marginal rates, since “man should be encouraged to spend his time and efforts in the job for 
which he is best equipped.” “That is a very interesting comment,” Gore responded. “You are 
saying that they are wasting some of their effort…to cut their effective tax so you are going to 
make it easy for them…. You are just automatically going to cut his rate to 50 percent.” Cohen 
said that 50 percent was still a “high rate.” “Well, so is 40,” Gore replied, and asked if it was not 
shocking that a secretary and a CEO would have marginal rates so close together. “You are 
making it easy for people with very large incomes to pay very low effective rates, and this, I say 
to you, is not right, and I am going to fight you on it…,” Gore closed by saying. “Whether I win 
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or whether you win…[i]n a period of 15 years we have reversed the system of graduated income 
tax…and we are bringing about a great reconcentration of the wealth of this country…”304  
The media was quick to pan the White House’s turn to the right. Humorist Art Buchwald 
went after the Nixon administration in the wake of Kennedy’s testimony. Once again using the 
form of a mock interview – this time with economist Heinrich Applebaum – the “professor” in 
Buchwald’s column explained to readers that the Nixon team’s proposals would ensure that “if 
you’re married and have two children and make $3,500 a year – which means you’re starving – 
you don’t have to pay any taxes at all.” Those who made a little more, $5,000 a year, would be 
able to see “one extra movie a year.” Middle-class taxpayers would see “enormous benefits.” 
They would be able to buy one tire for their car or, if they could not afford a car, they could 
“purchase 200 bus tokens” with the relief afforded them in the Nixon plan. To be fair, the 
economist explained, the Nixon team also had to lower taxes on rich, too, since “you can’t just 
give tax relief to the little guy without getting the corporations and the upper brackets mad.” The 
Nixon team showed “courage” by seeking to aid “companies suffering from corporate taxes.” 
The savings afforded a conglomerate in the Nixon plan would allow them to “buy three more 
companies.” “[Y]ou have to help those in the greatest need, and if we can ease the burden on our 
large companies and upper-income bracket families, the Nixon administration will have gone a 
long way in bringing much-needed tax relief to this country,” the professor concluded. “This is 
the first instance in a long time that a president has taken into consideration the problems of the 
rich. He has made a concerted effort to remedy the inequities in our tax system, which was 
originally written to give people in the lower brackets all the breaks.”305  
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More serious commentators took the Nixon team to task, too. With an incredulous tone, 
NBC anchor David Brinkley commented on Kennedy’s Senate Finance Committee performance. 
He told evening news viewers that the initial Nixon proposal were “disappointing,” especially for 
middle-income taxpayers. The House reform bill “did nothing” for middle-class taxpayers, 
according to Brinkley, even with the added 5 percent tax cut added by Mills after the DSG 
report, since it was a “rather small bone” for those struggling to “keep even with the rising costs 
of housing, food, medical care, tuition, and everything else.”  Yet, Brinkley commented 
sarcastically, the Nixon team was now insisting that the existing middle-class cuts in the bill 
were “too big.”306 In a straight news segment the next week, NBC reporter John Chancellor 
offered a grim view of the tax relief in store for the middle-class, at least as the tax reform bill 
was currently constituted. “There are billions of dollars involved in tax reform, but when it gets 
down to the average taxpayer it doesn’t look like very much,” NBC reporter John Chancellor 
noted. With a table projected behind him, Chancellor explained that families making $7,500 
would receive only $50 under the tax bill, while families making $12,5000 would receive just 
$95 and those making $17,500 would receive $85. “There is a taxpayers’ revolt going on 
precisely in these brackets,” Chancellor noted, “but tax reductions of 50 to 85 dollars a year are 
not likely to cool down the revolt.” 307 The administration’s pushback on tax reform brought such 
negative press that even Arthur Burns’s own son – a lawyer “so conservative that he makes his 
father look like a raving red,” as Burns told Nixon – believed that the administration was tilting 
too far towards business in the reform debates. Burns blamed the media, but he also faulted the 
administration’s poor public relations on taxes.308 
 As chronicled in the evening television news and daily papers for Americans across the 
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country, the Senate Finance tax reform hearings appeared to be battle between those who wanted 
more loophole-closing and the big business interests, in particular, that wanted to maintain or 
expand the loopholes for capital gains and oil depletion, among others. 309 The hearings became 
so contentious that Finance Committee chair Russell Long took to using an egg timer set at 10-
minute intervals to keep witnesses moving. 310 Critics on the left testified that the House bill was 
too timid and failed to provide either real reform or substantial relief to low- and, especially, 
middle-income taxpayers. New Deal-era liberals like Leon Keyserling joined populist Democrats 
and labor in dismissing the tax reform bill’s provisions. Just as during the Kennedy-Johnson tax 
cut debates, Keyserling argued that the proper measuring stick for the progressivity of a tax cut 
was not the percentage change in one’s tax burden, but the percentage change in one’s after-tax 
income. Because of the low-income allowance, the tax reform bill seemed fairly progressive, 
cutting the tax bills of the poorest in half. It also reduced the tax bills of middle- and upper-
middle class taxpayers by between six and seven percent. But, Keyserling told the Senate 
Finance Committee, measured by each income group’s gain in after-tax income, the effect was 
substantially different. The poorest – those making less than $3,000 per year – received a 2.3 
percent increase in after-tax income, while those making between $20,000 and $50,000 received 
a 1.3 percent boost, and middle-income taxpayers would see a less-than-one-percent rise in their 
after-tax income.311 Keyserling also sent his analysis of the tax bill to friendly Democrats like 
Fred Harris, to whom he bluntly argued that the “personal tax reductions are not progressive 
enough and that they should be concentrated more largely among those with incomes under 
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Betty Furness – Johnson’s former special assistant for consumer affairs – testified on 
behalf of the newly-formed National Committee on Tax Justice, which was founded and headed 
by former Democratic Senator Paul Douglas. Douglas and the NCTJ had already made headlines 
for its public denunciations of the weak reforms to the oil depletion allowance. Douglas told 
reporters that the depletion allowance was not necessary to encourage drilling and was instead 
the product of oil industry lobbying to keep “its profit ratios artificially high” compared to other 
industries. “The excess oil depletion allowance is the symbol of present tax inequities,” Douglas 
said in August. “The American public is demanding tax justice.”313 With Douglas ailing, Furness 
appeared in Congress on behalf of the NCTJ in September. Furness presented Douglas’s 
prepared testimony, which outlined the NCTJ’s five-point tax reform plan: “1. Eliminate 
preferential treatment of all capital gains, 2. Eliminate special deductions for depletion of oil and 
other minerals…, 3. Provide federal assistant to state and local bond issues instead of allowing a 
tax exemption on their interest, 4. Withhold taxes on interest and dividends at the source…, 5. 
Provide tax relief for low and middle income families by providing a minimum standard 
deduction of $1,100 for all families.” The NCTJ’s “tax relief” was relatively modest – the House 
bill included the $1,100 standard deduction increase – and, overall, their proposals raised much 
more money for new spending than it offered in tax cuts. The goal of tax reform, Douglas argued 
in his statement, was to ensure that the rich did not escape taxation and to make the system more 
progressive while providing revenue for needed programs. “Those escape routes, those tax favors 
[for the rich], impose a dual hardship on the less well-to-do in American,” Douglas said. “For not 
only are they called upon to pay more than their fair share of the tax burden; they are asked to sit 
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by and do without public programs and services…. [I]f the government were collecting the 
billions of dollars that are currently being siphoned off through gaping loopholes, there would be 
funds for the rebuilding of our slums and schools, for the purifying of the environment, and 
many other programs which are now suffering financial asphyxiation.” Americans did not hate 
taxes, Douglas argued, “they only ask that their share of the tax payment be just; that every 
individual be taxed according to his ability to bear the burden of taxation.” 
Furness explained that she was not a tax expert, but an expert on consumers. As such, she 
cast the reform debate as one that struck at the heart of the American consumer economy. 
Echoing the Life article, Furness argued that inflation and taxes were creating a “squeeze” on 
Americans with modest incomes, in particular. “[A] loaf of bread and a pound of meat cost the 
same whether it is bought by a low-income consumer or a high-income consumer,” Furness said. 
But only high-income Americans had a lobby. NCTJ hoped to be a lobby for everyone else to 
ensure that everyone paid “his fair share of taxes.” Two other NCTJ members appeared with 
Furness: Woodrow Ginsburg, a former research director for the UAW and the AFL-CIO, and 
Philip Stern, a former aid to Douglas and author of The Great Treasury Raid. Stern made an 
impassioned plea for eliminating the preferential rate on capital gains. “In my opinion, that single 
action of taxing capital gains as ordinary income would eliminate the greatest single cause of 
both inequity and complexity in the American tax system,” Stern testified. “That may sound like 
an extravagant statement, but…among those superic people with income of $5 million or more, 
two-thirds of their income is in so-called capital gains, not taxed at 70 percent or 50 percent, but 
taxed at no higher than 25 percent, the same top bracket rate that is paid by a married couple with 
a taxable income of $12,000…[which] throws the principle of ability to pay right out the 






arguments and moral arguments, Stern noted the “talent and energy” expended by high-income 
earners in “trying to transform ordinary income into capital gains by financial alchemy.” It was 
inefficient, Stern argued, and it happened only because of the preferential rate. “Also consider 
what kind of values that are expressed in what amounts to a penalty on earned income…,” Stern 
said. “It seems to me that penalizing earned income is hardly consonant with the moral precepts 
that we teach in our schools and churches and is hardly consonant with what’s made this country 
what it is.” Stern concluded his statement by echoing his April New York Times article, asking 
Congress, “[W]hy should the work of money be so vastly favored over the work of men?... 
[W]hy is a dollar of capital gains income different from a dollar of earned income when it comes 
to buying food or shoes or a yacht or for paying taxes?” When some skeptical senators began 
questioning Stern’s argument, he interjected. “I would like to point out, sir, that capital gains and 
ordinary income were taxed on the same basis during the first 8 years of the American tax 
system. So what I am proposing here is hardly radical…. It is going back to what the founding 
fathers of the tax system originally enacted.”314 Furness and Stern’s criticisms of the bill as too 
timid before the Finance Committee were excerpted in evening news coverage.315 
 When George Meany testified, he reiterated his argument that the “tax revolt” was a call 
for a progressive redistribution of the tax burden, not a conservative anti-government cry. “The 
13.5 million members of the unions of the AFL-CIO are, almost without exception, taxpayers…. 
[T]hey appreciate the value of government, the services of government, the need for paying for 
government,” Meany said. “They are willing to pay their fair share. But they are tired of having 
to pay the share of other Americans…those Americans whose incomes are greater and whose 
taxes are lower – the ‘loophole set’ in today’s society.” The AFL-CIO was testifying, Meany 
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said, “as advocates of tax justice.” But Meany had little positive to say about the tax reforms 
being proposed by the House or by Nixon. “We do not have tax justice today, and we will not 
achieve it under the House bill,” Meany said. “And the administration’s proposals bear no 
resemblance to tax justice at all.” The AFL-CIO leader charged that the tax system was “rigged” 
in favor of investors and against average wage earners. “The single most costly loophole and the 
one that is the prime culprit of unfairness is the capital gains loophole…,” Meany said. “We see 
no justice to a tax provision which says that a married taxpayer with $8,000 in capital gains 
income should pay a tax of $354 while a married taxpayer with the same amount of wage income 
should pay $1,000.” Meany advocated closing that loophole, among others, removing the poor 
from the tax rolls, and providing “meaningful reduction” for lower- and middle-income 
taxpayers. Closing major loopholes could yield $15 to $17 billion, which could be used to 
provide significant progressive tax reductions and still leave $8 to $10 billion for new programs.  
Just as Stern and Furness received skeptical questions, so did Meany. While Gore, Fred 
Harris, and other more populist Democrats were receptive to Meany’s proposals, many others 
were not. Republican Senator Jack Miller of Iowa questioned eliminating the capital gains 
preferences. Without a preferential rate for capital gains, Miller argued, no one would invest in 
businesses and, he added apocalyptically, “our capitalistic system will go by the board.” 
Unmoved, Meany insisted, “I do not think that if you took away this tax preference you would 
substantially discourage investment.” Meany faced the same incredulousness from chair Russell 
Long, who did not believe that individuals would still drill oil wells in the U.S. without the oil 
depletion allowance and other special preferences. “Mr. Meany, you are the first person I have 
heard advocating cutting the depletion allowance who did not couple that with the proposition 






you would hire Arabs, you would hire Spicks, you would hire various and sundry people to 
produce that oil but you would not produce it here.” But Meany remained unmoved. “[I]f oil 
companies could make more money by bringing it from overseas,” he responded, “I suppose they 
would bring it from overseas, without regard to whether depletion allowance is there or not.”316 
Given the response of Long and others to the testimony of left-reformers, it is not surprising that 
many anti-reform forces saw the Finance Committee as an opportunity to stem the reform tide. 
Anti-reform interests viewed their partial defeats in the House bill as only temporary 
setbacks that could be reversed in the Senate. Merrill Lynch president Donald Regan – who 
President Reagan would make his chief of staff a decade later – appeared before the Finance 
Committee to defend the preferential rate for capital gains and criticize the existing reform 
proposals. He quoted Treasury Secretary Kennedy’s argument that the bill was “weighted in 
favor of consumption” and against capital. The government needed to encourage investors with 
low capital gains rates, Regan argued, because without capital investment, the entire economy 
would break down. “Capital is an essential ingredient in a flourishing economy,” he said. 
“Before there is a return, before there is income, there must be an expenditures of capital, of 
labor, of entrepreneurial energies.” The country depended on the investment that the preferential 
rate for capital gains encouraged. “At present $25,000 in capital gains stands behind each job in 
manufacturing in this country,” Regan continued. “This is one of the principal reasons why we 
have the highest standard of living in the world…capital equals jobs.” With this simple 
formulation, Regan flipped preferential capital gains rates from being the most egregious 
loophole – as most reformers argued – to being essential to the wellbeing of the average blue-
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collar worker and the country as a whole. NYSE chairman Haack also made his case, again, in 
defense of low capital gains rates. The reforms in House bill being considered by the Senate, 
Haack argued, “constitute a sharp increase in the capital gains tax.” If the tax bill passed, “risk-
taking incentives and the supply of essential venture capital would be seriously curtailed,” while 
“investments in modern plant and equipment and in new technologies would diminish.” Like 
Regan, Haack cited Treasury Secretary’s Kennedy’s comments about the bill being “weighted in 
favor of consumption.” Attempts to extend the holding period to qualify for the lowest capital 
gains rate would fail to raise revenue, Haack argued, because “investors will tend to follow their 
individual self interest” and simply hold on to investments for longer periods. Moreover, Haack 
argued improbably, the extra burden created by raising capital gains taxes would “fall not on the 
wealthiest taxpayers – but on those who can least afford to bear it.”317 Unlike the progressive tax 
reformers who testified, neither Haack nor Regan were subjected to critical – or even substantive 
– questioning. Despite his musings about the unfairness of the capital gains preference a few 
years earlier to the Wall Street Journal, chairman Russell Long made it clear that he was in 
wholehearted concurrence with Regan’s testimony and took Regan’s arguments further, 
suggesting that investors would send their money to other countries or stop investing it at all if 
capital gains rates were increased even slightly. Regan agreed.318 
Perhaps the most significant development in the tax reform debates throughout 1969 was 
the halting recognition by many officials and commentators that the public’s complaints about 
local, state, and federal taxes were linked. For years many government officials and 
commentators had viewed revolts in places like Youngstown, Ohio, with confusion. Often, they 
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saw them either as a sign of the public’s growing anti-government conservatism or as evidence 
of voters’ irrationality. Now, however, many observers began to see the common causes of the 
public’s tax frustrations, regardless of the level of government doing the taxing. If local, state, 
and federal frustrations together composed the “tax revolt,” they reasoned, then solving the 
revolt would take solutions that addressed all levels of taxation. As noted above, unions, average 
Americans, and many in the media argued from the beginning of the reform debates that all three 
levels of taxation were implicated in the revolt. And this view gained support throughout the 
year. Reflecting on the 215 letters about taxes that he received in the first 12 days of February, 
Wisconsin Democratic Senator William Proxmire argued that the tax revolt was not just about 
federal tax issues. “It’s happening now not only because of the Federal income-tax surcharge,” 
he said, “but primarily because of the astronomical increase in the burden of state and local 
property and sales taxes which fall so heavily and so unfairly on taxpayers of modest 
incomes.”319 Newsweek also connected the letters pouring into Congress both with local levy and 
bond failure in Youngstown and Richmond, California. 320 Time speculated that it was “doubtful” 
that most taxpayers would actually get to even keep the small cuts in the bill given soaring 
regressive state and local taxes. “Hard-pressed state and local governments have been searching 
for new revenue sources,” the magazine noted. “If their past performance is any clue, they can be 
expected to take advantage of any relaxation of the federal tax grip to impose new taxes of their 
own.”321 Indeed, across the country, the cash-strapped localities like Youngstown continued 
turning to increasingly reluctant voters to approve new bonds and levies. At the state level, too, 
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governors and legislators were pursuing new taxes and increases in old taxes.322 In fact, one 
ACIR official called 1969 “the most eventful year since World War II” when it came to state 
taxes.323 No state escaped the need for new tax revenue in 1969. Each state either enacted or 
raised at least one tax.324 Timid federal reform, a growing chorus of voices argued, was 
meaningless in the face of rising state and local burdens. 
 Making the left’s case for taking local and state taxes into account at the federal level, 
Reprehensive Richard McCarthy linked federal loopholes to the rejections of local levies and 
bonds in his Ways and Means testimony. The public was, he said, frustrated with the entire tax 
system. The suburban Buffalo, New York, Democrat testified that tax reform had “aroused more 
interest and concern than almost any other issue” among his constituents. But federal 
policymakers were not the only ones hearing the taxpayers’ frustrations, McCarthy testified. “A 
number of observers have commented that public dissatisfaction with taxes may lead to a 
taxpayer's revolt,” McCarthy said. “This view gains validity when we see a number of school 
districts in the country that have had to shut down classes…caused by an unwillingness by the 
local taxpayer to increase the school tax…because of a concern about the increase in the property 
tax that would result.” The public was not turning against education or other local programs, 
McCarthy argued. Nor was the public’s resistance to the surtax driven by animus towards the 
federal government’s’ fight against inflation. “The strength of the opposition to the surcharge 
was caused, I believe, by the many increases in state and local taxes that have been imposed on 
the taxpayer during the last several years.” Federal policymakers’ failed to consider the rising 
state and local tax burden – particularly regressive property and sales taxes – facing low- and 
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middle-income taxpayers. “The burden of local taxes, particularly property taxes, has been 
increasing by as much as 15 to 20 percent per year. State income taxes have been increased in 
many cases. Sales taxes have risen,” he explained. “General sales taxes, for example, were the 
best revenue raiser for 31 States in 1967, accounting for 28 percent of the 1967 state tax take. 
And sales taxes, a form of taxation that makes no distinction in the ability of the taxpayer to pay, 
are increasingly being applied to items such as grocery bills and medicines so that the tax falls 
most heavily on the poor. The burden of these state and local taxes, when added to the Federal 
tax, cannot be lightly dismissed, especially in an inflationary period when prices are constantly 
increasing.” This combination of rising taxes and rising inflation was behind the tax revolt being 
felt at all levels of government – not resentment of government, in general, or any particular 
programs. Congress needed to focus on solving revenue problems at all levels of government by 
using progressive revenue sources rather taxes that “are more of a burden to the poor than the 
rest of the community.” That meant devising federal programs to help states and localities meet 
their revenue needs with progressive taxes.325 
 Several witnesses suggested using the federal tax system to provide relief from regressive 
state and local taxes. Wilbur Cohen, HEW secretary under President Johnson, “strongly” 
suggested exempting “a reasonable amount of the value of home ownership from state and local 
property taxes” for the elderly. Cohen made his suggestion not only for the benefit of elderly 
homeowners, but also for cash-strapped local governments. “Bond issues and millage increases 
for education have been turned down by voters in an increasing proportion in recent year, 
primarily, in my opinion, by the votes of older persons on fixed incomes,” Cohen said. “This is 
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unfortunate.”326 In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Cohen expanded on his 
earlier comments, calling for “a major redistribution of the tax burden.” Total taxes in the U.S. – 
state, local, and federal – were much lower than in other countries, Cohen argued, and additional 
revenues in the U.S. should come from a variety of loophole-closing measures, including “the 
elimination of accelerated depreciation for high-income and luxury housing, tightening farm 
losses, capital gains,” and others. Though Cohen was overall fairly conservative in his views on 
welfare and other issues, his tax suggestions were aimed at restoring progressivity to the tax 
system. Beyond addressing state and local property taxes, Cohen also suggested making “the 
Social Security tax system much more progressive” by taxing part of high-income recipients’ 
benefits, giving a refund to low-income workers to cover part of the payroll tax, and lifting the 
contribution cap for employers. His statement also included a suggestion that Congress study 
ways “to reduce local residential property taxes as a way of financing elementary and secondary 
schools.” Taking Cohen’s ideas even further, Beloit College president Miller Upton submitted a 
truly radical proposal to the Senate Finance Committee. He called for “complete overhaul, not 
isolated reform.” Specifically, Upton argued that the federal government should take over all 
taxation, rather than leaving intact the current system of fiscal federalism in which states and 
localities competed with each other. The federal government should collect all revenues for 
states and local governments via the progressive federal income tax, Upton argued, then 
distribute money to state and local governments, eliminating the need for property taxes and 
other state and local taxes. 327 
 But this increasing recognition that state and local tax crises and federal reform were 
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connected had ironic consequences, at least in the short term. Given the proper spin, even 
ostensibly progressive views of the tax revolt could be fashioned into arguments for conservative 
policies. Pulling the local tax revolt into the federal reform debate gave those who wanted to 
protect one of the most infamous loopholes that benefitted upper-income taxpayers – the tax 
exemption for interest on state and local government bonds – a powerful tool to block reform. In 
an organized campaign both to save the tax-free status of state and local bonds (and to defeat the 
inclusion of income from state and local bonds in the calculation of the new minimum tax), both 
local officials and banks wrote to representatives outlining the woes that would face states and 
localities if any tax was levied on their bonds – and they higher taxes that, they claimed, would 
face state and local taxpayers. Using the same language adopted by many bond preference 
defenders, the mayor of Barsndall, Oklahoma, E.M. Bruce, wrote to Carl Albert in opposition to 
any changes to the tax treatment of state and local government bongs. “IF ALL HOME 
OWNERS AND OTHER TYPES OF LOCAL TAXPAYERS ARE TO BE PENALIZED 
THROUGH HIGHER LOCAL TAXES TO PAY INCREASED INTEREST CHARGES 
ONLOCAL GOVERNMENT BOND ISSUES IN ORDER TO TRY TO RECTIFY THE 
INEQUITY THAT RESULTS FROM A FEW TAXPAYERS PAYING LESS THAN THE 
AMOUNT OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX THA THEY SHOULD, JUSTICE AND EQUITY 
HAVE INDEED NOT BEEN REALIZED,” he claiimed.328 The chairman of American National 
Bank of Pryor, Oklahoma, used the same phrasing as Bruce, then added, “To cut off one’s arm to 
get rid of a wart seems hardly sound judgment!”329 Opponents of changing the tax-exempt status 
of state and local government bonds circulated an article by the executive director of the Austin, 
Texas, Municipal Advisory Council. “Our thesis is this: the real beneficiary is not the holder of 
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the municipal bond…,” the article argued. “[T]he real beneficiary is any one of the 200 million 
Americans who may at any time during the routine of his day-to-day existence – Draw a glass of 
water to quench his thirst… Drive his automobile on a paved street… [or] Romp with his 
children in a public park…” The tax sop to the wealthy was, in other words, really a favor to 
everyone who used government.330 
In the Senate Finance Committee Hearings, witness after witness predicted that property 
taxes would soar if the Congress decided to begin taxing state and local government securities. 
Governments would need to raise the interest rates on their bonds, they argued, and this higher 
borrowing cost would be passed on to taxpayers in the form of drastically higher taxes. For the 
state and local officials that testified, their fears were grounded in the fiscal crisis. Colorado 
Governor John Love worried about the “undeniably heavier debt service burden” for state and 
local governments that would result from removing the interest tax exemption, a burden Love 
said would be borne “predominantly by their property taxpayers.” Florida Governor Claude Kirk 
indicated that studies showed that increased borrowing costs “would fall on the taxpayers of the 
state and localities, primarily the property taxpayers and the sales taxpayers.” Nashville Mayor 
C. Beverly Briley appeared with the executive director of the National League of Cities, Patrick 
Healy. Briley predicted that the “poorest” taxpayers would be face higher taxes if the interest 
exemption was ended, while Healy quoted a statement by an anonymous Midwestern mayor who 
predicted, “Property taxes will be increased 6 percent across the board; charges to water and 
sewer users will have to be raised 10 percent.” Though the interest exemption was a loophole, 
Healy’s statement argued that “equity isn’t everything.” Specifically, “structural problems” in 
the federal system meant that the entire tax structure – state, local, and federal – had to viewed as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






a whole and had to be reformed without “further depressing financial resources of states and 
localities.” But the system of fiscal federalism was too interconnected to believe that changes in 
taxes at one level did not affect the others. As Briley had put it earlier, “It is the height of irony 
that an effort to tax a very few individuals receiving income from municipal bonds will 
boomerang against hundreds of thousands of local property taxpayers and users of municipal 
services who will have to bear the burden of increased debt service costs.” Nashville’s mayor 
told Congress that it would be responsible for any increased property taxes that resulted from 
removing the interest exemption. “This action would really cause a taxpayers revolt,” he 
predicted. Baltimore County, Maryland, Executive Dale Anderson warned of property tax 
increases, too, but also used his testimony to attack the property tax itself. “When we raise the 
property tax, it doesn’t mean the homeowner is earning more income…,” Anderson said. “I can 
cite case after case where a homeowner in Baltimore County has an income today about the same 
as he had 5 years ago, and his property taxes had gone up almost 40 percent. This increase in 
property taxes has absolutely no relationship to his ability to pay.” The county executive 
supported more direct federal assistance to state and localities, but he argued that it made no 
sense to take away the tax exemption for bonds at the same time. “Gentlemen, please remember 
a taxpayer revolt is not limited to federal income taxes,” Maryland State Comptroller Louis 
Goldstein told the Finance Committee. “It has led to the defeat of many local bond issues in 
popular referendum.” Dozens of other state and local officials who did not testify submitted 
statements opposing removing the interest exemption.331 Despite its status as a tax haven for the 
rich, many progressive Democrats agreed – especially after being lobbied by local governments 
– that state and local governments needed tax-free interest on their bonds, including ardent tax 
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reformer Fred Harris.332 
Not everyone interested in interest-free state and local bonds had as plausible an interest 
in local budgets and taxpayers’ pocketbooks, though. William E. Simon of the Investment 
Bankers Association of American – who would be appointed by Nixon as the secretary of the 
Treasury several years later – appeared on behalf of the interests of wealthy investors. Like 
mayors and governors, Simon couched his concern about preserving tax-free interest on state and 
local bonds in terms of the needs of the great mass of middle-income taxpayers. Making changes 
in the tax laws “aimed at investors in municipal bonds will be passed along to the average 
taxpayer and especially to homeowners,” Simon said. Even the suggestion that Congress might 
close the interest loophole, Simon warned, had already made investors reluctant to buy 
government bonds and, as a result, interest rates had already gone up.333  
 Despite the pushback by the Nixon team and by business groups, the pro-reform coalition 
remained confident that they could squeeze more reform out of the Senate than they received 
from the House. Unions, populist Democrats, and others believed that the combination of the tax 
reform mail deluge and liberal Democrats’ insistence on stronger reforms would overtake 
resistance to reform. “[A] year ago the [oil] boys would have laughed at the poor soul who 
suggested Congress might reduce or repeal the 27.5 percent depletion allowance…[but] [t]oday 
the industry itself admits the allowance is in danger. There is growing sentiment for taxing 
capital gains as ordinary income, for boosting the income tax exemption from $600 to 
$1000…and for repeal of the tax exemption on state and local bond interest,” one political 
columnist marveled. “Yes, Mrs. Balderdash, there really is a tax revolt.”334 Labor was confidant 
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that it could move the needle even further towards reform. “We’ve gotten more reform from 
Dick Nixon than we’ve gotten from any president in our time, however short the step,” Seafarers 
union head Paul Hall said. “We got it and that’s more than we got, for example, from our ‘friend’ 
Lyndon Johnson….”335 The slim 210 to 205 tally by which the surtax was approved – and the 
large Democratic opposition to the measure – was viewed as a symbolic victory by organized 
labor since a large margin of victory in the House would have made it more difficult for Senators 
to quash it. “We can turn on the heat,” one labor leader told labor columnist Victor Riesel. “Not 
only do we have the boys back home. But we have some 65 to 70 legislative representatives on 
the Hill working on this tax-justice fight…. We now want tax justice.” The unions felt they were 
“playing it from strength” when it came to tax reform.336 Ultimately, the fact that Nixon even 
considered reform in 1969 was viewed as “a measure of the success of this taxpayers’ revolt,” as 
one columnist put it.337  
 Unions had a powerful new strategy for advocating for reforms beyond traditional labor-
related issues. In the late-1960s, unions increasingly adopted a social movement model to push 
for progressive reform, and taxes were no exception. In the summer of 1968, the UAW and the 
Teamsters – two major unions unaffiliated with the AFL-CIO – formed the Alliance for Labor 
Action, designed as a part-union organizing, part-community organizing, part-lobbying effort 
that would exist in cooperation with, but outside of, the AFL-CIO and Teamsters unions.338 The 
ALA pledged to fight for “social justice,” and the group’s “first major lobbying effort” was “tax 
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justice.”339 UAW president Walter Reuther declared the United States’ tax system the most 
inequitable in the world, and pledged an “all-out fight” for tax reform and tax relief for low- and 
middle-income Americans. Reuther worried that working- and middle-class Americans had been 
lulled into complacency after the initial outrage that followed Barr’s tax-free millionaires 
revelation. The public could not be confident that Congress was undertaking meaningful tax 
reform in response to the tax revolt, Reuther argued. Instead, the idea of tax reform was being 
perverted, particularly given the control conservative Democrats exerted over the Senate Finance 
Committee and House Ways and Means Committee, under the leadership of Russell Long and 
Wilbur Mills, respectively. “Swooning to the plaintive appeals of special interests,” the ALA 
argued, the Finance Committee had taken the House bill’s minor reforms and “reduced even that 
modest amount.” With its tepid loophole-closing and slight relief for working-class and middle-
income taxpayers, the bill emerging from the Senate was making a “mockery” out of the idea of 
reform. Average taxpayers needed to push back. To that end, the ALA held a “Tax Justice 
Conference” in November to push for a more left-leaning tax reform bill. With over two million 
petitions piled in front of the stage at Washington’s Sheraton Park Hotel, Reuther and 600 ALA 
leaders welcomed friendly speakers like consumer advocate Betty Furness and Democratic 
senators Walter Mondale and Vance Hartke and to the conference. “Unless they change the tax 
bill,” Reuther declared at the conference, “we’re going to change the composition of 
Congress.”340  Signs demanding “CLOSE TAX LOOPHOLES” were plastered around the room, 
and members of the ALA’s unions visited every senator during the conference to press them to 
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take on the capital gains and oil depletion loopholes, in particular.341 “With each step toward 
enactment, however, the very phrase ‘tax reform’ has assumed a more hollow, fraudulent ring,” 
the ALA’s resolution, delivered to the senators, declared. “Legislation… continues undeserved 
favors to the few who have for decades prospered at the expense of the majority.” Out of the $50 
billion in revenue lost yearly to loopholes, the existing bill only recouped $2 billion, the ALA 
charged. It also failed to provide much relief to those who needed it. “Americans in deprivation 
and those on the margin of poverty must be relieved of oppressive tax obligations,” the ALA’s 
statement continued. “Those in low and middle-income levels, for so many years victimized by a 
warped tax structure which has compelled them to carry a disproportionate share of the tax 
burden, must be given relief.” Ultimately, it was up to Congress to prevent an even worse tax 
revolt, especially if it wanted to maintain public faith in the tax system and government, in 
general. “If a taxpayers’ revolt is to be avoided, if the voluntary nature of our tax system is to 
survive, and if the concept of participation in, and support for, the government by all Americans 
is to stand…,” the ALA’s statement concluded. “We urge the Senate to take a strong and 
uncompromising and for tax justice….”342 
 Unions hoped that organizing could counter the traditional lobbying power of business 
when it came to taxes. In addition to the ALA’s push, the AFL-CIO’s Biemeller sent a letter to 
the state and local unions urging members to write to their senators to stop the reform bill from 
“being cut to ribbons” by “business lobbyists.” “Like a plague of locusts, this mass lobby has 
devoured almost every loophole-closing section…,” Biemeller wrote. “We must act immediately 
if we are to stop the Big Tax Steal of 1969. Today labor stands virtually alone in the fight for tax 
justice for millions of low- and middle-income Americans…. The average taxpayer’s voice, 
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heard so clearly earlier this year…is now being drowned out by the din of the loophole lobby.”343 
 Labor groups had to carry a disproportionate weight in the tax reform fight, at least partly 
because Congress failed to give a seat at the table to other key members of the left-labor 
coalition. Notably, civil rights groups did not testify in either the House or Senate’s reform 
hearings – except for a few brief statements dealing only with the treatment of tax-exempt 
organizations, since Congress was considering removing the tax-exempt status of groups that 
engaged in nonpartisan voter registration, a move leaders from Bayard Rustin to Roy Wilkins 
called an attack on voting rights.344 But this absence did not reflect a lack of concern for reform. 
The black press, in particular, worried that the “taxpayers revolt” would face substantial 
opposition from the Nixon administration and a “powerful lobby” of those who benefitted from 
loopholes, as the Chicago Defender put it, in addition to its positive coverage of Reuther’s tax 
reform demands.345 Rustin, in particular, was one of the most forceful voices for reform. 
In a column reprinted in black papers across the country, Bayard Rustin slammed the 
Nixon administration’s proposal to shift some of the bill’s tax relief from low-income individuals 
to corporations. Nixon, Rustin argued, represented “the corporations and…the very wealthiest 
individuals.” The president had “turned his back…[on] black people of all classes and salaried 
workers of every race.” Rustin called Nixon the “Robin Hood of the ruling class.” Real tax 
reform was essential, he wrote. “Corporations and men of great wealth” had lawyers who knew 
“ways of finding tax loopholes.” Meanwhile, average workers – those “who earn more than the 
poverty level of $3500 a year but less than the $9500 it costs to maintain a moderate standard of 
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leaving” – were “forced to bear the heaviest burden of taxation.” This unfairness was driving the 
“tax revolt by low and middle income groups,” he wrote. “Nixon’s proposals…would increase 
the economic frustrations of working class America, which feed backlash sentiment.” If the 
government continued to ignore the revolt, Rustin worried that their “frustrations will not be 
directed at the wealthy…but at federal programs for the poor and, by extension, at the poor 
themselves…[and] many of these poor also happen to be black…feed[ing] the flames of racial 
hostility.” The failure to provide meaningful tax reform and relief made it more likely that “the 
poor and the almost poor [will] take out their frustrations against each other,” while those on 
“Wall Street…[and] in the inner chamber of the White House” ignored the public’s discontent.346  
Baltimore Afro-American columnist Max Johnson also critiqued the administration’s 
resistance to reform. By turning his back on reform, “Nixon must by now have lost big hunks of 
whatever esteem and endearment he may have enjoyed among millions of Americans of both 
races in the moderate, low-income brackets and senior citizens class.” The White House’s 
resistance to reform was especially “disheartening for millions of wage earners, especially black 
citizens, in the low and moderate-income brackets – trying to carry their families along on 
salaries that have not kept pace with rising costs of living.” It was hypocritical, Johnson argued, 
for Republicans to worry about the revenue loss that would result from low- and middle-income 
tax relief while simultaneously blocking attempts by Edward Kennedy and other Democrats to 
raise taxes on the wealthy. But, he noted, Republicans “have consistently sheltered the wealthy – 
as against the needs of the poor.” With the midterm election looming and public pressure for tax 
reform, Johnson speculated, “maybe [Nixon] might be persuaded to break GOP precedent – and 
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take another long look at those tax loopholes for the wealthy.”347   
Confident in having the support of the left-liberal coalition – and the majority of the 
public – populist left-distributionist Democrats in the Senate began pushing their colleagues to 
tilt the tax reform bill more in the direction of working- and middle-income taxpayers. 
Tennessee’s Albert Gore – supported by Indiana’s Vance Harke, among others – led the way. As 
in the House, pushing for greater loophole closing in the Finance Committee proved to be 
difficult, given the opposition of most Republicans and some conservative-to-moderate 
Democrats. But progressives knew that distribution-minded tax relief was an easier sell. Gore’s 
strategy was simple. Instead of suggesting rate cuts, the Tennessee populist proposed a large 
increase in the personal exemption, from $600 to $1,000. It was an idea that, by the fall, had a 
long lineage. Many angry members of the tax revolt had requested an increase in the personal 
exemption in their letters to Congress. The DSG and the UAW, among many others, had 
proposed the idea earlier in the year, but Wilbur Mills rejected it out of hand. Edwin S. Cohen, 
Nixon’s Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, also dismissed the idea as too costly 
in his Ways and Means Committee testimony earlier in the year. Gore himself had previously 
floated the idea of hiking the exemption to $1,250 during the question-and-answer period 
following the Nixon team’s controversial Senate Finance testimony. But Treasury Secretary 
Kennedy echoed Cohen’s earlier dismissal of the proposal as too costly, and it seemed that 
conservative Democrats like chairman Long agreed.348 Still, Gore tried to insert a personal 
exemption increase into the bill before it made it out of the Finance Committee. His proposal to 
raise the personal exemption to $1,000 failed 3-13 in the committee. Then a second proposal to 
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raise it incrementally to $850 by 1972 failed 8-8 (a majority being required for a measure to 
make it out of the committee). Those opposed argued that it was too costly and that the resulting 
deficit increase would fan the flames of inflation. Gore supported closing loopholes to make up 
the revenue loss, but that was an even trickier proposition than simply pushing for the exemption 
increase without regard to revenue balance.349  
Unlike the closed rule that prevailed in the House, however, the Senate tax reform bill 
was open to amendment on the floor after it was reported out of the Finance Committee. 
Undeterred by defeats in the Finance Committee, Gore took his proposal to the full Senate, 
setting off what the Congressional Quarterly called “the most heated floor fight on the bill.”350 
In proposing his increase in the personal exemption – from $600 to $1,000 – Gore couched the 
proposal in left-distributionist terms, saying that the reform bill – like the tax system as a whole – 
needed to be guided by “ability to pay.” The bills passed by the House and the Senate Finance 
Committee were “regressive” in their rate reductions, he charged, because lower brackets were 
reduced by one percentage point, while upper brackets had reductions as high as eight percent. 
“This rate reduction, it is clear, benefits the wealthy far more than it does the middle-income 
taxpayers,” Gore wrote. The increase in the standard deduction contained in the passed bill was 
flawed, too, Gore argued, because it had vastly uneven benefits for different taxpayers with the 
same income, depending on whether they rented or owned and on the tax structure of their state. 
Compared to those alternatives, Gore argued that increasing the personal exemption was “fairer 
and more progressive.” 
Tapping into the discourse of the pocketbook squeeze, Gore justified his proposal in 
reference to taxes and inflation. “For a family of four, the present $600 exemption provides a 
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lower amount of tax-free income for the necessities of life that was available to a family of four 
in 1940,” Gore noted. “Yet the cost of living has risen more than 2 ½ times since that date – from 
a Consumer Price Index of 48.8 to today's 128. No one, then, can seriously question the 
inadequacy of the present $600 exemption. Who can live on $50 per month?” Increasing the 
exemption, he continued, was “the most effective and fairest means of achieving tax relief.” 
Framing the proposal in political terms, Gore said that his colleagues had a “basic choice.” They 
could “give the most tax relief where it is needed – the low- and middle-income taxpayer with 
the largest number of dependents, or…[provide an] unfairly large tax reduction for those in the 
high-income brackets.” Compared to current law, Gore’s proposal gave $300 in tax reduction to 
a family of four making $10,000, whereas the House- and Senate Finance Committee-passed bill 
gave less than $100. While an increase in the personal exemption would help upper-income 
taxpayers, too, Gore noted that his bill gave only about 20 percent of its total tax relief to those 
making more than $15,000, while the existing bill gave 33 percent of its benefits to that group. 
Gore continued his earlier assault on the logic of recent tax policy, including the cuts 
championed by JFK and LBJ, which Gore criticized for lowering top tax rates dramatically. 
Cutting taxes for the wealthy was equivalent to raising taxes on everyone else, he argued. “Our 
tax system has become steadily less progressive since 1964. The rate reduction provisions of the 
bill continue that process...,” Gore said. “A reduction in progressivity is just another way of 
increasing the tax burden for the average taxpayer on whom the major burden of the tax system 
already falls.” To those who said his proposal was too expensive and fiscally irresponsible, Gore 
outlined a host of loophole-closing options that would raise more than enough money to pay for 
his proposal.351 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Indiana Democrat Vance Hartke co-sponsored Gore’s proposal. “I do not think that aid to 
the wealthy is what is meant by tax relief,” Hartke said of the existing bill. The Indiana 
Democrat cited a 1947 Treasury Department study that found that the personal exemption 
“should be at least adequate to cover some minimum essential living costs…where the minimal 
means of life have been obtained.” Everything from inflation to current poverty thresholds to the 
BLS family budgets showed, according to Hartke, that the personal exemption should be much 
higher in 1969 than in was in 1948, yet that was the last time the exemption was raised.  Lower- 
and middle-income taxpayers “desperately” needed “tax relief,” Hartke argued, “because they 
bear a disproportionate share of the existing tax burden, endure the full brunt of the present high 
tax and high interest rate policies and pay more than their share of the highly regressive state, 
local, and property taxes.”352 At least when it came to the exemption, Hartke was able to reclaim 
the idea that the federal tax code should provide relief from state and local taxes from the mayors 
and bankers who appropriated the argument to protect the government bond interest loophole.   
With low-income taxpayers already helped by other provisions in the act, the political 
room existed for Gore and Hartke to aim their proposal squarely at median income voters 
making around $10,000-a-year. Gore said that Senate Finance Committee proposals would 
“provide disproportionate and, in my view, unfairly large, tax reduction for those in the upper 
brackets.”353 Compared to the Senate Finance Committee’s bill, the exemption increase gave 
“proportionately more tax relief to the middle income, about the same to the lower income, and 
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proportionately less to the upper-middle and upper income” taxpayers.354 Gore’s rationale for 
favoring middle-income voters was simple. “[M]idle-income families feel sorely pressed by 
taxes on one side and inflation on the other, and they are clamoring for tax relief,” the New York 
Times explained in its piece on Gore’s proposal. “They also vote, much more than the poor 
do.”355 In fact, he explicitly framed his proposal as a pocketbook program designed to combat 
Republican’s cultural appeals to the “Silent Majority.”356 Though similar proposals by Gore in 
previous years had been blocked by a combination of Republicans and conservative Democrats, 
Gore believed that the growing tax revolt would make the political calculus different this time. 
Specifically, he hoped to make “Republicans stand up and be counted on economic issues – 
mainly taxes,” as Washington Post reporter Joseph Kraft put it. He also hoped to win enough 
moderate Democrats to his side to pass the amendment.357 President Nixon and Republicans 
countered that Gore’s proposal was fiscally irresponsible. If it passed, they argued, Democrats 
would be to blame for future inflation.  “This bill represents the most irresponsible piece of 
legislation that I have seen since I have been in the Senate,” declared Delaware Republican 
Senator John J. Williams.358  
The Democrats who supported the personal exemption increase welcomed Republican 
opposition. In speeches and press releases, Representative Henry Reuss, who had been a leading 
advocate of progressive reform in the House, used the administration’s new position on tax 
reform as an opportunity portray Nixon the friend of corporations and Democrats as the friend of 
average Americans. “Only when it was clear that Congress intended to close tax loopholes 
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despite the Administration did we get a few half-hearted tax proposals from the Nixon 
Treasury,” Reuss said. “Now the Administration is complaining that the House-passed tax 
reform bill is too generous to Mr. Average American…. The story is different for Mr. Corporate 
America… The way the Administration tells it, a too-generous tax reform bill for Most 
Americans is too onerous for corporate America…. In the meantime, Mr. Average American can 
wait [for tax reform] and pay the surcharge.”359 Likewise, Gore challenged Vice President 
Agnew to a public debate pitting his proposal versus what he called the administration’s “rich 
man’s tax bill.”360 Indeed, Republicans’ intransigence seemed to create an air of political 
opportunity around the Gore proposal that tempted previously reluctant Democrats. “More than 
any other development, the tax bill was responsible for bringing the domestic issue to the fore 
along classical lines between Democrats and Republicans…,” one reporter observed. “[I]n the 
form of tax relief, Democrats are fighting for the political affections of that ‘mid-America’ the 
Nixon Administration is counting on for its political future.” 361 Democrats, the New York Times 
reported, were suddenly reviving tax rhetoric that “sounded like faint echoes from New Deal and 
Fair Deal days.”362  
Though claims of Democratic unity around left-distributionist populism were 
exaggerations, they did capture a subtle swing of the pendulum back in the direction of 
downwardly redistributive relief and reform. “What we are fighting for is suburbia,” one 
unnamed Democratic senator declared. Gore put it more evocatively, saying that he wanted “to 
give tax relief to the guy who needs it the most – the man living in the suburbs in his little house 
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with a big mortgage and filled with children.”363 Giving the proposal a blue-collar burnishing, 
the AFL-CIO, which had long proposed a substantial increase in the personal exemption, 
strongly backed Gore’s plan.364 Looking towards what many expected to be a difficult reelection 
fight in 1970, Gore believed the public was on his side when it came to taxes. He seemed to be 
reading the pubic correctly. The New York Times reported that the public was letting the 
Republicans and conservative Democrats opposing Gore’s proposal know that they wanted “a 
tax cut in a form they can see – an increase in the personal exemption.”365 Columnist Joseph 
Kraft called Gore’s tax plan an “emerging Democratic defense against the administration’s 
Southern Strategy.” “Gore has developed an approach to taxes that emphasizes relief for middle-
income voters,” Kraft wrote. “And that approach unites Democrats and puts the Republicans in a 
terrible bind.” 366  
But, despite exaggerated media reports, Democrats were not united around Gore’s 
proposal. Many moderate-to-conservative – thinking of taxes in fiscalist or, sometimes, right-
distributionist terms – Democrats bristled at the potential revenue loss, as well as the supposedly 
anti-business tone of Gore’s populist appeal. Despite the support from the public for Gore’s 
proposal, moderates and conservatives like Russell Long, in particular, made it clear that he 
would lead the fight on the floor against any increase in the personal exemption. When voting on 
amendments began, however, supporters of the increased personal exemption started with the 
boldest proposal possible. Alabama Democratic James B. Allen’s introduced an amendment to 
raise the exemption to $1,200. It was rejected 13-46. Only two Republicans voted in favor of the 
measure, while the measure’s strongest support came from left-leaning, most Northern and 
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Western, Democrats, including Hawaii’s Daniel Inouye, South Dakota’s George McGovern, and 
Montana’s Mike Mansfield. Even many ostensibly liberal Democrats opposed the increase, 
including Maine’s Edmund Muskie and Minnesota’s Eugene McCarthy. 367  To the 
disappointment of progressive reformers, it became clear that even Gore’s $1,000 did not have 
the votes to pass, and eventually Gore settled on an increase to $800 as the only viable 
amendment in the full Senate – and even it seemed far from assured of victory.368 
Even Gore’s more modest amendment was cosponsored only by Democrats and, for the 
most part, only by the most left-leaning of Democrats, including Hartke, Ted Kennedy, Fred 
Harris, and Walter Mondale. When debate began on his amendment, Gore joked to laughs across 
the Senate chamber that it might not even be “necessary to have a roll call on this amendment,” 
since he feared that – like previous proposals – the increase to $800 was doomed to defeat. 
Indeed, two bipartisan coalitions of Senators – pro-business conservatives and balanced budget, 
anti-inflation moderates – attacked Gore and his supporters. Capital-friendly senators argued that 
making the tax system more progressive would discourage business investment, while balanced-
budget senators slammed an increase in the personal exemption as too inflationary. Speaking for 
the former camp, an unhappy Long proclaimed that those who supported Gore did not 
“understand” the tax debate. Loophole closing that hurt the wealthy had to be balanced by cuts in 
the upper-income brackets to benefit the wealthy. “[I]f we are to have tax reform…by putting 
heavier taxes on corporations and persons receiving $25,000 or more, to the point where we are 
saying that one man who now pays little or nothing will now pay substantially,” Long said, 
“then, in fairness we should have some reduction in tax rates so as to encourage those who are in 
high tax brackets – who are actually paying 70 percent of their income in taxes – to invest their 
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money in ways that are productive….” Plus, Long argued, lower tax rates on the rich would 
actually pay for themselves due to the higher growth they would create. “I do not think much 
money will be lost if we reduce the upper tax rate because if people are encouraged to invest 
their money in productive ways…that will result in benefits to the economy and the nation,” he 
explained, “and whatever reduction is made in taxes will be more than made up as a result of the 
investment of their money and effort in constructive ways.” 369  Moderate Massachusetts 
Republican Edward Brooke proclaimed that “any increase in personal exemptions will, in fact, 
be illusory…because such an increase is bound to fueled the very inflation that destroys the 
benefit it offers.” Delaware Republican John Williams and Nebraska Republican Carl Curtis 
both flatly opposed any tax cut that would increase the deficit, while Colorado Republican 
Gordon Allott said that the “emotional pull” of Gore’s appeal for the “little man” did not 
outweigh the “vital need for fiscal moderation to combat the inflationary spiral.”370 
However, as debate wore on, it became clear that the $800 amendment had more friends 
in the full Senate than Gore’s previous proposals, sometimes from unexpected places. Despite 
the skepticism from the pro-capital, anti-inflation contingent, as the debate wore on, more and 
more Senators – including everyone from West Virginia’s Robert Byrd to George McGovern – 
lined up behind Gore’s amendment, either in floor statements or as cosponsors. John Stennis, an 
ardent segregationist Mississippi Democrat began the debate with an impassioned plea for 
Gore’s amendment and a stinging criticism of the overall reform bill. “If it is indeed to be a tax 
reform bill, I think we must shift the burden away from the low income and middle income 
taxpayer and make that revenue up from others,” Stennis said. “I am afraid the bill does not do as 
much as it should, but certainly the Gore amendment is a step in the right direction.” Stennis 
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argued for closing loopholes that benefitted the wealthy and giving more of the relief average 
taxpayers in order to create a more “progressive tax structure” that was truly “based on the 
ability to pay.” Stennis had voted against the $1,200 increase, but he argued that defeating the 
$800 increase would prove that Congress had no desire to respond to the tax revolt. “[D]uring 
the last year we have heard a lot of rhetoric about tax relief for the average taxpayer,” Stennis 
said, “but now when Senator Gore’s amendment offers us a chance to do something about it, we 
suddenly begin to hear all sorts of excuses about why it cannot be done…. To plagiarize from 
Frost, ‘tax reform still has many miles to go and many promises to keep.’”371 Hawaii Democrat 
Daniel Inouye noted that his home state had one of the highest cost-of-living levels in the U.S., 
but that rather than claim inflation as a reason to oppose Gore’s bill, he saw the pocketbook 
squeeze created by inflation as a reason to support the personal exemption increase. “The Gore 
amendment…merely recognize[s] what should be apparent to all: the declining value of the 
dollar and the value of the present personal exemption,” Inouye said. “If we leave that exemption 
at its current level we will in effect increase taxes with every increase in inflation at a rate in 
excess of the inflationary increase [because the fixed value of the exemption declines in real 
terms].”372 Robert Byrd also turned a conservative argument on its head. He agreed that “the cost 
of living has skyrocketed,” that the government “was wasted too much money on questionable 
programs,” and that Gore’s amendment might threaten the deficit if nothing was done in 
response. But the government could cut those wasteful programs to fund Gore’s proposal. “As 
far as I am concerned,” Byrd said, “a platoon of spacemen on the moon is not as important as a 
$200 tax break for the low- and middle-income American.” 373  
As Gore’s proposal gained momentum, moderate Republicans, including Pennsylvania’s 
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Hugh Scott and Illinois’ Charles Percy hoped to craft a more conservative alternative to Gore’s 
$800 plan, by proposing a Republican plan that also raised the exemption to $800, but did so by 
$50 a year for four years, rather than immediately. President Nixon had repeatedly indicated his 
opposition to any increase in the exemption, even at the $800 level.374 But Senate Republicans 
believed their Percy-crafted moderate alternative to Gore’s plan was smart politics. They hoped 
to win the White House’s support for the measure, but the Nixon team sent Senate Republicans 
mixed signals regarding the Percy plan. Still, Republican leaders believed that it had Nixon’s 
support and pushed forward with the bill.375 So Senate Republicans felt betrayed when, the day 
before the vote on the Percy amendment, Nixon sent a public letter to Mike Mansfield and Hugh 
Scott declaring his opposition to a hike in the personal exemption, even at the  $800 level. 376 
Such increases, Nixon said, were “too generous” and failed the “test of fiscal responsibility,” 
because they would increase the deficit. “The spirit of this legislation is tax reform which 
attempts to make taxation fairer to all Americans not tax reduction,” Nixon wrote. “It would be 
unfortunate indeed if Congress violated this spirit of reform and thereby jeopardized both the 
source of revenue for vital national goals and the fight against inflation.”377 Senate Republican 
leaders scrambled to mitigate the political damage done by Nixon’s letter and tried rally support 
for the Percy alternative. At the last minute, Bob Dole helped Percy lower his alternative from 
$800 to $750, phased in over three years. But many Republicans believed Nixon opposed any 
increase, and the amendment was defeated 23-72, with Republicans evenly divided (21-21) on 
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Immediately after Percy’s amendment, the Senate voted on Gore’s $800 plan. It passed 
58-37 with 10 Republicans, including moderates – such as Vermont’s Winston Prouty, Oregon’s 
Mark Hatfield, and Pennsylvania’s Richard Schweiker – voting in support. In contrast, many of 
the most liberal Republicans – including New York’s Jacob Javits and Massachusetts’s Edward 
Brooke – voted against it. Five conservative Democrats, including Long and Georgia’s Richard 
Russell, joined Republicans voting against the Gore amendment, too.379 Republican leaders were 
furious. Immediately after the vote, Republican senators began debating the extent to which the 
Nixon administration was responsible for the success of Gore’s amendment. Some believed the 
hard-line strategy of the Nixon team and some Senate Republicans doomed the party, while 
others believed moderates undermined unified Republican opposition. Scott and Percy blamed 
the Nixon Treasury – and Nixon personally – for opposing Scott’s more moderate increase in the 
personal exemption. “[Republicans] simply ‘blew it,’” Percy declared. “I do hope,” he said, “that 
responsible officials in the Treasury of my own Administration will listen when next time we 
advise them we understand more about strategy than they do.” Senator Baker worried about 
creating the “appearance of divisiveness within our party” and scolded Scott and Percy for 
“washing dirty linen in public” by criticizing Nixon. Baker acknowledged that there was no clear 
administration strategy on the Gore amendment, but faulted Percy equally for creating a 
“confused situation” by proposing his alterative and dividing the Republicans by appearing to 
accede to the idea of an increase in the personal exemption. If Republicans had held strong 
against any increasing the personal exemption, Baker implied, opponents to the Gore plan would 
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have prevailed.380  
Despite Republicans’ reaction to the success of the Gore amendment, it was still a 
relatively modest success. Letters from the public had indicated widespread support for 
increasing the exemption to $1,200. Moreover, many reform amendments – including lowering 
the oil depletion allowance to 20 percent – were rejected in the Senate, usually by a coalition of 
Republicans and moderate-to-conservative Democrats.381 Taking the concerns about state and 
local budget crises and rising regressive property taxes seriously, Harke even offered an 
amendment that would have returned the revenue from the surtax to local governments to fund 
education. It was rejected 8-74.382 So, despite conservatives’ anger, securing an increase in the 
personal exemption to only $800 seemed more like a compromise than a victory for the left. 
 
The Failure of Reform – and the Persistence of the Revolt 
Days after the passage of the Gore amendment, Nixon was asked at a press conference 
whether he would sign a bill that included the $800 person exemption. The president gave a one-
word answer: “No.”383 The conservative right-distributionist members of the administration, in 
particular, were not enamored with the Senate tax bill. In a December speech to the conservative 
Tax Foundation titled “The Control of Government Expenditures,” Burns criticized the bill for 
tilting too far to the left and cast it as a symptom of a bloated government fed by high taxes. 
Burns sent his speech to Nixon, hoping to influence the president to stand strong against the 
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But, to the public, the prospect of Nixon vetoing the tax bill seemed cruel. A White 
House analysis of the president’s mail following the press conference where he threatened to 
veto the tax bill found that most letter writers “expressed disapproval of the president’s 
position.”385 A letter from a New Jersey woman with a son in Vietnam and a husband who 
worked at DuPont was indicative of the public’s view. “You are not responsible for the war and 
we realize your hands are tied…. We do not participate in public demonstrations…. We have a 
strong belief in God and honor our flag, our president, and certainly [are] proud to be 
Americans…,” she wrote. “The one thing you are in a position to do and seem reluctant about is 
our taxes. Now, when you have been offered an opportunity to help the silent majority you 
threaten to veto the bill. Since World War II our basic $600.00 exemption has remained the 
same. The cost of living has doubled and is still rising steadily. If you and all those in office were 
to change places with us in the lower middle income bracket you would appreciate the struggle 
we are having. With rents and utilities high and food rising steadily it is almost impossible to 
keep one’s head above water…. [W]e look to you for help and you seem to have turned your 
head the other way when you do have the chance to help us…. We the people must have some 
relief.”386  
With both signing and vetoing the bill unappealing, Nixon moved to use the House-
Senate conference committee to tame the bill. The president met privately with both Mills and 
Byrnes to ask them to ensure that a more conservative bill emerged from conference.387 In his 
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concern with an inflation-fighting balanced budget, rather than tax relief for low- and middle-
income taxpayers, Nixon had the support of most mainstream pundits. Adopting a fiscalist tone, 
the New York Times editorial page worried that Gore’s proposal had turned the Tax Reform Act 
of 1969 into the “Tax Fiasco of 1969” – a “disastrous abdication of responsibility” that would 
feed inflation – and pledged the paper’s support to Nixon as the president fought for a more 
fiscally conservative bill.388 Even some liberals agreed. One of Kennedy’s “New Economics” 
wizards, Yale Professor James Tobin, private fretted that the tax reform bill was the “wrong 
direction,” since it increased the deficit. Like the Nixon team, Tobin argued that fiscal policy 
should be more restrictive to allow for easier money and lower interest rates.389  
Nixon worried that the conference bill would still be too costly, even if Mills and Byrnes 
succeeded in tilting it back towards the right. If it looked as if the conference bill would end up 
too progressive, Nixon would shift strategy again by trying to make a veto more politically 
viable. He told his closest advisers to prepare for “some very high politics” on the tax bill. 
Specifically, if it seemed Mills and Byrnes were failing, Nixon looked to “set the tax bill up for a 
veto in conf[erence]” by making it more costly.390 Nixon and his advisers prepared for the 
possibility of “leav[ing] it [the bill] screwed up” by trying to enlist Republican senators’ help to 
“get a bill as bad as possible.” This would make a veto more justifiable. The president’s personal 
preference, according to meeting notes taken by John Ehrlichman, was to “sink it.” 391 The 
president’s biggest concern, however, was that a bill that seemed popular but that was still too far 
to the left for his tastes would emerge from the conference committee. It was possible, Nixon and 
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Ehrlichman discussed, that the president  “might get a bill [that he] must sign.”392 
Fortunately for Nixon, the final House-Senate conference bill proved to be far smaller. It 
was notably less generous to middle-income taxpayers, in part because it fell far short of Gore’s 
initial proposal for the personal exemption. The exemption would be raised in $50 increments 
over three years, finally settling at $750 in 1973 – a plan identical to the Republican Percy plan 
that the Senate had rejected.393 Long called the bill that emerged from the conference committee 
“fiscally responsible” and predicted that it would be “a very popular bill with the overwhelming 
majority of the American people.”394 But, by December 1969, if Long was praising a tax bill, it 
was likely that it was very weak reform, indeed. 
And, in fact, both the relief and reform provisions in the final bill were modest. The low-
income allowance did provide relief to the very poorest. But the bill’s tax relief tapered off 
sharply as one approached median income. According to estimates, most middle-income families 
could expect about $100 in initial tax cuts from the Tax Reform Act of 1969.395 Though nothing 
to sneeze at for the family making $10,000-a-year, taxpayers could be forgiven for viewing it as 
lackluster, given that average homeowners across the country were facing yearly property tax 
increases of $100 or more.396 The plan was projected to save an addition $100 per year for a 
median income family over the next three years, totaling $300 in cuts by 1973 – an amount 
almost double the relief contained in the original House and Senate Finance Committee versions 
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of the bill.397 However, as the next several years made clear, inflation and increases in payroll 
taxes ensured that the federal effective tax rate paid by the middle income quintile dropped less 
than two percent in real terms – from 21.1 in 1969 to 19.5 in 1971 – before climbing back 
upwards and exceeding 1969 levels in 1973.398 
The bill’s reform provisions were equally lackluster. While it included versions of several 
long-discussed reforms, including an increase in the maximum rate on capital gains, a reduction 
the oil depletion allowance, a reduction in the benefits resulting from various tax-loss schemes, 
and a minimum tax that served as the predecessor to the Alternative Minimum Tax, among 
others, most were only half-measures, at best.399 Most gallingly to reformers, the bill included a 
maximum tax rate of 50 percent.400 In fact, the average federal tax rate for the top five percent of 
taxpayers actually decreased after 1969.401 Former Treasury official Joseph Pechman, the 
longtime voice of mainstream reformers, declared the package “a weak brew compared to what 
people would identify as a prescription for tax reform.”402 The Associated Press ran a series of 
damning reports exposing the limits of the tax reform bill. “While tax reformers debated publicly 
about closing well-known loopholes,” the first report began, “a diverse array of private interests 
working quietly in complex areas are winning new hand-tailored tax gimmicks.” For many 
powerful corporations and individuals, it seemed, when Congress closed a door, it opened a 
window. Some of the changes were subtle and did not necessarily seek to completely block a 
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reform, just to shift it slightly in a certain taxpayer’s favor. Winn Dixie, the politically well-
connected Jacksonville, Florida, grocery chain, lobbied successfully to move back the enactment 
date of a provision in the act, saving its stockholder millions of dollars. The company was 
planning a convertible stock issuance and the tax reform bill proposed taxing shares of that type 
at the common stock dividend, rather than the capital gains, rate. With the help of former Florida 
Senator George Smathers, a longtime friend of President Nixon who also happened to own 
12,000 convertible Winn-Dixie shares, the enactment date was delayed, making Winn Dixie the 
last major corporation to take advantage of the tax break and saving Winn-Dixie’s owners, the 
Davis family, millions of dollars in taxes.403 In an analysis picked up by newspapers across the 
country, including cities like Youngstown, the New York Times dismissed the legislation as “a 
mouse of a reform bill” that fell short of the high expectations stirred by the public outcry early 
in the year. Not only had the loophole problem not been solved, the Times reported, it had 
“hardly been touched.”404 
The biggest surprise in the bill was a 15 percent increase in Social Security benefits.405 
The president had suggested a 10-percent increase in a proposal completely unrelated to the tax 
reform bill, and the 15-percent raise was proposed by Russell Long as an amendment to the 
Senate tax reform bill. Left-leaning Democrats could take solace in the fact that amendments by 
Fred Harris, Robert Byrd, and Mike Mansfield increased the minimum Social Security payment, 
boosted payments to elderly who received both Social Security and welfare, and raised the 
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ceiling on the income subjected to the Social Security tax from $7,800 to $12,000. Yet, everyone 
knew that the Social Security measures had little to do with tax reform.406 
Despite the conference committee’s taming of the tax bill, Nixon still debated whether to 
sign or veto it. In a memo to the president, Kennedy, Mayo, and McCracken warned him that the 
public could interpret a veto as “denying taxpayers, especially low-income taxpayers, and 
Social Security beneficiaries advantages offered by Congress while protecting upper-income 
taxpayers against the loss of their loopholes.” The argument in favor of a veto, in contrast, was 
that it was tilted in favor of consumption against capital and could result in budget deficits. They 
prepared both a veto message and a signing statement for the president.407 Nixon and his advisers 
met with Republican congressional leaders, including Representatives Gerald Ford and John 
Byrnes and Senators Hugh Scott and Wallace Bennett. Bennett worried that the tax bill was 
“heavily titled to consumption” and anti-business. Nixon responded that he thought limiting the 
oil depreciation allowance was the right direction, despite other Republicans’ objections – and 
the president’s own past statements. The question for Nixon was whether to favor traditional 
Republican campaign donors – business and the wealthy – or the public. With that conflict in 
mind, Nixon and the Republican leaders debated the small increase in the capital gains rate 
contained in the bill. Nixon noted that it would hit what the he called “the risk-takers.” But, 
clearly pointing out the rhetorical significance that curbing the capital gains preference had for 
the left, Nixon noted that, by lessening the capital gains preference, the bill could also be seen as 
“favor[ing] the man who earns pay by his own talents, hard work” while “hit[ting] ‘unearned’ 
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income.”408 Yet, Nixon still worried that it would be damaging for a Republican president to sign 
a bill seen as “very” anti-business. “Truman always stuck w[ith] his constituency,” the president 
noted. “LBJ made the mistake of not doing so.” Presumably, Nixon did not want to make the 
same mistake.409  
After a year of wrangling with Congress and the Fed to control inflation, ultimately 
political considerations trumped economic considerations for Nixon when it came to the tax bill. 
The positives in the bill, as Nixon and the other Republicans saw it, were that it was good for 
single women, took the poor off the federal income tax rolls, and made sure that “no one escapes 
tax” among the “affluent rich,” thanks to the minimum tax.410 They also understood that most of 
the middle-income relief measures were too timid to have much political effect – an ironic 
observation given that Nixon fought that very relief. It was a “real prob[lem],” they noted, that 
middle-income taxpayers who were facing “high state [and] local tax[es],” among other issues, 
but were not receiving much tax relief in the reform bill. The “av[era]g[e] homeowner…gets 
nothing under this bill,” Nixon and the Republican leaders noted.411 Ultimately, the president 
worried that a “veto would help Gore.” He knew that if he vetoed the bill, it would be dead. 
Congress was about to go to recess and there would be “no chance” for Democrats to override 
Nixon’s veto. 412 Therefore, if Nixon vetoed the bill, Democrats would slam Nixon and the 
Republicans in 1970 and 1972 by talking up the elements of the bill with “popular appeal.” 
Moreover, it was not clear to Nixon that the revenue loss could be sold to the public as a reason 
to veto the bill. 413 Ford said that the 1970 midterms were a “must win” for Republicans and 
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urged the president to sign the bill. Scott agreed. Ultimately, though, they said that it was the 
president’s decision alone whether to sign the bill or not. 414  
In another meeting the same day, Nixon and McCracken debated the effects of signing 
versus vetoing the bill on the “inflation psychology” of the “b[usiness] community.” Nixon noted 
that the bill was “tilted too much to consumers, but [that] can’t be [the] basis of [the] veto.” On 
the other hand, vetoing the bill would save so much revenue that the budget would be in a 
projected surplus by 1970, allowing the president to argue that he “favors reform” – not tax 
reform, but the welfare reform and revenue sharing that would be possible the following year 
thanks to the revenue saved by vetoing the tax bill.415 Nixon worried about what the bill’s effect 
on the deficit would be. Secretary Shultz explained that a budget deficit “would prob[ably] cause 
the Fed to keep a tight money policy” because it would be “the only responsible fiscal control 
left.”416 But, returning to the conclusion of his discussion with House and Senate Republicans 
earlier in the day, Nixon declared that victory in the midterms was more important than 
controlling inflation.417 The president decided to sign the bill. 
Nixon’s signing statement touted the bill’s reforms, which the president said would make 
the “tax system more fair,” but also served as a lecture scolding congressional Democrats for 
their “irresponsible” actions. Nixon noted that the bill “unduly favors spending at the expense of 
saving at a time when demands on our savings are heavy.” It was also too expensive and, the 
president said, he would have vetoed it had the bill not been changed in the conference 
committee. “The critical moment for this legislation came after the Senate had passed a totally 
irresponsible bill that would have led to a sharp increase in the cost of living for every family in 
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America,” Nixon said. “In a letter to the leaders of the Congress, I left no doubt that such a bill 
would be vetoed. As a result, when Members of the Congress met to work out the differences 
between the House and Senate bills, the bill that came out of that conference was over $6 billion 
less inflationary for the next fiscal year than the bill that had passed the Senate.” Despite these 
changes, Nixon said he was still displeased with the unbalanced nature of the bill, and – in a 
seeming declaration of solidarity with balanced-budget Republicans against the new Goldwater-
influenced tax-cutting insurgents – Nixon declared that, “If taxes are to be reduced, there must be 
corresponding reductions on the expenditure side.”418 
 But the predictions from Gore, the press, and even Nixon himself, that Tax Reform Act 
of 1969 would have little impact on the public were correct. Even after the Tax Reform Act was 
fully implemented, the percentage of Americans who told pollsters that their taxes were too high 
barely budged – and for good reason, considering the modest relief provided in the bill, as noted 
earlier. Even the reform measures in the bill received mixed praise, at best, from the public. Only 
four percent of Americans told pollsters that the bill was “excellent,” while 30 percent rated it 
“pretty good,” 27 percent said it was “only fair,” and 11 percent called it “poor.” Nearly 80 
percent of Americans said there were “still a lot of tax loopholes for the rich to avoid taxes.” 
Perhaps most significantly, 67 percent of American said they still felt the same about their taxes, 
while only 20 percent said they felt better about their taxes because of the Tax Reform Act’s 
loophole changes.419 By almost any measure – and after a year of contentious political battle – 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was a failure – and the “tax revolt” continued unabated. 
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 “There are those within the Nixon official family who are already telling the President 
that he should never again recommend tax reform,” the New York Times reported.420 Indeed, 
Nixon’s frustrations with the reform bill caused the president to call his entire fiscal philosophy 
into question. Arthur Burns warned Nixon that the country was tilting too far to the left. Taxes 
were too high, and the state was too big. “We surely cannot afford to take capital formation or 
economic progress for granted,” Burns said in the speech he sent to Nixon. “In recent times, our 
nation has moved rapidly towards the welfare state, such as various European countries 
previously developed…” At some point taxes would become so high that they would strangle the 
American economy. “I do not know precisely at what point the burden of taxation will materially 
serve to check our nation’s economic progress, but I also do no think it wise to test this issue too 
closely. The trend of governmental spending and taxes in the past forty years has been sharply 
and inexorably upward…,” Burns said. “With over a third of our nation’s output already moving 
into the hands of the tax collector, it seems hardly prudent to contemplate any further increase in 
the level of taxation.” While some blamed the Vietnam War and defense expenditures for the 
growth of the federal budget, Burns said that the welfare state was to blame. “[T]he need for 
expenditure reform may be even greater than the need for tax reform,” Burns argued – and Nixon 
noted this point when he read the speech. As a solution, Burns called for ceilings on expenditures 
and “zero-base budgeting,” as well as a “larger reliance on volunteer efforts for dealing with our 
great social ills.” 421 
This hard-right view was gaining traction with Nixon. Liberal Democrats’ push for an 
increase in the personal exemption – despite its potential to increase the deficit – began to 
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convince the president that fighting for “fiscal responsibility” was a fool’s errand. Just as 
Friedman predicted, Democrats were willing to blow up the deficit, it seemed, and leave Nixon 
to fix it later. Moreover, the backlash from the Republican Party and its well-heeled backers to 
even modest loophole-closing seemed to indicate that Nixon would be better off trying to avoid 
reforms in the future. Moreover – despite what polls and letters said – Nixon remained 
unconvinced that the public actually cared about unfairness in the tax code. Maybe, just as those 
on the right argued, the public really wanted lower taxes and smaller government. As the Nixon 
team waited to see the outcome of the conference committee’s bill, Nixon, Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman had speculated that the “country doesn’t want tax reform.”422  
The 1970 midterms, however, quashed Nixon’s flirtation with right-distributionism. 
Running to the right on a backlash thesis-inspired interpretation of the tax revolt, GOP 
gubernatorial candidates in states like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida lost to populist Democrats 
openly advocating new, but progressive, forms of taxation. 423  Following the stinging 
disappointment of the 1970 midterms, in which Nixon took a leading role, the President began to 
consider a different, more pocketbook squeeze-oriented interpretation of the tax revolt, spurred 
in part by the successes of left-distributionist activists like Ralph Nader and Democrats like 
Edmund Muskie and George McGovern. Rather than moving right, Nixon would move left. 
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“New Populism” and the Ascendance of Left-Distributionism 
 
  
By the spring of election year 1972, the mood of the nation when it came to taxes was 
unmistakable. “Election-year rhetoric seldom has great or lasting impact on the course of 
economic policy,” the First National City Bank of New York noted in its monthly newsletter. 
“But this year could prove to be one of the exceptions. Discontent over the heavy tax burden [on 
low- and middle-income Americans] has given rise not only to demands for tax reform…but to a 
‘new populism’ which centers about proposals for a radical redistribution of income and 
wealth.”1 Not only were national activists and local grassroots groups turning their attention to 
taxes, but a series of local and state studies, as well as federal hearings and reports, were also 
providing ever greater levels of legitimacy to the idea that the country was gripped in an 
unstoppable “tax revolt.” In fact, 69 percent of Americans now told pollsters that they “would 
sympathize with a taxpayers’ revolt,” and 64 percent agreed that “the tax laws are written to help 
the rich, not the average man.” 2  The context for activists, policymakers, and aspiring 
officeholders to turn their attention to tax reform – not only at the federal level, but also at the 
state and local levels, too – could not have been more auspicious.  
This chapter charts the triumph of the left-“distributionist” vision of comprehensive tax 
reform in 1972. By the late-1960s, key activists like Saul Alinsky and Ralph Nader, cognizant of 
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the power of the “tax revolt,” were turning to inequities in the tax code as a key organizing issue. 
The ideas and attitudes of these activists and state policymakers quickly trickled up into federal 
politics and policymaking. Democrats vying for the 1972 presidential nomination embraced a 
“new populism” premised largely on the necessity of pursuing left-distributionist tax reforms. 
Moreover, President Nixon alarmed his most conservative advisers by turning to the left on taxes 
in response. After reluctantly embracing federal income tax reform in 1969 and turning to a hard-
right “backlash” approach in the 1970 midterms, Nixon now followed both left reformers and the 
public mood in portraying himself as a left-distributionist in the run-up to the 1972 election.  
Perhaps most significantly, federal policymakers in both parties now sought to tear down 
the distinction between local, state, and federal taxes. Beginning with the debates surrounding 
the enactment of federal Revenue Sharing and continuing through the presidential election, both 
left-leaning Democrats and Republicans loyal to Nixon insisted that it was the responsibility of 
the federal government to solve not only the “fiscal crisis” facing states and localities but also to 
end inequities in local property taxes and provide lower- and middle-income Americans relief 
from the most onerous and unfair taxes, regardless of which level of government levied them. 
Thus, this chapter explains how a bipartisan majority of federal policymakers – pushed by public 
opinion, grassroots activists, and politicians at lower levels of government – came to two 
interlocking, and profoundly significant, conclusions about the “tax revolt”: that the fairness and 
distribution of taxes, not just their level, were key to understanding American’s tax discontent 
and that only a federal initiative to close loopholes in the tax code at all levels of government and 
shift the tax burden upward would quell the “revolt.” As a result, by the end of 1972, it seemed 






This triumph began with an attack on business-friendly inequities in the local property 
tax – inequities that were often missed by many observers.  
 
The Business of Property Tax Preferences 
By the early-1970s, the local property tax had become yet another loophole-ridden code 
that seemed to be stacked against average Americans in favor of powerful property owners. 
These violations of equity extended beyond the race- and income-based assessment 
discrimination among homeowners and cut to the very core of the relationship between 
businesses and all homeowners in the property tax system. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
businesses shifted from the urban core to suburbs within metropolitan areas and from the 
Northeast and Midwest to the South and Southwest within the country at large. A significant part 
of this shift had to do with intrastate and interstate competition. Many states and localities 
attempted to lure businesses by offering them favorable tax treatment – either through statutorily 
lower rates on all businesses or by offering specific incentives, legal and extra-legal, for 
individual industries or firms. Thus, incentives to attract businesses not only shifted the 
georgraphic localities of business and industry, it altered the very distribution of the burden tax 
itself, both among businesses and between businesses and homeowners.3  
States and localities had a variety of legal tools at their fingertips to attract or retain 
favored businesses. “Undoubtedly, the most dramatic example of specific tax benefit for new 
industry is to be found in the legislation of 13 states that authorizes local governments to exempt 
from local taxation the real estate holdings of ‘new industries’ for a designated number of years,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






the ACIR noted.4 States and localities also pursued a variety of other tax incentives for 
businesses in the 1950s and 1960s, including state-level accelerate depreciation and other 
corporate income tax breaks. 5  Localities had additionally attracted “unfavorable public notice to 
the detriment of the public’s regard for local government administration” by utilizing the 
increasingly popular tool of industrial development bonds to dole out tax breaks to favored firms, 
including large national companies that could easily afford their own financing. Communities 
also made headlines by using the bonds for “pirating established firms [from] one community to 
another” and “establishing specially incorporated areas with relatively few residents to develop 
tax havens at the expense of neighboring communities.”6  
Thus, by the 1960s, businesses, not homeowners, had the upper hand in setting state and 
local tax policies. This reality reflected itself in the shifting tax burden. “[P]olicymakers are 
inclined to make use of direct consumer-type taxes (levies that are least likely to provoke the 
opposition of the business community) rather than to raise personal and corporate income taxes – 
levies that are more likely to trigger business community opposition,” the ACIR explained in 
1967.7 While states hiked a variety of other taxes, they consistently avoided increases in 
corporate income taxes.8 When it came to property taxes, state and local policymakers avoided 
keeping property taxes low across-the-board. Instead, they used targeted tax breaks for favored 
businesses, which allowed officials to keep property taxes high on homeowners and less-favored 
businesses and low on selected properties, thereby protecting revenue while rewarding favored 
businesses and “encourag[ing] economic growth.”9 “The industrial promotion slogan – ‘profit is 
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not a dirty word in Ohio’ – dramatically illustrates the increasing willingness of state political 
leaders to embrace publicly the free enterprise philosophy…,” the ACIR noted. “Since World 
War II, state tax policymakers have tended to adopt direct consumer tax policy…. There is ample 
documentation to support the contention that the business community generally favors state sales 
and other forms of consumer taxation of more intensive state use of corporate and individual 
income taxes.”10 As a result, the percentage of state and local taxes paid by businesses fell 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. This meant that the tax burden throughout the post-WWII era 
was slowly being shifted from corporations to homeowners, consumers, and workers. Between 
1950 and 1964, taxes on individuals rose from 60.1 to 65.4 percent of the total taxes collected by 
states and localities, while taxes on businesses fell from 39.9 percent of to 34.5 percent – a fall 
that was actually cushioned by the inclusion of unemployment compensation taxes in ACIR’s 
calculations. Nearly the entire drop in business taxes occurred in property taxation of businesses, 
which fell from 21.2 percent of total state and local revenue in 1950 to 16.9 in 1964. The 
increase in individual taxes, in contrast, was spread among hikes in property, sales, and income 
taxes.11  
Breaks for businesses did not begin and end with legal preferences, however. Often, 
property tax assessors took it upon themselves to offer extra-legal “incentives” – which the 
ACIR euphemistically called “locally negotiated property tax concessions” – to businesses in the 
form of artificially low assessments.12 “While there are examples of deliberate over-assessment 
of industrial property, it is not uncommon for local assessors to go in the other direction and 
assess industrial property below the prevailing assessment ration,” the ACIR noted. The 
expertise needed to assess industrial and commercial property was often beyond local assessors, 
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a fact that could contribute either to over- or under-assessment. But many extra-legal breaks for 
businesses were intentional, rather than a product of inexperience or incompetence. “In 
communities actively competing for new industry, local assessors are often under considerable 
pressure to give a prospective industry a ‘tax break,’” the ACIR noted. “This preferential 
assessment policy is often justified as being in the best interest of the community and the mere 
threat by a dominant manufacturing firm to locate or relocate in another community may yield 
tax assessment benefits.” 13  In fact, a Prentice-Hall handbook for businesses on industrial 
development incentives advised businesses to appeal to local assessors and politicians for 
informal property tax breaks. “It is often more advantageous to work with local groups, 
especially those with close connections to the local government – official or unofficial – than to 
work through state agencies,” the guidebook explained. “Local groups may be in a better 
position to arrange for such local matters as extending water and sewerage lines to, and 
improving roads near, your site. Too, they may be able to obtain a ‘better break’ for you on your 
property assessment.”14 Unsurprisingly, the same assessors who were willing to offer a “better 
break” for favored businesses were usually also willing to do the same for well-connected 
homeowners. These informal breaks, moreover, were often not reflected in official statistics. 
“While the extent of this ‘bargaining table approach to property tax assessment cannot be 
documented, its existence cannot be denied,” the ACIR explained.15 But the flaws in official data 
were clear. In the late-1960s, the ACIR cautioned that projections of increased property tax 
revenue flowing to localities were flawed because of the artificial tax breaks given to many 
property owners. While rising property values could usually be counted upon to increase tax 
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yields, those property owners who enjoyed informal assessment breaks could expect their 
already low assessments to remain flat.16  
This trend towards increased use of business tax incentives by states and localities 
troubled policymakers, at least in the abstract. However, the knowledge that other communities 
were using them forced even the most reluctant governor, mayor, or assessor to offer property 
tax breaks, lest their state or community be left out in the cold. The ACIR – made up of a cross-
section of local, state, and federal policymakers – worried that these legal and extra-legal tax 
breaks were reating a zero-sum race to the bottom among states and localities – one that undercut 
revenue capacity nationwide. “The commission concludes that the practice of making special tax 
concessions to new industry can have baneful effects on our federal system by setting in motion 
a self-defeating cycle of competitive tax undercutting and irrational discriminations among 
business firms,” the ACIR concluded at the end of its long investigation of taxes and industrial 
location. The commission noted that the “baneful” effects of tax competition were harder to 
discern during a period of “full employment.” But it predicted, prophetically, that it could “take 
on a new ruthless character should the economy dip into a major recession” or “even a ‘flattening 
out.’”17   
Moreover, there was little evidence that tax incentives for businesses served their 
intended purpose. The ACIR’s review of the literature showed that “as a general rule tax 
considerations do not figure prominent in the selection of a general region or area in which is 
plant is to be located.” 18 Beyond regional effects, the literature on the effect of tax differences 
between neighboring states or cities was less conclusive, but it still strongly suggested that taxes 
played only a very small part on firms’ location decision. The only area in which it seemed taxes 
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had a significant impact on firms’ locations occurred between metropolitan areas within states. 
As a result, the desire of cities and suburbs to compete against their peers caused them to push 
down property tax rates on businesses, by legal or informal means, and especially on large 
firms.19 
The idea of widespread property tax breaks throughout the post-WWII era, however, 
stands in sharp contrast both to the beliefs of many experts at the time and the conclusions of 
subsequent scholarly studies of the property tax and the tax revolt. Some scholars have argued 
that homeowners received informal property tax breaks in the form of fractional assessment, 
while businesses were socked with high taxes.20 However, this argument misses the type of 
“locally negotiated property tax concessions” described by the ACIR and exposed in often 
shocking detail by local grassroots activists. Moreover, both local studies and Census data, based 
on actual assessment-to-sales price ratios, paint a very different – and more nuanced – picture of 
the distribution of the property tax burden. In the aggregate, homeowners and the industrial and 
commercial property owners paid almost exactly the same property tax rate as a percent of the 
sale price. For example, the 1967 Census of Governments found that the nationwide assessment 
to sales price ratio was just under 35 percent for residential property and just over 35 percent for 
commercial and industrial property.21 However, this general pattern, as the Census data also 
make clear, concealed wide variation – measured by “coefficients of dispersion” – within classes 
of property, both at the state and the local level. Two nearly identical homes or businesses in the 
same city could see their assessment vary by 10, 20, or even 50 percent, whether due to simple 
assessment errors or intentional extra-legal tax breaks. To understand the specifics of this 
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assessment variation – which generally seemed to favor large and well-connected businesses and 
homeowners at the expense of small businesses, homeowners of color, and homeowners in poor 
and working-class neighborhoods – it is necessary to dig into the nuances of local politics.  
And, indeed, by the late-1960s and early-1970s, left-grassroots reformers were beginning 
to attack these patterns of inequity at their source.  
 
Nader, Alinsky, and the Left Capture of the Tax Revolt   
 For both consumer crusader Ralph Nader and community organizer Saul Alinsky, interest 
in taxes grew organically from past activism. Nader’s commitments to consumer rights and good 
government intersected in the form tax loopholes that benefitted big businesses at the expense of 
average taxpayers. Alinsky’s longtime concern with organizing the poor and disenfranchised 
against powerful interests – often by lettering the poor themselves define the movement’s goals – 
seemed almost certain to be on a collision course with taxes, given the rising public discontent 
embodied in the tax revolt. However, the respective styles and philosophies of Nader and 
Alinsky, though complimentary, seemed to spring from different intellectual traditions on the 
left, at least superficially. Alinksy, who had studied criminology at the University of Chicago, 
left academia in part because he rejected top-down, social work model of progressive reformism 
it embodied. Instead, Alinsky’s bottom-up method of community organizing, which stressed the 
collective power of seemingly powerless citizens, seemed to veer closer to populism than 
progressivism. 22  The Harvard Law-educated, Nader, in contrast, embodied the top-down 
reformism of American progressivism. Though Nader would become immensely popular among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






the public, his methods focused on using the power of legal expertise to force change in 
regulation and legislation.23  
Taxes, though, proved to be an issue that encompassed both Nader’s top-down and 
Alinsky’s bottom-up approaches. Though undoubtedly a complex and highly technical legal 
issue, taxes also proved to be an issue shot through with raw emotion, one that was highly 
amenable to straightforward claims to fairness and morality. Indeed, despite their other seeming 
differences, Nader and Alinsky shared rhetorical style that was undeniably populist – relying, as 
it did, on the image of a average citizens besieged by corrupt and powerful interests. Their 
rhetoric was similarly confrontational and relied on making the enemies of the people clear. 
Alinksy famously advised community organizers to “pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and 
polarize it.”24 Alinksy never hesitated to make his rhetoric and his actions combative, or even 
crude, if it served the larger purpose of garnering attention and advancing his cause. Likewise, 
Nader, despite his Harvard Law pedigree, peppered his accusations of wrongdoing with 
inflammatory, cutting prose. As with Alinsky, this invective served a purpose. Not only did it 
help garner media attention, it also “sharpens the conflict and aggravates the target,” as one news 
account of Nader’s strategy summarized, provoking a backlash often more bile-filled as the 
original accusations.25 The mutual influence of Alinsky and Nader on one another seemed clear. 
With his tax campaign, Nader would explicitly move to support local grassroots groups, if not 
organize them directly. Likewise by the late-1960s, Alinsky’s Industrial Areas Foundation 
training center would be assigning its students to read a Ralph Nader speech on the absence of 
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“law and order” for big business.26 As with each of their earlier interests, Nader and Alinsky’s 
shared goal when it came to taxes was to tilt the tax code away from powerful interests to the 
benefit of average Americans.  
By the late-1960s Saul Alinsky had become a national figure. “It is not too much to argue 
that American democracy is being altered by Alinsky’s ideas,” Time magazine declared in 1970. 
“In an age of dissolving political labels, he is a radical…. He has instructed white slums and 
black ghettos in organizing to improve their living and working conditions; he inspired Cesar 
Chavez’s effort to organize California’s grape pickers. His strategy was emulated by the Federal 
Government in its antipoverty and model-cities programs….”27 Though Alinsky had made his 
reputation organizing poor whites and African Americans through groups associated with his 
Chicago-based Industrial Areas Foundation, by the late-1960s, Alinsky was turning towards 
organizing the working- and middle-class. 28  “Although he has largely helped the very poor,” 
Time noted, “he has begun to teach members of the alienated middle classes how to use power to 
combat increasingly burdensome taxes and pollution.” 29 The conservative Chicago Tribune 
editorial page cynically postulated competition among left-leaning leaders for Alinsky’s new 
attention to the middle-class. “Ralph Nader has been getting more publicity,” it quipped. “So 
Alinsky has gone out for bigger game. He wants to wants to corner the middle class….”30 
Alinsky’s interest in the middle-class was more instrumental, however. “One thing I’ve come to 
realize is that any positive action for radical social change will have to be focused on the white 
middle class, for the simple reason that this is where the real power lies,” Alinsky explained. 
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“Today, three fourths of our population is middle class, either through actual earning power or 
through value identification.” 31  
Alinsky had learned from both the clear successes of the United Farmworkers’ Cesar 
Chavez and Delores Huera – both of whom were trained by Fred Ross, an employee of Alinsky’s 
Industrial Areas Foundation – and from the decidedly mixed successes of FIGHT, Alinsky’s own 
Rochester, New York, organization. “We are belatedly beginning to understand…that even if all 
the low-income parts of our population were organized – all the blacks, Mexican-Americans, 
Puerto Ricans, Appalachian poor whites – if through some genius of organization they were all 
united in a coalition, it would not be powerful enough to get significant, basic, needed 
change…,” Alinsky explained. “The only potential allies for America's poor would be in various 
organized sectors of the middle class. We have seen Cesar Chavez’ migrant farm workers turn to 
the middle class with their grape boycott. In the fight against Eastman Kodak, the blacks of 
Rochester, New York, turned to the middle class and their proxies.” 32 In private memos, IAF 
explained that its transition towards targeting the middle-class began in the late-1960s, when it 
moved away from the “geographic community organizations” that began with Alinsky’s Back of 
the Yards group and continued with groups like FIGHT and instead turned towards “a broader 
concept which could best be described as organizing around community of interest [sic], or, 
people around issues.” By organizing around issues, IAF groups could broaden their 
membership, both in terms of income and geography, culling members “from diverse sections of 
the cities and suburbs.” Most issue-oriented groups, IAF explained, gravitated towards “specific 
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problem areas such as: pollution, elderly, taxes, consumer items (telephone, electrical utilities, 
etc.), schools, inflation, race, health, crime, etc.”33 
Beyond the simple math of creating coalitional majorities, Alinsky’s move into the 
middle-class seemed to be motivated, at least in part, by President Nixon’s focus on building his 
“New Majority” by making inroads into formerly Democratic constituencies. “This is the so-
called Silent Majority that our great Greek philosopher in Washington is trying to galvanize, and 
it’s here that the die will be cast and this country's future decided for the next 50 years,” Alinsky 
said. “Pragmatically, the only hope for genuine minority [a term Alinsky used as a catchall for 
‘all the blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, poor whites’] progress is to seek out allies within the 
majority and to organize that majority itself as part of a national movement for change. If we just 
give up and let the middle classes go to the likes of Agnew and Nixon by default, then you might 
as well call the whole ball game. But they’re still up for grabs – and we’re gonna grab ‘em.”34 He 
called the idea that the “Silent Majority” was “inherently conservative” a “crock of crap.”35  The 
“blue-collar or hard-hat group,” in Alinsky’s view, had legitimate complaints that extended 
beyond an amorphous cultural conservatism.36 “[F]rom taxation to pollution,” Alinsky said, “the 
middle class actually feels more defeated and lost today on a wide range of issues than the poor 
do. And this creates a situation that's supercharged with both opportunity and danger.” They 
were, Alsinsky said, “a bewildered, frightened and as-yet-inarticulate group of desperate people 
groping for alternatives – for hope.”37 “The instinct of middle-class people is to support and 
celebrate the status quo,” he conceded, “but the realities of their daily lives drill it home that the 
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status quo has exploited and betrayed them.” 38 In Alinsky’s view, the white working- and 
middle- classes would “go either of two ways in the coming years – to a native American 
fascism or toward radical social change.”39 Conservatives’ goal, he said, was to “give them 
scapegoats for their misery – blacks, hippies, communists…” “Their fears and their frustrations 
over their impotence can turn into political paranoia and demonize them, driving them to the 
right,” he warned in a prognostication eerily reminiscent of how Ronald Reagan would present 
himself just a few years later, “making them ripe for the plucking by some guy on horseback 
promising a return to the vanished verities of yesterday.” 40 Alinsky hoped to avoid that fate by 
“show[ing] the middle class their real enemies: the corporate power elite that runs and ruins the 
country – the true beneficiaries of Nixon’s so-called economic reforms.” 41 
In making the organizing working- and middle-class whites part of its new mission, 
Alinksy’s Industrial Areas Foundation needed to overcome two issues. The first was the belief 
that a move to organize the “Silent Majority” meant an abandonment of IAF’s previous 
commitments to the poor and people of color. Ed Chambers, the director of IAF following 
Alinsky, took pains to stress that IAF’s incursion into the middle class did not constitute 
abandonment of other groups, either psychologically or in terms of actual organizing and 
training. Nor did Chamber see it as necessary for all groups to be integrated. “The answer isn’t to 
get all the blacks, whites, and Chicanos fighting together in one big group,” Chambers explained. 
“That’s impossible, and the impossible can never be an answer. The answer is to organize the 
blacks around black issues, the Chicanos around Chicano issues, and the whites around white 
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issues. Then you let them bargain with each other – and that’s when you’ll have integration.”42 
The second issue facing IAF with its new strategy were “stereotypes” many on the left harbored 
about working- and middle-class whites. Chambers suggested that some of would-be organizers 
who came to IAF for training – as well some already-establish religious and community leaders 
– saw working- and middle-class whites as little more than “conservatives afraid of change.” 
IAF’s goal, he argued, was to get those on the left to listen to the “middle class people” to find 
out where they were “hurting – on money, alienation, and powerlessness.” Often, Chambers 
argued, their attitudes would surprise organizers. Even when they encountered negative attitudes 
on some issues, Chambers suggested that organizers remember “the premise that racism and 
reaction are products of powerlessness.” 43 By using key issues to break through the conservative 
façade of the “Silent Majority,” IAF leaders believed, organizers could tap into deeper strains of 
latent progressivism.  
From the beginning, an understanding of the tax revolt and the pocketbook squeeze was 
central to Alinsky’s working- and middle-class mission.44 “They live in small bungalows or 
building tract suburbs,” Alinsky said of working-class whites. “They are caught in the squeeze of 
rising taxes and resent the many tax dodges of those above them dumping an unfair burden on 
them.”45 Alinsky believed that middle-class Americans harbored many of the same feelings as 
their working-class counterparts. “They’re oppressed by taxation and inflation, poisoned by 
pollution, terrorized by urban crime, frightened by the new youth culture, baffled by the 
computerized world around them,” Alinsky said of the middle class. “They've worked all their 
lives to get their own little house in the suburbs, their color TV, their two cars, and now the good 
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life seems to have turned to ashes in their mouths.”46 Rather than believe that the working- and 
middle-class tax revolt was a sign of rising conservatism, Alinsky believed that it was an 
expression of genuine concerns over the fairness and the distribution of the tax burden. As early 
as 1957, an Alinsky group under the supervision of Nicholas Von Hoffman in Lackawanna, New 
York, near Buffalo, concluded that the nearby Bethlehem Steel plant was underassessed by at 
least 50 percent. “The Bethlehem Steel company has made sure that tax assessments and tax 
rates are not touched without its approval,” a report on the Lackawanna organizing project by the 
National Conference of Catholic Charities concluded. “By dispensing easy jobs in the plant to 
influential local politicians, and by giving these individuals a certain amount of patronage 
through plant jobs, the company has managed to keep assessments and taxes at levels 
satisfactory to it.” To additionally ensure its favorable assessment, Von Hoffman found, the 
company employed all three local assessors and granted them two-to-three months paid leave 
each year to “perform their official duties” as assessors.47 This pattern, uncovered so early by 
Hoffman, would be discovered by Alinsky groups across the country in the early-1970s. 
Though taxes rarely proved central to the activities of Alinsky groups in the 1950s, with 
the tax revolt of the 1960s, the importance of taxes to organizing the working- and middle-
classes was unmistakable. Like many on the left, Alinsky saw tax discontent as a question of 
both the fairness and regressivity of certain taxes. In a long 1969 study of suburbia, longtime IAF 
staffer Richard Harmon argued that taxes – along with women’s issues, environmental issues, 
education, the environment, and consumer issues (for which he praised Ralph Nader) – were key 
topics for motivating middle-class Americans to become involved in politics. Loopholes for the 
wealthy and corporations, he argued, were “a public scandal” that angered average Americans. 
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Not only were federal tax loopholes exacerbating economic inequality, Harmon noted, they were 
also undermining “the American ability to collect taxes,” since such an ability “rests on the 
citizen believing the tax structure is fair.” Likewise, he wrote, “local tax policy usually benefits 
large industry” and “encourage[es]…slums and blight.” “Taxation is another self-interest issue 
around which coalitions of organized blacks, New Class whites [middle-income whites making 
more than $7,000, in Harmon’s definition] and blue collar whites could develop,” Harmon 
concluded. “New Class owners are not only demoralized by a city which cannot, because of a 
penalizing property tax, rehabilitate and rebuild; they are also discouraged from improving their 
own homes. Blue-collar whites, heavily saddled with debt, are also penalized every time they 
want to make major repairs. Black homeowners are in the same bind. Black tenants are exploited 
by slumlords whose economic incentive, under present tax regulations is to make no repairs and 
to get out in a hurry.”48 Nor did IAF’s critique of the tax system end at the cul-de-sac. In 1969, 
Alinsky even suggested to Time that all Americans making less than $12,000 per year be 
exempted from the sales tax.49  
By the late-1960s, countless number of left-leaning activists – many with experience in 
Civil Rights and New Left groups – were flocking to Alinsky’s Chicago training facility, the 
Industrial Areas Foundation, to learn the organizing model Alinsky had been perfecting since his 
work in the city’s poor Back of the Yards neighborhood in the 1930s. In fact, taxes were 
becoming central to the campaigns of Alinsky groups. Of eight Alinsky-affiliated grassroots 
organizations reviewed at the 1971 IAF annual meeting, five were successfully organizing 
around taxes. 50 Alinsky held out high hopes, in particular, for a new Chicago group, the Citizens 
Action Program, which was focusing on organizing working- and middle-class Chicagoans, both 
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black and white. When it came to taxes, CAP’s success would be rivaled by another Alinksy-
affiliated group in nearby Gary, Indiana, the Calumet Community Congress. Due to his untimely 
death in June 1972 of a heart attack, Alinsky would only get to witness some of these successes, 
but the Industrial Areas Foundation would carry on his work. And, in both Chicago and, 
especially, Gary, Alinksy’s groups would have the help of the man the Tribune derisively 
suggested had inspired Alinsky’s interest in the middle class – Ralph Nader. 
 By time Ralph Nader placed the nation’s tax system in his sights, he was already a 
household name. His 1965 investigation of automobile safety, Unsafe at Any Speed, along with 
the publicity generated by the revelation that General Motors had hired investigators to trail and 
discredit Nader, catapulted the consumer advocate to nationwide celebrity. In the late-1960s and 
early-1970s, Nader had enviable name recognition, landing seventh on Gallup’s 1971 “Most 
Admired Man” list behind Nixon and Ted Kennedy, but ahead of the Pope and Bob Hope.51 
“Quite contrary to his original intentions, ‘Ralph Nader’ has become a brand name,” the 
Washington Post noted in a long 1971 profile of Nader, “the label of credibility which sells a 
report or a news item to the media and to the general public.” 52 The clean-cut, highly educated 
activists populating Nader’s growing number of organizations – funded, at least in part, by 
money from GM’s settlement with Nader – became known as “Nader’s Raiders.” Most 
“Raiders” were recent graduates of elite colleges, law schools, and graduate programs – “bright, 
white, middle-class strivers,” as the Washington Post put it. Sensitive to the claim of “elitism,” 
Nader’s organizations attempted to recruit black lawyers and encouraged investigations that had 
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“blue collar” appeal.53 (When it came to taxes, as we shall soon see, partnerships with other 
grassroots activists helped overcome the class and racial divides that concerned Nader.) Yet, 
even if Nader seemed to struggle to attract “Raiders” from the groups he fought for, he seemed to 
have no trouble attracting supporters from those very people. “Although Nader is usually tagged 
simply as a ‘consumer advocate’ by the newspaper, he is much more than that,” the New York 
Times argued. “[H]e is an ombudsman; a symbol to all the little people of the world; a one-man 
court of last resort that receives an average of 1,500 letters a week from the helpless; an 
inspiration to college students; the man who turned the phrase ‘public interest law’ into a whole 
new concept of the legal profession.” “But is he a revolutionary?” the Times wondered. 54 The 
answer, of course, seemed to depend on how the term was defined. 
While sharing the spirit of 1960s New Left activism, Nader’s determination to use staid 
tools like research and legislation to force change from within the system stood in contrast to the 
tactics of many New Left activists. Like the consumer movement, the rise of grassroots tax 
activism was dependent on the democratization of specialized knowledge, which was, in part, 
itself dependent on the activism of highly educated activists like Nader with the expertise – and 
social status – to challenge the privileged knowledge of powerful companies like U.S. Steel. 
James Turner, one of Nader’s “Raiders,” explained the appeal Nader’s organizations made to 
college students and would-be-radicals. “The real change is going into a court room and having 
the establishment’s own judge come down on your side and say the other guy is wrong,” Turner 
said. “That does more to shake up the corporate structure than destroying some buildings.”55 
Indeed, Nader placed a premium on diligent research, believing that to beat the powerful, the 
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work of the “Raiders” needed to be as good, or better, than that put forth by the opposition. Thus, 
the factual claims in most Nader-affiliated reports were well documented and rarely proven 
incorrect.56 Even though many public officials privately criticized Nader and his organization – 
just as many corporations did without hesitation – few were willing to do so publicly. Nixon’s 
consumer adviser Virginia Knauer praised “Nader’s Raiders” as “dedicated young men and 
women working legally within the system to improve conditions for consumers,” saying that 
their actions “should be encouraged.” An unnamed White House official noted that Nader’s 
tendency to “come on like the prosecuting attorney…turns some people off” before adding, “But 
I think they’re doing a good job.”57  
In turning to taxes, Nader hoped to inspire in American youth a passion for taking on 
unfair taxes, just as he had for consumer safety and environmental protection. True to Nader’s 
hopes, many college students seemed as excited about using public interest law to affect property 
tax reform as they had been to turn it against corporate malfeasance or environmental 
degradation. “Environmental groups, like the Sierra Club, have argued their cases all the way to 
the Supreme Court, and they have won,” one 22-year-old law student in suburban Milwaukee 
commented in 1973. “Now local citizens’ lobbies are using the courts even to fight tax 
assessments that are unfair.”58 Such services seemed likely to be welcomed by overburdened 
homeowners, too. Even before Nader launched his tax campaign, the notion that someone like 
Nader should tackle the property tax was not far from the public’s mind. Many in the public 
seemed to welcome Nader’s attention to taxes. As one Los Angeles man wrote in a letter to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 William Greider, “Institutional ‘Lone Ranger’: Ralph Nader Strives to Inspire ‘Public Citizens,’” Washington 
Post, December 5, 1971 
57 Ronald G. Shafer, “Empire of the Consumer Crusader Blooms, Bringing Him New Challenges and Problems,” 
Wall Street Journal, November 19, 1970 
58 Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, U.S. Senate, Confidence and Concern: Citizens View American 






Los Angeles Times complaining about unfair assessments, the country needed “our Ralph Nader 
of the property owner” to “get relief” from rising property taxes.59 
Nader’s opening salvo in his tax campaign was an August 1970 letter to Democratic 
Senator Edmund Muskie calling for his Senate Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee to 
open investigations into inequities in the local property tax. Nader charged that “unbridled 
abuses” in local property tax administration had created a “national scandal of corruption” and 
“industrial extortion toward local communities” that cost local governments $6 billion annually, 
largely from businesses and mineral properties, such as oil, coal, and gas. 60 The political and 
secretive nature of assessment, the ability of corporations to hide or challenge the value of their 
property, and the “shopping” of corporations for low taxes by playing localities off one another 
all combined, according to Nader, to create the “grossest inequities.”61 Nader linked the low 
assessments for large businesses and well-connected individuals with the rising property tax 
burdens on average homeowners that had helped create the tax revolt. When favored property 
owners shirked their bills, Nader wrote to Muskie, it is “small business and home owners who 
have to pay the bills.” 62 Nader made the case that corruption in the property tax system was 
endemic. “There is no doubt whatsoever that the grossest inequities, discrimination, illegalities 
and incompetence prevail on a scale well beyond the episodic,” the activist wrote to Muskie. “It 
is important to note that, unlike sales and income taxes, property tax liabilities for the average 
not-well-connected taxpayer are not initially determined by taxpayers but by assessors who are 
elected, for the most part, in highly partisan rather than professional contexts. Add to these 
contexts the camouflaging capacity of valuation and assessment advocacy by corporate 
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advocates operating well out of public visibility and the interlocal and interstate property tax 
competition induced by tax ‘shopping’ industries and the backdrop for profound and unbridled 
abuses becomes clearer.” 63  Nader’s letter included specific examples uncovered by his 
“Raiders,” including oil and gas properties underassessed by 50 percent in Texas, timber land 
underassessed in the Northwest, coal land underassessed in West Virginia, and the national trend 
of tax-favored “industrial zones.” 64 Nader argued that only federal investigation by a committee 
like Muskie’s could uncover the pattern of property taxation across the country.65 Nader’s letter 
to Muskie was reported widely in the press, and following that publicity, the senator received 
letters from property taxpayers across the country supportive of Nader’s arguments and calls for 
a federal investigation.66 
Nader went on a press blitz to publicize his new tax initiative. On ABC’s “Issues and 
Answers” Nader made the case that the public was right to be cynical about the property tax. “In 
some major cities like Chicago and New York, it is just notorious,” Nader told viewers. “People 
who know the property law firms go to… get their assessed valuations cut down very, very 
significantly.” The underassessment of large commercial and industrial property meant that “the 
small homeowner, the small businessman, the small property holder has to pay a higher 
share…billions of dollars have to be paid by those in the least position to pay them.”67  
“Unprofessional assessments done by assessors subject to enormous political and economic 
pressures results in a system that favors large economic interests at the expense of the small 
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homeowner and businessman,” Nader told the New York Times.68 “All too often it is the 
corporate taxpayer who is not carrying a property share of the tax load,” Nader explained the 
Boston Globe. “In example after example, we have seen situations in which corporate taxpayers 
have used their economic influence to obtain more favorable tax treatment.”69 The consumer 
crusader was determined to go beyond generalities, however, and provide concrete evidence of 
the epidemic of underassessment he claimed existed – and for which he had provided some 
examines in his letter to Muskie. 
Beginning in late-1970, Nader and his “Raiders” released a series of studies, usually in 
conjunction with a news conference, on preferential property tax treatment for specific industries 
and companies in states around the country.70 In November, it was a report on oil, timber, and 
commercial property in Texas, which found that oil and gas fields in West Texas, timber lands in 
East Texas, and commercial real estate in Houston were all underassessed between 50 and 70 
percent. 71 Underassessment of properties belonging to Atlantic Richfield and Texaco in Ector 
County, for example, cost local schools $1 million per year in lost tax revenue, Nader noted.72 In 
Houston, industrial and commercial properties were assessed at 13 percent, while residents were 
assessed at 32 percent, according to a Nader study.73 Another report pointed to underassessment 
of coalmines in West Virginia.74 “Coal properties in Kentucky, West Virginia, and other 
Appalachian states escape taxation almost completely,” Nader explained, because they assessed 
themselves.75 Nader quoted two Kentucky assessors’ own explanation of how coal companies 
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were treated. “The coal companies pretty much set their own assessments…. We have no system 
for finding out what they own,” one assessor said. “Like they may tell us they own 50 acres at a 
certain place, when actually they own 500 acres…. If a company says an area is barren or mined 
out, we have to accept It.” The other assessor agreed, noting that companies “just paid what they 
thought they should. Still do, mostly.”76 Another study by Nader’s organization found that cotton 
and bag manufacturer The Union Camp Company of Savanna, Georgia, paid “a special tax rate 
that is less than one half” the rate paid by other property owners, saving the company saved $3 
million per year.77 Yet another study charged that country clubs in Montgomery County, 
Maryland, received $166 thousand in preferential assessment subsidies each year – the result of a 
1966 law enacted specifically for country clubs, some of which still had racially exclusive 
policies. Maryland’s Lieutenant Governor-elect Blair Lee had successfully pushed for the law’s 
enactment, and he still stood by it, noting that lobbying on behalf of the country clubs was his 
main job between 1962 and 1966. The preferential assessment saved each country club member 
in the county between $25 and $45 per year, assuming that higher taxes would be passed on to 
members.78 A 1972 study, completed in conjunction by a local tax group and Nader-affiliated 
Public Interest Research Group, found that property in Pennsylvania – particularly property 
associated with the Mellon family – was dramatically underassessed. One Mellon property was 
valued at zero dollars, while a 178-acre tract of land purchase in 1971 by Richard Mellon Scaife 
for $590 an acre was given a market value of $133 per acre, leading to an assessed value of only 
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$27 an acre. The private company hired to conduct the assessments denied any wrongdoing.79 In 
the infamous coal lands of Harlan County, Kentucky, Nader noted, United States Coal and Coke 
– a U.S. Steel subsidiary – paid taxes of only $34,500 a year on mines valued at more than $9 
million. 80 These were just some of the examples offered by Nader in reports, speeches, press 
conferences, and Congressional appearances.81 The volume was overwhelming. But the Raider’s 
were not determined to find scandal everywhere. When Raiders undertaking a local assessment 
investigation uncovered little damning material, the resulting report made little attempt to hide 
that fact.82 With the abundance evidence of scandal the Raiders had already uncovered, there 
seemed to be no need for exaggeration. And, with increase citizen activism on the property tax 
front, Nader was confident – not without reason – that more examples of assessment malpractice 
would be forthcoming. 
Nader established the Tax Reform Research Group in order to “help local citizen groups” 
fighting for tax reform and serve as a “clearinghouse for information on such reform drives and 
for technical assistance to them.” The TRRG’s publication – packed with stories of activists 
around the country as well as practical help for those who wanted to organize around taxes in 
their own community – was initially dubbed the Property Tax Newsletter and later retitled 
People & Taxes to reflect a shift to covering all types of taxation.83 To encourage its use by 
citizen activists, the Property Tax Newsletter was offered free by the TRRG.84 Nader’s opening 
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editorial on the front page of the first Property Tax Newsletter outlined the issues with local 
property tax administration and the evasion of the property tax by wealthy interest that he had 
covered in the Muskie letter. The consumer crusader also issued a call for citizens across the 
country to organize and begin to work for change in their own communities. “The only method 
of securing this reform…,” Nader wrote, “is for the citizenry of each locality to demand and 
work for change. Group activity on the part of concerned citizens can result in disclosure of 
those businesses, land developers, and large homeowners who are assessed or taxed at less than 
the legally required rates.” The newsletter and TRRG’s offices, Nader explained, were meant to 
assist local citizens in their attempts to force property tax reform in their own communities.85 
The rest of the inaugural Property Tax Newsletter issue was dedicated to instructions and 
suggestions for how to form local tax reform groups, calculate assessments, and investigate the 
assessment of business properties, among other topics. “You will undoubtedly be branded as 
‘troublemakers,’” the newsletter warned. “You should not be deterred. The most effective 
weapon against this kind of attack is to make public findings and expose those who are receiving 
favored treatment. An aroused public will be your greatest alley. For it is these people who are 
paying more so that the wealthy and powerful pay less.”86 Cementing Nader’s conviction that he 
was on to an important issue, TRRG received nearly 1,000 responses to its first issue of the 
Property Tax Newsletter.87 
In December 1970, Nader and PIRG sponsored a conference in Washington D.C. on 
property tax reform. The conference was advertised in Property Tax Newsletter, inviting activists 
from around the country to attend and promising appearances by Nader and other notable tax 
experts and public officials. Nader undoubtedly succeeded in attracting important guests. 
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Notably, the conference included speeches not only by Nader, but also by Senator Edmund 
Muskie and Pennsylvania Governor Milton Shapp, who had won his governorship by promising 
to institute a progressive state income tax, in startling opposition to his GOP opponent who 
pledged not to increase any taxes. Muskie praised Nader in his speech. “This conference with 
Ralph Nader and this assembly represents not simply the gathering of some people, but it 
represents, I think, the development of a program on his part to stimulate the initiation of reform 
in the property tax area….,” Muskie said. “I think that Ralph Nader, to a greater extent than 
anyone else I know, has opened the property tax problem as a significant key to the door in that 
future. So I compliment him upon undertaking this effort, stimulating and prodding it in the only 
way that Ralph Nader can. I know, because he’s prodded me into the area of property tax 
reform…”88 Muskie said that he believed that it was time for a national solution to the property 
tax issue. Though unfair property taxes had long been a local concern, “Taxpayers across the 
nation are beginning to ask the same questions: Are property taxes fair? Are they equitable? Are 
they sound?” It was an issue beyond the scope of localities. “This is an issue which, although it 
involves local tax policy, undoubtedly deserves a searching national inquiry,” he argued. Muskie 
agreed with Nader that taxpayers had “unwittingly” been subsidizing businesses, both because 
their own property taxes had to be higher and because their federal income taxes needed to be 
higher, since local financially strapped governments sought federal aid.89  
Shapp used his speech not only to call for national solutions to the fiscal crisis, but also to 
argue that the “tax revolt” was justified by the sorry state of the national tax system. The 
Pennsylvania governor-elect began his speech by quipping that property taxes were “valuation 
not on the basis of what you own but who you know,” or, paraphrasing Nader, “who you own 
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and not what you own.”90 Looking at the budget crises in Pennsylvania and states across the 
country, as well as cities like Newark and New York, Shapp argued that the problem could only 
be solved by the federal government. “[A]ll cities and states must either slash services to the 
people or raise taxes at a time when we are experiencing a citizens tax rebellion and a citizens 
demand for an increase in services to be supplied by government,” Shapp said.91 Businesses were 
playing states and localities against one another in a race to the bottom, according to Shapp, and 
only the federal government could stop it. “[S]o long as there is interstate competition for 
industrial development, there will be the temptation to give new plants special breaks on real 
estate taxes,” Shapp said. “And this practice, I believe, is detrimental to the tax system in the 
long run because it encourages the belief that a tax system can be inequitable in some ways as 
long as it serves some long range public good….This is why I think that we should shift 
emphasis and a greater bulk of our taxes should be collected at the national level and distributed 
locally.”92 Shapp also sought to dispel the notion that the “tax revolt” was a sign of rising 
conservatism. “Make no mistake about the tax rebellion – rebellion it is, but I think that it is 
faulty reasoning to say that our citizens are merely rebelling against the idea of taxes,” Shapp 
argued. “Obviously, with a few exceptions, they are not rebelling against the services the taxes 
provide because no one really wants to close down schools, or hospitals, or stop building 
highways, or public transit facilities, or to make the poor and aged starve. Everybody wants to 
clean up our air and water. People are rebelling against the waste of tax dollars due to politics 
and inefficiency in government and people are rebelling against the idea that somewhere 
somebody else is not paying his fair share of taxes and that the rest of the community has to pick 
up his share of the tax burden.”  Homeowners, particularly those on fixed incomes, Shapp said, 
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were right to resent skyrocketing property taxes when they knew that other property owners – 
usually businesses – received property tax breaks, both legal and illegal, thanks to the “wheeling 
and dealing and politics” inherent in existing assessment practices.93  
The primary purpose of Nader’s speech at his convention was to dispel the myth that 
homeowners were getting property tax breaks, while corporate property was being overassessed. 
“There is a belief that is widely held among those who deal with property taxation that 
underassessment and undertaxation applies equally to all types of property and in equal amounts. 
Many of these people insist that if any property is overtaxed it is commercial and industrial 
property…," Nader said. “Not only is the belief that commercial, industrial and mineral property 
is overtaxed a myth, it verges on being hyperbolically ridiculous…. Undervaluation, 
underassessment, and consequently undertaxation of large commercial, industrial and mineral 
property is of epidemic proportions across the entire country. Studies conducted by my staff, by 
interested citizens, and by professional organizations have documented case after case of 
undertaxation of these large economic interests.” Like Shapp, Nader defended average citizens 
against accusations that they were revolting against taxes without reason. “Taxes on residential 
property are increasing to a point where the average citizen can no longer afford to own a house, 
especially in the cities, Nader said. “Entire school systems are considering closing down because 
of the unwillingness of overburdened property owners to subject themselves to even higher 
taxes. Senior citizens are literally being forced out of their homes. Many of these elderly citizens 
are now paying taxes on their homes that are higher than the monthly payments they made to 
purchase them.” Nader’s final goal was to let Americans know that, despite the power 
differential, they could “fight city hall” and the wealthy interests that fought to keep their own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






tax rates low. “This conference, the Property Tax Newsletter, and technical aid and support from 
our Public Interest Research Group, combined with citizens who are determined and who have 
the courage to stand up to the frequently abusive tactics of those receiving favorable tax 
treatment can achieve positive results,” he said.94  
Reactions to Nader’s new crusade varied. Nader found support for his tax campaign 
among even many otherwise skeptical left-leaning groups. Though public sector unions could 
often be cautious when it came to property tax reform – fearful that it might result only in a loss 
of revenue, rather than a replacement of property tax revenue with a more progressive source – 
AFT president David Selden praised Nader. “When it comes to evaluating industrial property, 
how does a little locally elected assessor who has three clerks and three other people working in 
his office – how does he go down and assess an auto plant?” Selden asked rhetorically. “Well, I 
will tell you how he does it. Mr. Nader is exactly right. He calls up the general manager of the 
plant and asks him what it’s worth.” Selden saw the underassessment of commercial and 
industrial property as a major issue. “We had a strike in Gary, Indiana, last year that went on for 
21 days in near-zero weather. The two sides were about $100,000 apart,” he explained. “And all 
that time, sitting there within the confines of that school district was the main plant of U.S. Steel. 
The thought often crossed my mind that if we only had that plan assessed a little higher, that 
strike would have been unnecessary.” Selden called not only for assessment reform, but for 
allowing states to levy a piggyback tax on the federal income tax to use instead of, or in addition 
to, the property tax to fund educations. 95  
The press, in contrast, remained divided along ideological lines. The Washington Post 
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editorial page praised Nader’s turn to taxes. It continued, the paper noted, Nader’s “insatiable 
zeal for attacking the unattackable – the things so big, baffling (and generally time-honored) that, 
for lack of a better idea, we tend to accept them.”96 But in its editorial on Nader’s campaign, the 
Chicago Tribune sarcastically put Nader’s charge of “abuses” in assessment favoring large 
businesses in quotation marks. If Nader investigated Cook County, the paper claimed, he would 
find that “the shoe is on the other foot.” “For many years the assessors here have fixed property 
valuations for tax purposes to as to favor home owners and discriminate against business and 
industrial property…,” the paper claimed, citing an unnamed study. “Ralph Nader and Sen. 
Muskie thus will be disappointed if they try to find ‘abuses’ of the tax laws which punish little 
property owners in Cook County.”97 Contrary to the claims of the Chicago Tribune editorial 
board, Nader held up Chicago as a city in which “nearly every major building in the city is 
grossly underassessed.” He also singled out Gary, Indiana, where, Nader noted, “U.S. Steel’s 
taxes went down this year while the taxes for all other taxpayers increased.” It is to these cities – 
and the activism of Alinsky- and Nader-affiliated groups there – that we now turn.98  
Alinsky began his move into the middle class close to home. He founded Chicago’s 
Campaign Against Pollution in 1970 as his “first major experiment in organizing the middle 
class and his last major project before dying unexpectedly in 1972.” CAP’s initial focus on 
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pollution sprung from Chicago’s “air inversion crisis” in 1969, when a high-pressure system 
trapped pollutants over the city for five days. The anger of irate, choking Chicagoans, who had to 
drive through the city with their headlights on during the day to see through the chemical fog, 
provided CAP’s initial spark. Five hundred people attended CAP’s founding meeting at Saint 
James Cathedral. After an initial failure to block a rate increase by Commonwealth Edison, CAP 
succeeded in getting Com-Ed to begin purchasing low-sulfur coal and Mayor Daley and the City 
Council to enact a tough new anti-pollution law. With these successes, CAP’s profile grew.99 
Soon, it moved beyond pollution. By 1971, CAP would change its name from Campaign Against 
Pollution to Citizens Action Program in order to reflect its broadening base of issues – taxes, in 
particular.100 In this broadened form, CAP called “the future of our environment, taxes and 
economic inequality, the fiscal crisis of local government, corporate power, political corruption, 
[and] grass roots democracy” its “fundamental issues.”101 Tax issues proved to be crucial to the 
CAP leadership’s decision to become a multi-issue organization.  
For those on the left who sought to appeal to Chicago’s working and middle classes, 
among others, pocketbook issues seemed the obvious route. As in Youngstown, Chicago-area 
workers – despite postwar prosperity – struggled to attain even a modest middle-class status. The 
Chicago Daily News reported that the BLS’s 1970 “moderate” budget for a family of four 
exceeded the average Chicago factory worker’s earnings by $70 per week. “There are no frills in 
the budget,” the Daily News noted. “It does not allow for savings of extras such as a second 
family automobile. Nor does it allow for deductions for the Illinois state income tax, which went 
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into effect in late 1969.”102 Additionally, both inflation and steadily rising property taxes made 
the pocketbook squeeze so discussed nationally readily apparent in Windy City, too. While 
resentment of this squeeze could easily propel these Chicagoans to the right, as Alinsky feared, 
that outcome was not at all foreordained. The strong presence of organized labor in the city, in 
particular, helped give voice to a different analysis of the squeeze than the one traditionally 
offered by the right. As in many areas of the country organized labor in Chicago had long called 
attention to tax inequities in the city and region. Chicago-based union magazine Labor Today, 
for example, educated workers about inequities in the tax code by printing a “Tax Test” in its 
July 1969 issue that included questions like, “Between 1957 and 1967, what was the increase in 
(a) commercial and industrial property taxes, (b) residential property taxes?”103 But translating 
this education into action was a challenge for any organization. Alinsky and CAP hoped 
working- and middle-class Chicagoans’ frustrations had primed them for organizing.  “It is clear 
that there is tremendous anger, especially in blue collar white areas, over the levels of property 
taxes,” an IAF report noted. “The closing of schools this December for 12 days because of lack 
of revenue provides CAP with a good opportunity to rub raw more [sic] on the tax issue.”104  
As much as CAP and similar IAF-trained groups were Alinsky’s counter to Nixon’s 
“Silent Majority,” they were also Alinsky’s answer to what he saw as the failures of the New 
Left – particularly SDS’s ill-fated community organization initiative, ERAP. Alinsky was 
cynical about the New Left’s strategies and had, at best, a complex relationship with its 
leaders.105 New Left activists had made attempts to tackle tax issues in Alinsky’s back yard. The 
issues that CAP would raise about Chicago’s tax system had earlier been voiced by JOIN, an 
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ERAP-associated group in Chicago led, in part, by former SDS president Todd Gitlin.106 A 1968 
JOIN position paper called the tax system “one of the most important means the government 
uses to decide who gets what in our society and who pays the price.” Charging that the rich 
avoided taxes through loopholes, JOIN stressed that “when some pay less, others have to pay 
more.” Looking at Chicago’s tax system, JOIN criticized the property tax, in particular. “While 
the homeowner has to pay every cent himself, the apartment building landlord can pass the cost 
of the tax on to residents by raising the rent,” JOIN noted, adding that exempting large property 
owners like the Catholic Church from property taxes was no different from “the city given them 
thousands of dollars…[that] have to come out of the pockets of homeowners and tenants.” JOIN 
also linked the property tax to corruption. “The County Assessor…is an elected official 
sponsored by the democratic machine,” JOIN noted. “The machine can arrange lower 
assessments for friends, and people with money can often buy themselves a lower tax by bribing 
the assessor.” Ultimately, “the more cheating there is, the higher rates [on everybody else] go,” 
while lower-income residents “lose because as long as the government fails to collect the money 
it should, it cannot afford decent schools and libraries or to repair streets in poor neighborhoods.” 
JOIN criticized Illinois’ lack of individual or business income taxes, as well as its reliance on the 
regressive sales tax. Turning to the federal tax structure, JOIN cited Philip Stern’s Great 
Treasury Raid approvingly. Following Stern’s lead, JOIN argued that the U.S. income tax “is the 
best in theory, but it has the biggest loopholes,” such as the preferential rate for capital gains and 
dividends. “Many of the riches people in America today pay no taxes at all!” JOIN noted, citing 
examples like capital gains, charitable donations, overseas tax havens, depreciation, and oil 
depletion allowances. Such loopholes existed, JOIN argued, because the wealthly “get special 
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laws written to spare them the hardship of paying taxes.” Taking the whole tax system into 
account, JOIN painted a bleak picture. “Whether you look at the city, state or federal level, it is 
the lower-income people who bear the burden of government in America,” JOIN concluded. 
“Property taxes take money from poor and working people who must live in the city. Sales tax 
takes money from people who have to spend most of their income on necessary food and 
clothing. Even with the taxes which are progressive in theory, the richest people escape through 
loopholes open only to them, leaving the masses to carry the weight.”107 JOIN, like many ERAP 
groups, had more rhetoric than accomplishments. Alinsky intended for CAP to be different, but 
he actually started CAP with a veteran of the New Left.  
From its founding, Paul Booth served as CAP’s chair. Booth has served as SDS’s 
national secretary and was a committed socialist. Additionally, both Booth and Staughton Lynd 
(who will be discussed later) participated in the “Union of (White) Organizers” conference in 
Grayslake, Illinois, on September 21 and 22, 1968. The meeting – like ERAP itself – reflected, in 
part, white New Left and Civil Rights Movement activists’ attempt to respond to the call of 
African American leaders in SNCC and other black freedom groups for whites to organize their 
own communities for social justice.108 The Union of Organizers meeting was monitored “by both 
Chicago police and federal agents, who noted license numbers and the comings and goings of the 
leftist leaders,” as the Chicago Tribune reported.109 The Union listed its first priority as 
“organiz[ing] a community organization in every white community in metropolitan Chicago.”110 
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Given that, it is not surprising that Booth – and, as we will see later, Lynd – turned to Alinsky. 
However, as CAP gained in popularity and publicity, Booth’s status as the face of CAP become 
more controversial, which led to the installation of Leonard Dubi, a priest, as CAP’s co-chair. 
Dubi was the son of a steelworker, influenced by Pope John and radicalized by the civil rights 
and anti-war movements. Booth and Dubi led CAP until March 1973, when Mary Lou Wolf – 
who had spent 23 years as a housewife, with nine children – was elected CAP’s new president, 
following her previous stint as the co-chair of CAP’s Taxpayers Coalition.111 IAF’s Richard 
Harmon personally trained most of CAP’s staff.112  
As CAP grew, it developed a metropolitan structure comprising 2,000 members across 
fifteen separate chapters who elected delegates to the CAP steering committee, which 
determined the issues it would address and programs it would push. Individual chapters could 
also pursue their own “local action program[s].”113 The IAF’s Chambers praised CAP as a model 
of the kind of organizing IAF wanted to encourage, touting CAP as “the most effective 
grassroots, action-oriented operation that metropolitan Chicago has seen.”114 IAF leadership also 
praised CAP as “an example in Chicago of the alienated middle getting up on its hind feet and 
fighting back.” CAP, IAF leadership noted, was having success at attracting “middle 
Americans.” 115  IAF staffers also called Booth and Dubi good leaders of “this kind of 
metropolitan, consumer oriented, middle class organizing.”116 Likewise, the Nation magazine 
called CAP “one of the most impressive moves to organize a non-trade union, lower-middle and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Don Rose and Richard Rothstein, “The Working-Class Reformers,” Nation (September 21, 1974); Margaret 
Sendzimer, “My View of Mary Lou Wolff,” (CAP) Action (April 1974); Cheryl Fries, “David and Goliath Revisited 
– CAP Taken on Them All,” Hyde Park Herald, April 14, 1971 
112 Harman Bio, Undated, IAF, B 1, F Staff Bios, UIC 
113 A Democratic Organization, Undated [1972], CAP, B 1, F 2, UIC 
114 Chambers to Trustees, December 1, 1972, IAF, B 70, F 854, UIC 
115 For Saul, Undated [1972], IAF, B 46, F 652, UIC 






working-class base.” 117 And, according to one 1970 academic study, CAP was “the nation’s 
largest citizen coalition,” with its membership numbering in the thousands.118 CAP saw itself as 
a growing opposition to the “Chicago Machine,” “Democratic Organization,” and “Daily 
Bureaucracy” that ran the city. CAP wanted to show that the people were more powerful than 
“the machine.”119 “The organization stands as living proof that the lessons taught over the past 
years by people like Ralph Nader have been assimilated,” Booth said, “and that people are doing 
something important with what they have learned.”120 Keeping with Alinsky’s determination to 
undercut Nixon, Paul Booth bragged, “CAP’s members and leaders are drawn from that segment 
of society that Spiro Agnew dubbed the ‘Silent Majority.’”121 Yet, CAP did not mean to imply 
that the “Silent Majority” it represented was the same, almost wholly white, one touted by 
Nixon. Despite the insistence of IAF’s Chambers that groups need not be integrated, CAP 
broadened from a mostly white working-class group to a more multi-racial coalition as it gained 
notoriety and its topical areas of focus broadened. As CAP itself put it, “The backbone of CAP is 
the great ‘silent majority’ come alive: housewives, barbers, accountants, priests, policemen, 
printers…from all ethnic groups.”122  
Problems with property tax assessment in Chicago were well known before left-activists 
groups like JOIN or CAP attempted to organize around the issue. In a city known for its 
corruption, the idea that a tax system known for fraud would be on the level seemed impossible 
to most Windy City homeowners, who often needed only to look around their own 
neighborhoods to find evidence of assessment issues. Indeed, the ability to pass out favorable 
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assessments to the well connected elevated the Cook County assessor to position above nearly all 
other offices. “In Chicago Democratic party politics the power of the assessor ranks just below 
that of Mayor Daley himself,” as one article put it.123 The powerful Cook County assessor was 
P.J. “Parky” Cullerton. As assessor, Cullerton had more than 300 employees at his disposal, 
many of whom received their position through patronage.124 Under Cullerton, the practice of 
exchanging favorable assessments for campaign contribution was a well-known practice.125 In 
1970, both the Daily News and Chicago Today published stories claiming that Cullerton handed 
out low assessments to favored businesses. 126 Not only was Cullerton’s office handing out wink-
and-nod underassessments in exchange for campaign donations, it was also accepting out-and-
out bribes. Beginning in 1969, undercover stings and grand jury indictments netted several of 
Cullerton’s staffers for accepting bribes and using the threat of higher assessments to extort 
money from businesses. Over the next several years, more than a dozen Cullerton staffers would 
be implicated, but Cullerton remained unscathed, and the investigations generally avoided the 
larger issues of assessment inequity beyond the specific cases of bribery in question.127 In 
response to this pressure, Mayor Daley hired the Real Estate Research Corporation, a consulting 
firm, to review the city’s assessment practices. Just as the newspaper articles had asserted, RERC 
found that much of the city’s commercial and industrial property was underassessed.128 With 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Edward Greer and Paul Booth, “Pollution and Community Organization in Two Cities,” Social Policy 
(July/August 1973) 
124 David F. Emmons, “Community Organizing and Urban Policy: Saul Alinsky and Chicago’s Citizens Action 
Program,” Dissertation, University of Chicago (December 1986) 
125 David F. Emmons, “Community Organizing and Urban Policy: Saul Alinsky and Chicago’s Citizens Action 
Program,” Dissertation, University of Chicago (December 1986) 
126 David F. Emmons, “Community Organizing and Urban Policy: Saul Alinsky and Chicago’s Citizens Action 
Program,” Dissertation, University of Chicago (December 1986) 
127 Thomas J. Gradel, et al, “Corruption in Cook County: Anti-Corruption Report Number 3,” University of Illinois 
at Chicago Department of Political Science (February 18, 2010); Thomas J. Gradel and Dick Simpson,  Corrupt 
Illinois: Patronage, Cronyism, and Criminality (University of Illinois Press, 2014) 
128 David F. Emmons, “Community Organizing and Urban Policy: Saul Alinsky and Chicago’s Citizens Action 






Chicagoans angry not only about the corruption in the city’s property tax system, but also their 
own rising taxes, CAP sought to turn frustration into action. CAP’s shift from a single-issue 
group concerned only with pollution to a multi-issue group began with its tax campaign. This 
shift was encouraged by IAF, which saw single-issue groups as inherently short-lived.129 CAP’s 
planned to go beyond the isolated revelations of underassessment for powerful taxpayers 
uncovered by the criminal and newspaper investigations.  
CAP’s first step was to argue that the modest reforms taken by the assessor’s office were 
not enough. The group argued that even the RERC study actually understated the extent of 
preferential assessment for businesses, since RERC was a subsidiary of First National Bank and 
therefore “shot through with conflicts of interest,” as Booth put it. CAP also questioned why 
RERC had not released the full results of its assessment study.130 CAP’s arguments were 
supported by well-known civil rights attorney Marshall Patner, of Businessmen for the Public 
Interest, which would provide assistance to many left-leaning tax groups. Not only did First 
National Bank own RERC, Patner and BPI also claimed that RERC excluded First National’s 
nearly $1.5 million underassessment, as well as underassessments of four other large banks 
totaling $2.4 million, in its study. Moreover, First National Bank’s president – as well as the 
president of Continental Illinois Bank, which was underassessed by $1.9 million, according to 
Patner and BPI – joined the Cullerton’s reelection committee after the scandal broke as sign of 
support.131 The assessor’s office responded to BPI’s charges by acknowledging the banks’ 
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underassessments. It defended the practice as a way to help Chicago banks compete with New 
York banks. “Banks negotiated this rate and the practice has been going on for a long time,” it 
explained. BPI called this type of deviation from standard assessment practices a “form of civil 
disobedience,” since the banks and assessor “did not seek a different law through the legislature, 
and they did not seek court review of the tax.” The banks were not the only ones receiving 
favorable treatment, according to BPI, which wondered “how it is that as soon as Rubloff [one of 
Chicago’s largest real estate firms] acquires a building the taxes on it go down.” 132 Like CAP, 
BPI doubted that “homeowners and others [would] continue to subsidize the banks and their 
customers” if given the choice.133 
CAP’s answer to the RERC study was to conduct its own investigation into the city’s 
most notable and valuable properties. With that assessment information in hand, CAP hoped to 
make a key distributional point by explaining to average homeowners that their own assessments 
were artificially high because the assessments for preferred business properties were artificially 
low. The group also sought to publicize the interrelationship of “property taxes” and “the closing 
of Chicago schools,” as one memo put it.134 CAP’s own informal surveys noted increasing 
frustration among Chicagoans regarding property taxes – a finding that was not surprising given 
the 21 percent increase in property tax rates over the past two years. However, the group also 
noted that “the connection between assessments, tax rates, and revenues was probably not clear 
to most citizens,” as former CAP organizer and research director David Emmons later 
remembered.135 By conducting original assessments studies and linking them to issues like rising 
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property taxes for homeowners and insufficient revenue for schools, CAP hoped to create a 
movement for progressive tax reform in the Windy City.  
CAP’s tax studies began modestly, but quickly expanded into a two-and-a-half year 
assault on all facets of the Chicago property tax system.136  To carry out its assessment studies, 
CAP enlisted the assistance of reporters at the Chicago Daily News and, in return, promised the 
paper that it would be the first to receive the results of CAP’s investigation.137 CAP began with 
U.S. Steel’s South Works mill. CAP’s study found that South Works was underassessed by 
nearly $120 million in 1969, resulting in a $12-million-a-year tax break for U.S. Steel. Not only 
did CAP’s U.S. Steel study land on the Daily News’s front page, its findings were covered in the 
Sun Times and Tribune, too.138 Cullerton’s chief deputy assessor Thomas Tully called CAP’s 
allegations “totally unfounded,” while Cullerton himself dubbed the CAP studies as “amateurish 
and irresponsible,” but CAP pressed forward.139 CAP expanded its study from U.S. Steel to 
Republic Steel, Interlake Steel, and Wisconsin Steel, updating the U.S. Steel figures to the year 
1970 in the process. “The whole steel industry in South Chicago shows the same pattern of 
flagrant property tax underassessment revealed two months ago for the South Works plant of 
United States Steel,” CAP explained in its study. It found that, in 1970, all four plants were 
underassessed at an average rate of 69 percent, totaling more than $27 million in lost taxes. U.S. 
Steel’s underassessment alone, CAP reported, cost Chicago schools $4.5 million. 140  The 
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organization continued its studies, turning to assessments of the First Bank National Building, 
five racetracks in the suburbs, and the Illinois Center Plaza. All of the studies found significant 
underassessment. First National Bank’s “glamorous new skyscraper” in the Loop was 
underassessed by $20 million, costing the city more than $2 million in taxes.141 The four 
racetracks were each underassessed between 48 and 74 percent, leading to a total 1970 tax loss 
of more than $3 million.142 In order to make the link between the education budget shortfall and 
school closings, CAP’s researchers calculated the tax dollars lost to individual schools, which 
reached more than $100,000 per year for some schools, from underassessment of race tracks 
alone.143  
CAP practiced a “strategy of encirclement” to put public pressure on county assessor P.J. 
“Parky” Cullerton and other public officials.144 The organization’s public campaign stressed 
issues of fairness in taxation, along with the necessity of public services like education. “Let the 
big guys pay their share,” CAP argued. “CAP’s goal is fair taxation. If the big industries paid 
their share of real estate taxes, our children would get the education they deserve without an 
increase in the homeowners taxes.”145  With fair assessments for properties like U.S. Steel, CAP 
argued, “The schools wouldn't have to close and our taxes wouldn’t have to go up.” 146 Privately, 
IAF thought that CAP’s focus on “the schools issue,” was a good issue. “The money is there [for 
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the schools] in Cullerton’s underassessments,” one IAF memo from Richard Harman to Alinsky 
explained.147 Indeed, CAP’s strategy was a consciously distributionist one. “Not only did CAP 
expose the tax fraud,” Paul Booth later noted, “but also it drew the vital connections between 
properly tax boondoggles for the rich and the conditions of the victims of the property tax 
system.”148 Cullerton was “giving tax favors to the politically connected businessmen at the 
expense of the average homeowner and renter,” CAP declared.149 Cook County assessments 
were “arbitrary and unwritten,” CAP said, which encouraged “extortion, bribery, and 
favoritism.” 150 Tying the mayor to the system, the activists argued that “Daley, P. J. and their 
rich campaign contributors have fleeced the small taxpayers long enough.”151  CAP’s understood 
the political machinations behind the pattern of underassessment it uncovered. “Cullerton’s 
policies, in keeping with the mayor’s desire for vigorous downtown development, had softened 
the tax burden on major business property and helped launch a building boom in Chicago’s Loop 
and near the north side during the late 1960s,” CAP’s Emmons later noted. “Every year, more 
than ten thousand businessmen, political leaders, and party workers showed their appreciation by 
attending P.J. Cullerton Gold Day at St. Andrews Country Club.” Rarely was any official 
assessment of favored commercial properties conducted and, insofar as one was, it often 
consisted of little more than a conversation with real estate brokers who represented the 
properties, and they were all too happy to provide information that encouraged low assessments 
for their clients. 152 
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CAP’s strategy of “encirclement” began in earnest with a June meeting with Cullerton, 
the person CAP hoped to “encircle.” In their meeting – the first and only one he would ever grant 
CAP – the assessor promised only that, in the coming fall, he would consider assessment 
changes to the properties studied by CAP. To keep the pressure on Cullerton, CAP held two 
“Payoff P.J. Day” protests – one in July and a second in September. CAP made “Wanted: P.J. 
Cullerton” posters, dubbing him the “Crook County Assessor” who was giving “tax breaks to 
polluters.”153 Hundreds of protestors also deposited their tax bills and “play money” bearing 
Cullerton’s picture off at his office. 154 “On September 1, the final due date for 1971 taxes, 200 
CAP members marched from the County Building to the Board of Education Building carrying 
huge million-dollar bills bearing P. J.’s picture, symbolizing the millions that his 
underassessments are costing the public schools,” Booth recounted later. “One contingent of the 
parade was made up of retired residents of the neighborhoods near the steel mills, the group most 
tightly squeezed economically by an unfair tax burden. Another large contingent was made up of 
teachers who faced a threat of layoffs in September due to a $100 million school budget deficit. 
The underassessments are huge enough to afford relief to both groups.” 155  Yet despite 
Cullerton’s vague promise and CAP’s protests, fall came and went without reassessments. CAP, 
however, continued its campaign of “encirclement.” It met with the Chicago Board of Education 
to present its assessment findings and secured the support of the League of Women Voters, along 
with several parent-teacher organizations, school boards, and teachers’ unions, since education 
groups, above all, recognized that the underassessments “depriv[ed] the schools of needed 
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revenue,” as CAP put it. 156 A notable absence in CAP’s coalition however, was the main 
Chicago teachers union, which feared crossing Daley, particularly when it already found itself 
under fire from conservatives who blamed the union for rising school costs.157 CAP also 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to get the Cook County Board of Appeals and the city council to force 
Cullerton to reassess the properties.158 CAP then turned its attention to the Illinois Department of 
Local Government Affairs and the Ogilvie administration, which, while more sympathetic to 
CAP’s claims, argued that it could only order the reassessment of whole classes of properties, 
not specific parcels, and declined to do so since such a request would have delayed tax 
collections for months. 159 
CAP’s biggest action in its business assessment campaign would be directed at the center 
of the city’s power structure – Mayor Daley. On December 13th, between 100 and 300 CAP 
protestors stormed city hall.160 The protestor was dubbed “Tax Break University,” an act 
designed to teach the public about the unfair tax system that CAP said was ultimately Daley’s 
responsibility. To publicized the protest, CAP released a flyer, “Mayor Daley’s Tax Break U,” 
that featured a cartoon of the “taxpayers,” depicted as a teacher forcing Mayor Daley to write “I 
will not cheat de tackspayers” over and over on a chalkboard. “DALEY & CULLERTON ARE 
FLUNKING AS TAX COLLECTORS. They are cheating the taxpayers out of millions by 
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giving tax breaks to large business & industrial property,” the flyer explained. “The teachers, 
students, parents and taxpayers are going to hold a special class on Dec. 8 to teach Daley and 
Cullerton they must collect all the taxes. NO MORE TAX BREAKS: The homeowner and small 
businesses won’t pay the big guys’ taxes anymore. If BIG TAX BREAKS are eliminated, 
schools will not have to close or cut back in 1972.”161 The announcement that city schools would 
need to close in 1972 because the city school board had run out money inspired “Tax Break U.” 
Its goal, according to CAP, was “to teach Mayor Daley one lesson: that parents, taxpayers, and 
teachers will no longer tolerate tax breaks to big businesses while our tax bills shoot up (16% 
next year) and while the schools face financial crisis.” Closing schools and borrowing money 
were not the solutions to the never-ending fiscal crisis, in CAP’s view. “The real solution is a 
fairer property tax system that prevents big businessmen and political cronies from getting 
enormous tax favors,” CAP argued. “From the tax breaks CAP has uncovered alone this would 
bring in an additional $13 million to the schools and this is no doubt just a beginning.”162  
The CAP coalition marched to City Hall and assembled on the fifth floor outside of the 
mayor’s office, where members delivered statements. Then they proceeded to the Department of 
Local Government Affairs to demand that it “force the county assessor to reassess any property 
which has been unequally assessed.” 163  CAP protesters carried signs with messages like 
“Industries Win Through Tax Breaks While Children Lose” and a banner replica of a 
“$1,000,000” bill with a caricature of Cullerton, who was labeled a “school swindler.” 164 “We, 
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the homeowners, are the ones that suffer by these tax breaks,” one protestor told reporters. 165 
“Property taxes, that’s what’s making me mad,” another explained. “Eleven years ago, my taxes 
were $300 and now they’re $600.” 166 Yet another CAP protester shouted, “What Chicago needs 
now is another Boston Tea party, but the lake is already too polluted.” 167 CAP delivered a letter 
to Daley demanding “fairer taxes,” including specific demands. They also publicized Chicago’s 
regressive tax system and needled Daley by passing out wooden rulers inscribed with the words 
“Mayor Daley’s Tax Rule – The Little Guy Gets the Short End of the Stick.” 168 “As Cook 
County taxpayers, and parents and teachers, we are here this morning to demand that you take 
action to force P.J. Cullerton to end the enormous tax breaks which he has given to politically 
influential big businessmen and real estate speculators in behalf of your political organization,” 
CAP’s letter to Daley, authored by Booth and Dubi, began. It went on to charge that Daley and 
Cullerton effectively traded “enormous underassessment” tax breaks for “the rich and powerful” 
in exchange for “political support and campaign contributions.” The end result, CAP reminded 
the mayor, was “disastrous” increases in the “tax bills of average homeowners” – like 1971’s 16 
percent increase – as well as the “financial crisis” forcing school closings.169 Daley refused to 
meet with CAP, but decided to skip the planned dedication of a nativity scene in order to avoid 
being “hassled” by CAP, as a Daley aide told the Chicago Daily News. 170  Despite the 
confrontational tenor of its protest, CAP found that it had few problems with police, because 
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“most policemen are taxpayers too and generally support our demands that the big guys pay their 
share.” 171 “The people of this city are waking up to the fact that there is no need for financial 
crisis and high taxes,” CAP declared in a press release. “If the mayor and Parky would stop 
giving million dollar tax breaks to their political contributors there would be plenty of 
money.”172 
Despite Cullerton’s initial resistance and the myriad roadblocks faced by CAP from local 
and county governments, the organization’s actions eventually brought results. Reassessment of 
Chicago’s Illinois Center Plaza proved to be the easiest victory. Rather than a complex issue of 
valuation, the Illinois Center Plaza’s underassessment was straightforwardly illegal. The Center’s 
developers had struck a deal with the landowner, the Illinois Central Railroad, to purchase the 
property piecemeal. The developer’s hope was that this ruse would allow them to avoid paying 
taxes on the not-yet-developed parcels of land, since the railroad was exempt from property taxes 
under the state charter. However, as another activist group, Citizens for a Better Environment 
worked with CAP to publicize that the developer’s deal with the railroad was illegal. Railroad 
property was only exempt, according to state law, when being used for railroad purposes. Since 
the Illinois Central Railroad had openly advertised that this land was being taken out of use and 
sold to developers, it no longer could plausibly claim that the land was tax exempt. As a result, 
the assessor quickly conceded the correctness of CBE and CAP’s argument and placed the land 
on the tax rolls, an action that brought in approximately $6 million in additional taxes per year. 
173 CAP’s victories did not end there, though. After failing in the fall of 1971 to reassess the 
other properties studied by CAP, Cullerton announced reassessments in January 1972, just a few 
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weeks after CAP’s City Hall protest. These new assessments raised the county’s total valuation 
by $534 million, the largest single-year increase of Cullerton’s tenure. Of that hike, the CAP-
highlighted properties were responsible for staggering $67 million.174 Each of the steel mills 
studied by CAP saw their assessment raised by a minimum of 20 percent in 1972, with U.S. 
Steel’s South Works’ assessment increasing a whopping 80 percent. These reassessments 
brought in an additional $17 million dollars for “Chicago area schools and services,” as CAP 
bragged. 175 Cullerton also raised the assessments of the Chicago-area racetracks exposed by 
CAP. One received a hike of 250 percent, which fell within five percent of CAP’s own 
assessment.176 Likely not coincidentally, many of the other properties that saw their assessments 
hiked by Cullerton looked awfully similar to those that had been singled out by CAP. They 
consisted primarily of property in “the Loop and other downtown real estate,” as well “10 city 
and suburban townships” on the more well-off North side of the city, almost all of which saw 
higher assessments.177  
The reassessments seemed like a clear victory for CAP. “Cullerton denied that CAP had 
influenced the reassessing, but it was difficult to conclude otherwise,” Emmons noted. “The 
percentage increases in assessments on the properties over which CAP had battled were 
substantially higher than those for the city or county as a whole. These increases were nearly 
twice as great for the four steel mills, for example, as those for the city.” Moreover, Cullerton’s 
press conference announcing the new county assessments focused on the eleven “CAP 
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Properties.”178  In its statement on the reassessments, CAP linked the assessment hikes with 
lower taxes for homeowners and a greater sense of fairness in county taxation. “In January, 1972, 
the long struggle against property tax favoritism to big business in Cool County showed its first 
breakthroughs in the form of reassessment announcements by Assessor P.J. Cullerton,” CAP 
reported. “Major properties which CAP had exposed as benefiting from large and illegal tax 
breaks – the steel mill's race tracks, Illinois Central real estate, and Loop skyscrapers – were 
substantially reassessed, adding $100 million in assessed valuation to the tax rolls. Expected real 
estate tax increases of 19% were reduced to 14%. More important, citizens gained confidence 
that rigged property taxes were no longer inevitable.”179 Though CAP still argued that most of 
Cullerton’s reassessments fell short of the value calculated by CAP, it nonetheless viewed 
Cullerton’s raising of the properties’ assessments as a triumph. “We see this as a victory for the 
small taxpayer,” Paul Booth told the press, “proof that CAP’s original charges of illegal tax 
breaks were on target.”180 Not surprisingly, many in the press gave CAP credit for Cullerton’s 
reassessments.181  Indeed, schooled observers of Windy City politics scored the assessment hikes 
as a victory for CAP, too. “If you mention CAP, which is a grassroots reform organization, to 
Parky Cullerton, his lips turn gray,” Daily News columnist Mike Royko quipped. “There can be 
no higher praise.” 182 Following CAP’s protests, the Illinois Department of Local Government 
also announced an investigation into practices in Cullerton’s office. 183 
Moving beyond the underassessment of major properties, CAP expanded its critique of 
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the tax system to the method in which tax revenues were collected by savings and loan 
institutions and transferred to the government. Most Chicago homeowners paid their property 
taxes as part of their mortgage in twelve monthly installments. However, the S&Ls usually held 
the money in escrow, paying it to the county only once or twice a year. At the end of 1970, the 
202 Cook County S&Ls, CAP reported, held over $150 million of property tax payments in 
escrow – money that the S&Ls invested. “That escrow money fattens the salaries and other 
benefits of the directors of your savings and loan association,” CAP explained in a release. “Who 
are those directors? Some of them – perhaps your directors – are important Chicago area 
politicians.” At the same time, local taxing units, like the Board of Education, ran short of cash 
throughout the year. “[T]hey have monthly bills for payrolls, rent, supplies, etc., yet they only 
get the bulk of their tax revenue once or twice a year,” CAP continued. As a result, government 
taxing districts, like the Board of Education, borrowed money to meet its monthly expenses. To 
do so, the taxing districts issued “tax anticipation warrants,” which were bought primarily by 
“the major downtown banks.” Essentially, these warrants, CAP argued, were “short term, high 
interest loans.” In 1970 alone, CAP reported, the interest on these warrants cost the city’s seven 
taxing districts more than $37 million – including nearly $15 million from the schools alone. 
Moreover, due to federal tax law, the banks that bought the warrants paid no taxes on their 
profits, since they were technically municipal bonds. 184    
Between 1966 and 1970, the total interest paid by the government to banks was nearly 
$110 million.  “This is what property owners (and tenants, through higher rents) have had to pay 
– unnecessarily – between 1966 and 1970 because of the problem created by the savings and 
loans paying our taxes only once or twice a year,” CAP argued. “The problem is ‘created’ by the 
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lobbying power of savings and loans (Cook County Council of Insured Associations, and Illinois 
Savings and Loan League) in Springfield. Making savings and loans directors rich. Some of 
them are politicians. The problem is ‘solved’ by borrowing from the banks – making bank 
directors and stockholders rich. Some of them, also, are politicians.” First Federal Bank was the 
biggest beneficiary of the existing system and the president of the County Board, George Dunne, 
sat on its board. This taking of money from taxpayers and handing it to S&Ls and banks was 
“thievery” in CAP’s view, and, once again, the group connected the practice to both rising 
property tax rates for homeowners and the education finance crisis. “This wonton plundering of 
the taxpayer’s pocket book is simply obscene in light of the financial crisis of the Chicago 
schools and the rising tax rate,” CAP declared. “The politicians who manifest so much concern 
for school kids and taxpayers when the spotlight is on them have seen fit to do nothing about this 
outright robbery of the ordinary citizens.” To stop this practice, CAP argued that the S&Ls 
should be required to turn over property taxes to the government taxing units every month, which 
would virtually eliminate the need for tax anticipation warrants. Like other CAP studies, the tax 
warrant report received ample press coverage, and CAP told the Chicago Tribune that it would 
seek a meeting with Dunne to demand that he seek monthly payments by the S&Ls to the 
government tax units.185 In the end, CAP’s pressure worked. Dunne successfully pushed county 
board to switch to a quarterly payment system, rather than a once-yearly payment system, which 
the Chicago Tribune said would “save millions of dollars in interest payments” because it 
“eliminates or reduces the need for tax anticipation warrants.” Dunne also told the press that he 
expected quarterly payment would simply be the first step towards monthly ones.186 
Following these successes, CAP moved to expand its tax campaign by turning to the 
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problems facing individual homeowners. CAP spent 1972 “organizing a tax revolt,” as AIF’s 
Harmon wrote to Alinksy.187 In late-January 1972, CAP announced that it would be holding a 
“taxpayers’ assembly” in mid-February, which would be proceeded by eight smaller tax hearings 
across the city.  The final assembly drew 400 attendees. Together, they drafted a “Taxpayers’ 
Platform.”188  The “Taxpayers Assembly” was a forum for protesting “the unfair tax burden 
placed on the shoulder of the ‘little guy,’” as CAP put it.189 The long-term reform goals decided 
upon by the assembly included the enactment of a classification system allowing residential 
property to be assessed at less than half the rate of commercial and industrial property – “the 
most progressive [property tax] schedule allowable under the Illinois constitution,” CAP 
demanded – as well as a significant increase in the current $75 to $100 homestead exemption for 
the elderly and, ideally, the eventual abolition of the property tax and its replacement with 
progressive income taxation.190 “We demand that the state income tax be made progressive and 
that loopholes be plugged which currently allow may corporations to get away with paying only 
a pittance in state tax,” the “Taxpayers’ Platform” declared.191 Keeping with CAP’s emphasis on 
school finance, the “Taxpayers’ Platform” also “demand[ed] that the Chicago School Board 
restore all teachers, counselors and other instructional personnel whose positions have recently 
been eliminated.” If reductions were going to be made at the schools, it should be made in 
administration, not instruction.192 CAP believed that by announcing its platform early in the 
election year, some of its provisions would be more likely to be adopted, given politicians’ desire 
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to seem attentive to the tax revolt.193  IAF was pleased by CAP’s emphasis on taxes. “This [tax] 
constituency is building,” Harmon told Alinsky in late-April. “They’ve [CAP] got 300-400 
people actively engaged now. About 70% of the tax constituency are [sic] old people.”194 CAP 
continued its tax-centric meetings throughout the year – at its peak, CAP’s “Tax Coalition” met 
weekly – including a June meeting to endorse a “taxpayers’ bill of rights” and an October 
gathering to draft a “citizens’ budget.”195  In its continued meetings and publications, CAP linked 
the threat of school bankruptcies and shutdowns not to voters opposition to levies, but to the 
state’s failure to use revenue from the income tax to assist financially strapped localities. 196 CAP 
began calling for a two-year property tax freeze, and eventually upped the ante by announcing 
that it goal was not simply a statewide property tax freeze, but a “at least a 10% real estate tax 
cut,” which it believed could be used to force the use of other, more progressive, forms of 
taxation.197 The Tribune described one CAP tax meeting as “300 Chicagoans…rich and poor, 
black and white, young and old” gathered to “let off steam about high taxes and unresponsive 
politicians.”198  
In many of its new goals, however, it seemed CAP was overreaching. By pushing 
legislative actions, CAP was running headlong not only into the Daley machine within Chicago, 
but Chicago-area Daley loyalists in the state legislature.  As a result, CAP’s success on its 
platform demands were mixed. Perhaps CAP’s greatest legislative success came in securing 
greater tax relief for seniors. Hyde Part Democrat Robert Mann, a state representative, and three 
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Democratic state senators partnered with CAP to submit CAP’s “circuit breaker” bill for the 
elderly. Governor Ogilvie countered with his own, less generous, proposal. More than 100 
seniors from CAP’s tax coalition went to the state capital to lobby legislators in their hallways 
and offices. CAP’s version of the bill passed the House, but Ogilvie’s passed the GOP-
dominated Senate. CAP them met with Ogilvie directly to push for CAP’s bill in committee and, 
ultimately, they succeeded in pressuring the governor to accept most of the CAP bill’s more 
generous provisions. With Ogilvie’s approval, it quickly passed. The final bill effectively capped 
property tax payment for both renting and owning seniors making less than $10,000 at between 
six and seven percent of income, offering rebates of up to $500 for property taxes exceeding the 
ceiling. Ogilvie, joined by representatives of CAP and other senior groups, signed the bill on July 
17, 1972.199 “A major victory was won by the Citizens Action Program (CAP) on Monday when 
Governor Ogilvie signed Senate B 11 1363, the Senior Citizens’ Property Tax Relief Act, into 
law,” CAP declared.200  
Both classification and the property tax freeze, however, proved more difficult for CAP 
to get enacted. On classification, Cullerton eventually conceded. However it was a somewhat 
hollow victory for CAP, since Cullerton’s guidelines did little to raise taxes on commercial and 
industrial property 201 The two-year property tax freeze’s politics were even more complicated. 
AT an April 17, 1972, protest at the county board of commissioners meeting, 200 CAP members 
called for a tax freeze, threatening to bring thousands of supporters to the county building or 
even stage a tax strike, if the board did not comply. Over the next several weeks, hundred of 
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CAP members staged further protests at commissioners’ meetings. At one, they displayed a 
banner that declared “Don’t Tread on Me,” with Father Dubi, explaining, “This was the motto of 
the American Revolution. So remember, a tax revolt is the other side of no tax freeze.” The 
board promised to grant CAP its freeze and two weeks later, it did. 202 “CAP forced the County 
Board to freeze its taxes,” CAP declared. “That shows it can be done. This is the year of the 
taxpayers’ revolt and we’re going to stop runaway inflation.”203 Next, CAP sought to get a 
statewide freeze and, here, CAP would hit a wall in the form of Mayor Daley. Unlike the county 
board, which included a strong minority of Republicans with little allegiance to Daley, the state 
legislature was dominated by Daley Democrats, who – thanks to the fact that the legislature 
needed 3/5th approval to include Chicago, a home rule jurisdiction, under the freeze – easily 
blocked attempts by some Republican and downstate Democrats to act on CAP’s tax freeze 
proposal.  Forty-one out of 43 Cook County Democrats, reportedly acting on Daley’s direct 
orders, blocked CAP’s freeze legislation. Indeed, Daley-controlled Democrats – with the 
mayor’s public support – would continue blocking new versions of the tax freeze bill, including 
one that faced a conference committee stalemate after passing the House and Senate in different 
incarnations, into 1974. In the end, CAP’s activism and the overwhelming support among 
downstate Democrats, as well as many Republicans, were little match for the Daley machine.204 
CAP charged that Daley was unconcerned with rising property taxes, but Daley remained 
unmoved. 205 The group was more successful, however, in forcing selective tax cuts through 
reassessment.  
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After succeeding in its investigation of industrial property, CAP turned to conducting 
assessment studies of residential neighborhoods it thought were likely to be overassessed. To 
help with this task, CAP turned to Northwestern economist Arthur Lyons, who assisted CAP in 
its spring 1972 analysis of assessment variation between Chicago’s neighborhoods. To complete 
the study Lyons and volunteers “combed through sales data from real estate boards…, the state 
Department of Local Government Affairs, and assessment information from the local assessor’s 
office,” as CAP’s research director put it. Unwilling to push higher taxes on any homeowners, 
CAP focused its attention on lowering assessments in neighborhoods that were overassessed, 
rather than raising them in those that were underassessed. Crucially, the study found that homes 
in the predominantly black South Shore neighborhood and the working- and middle-class mixed-
race Beverly neighborhood – both of which CAP had hoped to organize – were “systematically 
overassessed” by an average of 30 percent relative to the statewide ratio of 21 percent.206 For 
example, CAP found that South Shore homes’ assessments averaged 26.5 percent of market 
value.207 In dollar terms, the overassessment of the two neighborhoods cost each family an 
average of between $150 and $250 per year.208  
With the results in hand, CAP spent the early fall publicizing the study’s findings and 
organizing the neighborhoods’ residents. Like CAP’s earlier tax actions, the Beverly and South 
Shore studies attracted wide media coverage. 209 Moreover, among the residents of the two 
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neighborhoods the notion that they were being assessed unfairly was common knowledge, and 
many pointed to both class- and race-based discrimination as the cause. “Up and down both sides 
of Yates for two blocks the houses are identical and taxes range from $800 to $1,000,” South 
Shore’s Mildred Howell, who decided to participate in CAP’s campaign, told the Sun-Times. 
When Howell looked at similar homes in other neighborhoods, she thought, “We [in South 
Shore] are all paying too much…. We were paying more for the same thing.” In interviewing 
residents of both neighborhoods, the Sun-Times found that Howell’s attitudes were typical. Many 
black residents said they believed that the assessor and real estate agents were colluding – taxing 
them even more than their already over-taxed white neighbors in order to force them out of their 
homes. “The real estate people are just sitting there waiting for us to abandon our building so 
they can pick them up for taxes,” Edna Vaughs argued. Some of their white neighbors agreed. 
“In essence,” Beverly’s Walter Holan explained, “the blacks who have moved in are paying 
more and getting less [services].”210   
Keeping with their consistent themes of progressive distributionism and tax fairness, 
CAP stressed the relationship between low taxes on powerful property owners and high 
assessments for average working- and middle-class homeowners in Beverly and South Shore. 
CAP’s Beverly and South Shore study included a list of large commercial and industrial 
properties – including Illinois Center Plaza, Wisconsin Steel, and U.S. Steel’s South Works – 
assessed at lower rates than single-family homes in Beverly and South Shore.211 “Assessor P.J. 
Cullerton is systematically discriminating against the residents of South Shore,” Booth told the 
Daily Defender, “who are subsiding the beneficiaries of illegal tax breaks such as United States 
Steel, the First National Bank, Arlington Park Race Track, and the Woodfield Mall Shopping 
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After publicizing their findings, CAP held meetings in the two neighborhoods, where 
attendance exceeded their wildest expectations.213 An October 30th meeting in Beverly, for 
example, drew 400 attendees. From there, the CAP campaign to secure lower assessments in 
South Shore and Beverly proceeded along two fronts. The public campaign, as Booth explained, 
was designed get “a large and expanding number of residents involved in protest, massive 
publicity on the protest in newspaper and on television, and the backing of key officials and large 
institutions with political power.” The second prong of the campaign would be assisting 
individual homeowners in computing and appealing their overassessment and, perhaps 
eventually, the pursuit of a lawsuit to compel reassessment. For individual homeowners, CAP 
created a Fair Property Tax Assessment Program that guided homeowners through formally 
challenging their assessment. Though CAP secured the support of local aldermen and realtors, 
among other community leaders, Cullerton refused to meet with CAP. In response, 200 Beverly 
and South Shore residents placed their tax protest forms into a black coffin and paraded it to 
Cullerton’s office on December 5th. Cullerton’s deputy, Thomas Tully, met with CAP members 
to hear their complaints. Tully told them that the state’s attorney would need to rule on whether 
the neighborhoods could be reassessed. Two months later, the state’s attorney Bernard Carey, a 
Republican, ruled that, while the neighborhoods could not reassessed out of turn, the assessor 
could issue certificates of error – usually reserved for simple mistakes, like an incorrect address – 
to lower the assessments. Cullerton agreed to abide by Carey’s ruling, and CAP dropped its 
lawsuit to force reassessment. 214 Perhaps not coincidentally, Cullerton’s capitulation also fell 
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just before the date CAP had announced would be the day on which it would sue Cullerton for 
assessment reductions. “CAP considers this to be a complete and total victory for the 
taxpayers…,” declared Paul Booth, adding that CAP’s success proved naysayers wrong. “Our 
study that showed systematic overassessment in South Shore and Beverly, and the willingness of 
the residents of these two communities to fight for their rights has established this new procedure 
[for ‘timely adjustment of overassessments’] that will benefit taxpayers throughout the county.” 
The victory’s long-term effects meant that “when a homeowner is being fleeced by an unfair 
assessment he no longer has to wait  until next year for relief.”215  Under the procedure 
negotiated by Cullerton and CAP, residents in the two neighborhoods could received a revised 
assessment if they submitted evidence that their home was assessed at higher than the 21 percent 
average. Over the next several months, CAP helped over 500 residents in Beverly and South 
Shore submit their appeals and secure lower assessments. CAP also helped about 150 residents 
in other, predominantly black and low-income, neighborhoods successfully challenge their 
assessments. 216  CAP was not alone in its success challenging assessments. Thirty miles 
southeast of Chicago, another grassroots group affiliated with Alinsky and Nader mounted its 
own challenge to unfair property tax assessments.  
During its relatively short history, the Calumet Community Congress, an Alinsky-
affiliated group whose early years overlapped almost exactly with CAP’s, ultimately proved to 
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be both more celebrated and more controversial than CAP. Even more explicitly than CAP, 
CCC’s origins are to be found in the fears of left-leaning community leaders that working-class 
white “ethnics” were turning away from liberalism and the Democratic Party toward not only 
Nixon but also the overtly racist politics embodied by George Wallace and the political far right. 
By the mid-1960s, some religious leaders in the Gary area became concerned about what they 
saw as the growing racial strife in the city. In response, they formed the Lake County Inner City 
Task force, comprised of the heads of, or representatives from, United Methodist, Catholic, 
United Church of Christ, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Baptist denominations, among others. In 
late-1966, after previous attempts to keep the city “cool” during years of urban strife, the task 
force decided that it needed to encourage “broad-based community organization” in order to deal 
with “major social problems in the region.”217 In a city divided by the election of one of the first 
black mayors in the U.S. – Richard Hatcher in 1968 – one of the religious coalition’s hopes was 
to organize working-class whites into a progressive coalition, rather than letting them fall into a 
politics of reactionary whiteness that might pull them to the right and further divide the Calumet 
region along racial lines. The Inner City Task Force first planned to fund an organizing project in 
Gary’s black community, but soon shifted their focus to whites, because, as the group’s 
president, Reverend Harold Lundgren, put it, “We then started to think that the real problem was 
in the while community.”218 The question for the ICTF became how to organize the white 
community in Lake County to move them towards more progressive ends.  
Initial organizing of what would become the Calumet Community Congress began in 
February 1969, when the ICTF’s religious denominations paid for Jim Wright, an ICTF staffer, 
to be trained at Alinsky’s Industrial Areas Foundation in Chicago. Newsweek described Wright 
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as “a 230-pound Mexican-American…former steelworker.” Wright’s father had come from 
Mexico after WWI to work at East Chicago’s Inland Steel mill.219 As a former Steelworker, 
Wright “was convinced that Wallace's appeal to his old workmates was a result of being 
disenfranchised from decisions that profoundly affect their lives,” as one account summarized.220 
Indeed, a study of Wallace supporters in Gary found that, while they undoubtedly harbored racist 
sentiments, their attitudes were born of “relative depravation,” both economically and socially. 
In fact, it found that Wallace voters actually had more resentment for white-collar workers than 
for African Americans.221 Wright wanted the ICTF to send him to train under Alinsky so he 
could help avert the shift of such workers to Wallace. These workers were still economically on 
the left and Wright believed their racial views could be overcome if they were empowered by a 
community group.222 The bishop of Gary’s Catholic diocese, Andrew Grutka, who had himself 
once been a steelworker, helped push the ICTF in this direction, too. Grutka would prove to be 
perhaps CCC’s most enthusiastic supporter among Lake County’s religious leaders. He had 
known Alinsky since the 1930s and supported the idea of Alinsky-trained organizers tackling the 
problems of “ethnic” whites in Gary. 223  
In February 1970, after a year of training at IAF, Wright returned to Gary with Mike 
Barnes and Staughton Lynd. The IAF-trained Barnes was a former Catholic seminarian who had 
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experience as an organizer both in Chicago and during the California grape boycott.224 Lynd, by 
the mid-1960s, was already viewed as “indisputably…a leader, elder statesman, and doyen 
theoretician of the New Left, with vast appeal among its disparate parts,” as the New York Times 
put it. By the time Lynd arrived in Gary, the Marxist Quaker had already lived and worked at a 
rural cooperative in Georgia and New York’s Lower East Side Settlement House, taught at the 
historically black Spellman College, directed SNCC’s Mississippi Freedom Schools, chaired the 
first major anti-Vietnam War march in D.C., spoken at antiwar teach-ins in Berkeley, traveled to 
North Vietnam with SDS’s Tom Hayden, and been denied tenure in Yale’s History Department 
thanks to that trip to North Vietnam. Following the Yale debacle, Lynd sought – and was denied 
– teaching positions at several Chicago colleges. But in late-1969 he landed a position teaching 
organizing-related American history at the Industrial Areas Foundation.225 Now Lynd went to 
Gary, serving the role of staff director for the nascent-CCC, with Wright and Barnes serving as 
organizers.226  
The Lake County Inner City Task Force also began a “black community organizing 
project,” which it hoped would exist in cooperation with the largely white organization 
spearheaded by Lynd, Wright, and Barnes. Obadiah Simms, a former OEO administrator in 
Pittsburgh, was tapped to organize the group. Like Barnes and Wright, Simms – whom the Gary 
Post-Tribune described as “a tall, well dressed man with a short Afro hair cut, bushy sideburns 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Richard J. Krickus, “Organizing Neighborhoods: Gary and Newark,” Dissent, January 1972; Perry L. Weed, The 
White Ethnic Movement and Ethnic Politics (Praeger 1973), 101-106; “‘Blue Collar’ Power Group Forms,” 
Hammond Times, November 13, 1970 
225 Author interview with Staughton and Alice Lynd, February 17, 2012; Lynd Resume, IAF, B 38, F 610, UIC; 
Lynd’s Job Description, IAF, B 50, F 691, UIC; Contract, IAF, B 50, F 691, UIC; Proposed Job Definition, IAF, B 
50, F 691, UIC; Carl Mirra, The Admirable Radical: Staughton Lynd and Cold War Dissent, 1945-1970 (Kent State, 
2010); Alice Lynd and Staughton Lynd, Stepping Stones: Memoir of a Life Together (Lexington 2009); “Leader of 
New Let Is a Quaker Teacher at Yale,” New York Times, December 28, 1965; John Corry, “We Must Say Yes to Our 
Souls – Staughton Lynd, Spokesman for the New Left,” New York Times, January 23, 1966;  
226 Agreement, May 22, 1970, IAF, B 129, F 1414, UIC; Staughton Lynd, “RE: Calumet Community Congress,” 
Dissent, September 1972; “‘Blue Collar’ Power Group Forms,” Hammond Times, November 13, 1970; George 






and moustache” – received a year of training at Alinsky’s IAF.227 The ICTF hoped that the 
formation of the two groups would reduce racial polarization and instead lead to cooperation 
between the two groups. “The theory holds that working class whites and most blacks need each 
other to successfully work toward the solution of certain problems they share in common: 
political corruption, pollution, inadequate law enforcement, inequities in the taxing system and 
others,” as one report summarized.228 Simms began working in Gary in September 1970, seven 
months after Barnes and Wright began organizing. Like CCC, Simms hoped to create a coalition 
of existing black organizations. “This area has a rich supply of black leadership and solid 
organizational base,” Simms told the Post-Tribune. “The only thing I’m trying to do is get the 
different groups together so they can have the power to fully participate in the democratic 
process.” 229 However, not only did Simms get a late start organizing his group, but he also 
became seriously ill early in the organizing process. Making matters more difficult for Simms, 
the Hatcher administration made “no bones about the fact that they were not about to have 
anyone else organizing the black in Gary,” as one account put it. Ultimately, despite several 
halting attempts, Simms’s black companion organization to CCC never got off the ground.230  
Any grassroots left-activism in Gary would need to be engineered by CCC alone.  
By March 1970, Jim Wright, Mike Barnes, and Staughton Lynd were in Gary working on 
what was simply called the “Lake County Project.” 231 The organizers “canvassed Lake County’s 
bars, churches, street corners, mills, union halls, and shopping centers.”232 An early planning 
paper on “Lake County Project Needs” began by declaring, “This project is an attempt to reach 
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and to organize for fundamental and progressive social change a constituency which many 
liberals and radicals have written off: white, working-class, union-belonging and home-owning, 
ethnic, often racist and Wallace-voting, Americans…in a community which the media have 
made a symbol of blue-collar conservatism, Lake County, Indiana.”233 As the organizers talked 
to Lake County residents, certain issues – like “pollution and high taxes” – emerged again and 
again.234 Indeed, Gary homeowners paid some of the highest property taxes in the country – 50 
percent higher than the Indiana average and 15 percent higher than the national average. A 
typical homeowner in 1970 with a $10,000 income and a $15,000 home paid $750 in property 
taxes annually.235 Rumors of the underassessment of local steel companies had also swirled 
throughout Lake County for decades. “[F]rom the people we were hearing from, they thought 
‘How come U.S. Steel doesn’t pay taxes and we do?’” Staughton Lynd’s wife, Alice, recalled. 
“[Y]ou know they [U.S. Steel] occupy all of this territory. They make all this money…. [W]e’re 
struggling along to make ends meet and they [U.S. Steel] get away with not paying taxes? They 
[Lake County residents] didn’t like that.”236   
When it came to taxes, the Lynds took the lead. Both Staughton and Alice had been 
working on the tax issue prior to CCC’s launch. The Lynds helped organize a group called the 
Writers Workshop, which sought to give ordinary workers and citizens an opportunity to share 
their stories and views, often in the creation of pamphlets that were shared throughout the 
Calumet region and, sometimes, found their way into wider publication. “They are, by 
profession, truck drivers and housewives, steelworkers and hardhats,” as the Post-Tribune put it. 
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“But on Tuesday and Thursday nights, while others might sit frozen before their TV sets, they 
become authors and philosophers, students and teachers.”237 One pamphlet, which went into a 
second printing after all 1,000 of the initial run were claimed, outlined the benefits available to 
laid-off steelworkers. Metro Corps, a federally funded Gary antipoverty agency paid to have an 
additional 5000 copies printed.238 The Lynds also formed a second group, called the Labor 
History Workshop, which was even better attended than the Writers Workshop and attracted 
“another strange conglomeration of participants ranging from young steelworkers to teachers, 
housewives, and old time labor figures in the county.” The labor workshop was run “under 
Lynd’s loose supervision,” and featured regular presentations by “old time labor organizers,” as 
well as informal sessions where current union members could discuss “their changing viewpoints 
toward their jobs in the mill.”239 The success of the first two workshops spurred the creation of a 
Literature Workshop and a Woman’s Study Group.240  
From the beginning, taxes came up organically in the Writers Workshop. In conjunction 
with members of local unions, the workshop drafted a pamphlet styled as an “imaginary 
agreement” with local steel companies. “This is an imaginary contract,” it explained, “but it 
doesn’t have to stay imaginary.” What made the “imaginary contract” unique is that in included, 
but went beyond, traditional collective bargaining demands. Alongside calls for substantial wage 
increases and the inclusion of a cost-of-living escalator in the next contract were calls for 
pollution abatement, tax reform, and inflation control. “If the companies in a community fail to 
pay their fair share of local property taxes, their workers must make up the difference,” the 
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agreement declared. “Therefore, whether the company is paying its fair share of local taxes shall 
be a legitimate subject for bargaining, and the union shall have the right to inspect company as 
well as public records pertaining to tax questions.” Gary residents wanted to ensure that higher 
taxes and higher wages were not simply passed on to consumers. “Higher prices and taxes are 
eating up increases in wages,” the workshop members wrote. “Moreover substantial wage 
increases and more equitable business property taxes, if achieved, are usually passed on to the 
consumer in the form of higher prices which are a burden for all working people.” To avoid that 
outcome, the “agreement” argued that workers and the community deserved a say in the steel 
companies’ price decisions.241 With their activism outside the CCC, the Lynds were already 
advocating a left-distributionist view of taxes. 
As their interest into tax issues expanded, the Alice and Staughton Lynd created the Tax 
Research Group, an organization separate from CCC, but which would help shape CCC’s 
direction on fiscal issues.242 As part of their anti-Vietnam activism, the Lynds had a history of 
federal income tax resistance.243 Now, with the Tax Research Group, the Lynds advanced a 
broader critique of the U.S. tax system beyond its role in financing the military-industrial 
complex. The Tax Research Group’s drafted a program for reforming Indiana taxes that included 
a graduated income tax, exempting food and health care from the sales tax, statewide 
administration of the property tax, a homestead exemption, and the state to assume responsibility 
of school funding.244 The Lynds and the Tax Research Group strived to stay informed of the left-
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leaning tax movement elsewhere. They kept abreast of CAP’s campaign in Chicago, which Alice 
Lynd summarized as arguing that the “underassessment of industry means schools close for 12 
days.”245 CAP’s Robert Creamer also attended a Tax Research Group meeting.246 Similarly, the 
Lynds subscribed to Nader’s Property Tax Newsletter, while the Newsletter used the Lynds’ 
research for its reporting.247 Most significantly for CCC’s long-term success in changing taxation 
in Lake County, Staughton Lynd approached Ralph Nader in late-1970 after a lecture by Nader 
at the University of Chicago. Lynd passed Nader information on the TRG’s ongoing 
investigation into U.S. Steel’s property taxes in Gary.248 Later, Lynd also appealed to Nader to 
send “Raiders” to Gary to help CCC investigate U.S Steel.249 Lynd’s contact with Nader came 
early in the consumer advocate’s tax activism and this timely connection between Nader and the 
CCC would pay dividends, both directly and indirectly, for the Gary activists. 
By the fall of 1970, Barnes, Lynd, and Wright organized a series of meetings with leaders 
of other local groups and interested citizens. As the organizers had hoped, the idea of a Calumet 
region “community union” grew among the leaders of the various groups.250 An early-September 
meeting at the Holy Angels Cathedral in Gary attracted 75 “grassroots community leaders” who 
coalesced around the idea that a large coalition was needed to tackle “problems too big for 
existing local groups.” Volunteers formed a steering committee that planned a recruitment drive 
and arranged two more planning meetings leading up to the December 5 founding congress.251 
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Wright, Barnes, and other CCC organizers made the rounds to churches and other organizations 
to invite their leaders to participate in upcoming CCC meetings.252 Even at this early stage, the 
nascent CCC attracted notable supporters. “Oil Can” Ed Sadlowski, the president of United 
Steelworkers Local 65 attended the October planning meeting and encouraged the organizers to 
broaden the planned group’s geographic reach.253 The organizers viewed these early planning 
meetings as a “great success.”254  Ken Tucker, secretary of the local chemical workers union, 
noted the enthusiasm among attendees. Most participants were concerned about the same issues, 
prompting many to ask, “Why haven’t we come together long ago?”255 “From talks with the 
acting leaders, the dream for the congress is that it develop into a Ralph Nader-type of 
organization which would do extensive research, identify problems, and offer solutions to 
problems in the Calumet area,” the Gary Post-Tribune’s George Crile wrote of the embryonic 
CCC in November 1970. “But then, unlike Nader’s operation, the congress would act by 
applying pressure to bring about change.” 256 
As the IAF-trained organizers and the growing contingent of local leaders like Tucker 
continued planning CCC’s founding congress, the Lake County Inner City Task Force gave the 
group another boost. In the fall, the ICTF sponsored the “We Are Many Clergy Conference on 
the Issues Facing the Working People of Northwest Indiana” in Gary. In its conference program, 
the Task Force argued that “the working man sick of people stereotyped as a racist and a 
dullard.” “Tricked by political rhetoric,” the ICTF continued, the white worker “turns his anger 
to race,” even though “he himself is the victim of class prejudice.” Ultimately, material concerns 
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drove this anger, it argued. “The working man is over-taxed and under-served at every level of 
government. He does not have fancy lawyers or expensive lobbyists getting him tax breaks on 
his income,” the program explained. “Being a homeowner he shoulders the rising property 
taxes…. Yet he enjoys very from these unfair and burdensome levies.” If he wants to move to a 
better house, he finds he “cannot get an FHA loan” in the “Old Neighborhood,” and he does not 
want to move to subdivisions full of identical houses built with “second-grade materials.” “His 
income of $5,000 to $10,000 per year makes him ‘near poor.’ He is the victim of both inflation 
and anti-inflation measures. He is the guy that is hurt by layoffs, tight money that chokes him 
with high interest rates for installment buying and home improvements,” the Task Force 
continued. “Manufacturers with their price fixing, shoddy merchandise and exorbitant repair bills 
are gouging him to death…. When he complains about the cost of things, he is told that it is the 
‘high cost of labor’ that is to blame. Yet he know he is the ‘labor’ and that in term of real dollars 
his income ahs dropped…. The public and private institutions have made him frustrated by their 
lack of response to his needs, and he feels powerless in his…efforts to change them.” Instead of 
turning to “old prejudices and new fears” that channel anger “against other minority groups 
rather than those who have power,” a community alliance was needed. “This new kind of 
organization is fast becoming a reality in Lake County,” the Task Force concluded.257 The 
“primary purpose” for this clergy conference, in the view of CCC’s religious leaders, was “to 
inform the clergy of the region that an effort was underway to build a large, democratic 
organization throughout the Calumet region.” 258  
Approximately 175 religious leaders attended the “We Are Many” conference. They 
heard speeches by local religious and labor leaders. Bust the most important attendee, by any 
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measure, was the keynote speaker, Geno Baroni.259 Baroni was a “cigar-smoking activist priest,” 
as Newsweek put it, who had in the previous few years become one of the country’s most well-
known exponents of the theory that working-class white “ethnics” were not hopelessly 
conservative. 260 Baroni served as the Director of Program Development for U.S. Catholic 
Conference’s Task Force. Under Baroni’s direction, the Task Force held workshops for urban 
clergy designed to assist them in managing racial conflict in their communities and organizing 
white ethnics for more progressive reform. The workshops included classes on the history of 
immigration and black history.261 Baroni felt that abstract discussions of “racial brotherhood” 
often led nowhere. Instead, he encouraged those who hoped to organize white ethnics “to get at 
the economic and social issues that affect people’s lives” common to both blacks and whites. 
Eventually, Baroni argued, both groups would recognize they were working towards the same 
goals. “Where you have common problems, there is hope for a coalition that will reduce the 
polarization and conflict,” Baroni said.262 The priest argued that because “the Catholic Church 
has traditionally been an urban church, indeed an inner-city church” it was well positioned to 
respond to racial conflict in cities. Working-class whites who “see themselves in direct 
competition with neighboring Negreos for jobs, education, housing, recreation, shopping, and 
street life” were embracing attitudes that distracted them from constructive responses to the 
urban crisis, in Baroni’s view.263 But they were not permanently lost. Working-class whites were 
politically schizophrenic, the priest argued. “It’s true that they will vote for a Walace but then 
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they’ll vote for a Kennedy if they’re given the choice,” he explained. “They did it in Gary.”264 
Many other clergy agreed with Baroni’s views. “You just can’t write these people off as racists 
and reactionaries,” David Roth of the American Jewish Committee agreed said. “They’re the 
ones who formed the cornerstones of the Liberal-labor coalition which pushed through all the 
progressive social legislation we’ve gotten since the depression.” 265  
The Lake County Inner City Task Force based their decision to hire Alinsky-trained 
organizers like Barnes, Lynd, and Wright to address racial conflict in Gary on the philosophy 
embraced by Baroni. Indeed, Baroni encouraged CCC during its planning phase, citing tax issues 
as ones of particular concern to the working class. In private correspondence in April 1970, 
Baroni told Reverend Harold Lundbergen, the president of the ICTF, that the “urban crisis” had 
“become our major domestic issue,” but that it could only be solved by reaching out to the white 
working class in order to reduce what others described as “inevitable group conflict.” In Baroni’s 
view, second- and third-generation “almost poor” white ethnics were “the traditional backbone 
support” of the Catholic Church. But they had become “socially and politically alienated,” in part 
because they were “burdened by a lion’s share of taxes.” These ethnics were “dissatisfied 
because they are so heavily taxed…fearful of their job security and extremely concerned about 
the prohibitive cost of college education for their children.” The only answer was organization. 
“We must build together in out agenda for the ‘70’s a new coalition – press for new goals and 
new priorities for all the poor – the under-privileged poor, including the blacks, the Applachians 
[sic], the Indians, the Spanish-speaking, and white urban ethnic groups,” Baroni wrote to 
Lundbergen. “Only then can we develop a true culture in this country and reduce the ‘inevitable 
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group conflict.’”266 If the reaction of the gathered clergy at the “We Are Many” conference in 
Gary was any indication, the ICTF was working towards the type of organization that Baroni 
envisioned. The attendees were, as the meeting notes explained, uniformly “enthusiastic” about 
the progress of the nascent CCC.267 By CCC’s founding convention in early-December, the 
group had become national cause célèbre. 
 On a cold Saturday in early December 1970, CCC held its founding convention. In 
addition to their previous planning meetings, CCC’s organizers had distributed a flyer urging 
other community organizations to attend the convention and join the congress. The flyer argued 
that CCC was being formed “because of silence and a lack of action on such issues as: Pollution 
of the air and water, crime in the streets, our inadequate schools, the insanely high taxes paid by 
the homeowner and working person.”268 All told, 1,500 people crowded into Hammond’s George 
Rogers Clark High School gymnasium to participate in the creation of CCC. The attendees were 
ostensibly representing nearly 150 separate groups. The Post-Tribune reported that these groups 
“defy simple categorization.” Largest among them were the nearly 40 religious organizations, 
followed by education and environmental groups, labor unions, civic groups, and ethnic 
organizations, from the Chicago Youth Organization to the B’nai B’rith Women. Because CCC’s 
organizers specified that participating organizations must have at least ten members, some 
Garyites banded together in groups of ten “just to participate in the CCC.”269 In a symbolic 
gesture of continuity with the past, George Patterson – who had been the picket line captain 
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during the famed 1937 “Memorial Day Massacre” at Republic Steel – chaired the convention.270 
Together, the members of the newly christened Calumet Community Congress elected leaders 
and began formulating its direction on key issues. “The 20 elected officers of the CCC fit rather 
closely into the groups of people the sponsors of the CCC were trying to reach…mainly white, 
union members, ethnic oriented wage earners who earn from $5 to $11,000 a year…includ[ing] 
two union officials, to welfare workers, two truck drivers, two housewives, two students with 
outside jobs, two clergymen, a cook, a roofer, a secretary, a Gary city employee, and a steel 
worker,” the Post-Tribune reported. Ken Tucker was elected CCC’s first president.271 Given the 
belief at the time CCC’s founding that Simms’s black group would still come to fruition, only a 
handful of African American groups were represented at the convention, though Latinos were 
better represented, occupying an space somewhat undifferentiated from other white “ethnics” – 
as Wright’s role of organizer perhaps suggested.272  
CCC’s convention attracted widespread local and national attention. Following initial 
contact with Ralph Nader orchestrated by Staughton Lynd, CCC’s organizers invited Nader to 
address its founding convention. Nader told the group he wanted to attend, but had a speech 
scheduled in Canada for the same day. Instead, Nader sent his “key aid,” John Esposito, to 
address the convention.273 Esposito argued in his keynote address that it CCC’s actions were 
democratic, not radical. Standing up for the “little guy” was not radical. The real radicals, 
Esposito argued, were corporations that twisted democratic principles. “Who takes money out of 
your pockets through special tax advantages? Who manipulates prices and interest rates to 
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reduce the fruits of your labor?” he asked.274 Nader used CCC’s convention as an opportunity to 
formally ask the group to join him in investigating U.S. Steel’s Gary Works.275 “With Nader’s 
reputation as a reformer of such corporate giants as General Motors, the CCC became a 
significant force over night,” the Post-Tribune reported, adding that CCC had also received 
backing from the National Urban Coalition, the American Jewish Committee, and the U.S. 
Catholic Conference.276 “Much of the explanation for the national attention paid to the CCC’s 
birth can be attributed to Msgr. Gino Baroni,” the Post-Tribune’s George Crile suggested.277 
Baroni attended CCC’s founding congress and brought organizers from Baltimore, Newark, 
Providence, Cleveland, and Detroit, among other cities, who hoped to replicate CCC’s success in 
their own communities. 278 Baroni praised CCC, arguing that none of the other working-class 
groups around the country were “as advanced or sophisticated as the CCC.” 279 National figures 
like Senators Edmund Muskie, Ted Kennedy, and Vance Hartke, as well as John Gardner, LBJ’s 
HEW secretary and the head of Common Cause, sent CCC congratulatory telegrams. CCC’s 
efforts to “articulate the needs of the American working man and the fight for [their] fulfillment 
deserve full support from all of us who look for a prosperous future for our nation’s workers,” 
Kennedy wrote. “Perhaps in years go come the entire country will look to this Congress as proof 
that the democratic system can be made responsive to citizens united by a common cause and 
concern.” Muskie wrote that he hoped “CCC will be duplicated many times over” throughout the 
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country. And Gardner called CCC’s a “pioneering effort” that “represents the kind of grass roots 
citizens action that will move the nation toward a better future.”280 
The press treated CCC as a model of a rising backlash against the very notion of 
working-class conservatism. Newsweek marveled that a “sweaty, shirt-sleeved convention in a 
high-school gymnasium in Hammond [Indiana]” could cause such a stir that Senator Muskie 
would call the group “exactly what America must have if our democracy is to become more 
responsive to the people’s real needs.” “If we don’t organize them, George Wallace or some 
other demagogue will,” a CCC member told Newsweek.281 The New York Times reported that 
CCC’s convention “unite[d] [the] left and right” by gathering together “1,500 working-class 
white ethnics, students, suburban liberals, and conservatives” to elect delegates “from labor 
unions, Latin-American organizations, suburban betterment groups, church, student, and 
women’s associations.”282 “Now the American working man, hard hat, flag in lapel and all, is 
joining the procession of those seeking more power for the people. But this time there’s a 
difference,” the Washington Post’s Haynes Johnson began his report on CCC’s founding 
congress. “Workers here are not organizing to satisfy the longings of some ‘silent majority, not 
to run back the clock, nor elect a Wallace figure. They’re seeking power for social reform.” “If 
successful, [CCC] could serve as a model for other basically blue collar political organizations 
around the country,” Johnson concluded.283 Days after Johnson’s report, a Washington Post 
editorial praised CCC. Even though it was “only one of thousands of organizations across the 
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land that unite people with common interests and goals,” CCC’s founding had “national 
significance far beyond the hopes of some 1,500 working class white ethnics who met in a hall 
amid high hopes and high-waving American flags.” Unlike the Nixonian politics of the moment, 
the “ethnics” of CCC “seek power not to back a Wallace or an Agnew figure, or to advance the 
so-called hardhat philosophy, but for social reform.” “They now see only too clearly that the 
poor and the black are allies, not enemies, and that the real foes are unresponsive institutions…,” 
the Post’s editorial board argued. “The workingman has long been exploited by many politicians 
and businessmen…[but] [t]he Calumet Community Congress is a sign that the exploitation days 
are coming to an end….”284 Locally, the Hammond Times praised the convention, calling CCC 
“‘blue collar’ power group” that could be “a potentially powerful, region-wide political action 
group dedicated to the needs of blue collar workers and small homeowners.”285 The Gary Post-
Tribune noted that “the Calumet Community Congress (CCC) is being welcomed nationally as a 
hopeful and significant movement.” “Little more than a week old, the CCC has earned the 
endorsement of several of the country’s most respected political figures, enjoyed favorable 
comment from the national news media, and enlisted a number of formidable allies…,” the Post-
Tribune continued. “Accounts of the congress founding appeared in newspapers from Boston to 
San Francisco and included lengthy reports in the New York Times, Newsweek, and the 
Washington Post.”286 
 But not everyone appreciated the newly formed CCC. Local politicians from both parties 
– particularly the conservative anti-Hatcher wing of the Democratic Party – as well as local 
business interests, such as U.S. Steel, began attacking the ICTF and the Alinsky-trained 
organizers months prior to the founding convention, and the attacks only intensified from there. 
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Lake County Democratic Chairman John Krupa formed a group dubbed the Alert Americans as 
“conservative” rival to CCC and mailed a letter to 2,000 political and civic leaders in the 
Calumet area asking them to join “Al-Am” to combat CCC’s alleged subversiveness. A four-
page pamphlet accompanied the plea purporting to demonstrate CCC’s real intention, which it 
claimed was proving the “illegitimacy of private ownership.” 287  Addressed “Dear Fellow 
American,” Krupa’s letter began by noting that “all of us” agree with goals like “a cleaner 
environment, social justice, [and] an end to poverty.” But, Krupa argued, “certain movements” 
exist where “the real ultimate objectives are to lay siege to our system of free enterprise, and in 
some instances to wreck entirely those fundamental institutions of American democracy.” Such 
movements “are often made attractive my a façade of good causes.” CCC was just such a 
movement. Krupa sought to expose “the hard core of this new movement,” “alien persons with 
backgrounds of highly questionable nature.” The radical ideas CCC represented were “invading 
our homes, our schools, our community, and, now, our churches.” “Right-thinking citizens” 
needed to form “counter force.” Krupa’s mailing ended with a mail-in form to indicate interest in 
meeting to plan the “counter force” to CCC.288 The appeal included an attached four-page “fact 
sheet,” titled “Notes on the Calumet Community Congress.” It hinted that CCC had been 
“blessed” by the IAF, local religious groups, “and possibly by the Office of Economic 
Opportunity.” The “fact sheet” described Jim Wright as a “socialist and proponent of 
revolutionary methods,” Mike Barnes as “interested in New Mobe, a violent revolutionary 
movement,” and noted that both had been trained in Alinsky’s school. Going further, it listed 
Wright’s home address and noted his involvement in “the Miller Mafia (a group of Jewish 
people in the Miller area of Gary who were in support of Mr. Hatcher when he was a candidate 
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for election as Mayor of Gary” and his role as an editor of New Left Notes, which the “fact sheet” 
described as “a weekly publication of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) distributed on 
Calumet university campuses.”289 
Krupa reserved special vitriol for Lynd and Alinsky. But the real threat posed by CCC, 
Krupa suggested, was its popularity – including the possibility that it would organize blacks and 
whites together. Krupa’s “fact sheet exposed Lynd’s “radical and leftist views and activities,” 
such as his trip to North Vietnam and informed concerned Lake County residents know that “a 
brochure on Mr. Lynd…listing about 70 incidents of leftist and/or pro-communist nature is 
available.” The “fact sheet” also described Alinsky as “the ideological champion of the entire 
movement,” who has “preached and waged class warfare, the haves vs. the have-nots, by 
organizing poor people in places such as Buffalo, Chicago, Rochester, Los Angeles, Detroit, and 
Syracuse.” In those locales, Krupa explained, “Alinsky’s agitators work with Negro leaders, 
Protestant and Catholic clergymen, and so-called civil rights organizers… leav[ing] in their wake 
social chaos and racial bitterness.” However, rather than portray CCC as merely a case of outside 
agitators attempting to make an issue where one did not exist, Krupa’s “fact sheet” conceded that 
CCC was, in fact, popular and implied that the mass support for the group was the true threat. 
“What should be frightening to all is the ease with which people are being attracted to this 
movement,” the fact sheet noted, “which gives evidence that the people want action in many 
areas being championed by the likes of CCC.” Krupa attributed the emphasis on organizing 
whites to Alinsky’s teachings. Once organized, whites would join people of color in a 
“revolutionary force.” He warned that Simms’s black group would soon be off the ground. “In 
the not too distant future,” Krupa noted darkly, “a huge force of ‘black activists’ organizations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






will be merged with the Calumet Community Congress.” 290 In a two-hour interview with the 
Gary Post-Tribune November 1970, Krupa declared that CCC was “motivated by the Godless, 
atheistic force of Communism,” while simultaneously criticizing the religious leaders funding 
CCC. “Right now you’re seeing the embryonic stages of a revolutionary movement,” Krupa 
noted ominously. “For all we know it might end up being called the Calumet Communist 
Congress.”291 The Tribune reported that “the bulk of Krupa's allegations against the CCC stems 
from the participation of radical historian Staughton Lynd as a part-time volunteer for the 
organization.”292   
The Alert Americans, as well as other conservative and business opponents of CCC, 
hoped to quash the group before it got off the ground. The John Birch Society tried to recruit 
veterans’ organizations in opposition to CCC and the Ku Klux Klan circulated anti-CCC 
literature.293 When the CCC held a preliminary public meeting at the Andrean School on 
November 15th, members of the Alert Americans attended to protest the CCC, including Krupa 
and Sydney Garner, a Republican county council member.294 “Phones in south Lake County 
have been hot during the last few days as the anti-CCC John Birch Society sought backing from 
veterans organizations and other groups,” the Hammond Times reported. Members of Al-Am 
passed out newspaper clippings about Lynd, implying that he was a communist.295 “[T]ensions 
ran high” as the Alert Americans protesters at the meeting “attempted to squelch” the CCC.296 Of 
the 500 at the CCC planning meeting, about half were there to protest CCC, the Times 
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estimated.297 Methodist Reverend David Bonner tried to calm the Alert Americans in the 
audience by explaining that organizing the Calumet region’s working class “would be conducted 
in a democratic manner dealing with issues and not political ideologies.” But the Alert 
Americans would not hear it.298 Calling CCC’s organizers “capetbaggers,” Garner called for U.S. 
House Internal Security Committee (formerly the House Un-American Activities Committee) to 
investigate CCC’s activities and the IRS to investigate its financing.299 Representative Earl 
Landgrebe, a Valparaiso Republican, publicly denounced CCC, linking it to communism, largely 
because of Lynd’s involvement, which he said “casts a shadow of great doubt on this 
movement’s true purposes.” “One of the favorite tactics of Communists and other radical 
elements is to find a legitimate concern and take it over…. There are strong indications hat this is 
taking place in Lake County in a group known as the Calumet Community Congress,” 
Landgrebe said in a statement. The congressman quoted material from the House Internal 
Security Committee claiming that Lynd made “anti-American broadcasts” in Hanoi and 
London.300 Because of his anti-corporate stance, Landgrebe wrote, Lynd “appears to be more 
interested in destroying the workers’ means of earning a living than in ending pollution or 
racism.”301  
Opposition to CCC extended far beyond the public slandering of its leaders. In particular, 
the Lake County business community seemed particularly suspicious of the new community 
group, likely given its announced intention of attacking a tax system that benefitted large local 
businesses so well. Much of Krupa’s information on CCC’s organizers came from reports 
provided by the American Security Council, a conservative business- and military-oriented anti-
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communist group. Additionally, Methodist Pastor Rod Musselman, who was involved with the 
ICTF, “lost” his briefcase, which found its way into the hands of Krupa and other anti-CCC 
forces, who “found [the briefcase] and turned over to the FBI,” though not before first mining the 
documents on the “Lake County Project” for information. 302 Opponents treated members of 
CCC as communist subversives to be stopped at all costs. The private Northwest Indiana Crime 
Commission spied on CCC’s organizers almost from the moment they set foot in Gary. The 
Crime Commission was formed in 1959, in part as a response to the bad reputation given to 
Northwest Indiana by the U.S. Senate Racket Committee led by Senator John McClellan and 
Chief Counsel Robert Kennedy.303 As an “unofficial watchdog,” the commission relied on public 
donations, which it claimed did not affect the commission’s investigations.304 The commission 
was touted as “represent[ing] all facets of community life without regard to political views, race, 
color, or religion.”305 But, from the beginning, the Gary Chamber of Commerce guided the 
group. The Chamber’s president outlined the structure of the crime commission, and the manager 
of the Whiting Standard refinery served as the commission’s first president. The NWIC’s 
predecessor, the Gary Crime Commission, was headed by the secretary of Inland Steel.306 The 
NWICC’s leaders and board members were comprised almost exclusively of executives and 
managers from the area’s major businesses, including Inland Steel and U.S. Steel, Standard Oil 
and Shell Oil, and Gary National Bank, with a few academics and religious leaders mixed in.307 
The largest donors to the Crime Commission were the area’s major businesses, particularly 
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Inland Steel and U.S. Steel, which donated $3,000 and $5,000 in 1971, respectively. American 
Oil, Bethlehem Steel, LaSalle Steel, Gary National Bank, the Post-Tribune, and Youngstown 
sheet & Tube, among other companies, also donated at least $1,000.308 Indeed, representatives of 
Inland, U.S. Steel, and the Gary Post-Tribune, among other major local political power players 
served in executive positions on the Crime Commission.309 The commission was, in other words, 
synonymous with the most powerful businesses in Lake County. 
When CCC began organizing, the Crime Commission’s “operating director” was Elmer 
Jacobsen. Jacobsen was a questionable choice to head the commission in its day-to-day 
activities. In 1955, J. Edgar Hoover requested Jacobsen’s resignation from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for “unbecoming conduct.” The nature of Jacobsen’s conduct was debated, and he 
later insisted both that he had been the victim of corruption in the Bureau and that he had 
resigned voluntarily.310 Regardless, Jacobsen viewed CCC as a subversive group and, like Krupa, 
seemed to believe they were a communist front organization. Jacobsen kept extensive files of 
clippings not only on CCC, but also on national left-leaning grassroots groups, in general, most 
of which portrayed New Left, antiwar, and black freedom movement groups as communist plots. 
As soon as the ICTF began the organizational operation that would eventually birth CCC, 
Jacobsen started investigating and monitoring the organizers. Using informers, the former G-
Man kept notes on the minutest details of CCC’s meetings. “Rod Musselman attended meeting at 
Cedar Lake community center…. Good many people were there,” Jacobsen recorded on one 
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scribbled slip. “Door locked & identification necessary to get in.”311 Jacobsen secured copies of 
CCC memos and used informed culled from them to monitor even smallest CCC gatherings. For 
example, Jacobsen secured one early memo that noted a planning meeting at St. Andrew’s 
Catholic Church the following week. With that information, Jacobsen or an associate recorded 
the license plate numbers of 19 vehicles in St. Andrew’s lot the night of the meeting, and 
Jacobsen used the plate numbers to find out to whom the vehicles were registered.312 Jacobsen 
had the Chicago FBI run the license plates of the 1970 Volvo Lynd drove with his family from 
Chicago – where they lived – to Gary for a CCC meeting. 313 He noted that “when observed on 
the night of 11-15-70, this vehicle was being driven by Staughton Lynd who was accompanied 
by his wife and children.”314 “I remember being really scared because of people following us 
home from meetings,” Alice Lynd said later, “and scared because of knowing what had 
happened in Mississippi and other places where people were not popular.”315 Jacobsen reached 
out to law enforcement contacts across the country to find out information about the CCC 
organizers and Alinsky. 316 The Crime Commission’s director also worried about the “many 
longhairs” involved with CCC and Lynd’s involvement with “New Left parallel gov’ts,” which 
Jacobson believed were trying “to undermine legal gov’ts.”317  
Ironically, CCC had believed it could work with the Crime Commission in both its 
investigations into local political corruption and local property tax inequities, going so far as to 
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invite the NWICC to partner with CCC.318 Whatever CCC’s hopes, this partnership was dead on 
arrival. Not only did Jacobsen and other local leaders equate CCC’s leaders with communism, 
but the very fact that CCC planned to investigate the informal tax breaks given to U.S. Steel and 
other major businesses in Lake County meant that CCC was promising to attack the pocketbooks 
of Crime Commission’s funders. Indeed, local business leaders prompted much of Jacobsen’s 
attention to CCC. The NWICC was “virtually bombarded with info about [CCC’s] activities.”319 
Jacobsen noted that he “was told by a prominent business man of liberal philosophy that we’ve 
got to do something about that CCC.”320 The extent of the NWICC’s investigation into CCC, 
though, was likely unknown to its members. However, the fact that CCC was being monitored 
was widely known. Krupa’s “fact sheet” noted that the Lake County “movements are being kept 
under strict surveillance.” 321 Likewise, Sydney Garner, the GOP county council member, told 
the press that he was monitoring CCC. “We have people on the inside – on the very upper 
levels,” he said. “It’s kind of a dirty word but you could say we’ve infiltrated the 
organization.”322 
 The conservative broadside against CCC gave the group a short-term boost. Writing to 
Alinsky, the IAF’s Ed Chambers declared CCC’s founding congress “very successful, 
principally thanks to the attacks of the last week by Democratic chairman of Lake County, 
Krupa.” Those attacks, Chamber told Alinsky, had created a buzz around CCC that added, rather 
than detracted, from attendance at the convention. 323  CCC’s leaders agreed. “Krupa’s 
performance was the best thing that could have happened for us,” Ken Tucker enthused. “Now 
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everyone understands that we are important, that we do have strength and are on the verge of 
having power. He’s afraid we’re going to represent the little guy while he isn’t.”324 The Post-
Tribune reported that the Alert American protesters “seemed to be welcome[d] by most of 
CCC’s leaders.”325 Optimism ran high following the convention. Jim Wright and Obadiah Simms 
met after the convention and “compared notes.” Both declared CCC’s founding a success – the 
first step towards real interracial, progressive political power. “This method of operation, 
working mostly with the white working class, is the logical outgrowth of the failure to find a 
solution in the ghetto alone,” Wright explained. “The alienated working white has to be 
organized just as the black has to be organized. It can’t be a one-way proposition.” Simms 
agreed. “That’s right. We are talking about a new model where people deal with each other from 
a position of strength and power. In the long run, if there’s to be any hope for integration it will 
have to come when people develop a new kind of respect for each other,” Simms said, before 
concluding with grand optimism. “We’re writing the handbook for the nineteen-seventies right 
now.”326 Despite the opposition of local political and business leaders, many local residents 
defended CCC. Joseph Harkin – “a Republican who demands that his children keep their hair 
neatly trimmed and boasts of his patriotism” – told the New York Times, “I don’t see any 
Commies in there – why, hell, what they’re talking about in there is what I’m talking about – 
some control over my government; an end to corruption some answers on why we can’t clean 
this place up; lower taxes; how to live a decent life.”327 For many Lake County residents, the 
salience of the issues raised by CCC overwhelmed any innuendoes about its leaders. “It may be 
that [attendees at CCC’s founding convention] may feel the same as did the patriots at the Boston 
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Tea Party that they are the victims of ‘taxation without representation,’” wrote one resident, who 
was skeptical of both CCC and Krupa, to the Hammond Times. “It is high time that the people of 
Lake County remember that our system of government with two parties is the best in the world, 
but it collapses when one party is in power for two long.”328 “The issue is not Wright or Barnes 
or Lynd or Alinsky or Balsley or Grutka or anyone else,” another letter-writer argued. “The issue 
is pollution and fair taxation and crime and public transportation and jetports and recreation and 
quality education and public utility policies, etc.”329 
 The attacks on CCC were not without negative consequences for the new group, 
however. In fact, the attacks prompted several changes in the organization that undermine CCC’s 
potential for long-term viability. A few key CCC supporters began shying away from the group. 
Amid the controversy surrounding CCC, the leadership Calumet United Methodist Church – one 
of the founding religious denominations behind the Inner City Task Force – decided not to 
endorse or provide financial support to CCC.  The church’s leaders singled out the involvement 
of Lynd, Wright, and Barnes as the reason for withdrawing its support.330 By December 1970, 
the Inner City Task force disbanded “voluntarily,” though a new group called the Calumet 
United Ministries succeeded it.331 Many other religious leaders continued to support CCC. “The 
CCC doesn't aim to overthrow the existing form of government, just to make it more effective,” 
Catholic Bishop Andrew Grutka explained. Presbyterian Reverend Gerald Greg agreed. “It just 
doesn't make any sense to think that eight religious denominations and their executives who 
decided to back the CCC are subversive,” he said. And Methodist Reverend Eugene Balsley put 
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it bluntest: “The CCC is no more subversive than the Gospel.”332 But other religious leaders 
stepped up their attacks on CCC and the onetime members of ICTF. Baptist Pastor Wesley Hunt 
scolded “men of God” who were “playing the role of social reformers, civil rights experts, or 
political persuaders.” “Some of us still believe the Bible, preach the Gospel, and believe that 
America is still the greatest and best country in the world,” Hunt wrote. “Other so-called ‘clergy’ 
obviously do not agree. Color me red, white, and blue…. [But] [t]he only Triple-C I belong to 
means: Christ Cleanses Completely.” 333  Amid the growing controversy following CCC’s 
founding convention, Vivian Myers, chair of CCC’s constitution committee, resigned. “It’s just a 
personal thing,” Myers told the Post-Tribune. “I’m just not satisfied with the background 
involved some of the people, like Staughton Lynd and Saul Alinsky.” Just a few days earlier, 
Myers had enthused, “The principled of the organization is magnificent, it’s beautiful.” But 
Myers said that having her name included in a Hammond Times article on CCC gave her pause. 
After the article was published, her house was flooded with phone calls and callers to a local 
radio talk show called her a communist. Myers said that having the words “power” and “action” 
associated with CCC disturbed her, and that Krupa’s attacks on CCC caused her to reconsider 
her association with the group. Reverend David Bonner, CCC’s acting chairman, said that he 
thought she resigned because Krupa put political pressure on Myers’s husband, a Glen Park 
Democratic precinct committeeman.334 Myers said she quit after “sleepless nights.” The word 
“power” scared her. “There is not difference between black power and blue power,” Myers said, 
referencing the article, which called CCC a “blue collar power group.”335 While CCC was being 
attacked from the right, unnamed individuals – possibly related to the Crime Commission or 
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other CCC opponents – tried to sour the left on the group. Rumors swirled that Wright and 
Barnes were covert members of the John Birch Society.336 And early in 1971, a counterfeit letter, 
supposedly from CCC, was sent to an unknown number of Lake County residents. The letter 
claimed that CCC’s leaders thought black and Latino voters were too uneducated to think for 
themselves and that white ethnics were lazy.337  
The biggest obstacle for CCC, in the view of many members and supporters, was 
Staughton Lynd’s involvement. The Post-Tribune’s George Crile called Lynd’s background “the 
reason for the controversy” surround CCC, and it seemed even some of the group’s leadership 
agreed.338 Lynd attempted on numerous occasions to quell the controversy.  “I will answer any 
questions about myself that anyone cares to ask tonight,” Lynd told the clergy attending the “We 
Are Many” convention. “If you need me I am in the Chicago phone book.” Lynd did not deny 
that he was a “radical,” but questioned the specific assertions made by Krupa and other attackers. 
“I have been called a radical many times, but while I do not deny it, there are difference in 
radicals.”339 Following the November 15 CCC planning meeting, Lynd enduring an hour-and-a-
half of questioning from reporters. He denied he was a communist, but did not reject the socialist 
label. “If you believe, by socialism, to make the government responsible to the needs of the 
people, then I am a socialist,” Lynd responded.340 He also made clear that he did not believe in 
violence. 341  But Krupa’s continued attacks finally prompted Lynd to release a statement 
explaining that he would be “honored” to continue working part-time for CCC, but that he had 
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no interest in a full-time position with the group.342 However, Lynd’s ultimate withdrawal from 
CCC was less a product of choice than of necessity. Given the controversy surrounding Lynd, 
Wright and Barnes asked Lynd to step down following the convention, much to the chagrin of 
Lynd, who lamented that he had become “expendable as soon as…the CCC…was securely 
founded.”343 The effective dismissal of Lynd proved to be a serious blow to the group, given the 
Lynds centrality to the tax issue. Regarding the controversy surrounding Staughton Lynd’s 
involvement with CCC, Alice Lynd wrote that Staughton’s leaving CCC would do nothing to 
assuage critics, since they would still “assume he has control that he neither has nor wants” 
because he was “already linked with CCC in people’s minds.” Staughton’s involvement, she 
argued, had also helped the organization. Specifically he “opened [the] door to Nader.” 
Ultimately, Alice argued, there existed a “need for the right and left to work together on common 
issues,” and Staughton’s “motivation [was] to give all he has to work with other in creating a 
better place to live.”344 Making matters worse for the fledgling CCC, Wright would soon depart 
CCC to work for Geno Baroni in D.C., leaving Barnes the only original organizer left at CCC.345 
Lynd, however, remained involved with CCC throughout early 1971, at least when it came to the 
tax issues he had begun investigating with his Tax Research Group. When CCC decided to create 
its own Tax Committee, it turned to Lynd. “[S]ince nearly everyone who had expressed interest 
in working on tax problems was already in the Tax Research Group,” the TRG at least 
temporarily combined with CCC’s Tax Committee. John Smrekar, the head of the union at the 
DuPont plant in East Chicago, was elected by the CCC to serve as the Tax Committee chair, and 
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Lynd was unanimously elected by the Tax Committee as its Vice Chair. Despite his position, 
CCC leaders asked Lynd not to speak publicly for the Tax Committee and, eventually, given the 
continued attacks on CCC, they asked Lynd to step down from his position as Vice Chair.346  
The tax philosophy of the Lynds and CCC echoed that of other left-distributionist 
activists. Tax activism, Staughton Lynd argued in an unpublished position paper, “raises 
fundamental questions about the distribution of national income….” While debates over income 
distribution were “hard to win” because of their abstract nature, taxes provided an issue with 
clear distributional implications. Lynd pointed to tax activism by the grassroots left in states 
from Massachusetts to Illinois to California as demonstrations of the left’s ability to coalesce 
around clear demands, such as reducing or eliminating the sales tax, exempting low- and middle-
income taxpayers from the property tax, and shifting the overall tax burden to corporations. 
“[T]he fiscal crisis…especially of public bodies responsible for education,” Lynd noted, had 
created an opening for left-leaning tax reforms. He, however, cautioned left-leaning activists not 
advocate for policies that would simply freeze taxes, thereby starving schools and other 
institutions that needed their support. The challenge for left activist was to avoid calls to raise 
revenue without regard to distributive issues. Distributionism needed to trump fiscalism. “[T]he 
temptation for groups affected by the fiscal crisis most directly, like teachers’ unions, is to 
support tax legislation which increases revenue but does not change the present regressive tax 
structure,” Lynd wrote. “This is a short-sighted strategy for the teachers themselves, because it 
means that other working people who pay taxes will resent teacher’s demands for higher wages 
and fail to support the teachers if they strike.” Instead, tax activists on the left needed to advocate 
policies that redistributed the tax burden upward “making it possible to advocate both (a) higher 
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wages for public services employees [and] (b) lower taxes for the working-class taxpayer.” The 
left needed a message that would unite low- and middle-income taxpayers. “Teachers must be 
able to say to steelworkers: ‘We don’t want to take more money from you. We both need to get 
more money from those who have more than they should,’” Lynd wrote. Lynd proposed “good” 
but “relatively superficial” ways to “meet people” and “involve them,” such as door-to-door 
petitions be combined with more “direct actions,” such as tax strikes and protests. At the federal 
level, Lynd believed that the left needed to exploit the contrast between generous increases in 
business tax breaks and meager cuts for lower- and middle-income individuals enacted during 
the 1960s. For example, Lynd argued that the personal exemption was originally intended to 
“leave untaxed the income which an average family required for a decent standard of living” and 
that, therefore, “the left should demand that, in keeping with the original intent of federal tax 
laws, a family of four should receive an exemption of $10,000 and the exemption should be 
increased for each person to $2500.”347 “Tax is a felt issue, a potent issue, but extremely hard to 
work on,” the Lynds concluded in another document. However, they argued, “CCC can turn 
academic type research…into good agit-prop through their own group of writers… [T]his is 
obviously the best way to speak to a community: through people who live and work there, and 
know their neighbors.”348 This tax activism, they believed, would work best as part of a 
comprehensive distributionist pocketbook program that also included activism around rising 
prices.349  
The tax plank adopted at CCC’s founded congress reflected this left-distributionist 
philosophy. The resolution “demanded that industry be taxed its fair share so that the burden of 
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taxes for the small taxpayer could be relieved.” 350  It quoted Nader’s argument that 
“unprofessional assessments done by assessors subject to enormous political and economic 
pressures result in a system that favors large economic interests at the expense of the small 
homeowner and businessman” and cited Nader’s estimate that property taxes could be reduced 
by 25 percent nationwide “if industry were fairly assessed.” Turning to specific issues in the 
Calumet region, CCC’s taxation resolution singled out Regulation 16 as a loophole benefitting 
large industrial corporations.351 Regulation 16 allowed depreciation for property tax purposes at 
the same speed at federal depreciation.352 CCC pledged to “take all appropriate action to see that 
accurate information is obtained from industries as to the value of their taxable property, and to 
eliminate loopholes in the regulations for assessment of industrial property, so that industry can 
be taxed its fair share and the burden of taxation on the small property owner can be eased.”353 
Following Lynd’s lead, CCC’s leaders also strived to make clear that the groups tax complaints 
would not lead to scapegoating public employees. At the suggestion of the Gary teachers’ union 
and other public employee groups, an amendment protecting public employees right to collective 
bargaining was presented at the CCC’s founding convention. CCC also later adopted a resolution 
supporting the right of public employees to strike.354 Extending its spending concerns to the 
poor, CCC passed a resolution initiated by Caseworkers for Community Action calling for “poor 
relief” welfare to be funding by state sources, rather tan local property taxes. “The mounting 
burden of poor relief has created a steady increase in local property taxes,” CCC argued, and 
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moving welfare to the state level would not only lessen the burden on local property taxes, but 
would create “a more equitable and uniform” system.355 
The CCC’s official taxation “position paper” expanded on the resolution passed at the 
founding convention. It called for the elimination of the sales tax on food and health care, which 
it termed “a tax on hunger and illness.” It also declared that homeowners should be able to “live 
in freedom from confiscatory taxation,” noting that homeowners could pay 100 percent of the 
purchase price of a home in property taxes by the time the mortgage is paid off and then might 
find themselves forced to sell the home in retirement because they cannot afford the tax. “This 
situation is shameful and must be corrected immediately,” CCC argued. “There is no reason, 
moral or economic, why a family should not be able to maintain an average home, free from the 
tax collector.” The group chastised the Indiana legislature’s “property tax relief” proposals, 
which they argued offered generous property tax cuts to businesses and small cuts to 
homeowners that would be more than offset by hikes in income and sales taxes. Instead, CCC 
argued that the average value of a “lower-middle-income” or “working-class” home should be 
exempt from taxation – a value the group placed at $25,000 – and that property taxes should 
apply only to the value above that exemption. With Indiana property taxes increasing at more 
than 11 percent a year, CCC called for shifting the burden away from individual homeowners. 
“An effective local action we can take to lighten the tax burden for the working person is a 
campaign to make industry pay its fair share of the local property tax,” CCC argued. The CCC 
noted that “industries in the Calumet region appear to be badly underassessed,” especially steel 
mills. “Ralph Nader has stated that if industry paid its fair share, the local property tax of the 
ordinary home owner might be as much as 25% lower,” CCC wrote. The group called the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






income tax “an equitable way of taxation, provided it is a graduate tax, free from loopholes.” 
Because of loopholes in the federal tax code, ordinary taxpayers “subsidize[d]” corporations, 
churches, and “the 56 individuals with incomes in excess of $1,000,000 last year that paid not 
one cent of income tax.” The CCC called for increasing the personal exemption to $1,500, 
eliminating all deductions besides the standard deduction, and calculating federal income taxes 
based on gross, rather than net, income. The federal tax coded needed reformed, the CCC argued, 
“both to offset inflation and to encourage the government to live within its means.” Specifically, 
the CCC argued that spending on the “military industrial complex” and the Vietnam War, in 
particular, should be cut. “[F]or every man woman and child in the United States, we are paying 
$150 per year for our policy in Vietnam,” CCC wrote, adding that “there are other areas of 
federal spending, of course, that must be reduced.” Ultimately, CCC wondered “why it is that 
whenever revenues are inadequate the most vital services are the first to be cut.” Instead of 
cutting “the patronage worker or the political hack…it is always the schools that will be closed, 
or the public health agencies that will be curtailed, or mental health services to be stopped,” 
because, CCC noted, “a little scare talk is the best way to raise taxes on a gullible public.” 
Because of the flaws in the American fiscal system, “the middle-class American suffers from 
‘taxation without representation’ as did the colonists in the pre-Revolutionary times,” the CCC 
concluded grandly.356 
Like CAP in Chicago, CCC began its attack on tax inequities in Gary by conducting its 
own property tax assessment study. The Lynds and their erstwhile Tax Research Group 
conducted “A People’s Tax Assessment of Inland Steel.”357 The report, released in April 1971, 
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was the product of a two-month investigation.358 CCC charged that Inland Steel’s Indiana Harbor 
Works in East Chicago, Indiana, was under-assessed by $250 million, resulting in a $20 million-
per-year tax break.359 Using the company’s own accounting methods and statements against it, 
CCC noted that the Harbor Works assessment decreased the same year the company’s chairman 
bragged that it had made “a record high $148 million capital investments,” most of which went 
into the Harbor Works. Four additions to the factory – a $125 million hot strip mill, a $125 
million cold strip mill, a $70 million oxygen furnace, and a $32 million electric furnace – alone 
should have increased the company’s assessment by $116 million, CCC charged.360 CCC also 
drew on insurance industry capital-to-output estimate guidelines – used by Fortune magazine in 
computing company’s net worth – and based its calculations on the most conservative figures 
available.361 CCC’s calculations arrived at an assessed valuation of $330 million after write-offs 
and depreciation, more than three times Inland’s official $105 million assessment.362 “Does 
Inland Steal?” CCC asked in a press release. “The Harbor Works of Inland Steel in East Chicago, 
Indiana, is one of the largest steel mills in the world…its annual production of raw steel is more 
than twice that of the United States Steel Works in South Chicago,” CCC explained. During the 
1960s, Inland made over $1 billion in new investments, and Harbor Works was its only plant. 
One new strip mill alone cost $125 million. Yet, the same year that Inland’s chairman Philip D. 
Block boasted of a “record $148 million” in new investments, the company reported a $10 
million decrease on its personal assessment, and North Township assessor John Pers accepted the 
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company’s reduction. CCC charged that Inland “deliberately falsifies its tax returns” and that 
Pers shared the blame for the company’s low assessments. 363 Pers, CCC argued, was too friendly 
with the company, including granting it a 30-day extension in 1971 to declare its self-
assessment.364 “The Inland Steel Harbor Works is the third largest steel plant in the world,” a 
CCC release explained. From 1965 through 1970, Inland made more than $600 million in new 
investments. However, according to CCC’s research, Inland’s assessment in North Township, 
Indiana, went up less than $10 million during the same period. 365  
 Like CAP’s studies in Chicago, CCC’s assessment of Inland Steel – which came just two 
weeks after the release of CAP’s study of U.S. Steel’s South Works – received wide press 
coverage in both Gary and Chicago papers.366 However, CCC went beyond press releases. John 
Sargent, an Inland employee and the first president of its United Steelworkers local, served on 
the CCC Tax Committee. Using proxies, members of CCC – including the Lynds and Sargent – 
attended Inland’s annual shareholders’ meeting in Chicago to read its charges.367 At the meeting, 
Sargent told Inland’s stockholders that Inland needed to “pay as much tax as the law requires” 
because the money was needed “by the community for schools and hospitals and youth centers, 
as well as many other things.”368 “Citizens of the Calumet region, like working people all over 
the country, are heavily burdened by increasing taxes,” Sargent explained. Property taxes, in 
particular, had doubled in the previous ten years. “The problem is getting worse, not better,” 
Sargent said. Individual homeowners’ share of the state tax burden was rising, while 
corporations’ share was falling. Sargent charged that Inland, in particular, reported stagnant or 
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falling property values, even as the company invested hundreds of millions in new equipment. 
“When citizens in the Calumet area see that major industries, such as Inland Steel, pay only a 
little more in taxes despite enormous investments in new capital, they wonder why?” Sargent 
told Inland’s stockholders. “They know that if they added another room to their house, or another 
bathroom, or converted the attic into an apartment, the assessment of their house would 
increase.” Citing Ralph Nader’s investigations of business favoritism in property tax assessment 
nationwide, Sargent explained that one of CCC’s founding resolutions was to “take all 
appropriate action to see that accurate information is obtained from industries as to the value of 
their taxable property, and to eliminate loopholes in the regulations for assessment of industrial 
property, so that industry can be taxed its fair share and the burden of taxation en the small 
property owner can be eased.” According to CCC’s calculations, Inland’s harbor Works was 
underassessed by 70 percent and owed an additional $20 million because the company 
“deliberately falsifies its returns.” While Inland may justifiably cite its charitable expenditures in 
the community, “we are not asking for charity,” Sargent explained. “We are asking…that you 
pay as much tax as the law requires.” Letting Inland decide how to help the community through 
private charity – rather than through paying its fair share of taxes – was “paternalism,” according 
to Sargent. “The paternalism of the company union ended in 1938,” he concluded. “The 
paternalism of the company town must end now.”369 After the stockholders meeting, CCC took 
its arguments directly to Inland’s workers, passing out 10,000 leaflets to steelworkers asking: 
“Are your taxes going up? You want to know something? Inland’s are going down!” If Inland 
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was assessed accurately, the leaflet argued, homeowners would pay less in property taxes, have 
better services, like schools, and food and drugs could even be exempted from sales taxes.370 
Both Inland and the assessor strenuously denied CCC’s claims. Inland president Philip 
Block told the assembled stockholders at he “categorically reject[ed]” CCC’s charges, which he 
termed “grossly erroneous and naïve.” Block argued that it made several errors, many of which 
revolved around tax deductions that he said CCC had not considered, such as “a 60 percent 
reduction in assessed value for new facilities in the initial year of operation” and federal income 
tax deductions.371 Block acknowledged, however, that Inland had filed lawsuits to challenge 
higher assessments in 1968 and 1969. But he argued that it simply amounted to “differences of 
opinion over the proper interpretation and application of Indiana assessment laws and 
regulations.”372 Inland also fired back at CCC in the company’s employee newspaper The 
Steelmaker. There it attacked CCC’s “fictions.” It argued that the company did open its books to 
assessors and went beyond defending its own tax assessment to defending corporations’ tax 
payments, more broadly. “We could provide more facts about taxes in our community. But we 
believe you get the message,” the article concluded. “That small band of vocal critics either 
ignores the facts about tax assessments and tax payments in our community, or else these folks 
are deliberately trying to mislead someone.”373 CCC responded to Block by outlining their 
calculations, which CCC said included the items Block claimed they ignored, and criticizing 
Block for failing to answer CCC’s questions about Inland’s assessment.374 Staughton Lynd 
explained to the Chicago Daily News that Block’s arguments did not actually refute CCC’s 
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allegations. “We are saying that they have invested record amounts in capital expansion in the 
past few years that should have caused their assessment to have jumped substantially,” Lynd 
said. “The record shows, however, that their valuation actually decreased in 1970.” Inland had 
made $352 million in capital investments over the past eight years, CCC noted, yet the 
company’s assessment increased only $50 million during that period. 375  North Township 
Assessor John Pers placed the blame for Inland’s low assessment on the State Tax Board. “They 
have assumed the responsibility,” Pers told the Post-Tribune. “We’ve raised the mill’s 
assessments in the past, but they always finalize against our wishes.” 376 In an interview with 
Alice Lynd, Pers explained that, since factories could not be inspected “visually,” like houses, 
large corporations had to be assessed at least partly from their books – a task completed by the 
State Tax Board. So, Pers argued any errors in the assessments of the steel companies “is theirs 
[the board’s] and not mine.”377 
Just weeks after CCC publicized its allegations against Inland at the board meeting and 
the factory gates, the city of Gary announced a $3.3 million budget shortfall. City Controller 
Jesse E. Bell Jr. warned that as many as 600 city workers could be laid off. 378 Just as the 
Chamber of Commerce had blamed Gary’s schools’ supposed reckless spending for its woes the 
year before, the Chamber now blamed city government’s profligacy for the city’s 1971 deficit.379 
Members of the Chamber – especially U.S. Steel – pushed Bell to cut the budget rather than raise 
taxes in response to the deficit. 380 In response, the Lynds penned an anonymous letter to the 
Gary Post-Tribune tying low taxes on U.S. Steel and other large companies to the city’s budget 
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woes. “The way to solve the Gary school crisis is to tax U.S. Steel its fair share,” the Lynds 
wrote, pointing to the Post-Tribune’s own coverage of Nader’s tax efforts to reassess industrial 
property. “Every one knows that Gary Works is under-assessed. During the 1960s Gary Works 
constructed, among other things, two basic process oxygen shops, a high capacity continues slab 
casting unity, and an 84 [inch] hot strip mill. Yet the assessed valuation of personal business 
property of Gary Work rose only…4.7%. Meantime the assessed valuation of real estate in 
Calumet Township rose...25.9%,” the Lynds continued. “Clearly if U.S. Steel were taxes its fair 
share Gary’s tax revenue would increase by at least the $9.2 million needed to solve the school 
crisis.”381  
While Inland’s underassessment had received little attention prior to CCC’s study, U.S. 
Steel’s Gary Works had long been rumored to benefit from dramatic underassessment. Randolph 
Bourne had written about the affects of U.S. Steel’s underassment on Gary’s schools at the turn 
of the 20th century, but few attempts had been made to remedy it.382 At its root, Indiana law – 
like many states – ensured that neither local governments nor the public had the standing to 
challenge assessments in their community. Only the property owner or the assessor could legally 
appeal an assessment in Indiana, meaning that “if the property owner and the township assessor 
are satisfied with an assessment, it is almost unassailable,” even though other residents and their 
local governments had a material stake in the assessment of other property owners – particularly 
large property owners, like U.S. Steel – since everyone else’s taxes needed to go up or services 
needed to be cut if a major property owner was being underassessed.383 But even measuring the 
accuracy of the assessments U.S. Steel’s property proved to be difficult, despite assessment rolls 
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being open to the public. Large landowners like U.S. Steel had their properties listed in 
aggregate, rather than by parcel, making it impossible to compare a specific U.S. Steel buildings 
assessment to similar property.384 Mayor Richard Hatcher hoped to become the first Gary mayor 
to successfully challenge U.S. Steel.385 Part of Hatcher’s campaign platform was to push for an 
increase in U.S. Steel’s assessment and use the resulting money to both lower taxes on 
homeowners and fund better services.386 Rather than address specific assessment numbers or 
percents, U.S. Steel simply argued that it was in compliance with the law and warned that any 
attempts to raise its assessment would make Indiana a less attractive plant location for the 
company than other states. “[If U.S. Steel] were forced to pay a greater share of taxes than 
others, then it would be put at an obvious competitive disadvantage,” the Post-Tribune wrote, 
paraphrasing the company. “In time that could lead to cuts in the use of production facilities and 
consequent cuts in both tax base and jobs. In short, the Gary [Hatcher] administration could be 
preparing to cut off its nose to spite its face.”387 Most provocatively, the company’s claim 
implied that companies like U.S. Steel were also receiving favorable assessments in the other 
cities where they had plants, such as Youngstown, Ohio.388   
Despite these veiled relocation threats, Hatcher decided to move forward in challenging 
the company by citing a narrow law that required city controllers to “notify the treasurer of any 
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omitted property” in the community. 389 Based on the belief that some of U.S. Steel’s property 
was, in fact, “omitted” from its assessment, Hatcher’s Controller of the City of Gary, Maurice E. 
Baptiste, notified U.S. Steel in the summer of 1968 that he “had reason to believe that the 
possibility exists that some property may be omitted from your tax assessment” and asked U.S. 
Steel to find “a convenient time for our representatives to view your property and records.” In 
response, U.S. Steel successfully sought an injunction to prevent the Hatcher administration 
reviewing their records.390 In a fitting tribute to the corruption and dysfunction of the system, the 
judge that granted the injunction went on to represent Inland Steel in court when the company 
challenged its assessments.391 Due to lack of staff, the controller’s office did not pursue the 
matter further.  Working outside official channels, Edward Greer, Hatcher’s administrative 
assistant, attempted to form a Citizens Taxpayers Association in late-1968 because, as he put it, 
“it is clear that U.S. Steel Corp. is grossly underassessed,” but Greer’s movement foundered. 
(Greer eventually moved out of Gary, but wrote a book about the city, including its tax woes.)392  
Outside activists attempted to aid the Hatcher administration in its efforts to raise U.S. 
Steel’s assessment. In 1970, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law offered to aid 
the Hatcher administration in challenging to U.S. Steel.393 LCCR lawyers Sarah Carey and Judy 
Mazo began investigating U.S. Steel’s assessments. They received help from Garyites, including 
Tribune-Chronicle reporter George Crile, Assistant Controller Arnold Reingold, and the Lynds. 
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However, Mazo cautioned against mentioning CCC’s cooperation, since some people “might be 
frightened by Staughton’s name.”394 Carey and Mazo believed their investigation would lay the 
groundwork for a lawsuit challenging U.S. Steel’s assessment. The study found, as Carey noted, 
“[I]t is generally felt that most taxpayers are assessed at around 20% and that U.S. Steel is 
assessed at around 8-10%.”395 According to LCCR, the county board largely “rubber stamp[ed]” 
the number offered by the local assessor responsible for U.S. Steel’s Gary Works – Calumet 
Township assessor Thomas Fadell (who will be discussed later). The state board’s oversight of 
Fadell proved to be little better. The board had raised assessments – including U.S. Steel’s – in 
the past. But when challenged by the company, the board either dropped the increase or negotiate 
comprises, rather than fight to raise assessments in court. Even then, local assessors often 
nullified the board’s hard-fought increases the following year, a practice LCCR called 
“outrageous.” In Lake County, the five steel companies strenuously fought any increases ordered 
by the state board in court with “a battery of attorneys from Indianapolis, Chicago, New York, 
and Pittsburgh.” Inland Steel even hired local elected officials, including a county judge and state 
senator, as attorneys. Only two staff attorneys from the state attorney general’s office, on the 
other hand, represented the state board. State law made it easy for large landholders to challenge 
assessments. During the appeal period, companies needed only pay tax based on their earlier, 
lower assessment. If the higher assessment eventually prevailed, no interest or penalty accrued to 
the company.396 Because of the discrepancy between the relative ease with which large property 
owners challenged assessments and the difficulties average homeowners faced doing the same, 
the LCCR argued that “fair taxation may be reserved for the rich” when it came to property taxes 
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in Indiana.397 “If United States Steel is forced to pay its proper share of taxes in Gary, the 
citizens of Lake County will have a powerful ally in their further attempts to reach the other 
industrial underassessments – or to reform the system of local finance entirely…,” Carey wrote. 
“The response to the widespread favoritism towards heavy industry is not to enshrine the 
illegality, but to correct the situation as to everybody.”398 
However, Jerome R. Hellerstein, a well-known tax lawyer and law professor advising 
LCCR, was not optimistic about the chances of winning the type of case Carey and Mazo 
envisioned against U.S. Steel, calling it a “Herculean venture.” While Hellerstein believed that 
property taxes in Indiana and across the country were unfairly assessed, he questioned the 
viability of lawsuits to fix the problem.399 The only path to victory would be establishing 
“intentional disregard [of uniform assessment] by the assessors.” 400 In keeping with Hellerstein’s 
criteria, Carey had concluded, “It appears that the assessment officers have virtually abdicated 
their authority over U.S. Steel’s taxation, to the company itself.”401 But Hellerstein warned that 
both state and federal courts had a tendency to avoid hearing tax cases – even if couched in due 
process or equal protection claims – when they could argue that “administrative remedies,” such 
as appeals to local assessors and state tax boards, had not been exhausted.402 Nonetheless, even if 
it was unsuccessful in legal terms, Hellerstein viewed the type of lawsuit LCCR proposed “as an 
educational forum” to expose property tax inequities and lobby for legislative property tax 
reform.403 Ultimately, however, Hatcher declined to pursue the lawsuit that LCCR suggested, 
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effectively ending LCCR’s lawsuit campaign.404 Still, Hatcher did not hesitate to make his views 
on the company’s assessment public. “It is my feeling that U.S. Steel is not paying its fair share,” 
Hatcher told the press. “Were it not for the fact that we’ve had some massive federal grants, 
we’d be in serious trouble financially.”405 
As the Hatcher administration and LCCR dropped their lawsuit and CCC and Nader 
began ramping up their grassroots efforts, outside pressure continued to mount on U.S. Steel. In 
late-1970, the Chicago Free Press published its own report on assessments in Gary. The paper 
explained how U.S. Steel had “maintained and in some cases reduced its property taxes, while 
Gary’s steelworkers and small businessmen have seen theirs rise at an alarming rate.” In Lake 
County in 1970, property taxes rose almost six percent. “With property taxes tripling in some 
cases and the inflationary spiral continuing…,” the paper explained, “[rank-and-file 
steelworkers] find themselves once again the middlemen between uncontrolled inflation and 
undertaxed industries.”  Though the report uncovered little new, it proved to be a comprehensive 
recitation of the known issues with the assessment of U.S. Steel. “During the entire 10-year 
period since 1960, U.S. Steel’s taxes have increased less than one-third while individual 
taxpayers have seen theirs triple,” the paper reported. When it came to capital improvements, 
Gary had allowed U.S. Steel to effectively set its own property tax rate. Unlike homeowners, 
who needed to specify what was being constructed when applying for building permits, Gary had 
allowed U.S. Steel to pay a lump sum without outlining the construction it intended to undertake. 
Mayor Hatcher pledged to stop this process and returned U.S. Steel annual lump sum check 
when he took office. Generous depreciation allowances also wiped out taxes on capital 
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improvements “in a couple of years,” and state tax law additionally allowed steel companies to 
predict the performance of a new piece of machinery and attach a value to that predicted output. 
If the new machine failed to perform at the predicted level, the company could write off 60 
percent of the “disappointment.” Through generous initial estimates, companies like U.S. Steel 
could make new, more productive machinery seem like losses on paper. All the tax benefits 
available to companies like U.S. Steel stood in sharp contrast to the laws faced by average 
homeowners, the Press noted. “If a man builds a new addition on his home and it doesn’t turn 
out to his liking, there is no ‘disappointment’ write off available to him. He is saddled with an 
increase in taxes on his improved property,” the report remarked. “If a woman is suddenly 
widowed and her income drops appreciably, there is no adjustment provided in the regulations. If 
a steelworker retires after years of hard work in the mills, he must pay his personal property 
taxes without regard to the reduction in his annual income.” Like other participants in the “tax 
revolt,” Gary homeowners were reaching the breaking point. The Press related the story of a 
homeowner whose property taxes went from $400 in 1960 to more than $1,200 in 1969. “I’m 
looking for a place outside of Gary,” the homeowner told the paper.406  The Press concluded its 
report by explaining that “a serious tax reform movement would appear to be the only viable 
answer to the problem at present.”407 And that was just what CCC and Nader hoped to provide. 
By the time of CCC’s founding, the congress and Nader were already planning their own 
attack on U.S. Steel. The consumer advocate quickly made good on his official promise at 
CCC’s founding convention to coordinate an investigation in to U.S. Steel’s assessments with 
CCC. Less than a week after speaking at CCC’s founding congress, Nader’s “Raider” John 
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Esposito reiterated the Tax Reform Research Group’s charges that U.S. Steel’s Gary Works was 
underassessed and guilty of pollution violations. Turning around the language of Al-Am and 
other CCC critics, Esposito quipped that it was U.S. Steel, not CCC, “who is operating outside 
the American system of law and U.S. Steel who is subverting traditional American Values.” In 
contrast, Esposito said CCC was “trying to return to the fundamental American principles of 
fairness, full disclosure of information, and participation in the crucial decisions that affect their 
lives.” The “Raider” suggested that U.S. Steel could show “good faith” by opening its books so 
that an independent review of its assessments could occur.408 But, of course, the company had no 
intention of willingly giving up what it had gone to court to keep the Hatcher administration 
from accessing. Nader and CCC would have to conduct their study using publicly available 
documents and gumshoe detective work. Prior to CCC’s founding, the Lynds had begun 
investigating the assessments not only of Inland but also Youngstown Sheet and Tube and U.S. 
Steel.409 When the Lynds and CCC released their Inland study, they had noted, “Other steel 
companies don’t pay their fair share of taxes, either. But it is easier to prove this in the case of 
Inland Steel, because the company has just one steel plant….”410 
Now the Lynds and other CCC Tax Committee members worked with Raiders Sam 
Simon and Larry Silverman to conduct a more in-depth analysis of U.S. Steel’s assessments. 
CCC and the Raiders also enlisted the help of reporter George Crile and the Chicago-based 
Businessmen for the Public Interest, founded by attorney Marshall Patner. The coalition’s 
strategy was to frame its complaint as “kids vs. steel co[mpanie]s,” arguing that “children are 
entitled to public educ[ation]” and the revenues the steel companies were denying the city were 
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directly responsible for rising property taxes and school closings.411 The CCC-Nader-Crile-BPI 
coalition’s first task was figured out exactly how U.S. Steel’s Gary Works’ assessment compared 
with state law. The breakthrough on that front came in the form of a study by Leslie Singer, a 
University of Indiana economist and former advisor to Senator Paul Douglas. Singer’s 
“extremely reliable” calculations, as Silverman put it, found that U.S. Steel’s Gary Works’ 
assessment rose only $8 million between 1961 and 1970, even as the company installed $1.2 
billion in improvements.412 Working from Singer’s figures, it was possible to calculate that Gary 
Works was underassessed by more than $100 million, giving the plant an annual tax break of $16 
million. Looking to reports filed by U.S. Steel Indiana’s secretary of state, the coalition was able 
to independently calculate an annual $15 million break, which confirmed Singer’s figures. A 
yearly $15-$16 million tax break, Crile later explained, “means that tax bills for the average 
Gary homeowner have been a full 25 per cent higher than they should have been.” 413 
Investigators also uncovered a 1968 audit of Calumet Township by the Indiana State Tax Board 
that found that 175 of 181 examined businesses were underassessed. 414 
With this information in hand, Nader and his Raiders began publicizing the coalition’s 
findings. Silverman visited Gary in mid-1971 to “la[y] the groundwork for a possible crusade 
against tax assessments and pollution.”415 He told CCC members that the underassessment of 
business property was “the greatest scandal” that Nader planned to tackle416 In Silverman’s 
opinion “no better place could be selected than the Gary-East Chicago-Hammond area for an all-
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out campaign to rectify the tax system, pollution, and occupational health and safety issues.”417 
While in Gary, Silverman announced to the press that had spoken to attorneys, accountants, and 
public officials about assessments in Lake County and all agreed that industry was 
underassessed. 418 According to Silverman, Nader’s team found that the assessment situation in 
Lake County was mirrored across the country. The “Raider” argued that Gary could be a test 
case for tax reform. “If you can straighten out the tax structure and clean up some of the 
pollution in Gary, a whole nation of 200 million people are waiting for just such a victory to 
bolster their hopes,” Silverman said.419 In 1971 Congressional hearings on “Equal Educational 
Opportunity,” Nader pointed to Gary as an example of “what is occurring all over the country” in 
terms of property tax favoritism. The city was in a “fiscal crisis,” Nader noted, and facing the 
closing of its schools. Yet, the schools had been systematically denied revenue it was entitled to 
from the city’s U.S. Steel plant. “United States Steel has been stronger than Gary's property tax,” 
Nader noted, thanks to a “self-accommodating arrangement” with the assessor, which allowed 
the company to set its own assessment while illegally withholding any information that might 
allow the assessment to be challenged. “[T]he behavior of United States Steel in Gary, Indiana, 
almost bespeaks of 19th-century retrograde performances,” Nader said. “I have never seen such 
raw repugnance and raw repudiation of local laws and the utterly futile attempt by local officials 
to enforce that law…. The corporate arrogance here has to be seen to be believed.” Nader moved 
beyond the school crisis, pointing out that not only school children but the pocketbooks of 
average homeowners suffered because of the breaks afforded to companies like U.S. Steel. “I 
could call it very easily the number one political issue at the local level for middle-class 
America,” Nader said. “There's no question about that in my mind at the present time. This is an 
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issue which because it doesn't have a national reflection doesn’t get very much national attention 
[in D.C.].” However, Nader challenged Congress to “look at the local papers” and “the wide- 
spread number of local taxpayer groups who have been striving for reform.” The consumer 
activist also struck a sympathetic tone for participants in the tax revolt. “[T]hese taxpayers have 
attacked local school budgets and rejected school bond issues in self-defense,” he said. Rather 
than continually raising taxes on homeowners, Nader argued that local governments needed to 
collect the $7 billion in tax revenues being lost to the underassessment of commercial and 
industrial property.420  
CCC likewise used the assessment studies’ findings as organizing tools. Alice Lynd 
penned talking points for CCC speeches on taxes that began by declaring, “Citzens in the 
Calumet area are burdened and concerned by the doubling of their property taxes in the past ten 
years. When they see that the major industries in the area are paying hardly any more tax despite 
major investments in new capital, they wonder why.” Lynd added, “They know that if they had 
another room to their house…the assessment of their home increases because the entire value of 
the house is enhanced.”421 CCC attempted to accentuate the differences between the taxation of 
homeowners and large businesses. “Have your taxes GONE DOWN in the last ten years?” 
CCC’s talking points asked Gary residents. “Do you keep one set of books for the bank and 
another for the Internal Revenue Service? If you aren’t earning all you are capable of, can you 
tell the assessor that your property tax should go down?... Is it true that the assessor never comes 
to look over your property, but just takes your work for what’s been changed and added?... If you 
were the Inland Steel Company you could answer every one of these questions YES.”422 The 
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goal of CCC’s literature was to make clear to average residents that [roperty taxes in Lake 
County increased year after year homeowners precisely because they did not to the same for 
powerful businesses. “One reason taxes keep going up is that the steel mills are underassessed,” 
CCC argued. Inland Steel, according to CCC’s calculations, was being assessed less than one-
sixth, instead of the required one-third, of its true value. “This means that Inland SHOULD PAY 
ABOUT TWICE AS MUCH AS IT DOES IN PROPERTY TAXES,” CCC reported. If Inland 
alone paid its required share of taxes, “NO ONE ELSE’S TAXES WOULD HAVE TO GO UP.” 
But, CCC noted, “the story is much the same with Youngstown and U.S. Steel,” since these 
companies also “got away with murder when it came to taxes.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 
according to CCC’s calculations, was assessed at 23 percent, rather than 33 percent. “The case of 
U.S. Steel is the most dramatic of all,” CCC wrote. Despite hundreds of millions in 
improvements in the Gary Works, U.S. Steel’s assessment increased only $5 million between 
1961 and 1968. This increase amounted to 4.7 percent of the company’s 1961 assessment. 
During that same time, real estate assessments in Calumet Township went up over 25 percent. 
“Because of the underassessment of U.S. Steel the tax rise of the 1960’s in Calumet Township 
was born almost entirely by the small property owner,” CCC argued.423 
Over and over, CCC made the link between tax breaks for large landholders, high taxes 
for homeowners, and insufficient revenue for public services. “It’s important to reduce the 
amount of taxes paid by the working people who can least afford it,” CCC wrote. “But it’s also 
important to increase the amount of tax revenue so that people can have cleaner air and water, 
more parks, better-paid teachers and smaller classes. These are things which one person could 
not buy no matter how much money he had. They are things which people have to get by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






working together. So we need higher wages and lower prices and taxes, but we also need more 
tax revenue for ‘public goods’ like parks and better schools. If the steel companies paid their fair 
share of taxes, probably part of that revenue should be used to reduce the taxes of small property-
owners and part of it should be used to increase the total tax revenue.”424 In attempting to recruit 
more participants in their movement, CCC’s appeal was clear and direct. One CCC flyer for a 
1971 meeting at St. Patrick’s Catholic Church in East Chicago, Indiana, asked, “Are your taxes 
going UP? You want to know something: Inland’s taxes are going Down! If Inland and other 
industry paid their fair share our property taxes would go down, the sales tax on food and drugs 
could be eliminated, [and] we could improve our schools and other public services.” The flyer 
concluded, “It’s time Inland and other industry starts carrying their fair share of the tax 
burden.”425 Another CCC handout explained “Why We Are Here” simply: “Ralph Nader says 
that if industry paid its fair share of local property taxes, the taxes of the small property owner 
might go down as much as 25 per cent.” If U.S. Steel was assessed fairly, it stated, “there might 
not need to be a $10 million deficit in the public school budget.” CCC’s handout explained that 
public records showed that Inland Steel told stockholders that it had made $120 million in new 
investments in 1969, while it told the North Township assessor that its investment actually 
decreased. When it came to U.S. Steel, CCC argued that Calumet Township assessor Thomas 
Fadell was refusing to turn over assessment records and “appears…[to be] protecting U.S. 
Steel.”426 Privately, the leaders of CCC recognized that, ultimately, the type of reform it 
envisioned involved legislation at all levels of government and believed that national tax 
activism was needed to achieve sweeping reform. But on a more manageable, local level, CCC 
advocated “real property tax relief for the individual taxpayer” by waging a “campaign to make 
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industry pay its fair share, as advocated by Ralph Nader.”427 CCC’s message found a welcome 
reception among many Lake County residents. When CCC activists took their tax pamphlet to a 
printer, the printer took one look at the graph showing U.S. Steel’s falling burden and exclaimed, 
“My taxes didn’t do that!”428 
Like Inland Steel, U.S. Steel vigorously denied CCC and Nader’s charges. Following 
Krupa’s lead, the company resorted, at first, to redbaiting. Member of the CCC are “destroying 
the American way of life,” Gary Steel Works superintendent J. David Carr charged, and 
“represent the ideology of such anti-American philosophies as the Trotskyite Socialist Workers 
Party, Marxism, and other Communist-front organizations.”429 Carr denied that the Gary Works 
of U.S. Steel paid less than its fair share in taxes, as Nader and CCC charged. “United States 
Steel’s tax burden in Gary is the highest per ton payment of any steel producer in the Chicago 
area,” Carr said, offering a less-than-ringing endorsement of Gary Work’s tax load, given the 
charges of CAP, CCC, and Nader that all Chicago-Gary region steel facilities were 
underassessed.430 The superintendent also scolded the local leaders who supported Nader and 
CCC, subtly warning that they would regret attacking the steel company. U.S. Steel was “the 
economic mainstay of this city” and gave money to charity, Carr reminded leaders. “It is 
incongruous that a coalition of religious, educational, labor, and ecological leaders would 
embrace outsider to promote unity of purpose locally when such a move might very well lead to 
divisiveness and polarization which in the end could only harm the potential for progress in the 
community.”431 Carr’s attacks were echoed by U.S. Steel chair Edwin H. Gott, who slammed 
Nader and other critics of the company in a San Francisco speech. In a rousing defense of the 
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“free enterprise system,” Gott claimed that Nader and other members of the “disloyal 
opposition” – which he said also included Democratic Senators Philip Hart, Fred Harris, and 
William Proxmire – were attempting “to convince the American public that private business is a 
sinister influence on our society.” Though he did not address the Gary Works assessment, Gott 
argued that Nader’s claim that U.S. Steel had avoided taxes in Harlan County, Kentucky, were 
false. “These self-styled saviors of society,” Gott argued, “are more interested in capitalizing on 
our social, economic, and environmental problems than they are in helping to solve them.” Gott 
defended the sanctity of profits from critics like Nader. “It’s profits earned by American 
companies that provide our people with jobs and incomes,” he concluded his speech by 
declaring, “and all of the products and the services they want and need.” The Wall Street Journal 
called Gott’s speech “remarkable for its harsh tone and naming of prominent persons.”432  But 
even as U.S. Steel defended itself against charges of underassessment in Gary, the steelmaker 
was suing the State Board of Tax Commissioners, charging that it actually had been over-
assessed. It was the second such suit by U.S. Steel in as many years.433 
Despite the local press’s general deference to company, U.S. Steel received at least some 
pushback from its attack on Nader and CCC. The Hammond Times editorial board slammed U.S. 
Steel for brushing off CCC and Nader’s charges, arguing that “Carr bemoans the failure of Nader 
and CCC to conceded Big Steel’s cultural, monetary, and charitable contributions to the welfare 
and prosperity of Gary and Lake County.” But attention also needed to be paid to “U.S. Steel’s 
contribution to unpleasant living.” Industry rarely made major sacrifices willingly, the paper 
noted. Instead, they needed to be “cajoled, pushed, shoved, dragged, and even bribed” to do the 
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right thing.434 The Post-Tribune paper, in contrast, took paints to echo the company’s claim that 
U.S. Steel’s Gary Works was taxed at a higher rate than other nearby steel makers. It also 
cautioned that the “popular” “soak the rich” idea had “drawbacks,” namely that it could lead to 
“the graduate shifting of production to other locations.”435 Anticipating this objection, CCC 
directly addressed the steel companies’ arguments that their tax breaks helped workers and that 
raising taxes on steel companies would hurt average Lake County residents. “Some people say, 
‘If the company paid its fair share of taxes, it would be harder for us to get a big wage increase.’ 
Not true,” CCC argued. “Wages are negotiated in Pittsburgh and Washington DC” and were not 
dependent upon local taxes. Instead, CCC argued, if the public knew that “steel companies are 
paying what they should be paying in taxes, it will make the public more likely to side with the 
union this summer.”436 Likewise, CCC debunked the companies’ claim that higher taxes for 
businesses would also mean higher taxes for homeowners. “Just the reverse,” CCC wrote. 
“Homeowners in Lake County are assessed at about 20 percent of true cash value. The mills are 
assessed at 5 to 10 percent…. When the mills’ assessments go up, your tax bill goes down…. 
The quickest way to get real property tax relief is to make industry pay its fair share.”437  
The next step for the CCC-Nader-Crile-BPI coalition was determining how to proceed 
now that they knew U.S. Steel was underassessed. In April 1971, the Lynds met with BPI’s 
Patner, who encouraged CCC to have local taxpayers continue sending letters to Calumet 
Township Assessor Thomas Fadell outlining their findings and asking Fadell to reassess U.S. 
Steel. The hope was that continually confronting Fadell would prove that they had “exhaust[ed] 
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our administrative remedies.” 438  However, soon Fadell himself became the focus of the 
coalition’s attention. During George Crile’s investigation into assessments in Gary, he 
interviewed more than 100 people and uncovered a shocking pattern of corruption in Fadell’s 
assessment office. For his investigation, Crile had the help not only of Oral Cole, an IRS agent 
who had began, and then abandoned, an investigation into Fadell in the early 1960s, but also a 
former staffer in Fadell’s office.439 In the end, Crile’s investigation of Fadell “read like a law 
school exam in which the object is to identify the crimes committed,” as Silverman put it.440 
Crile found an “unmistakable” pattern. “The assessments of numerous corporations had been 
mysteriously reduced in the years after Fadell became assessor in 1958,” as Crile explained later. 
“Hundreds” of companies, it seemed clear, were receiving illegal tax breaks from Fadell.441 
When the Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners audited Fadell’s assessments in 1968, it 
found that the personal property of 176 of the 181 businesses examined was underassessed by a 
combined total of $32 million.442 Many, perhaps most, of these underassessment were linked to 
kickbacks and bribes. Fadell’s use of assessments to solicit bribes became brazen. According to 
Crile’s reporting, Fadell told the general manager of the Gary Screw and Bolt Company to sell 
his scrap metal to a specific dealer at a reduced rate. When the Screw and Bolt manager refused, 
Fadell raised the company’s assessment from $330,000 to $1,419,000.443 “Fadell can deal with 
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most of his enemies by selectively enforcing the law,” Silverman summarized in a memo.444 
Even within property classes, Fadell made clear distinctions based on race and geography, 
among other variables. For example, Leslie Singer’s study found that black businesses were 
assessed at higher rates than white business in Gary and businesses owned by out-of-town whites 
were assessed at higher rates than those owned by local whites.445 Crile also discovered that 
Fadell used his payroll to dole out bribes before elections. Prior to the 1966 election, for 
example, Fadell’s staff ballooned to 802 employees. After the election, 765 staffers were 
dropped.446 This effectively amounted to a $37,500 public subsidy to Fadell’s campaign, Crile 
calculated.447 It was a pattern than Fadell had repeated in other elections. 448 In part, Fadell 
avoided censure for so long through strenuous efforts at destroying his paper trail. Faced at one 
time with the threat of a federal grand jury investigation, Fadell had a “truckload” of documents 
buried in the city dump.449 Ironically, early in his career Fadell portrayed himself as the enemy of 
the type of corruption he now embodied. 
By the late-1960s, the face of corruption in Gary was former Major George Chacharis. At 
the beginning of the 1960s, Chacharis controlled Gary’s formidable Democratic machine. 
Chacharis had built his career largely on tax politics and had once portrayed himself as a tax 
reformer. The Greek-born Charcharis got his start in Gary politics through ethnic and social 
organizations, including Club SAR, which Chacharis founded with 21 friends. Chacharis 
engineered the successful 1946 campaigns of two social club friends – Peter Mandich and Steve 
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Gersack – for two patronage-rich offices, Calumet Township Trustee and Calumet Township 
Assessor. Once in office, the two WWII veterans benefitted from doling out the hundreds of jobs 
each office controlled, as well as the local “Red Scare” mentality, which undercut more left-
leaning Democrats.450 With a growing reputation in politics, Chacharis worked as an engineer at 
U.S. Steel before resigning to strike it big in the oil and coal business.451 Much of that fortune 
came from the fact that the well-connected Chacharis’s oil company secured lucrative 
government contracts making it the sole provider of fuel to local welfare recipients.452 Expanding 
his political influence, Chacharis would then engineer the successful campaign of Pete Mandich 
for mayor, and Mandich would return the favor by appointing Chacharis as city controller.453  
As controller, Chacharis used his knowledge of U.S. Steel from his time as an engineer at 
the plant to push for the reassessment of Gary Works, despite the objections of Gersack. 454 A 
1956 investigation by Chacharis found that U.S. Steel was dramatically underassessed. “We 
deplore the low assessed evaluation in the City of Gary, which is one of the wealthiest per capita 
communities in the United States,” Chacharis wrote to the Lake County Tax Board of Review. 
“The reason for this is that there are several large property owners who are enjoying special 
preferential treatment by having low assessed evaluations.” Chacharis said that he was 
“appalled” by U.S. Steel’s low assessment, in particular. According to the City Controller’s 
office’s calculations, U.S. Steel was being assessed at three percent of replacement value, while 
the average homeowner was being assessed at one-third of replacement value. In 1956, U.S. 
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Steel’s properties were assessed at just under $65 million, while Chacharis said that, even by 
“cautious and extremely conservative” industry measures, the company’s true assessment should 
have been $355 million. By influencing local assessors, Chacharis argued, steelmakers were able 
to generate artificially low average assessments, so that any individual steelmaker could 
successfully challenge an attempt to raise its assessment by arguing that a higher assessment 
would place it “in an unfair competitive position with his rivals.” The only way to solve the 
underassessment problem for any individual steelmaker would be “to reassess all heavy industry 
in Calumet and North Townships to eliminate the perennial legal histrionics displayed by the 
major steel producers whenever their assed evaluation is attacked.” Low assessments for the steel 
makers, in particular, were driving up tax rates for everyone else. “Unless the present 
ridiculously low assed valuation of U.S. Steel and other shirking large property owners in the 
community is raised, we will be faced with an unprecedented $9.00 tax rate in the city of Gary,” 
Chacharis wrote. 455 Eventually, he state tax board granted Chacharis a 10 percent rise in U.S. 
Steel’s assessment, far less than the discrepancy in assessment.456 Riding this image as a 
reformer, Chacharis became mayor in 1958 when Mandich resigned to run for county sheriff. 
Chacharis won his own term in office the following year. Chacharis’s colorful, picture-filled 
1959 booklet – “A Mayor for ALL the People” – proclaimed, “Here is an account of labor 
exerted unsparingly for the people of our City by a great Mayor and a great man – George 
Chacharis.” At its centerfold, “A Mayor for ALL” featured a two-page spread on taxes in Gary. 
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“They Said It Couldn’t Be Done…. But Mayor Chacharis Did It…Gary’s Civil City Tax Rate 
Cut Again!” the two-page headline read in bold type.457 
Chacharis’s term as mayor would be brief, however. In February 1962, Chacharis and six 
others – Mandich, City Engineer Harold Zwei, head of the city’s auto license bureaus John 
Diamond, retired policeman George Pavol, accountant Willmar Chulock, and the mayor’s 
brother Peter Chacharis – were indicted on federal tax fraud charges.458 Chacharis was indicted 
on eight counts for failing to report $226,696 in “payoffs.”459 U.S. attorney Jay Goldberg, a 
special aid to Attorney General Robert Kenney’s rackets and crime division, led the grand jury 
that handed down the indictments.460 The roots of the Justice Department investigation went 
back to 1958, when Robert Kennedy investigated Lake County as a special council for the Senate 
Rackets Investigation Committee. 461  Oral Cole, the IRS agent who later assisted Crile’s 
investigation of Fadell, had helped uncover a pattern of corruption that brought Chacharis down. 
Chacharis initially defended himself by claiming that “Anglo-Saxon elements,” whom he 
compared to anti-black racists, were behind his indictment.462 According to the indictments, 
Chacharis and the other defendants made “demands upon contractors performing construction 
work in Lake County, Indiana…for the payment of substantial sums of money…in order for the 
contractors to obtains preferential treatment” from the government. The kickbacks were then 
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funneled through dummy corporations with names like “Haze Engineering” and “Universal 
Services Co.” and the conspirators planned eventually to declare the payments as long-term 
capital gains.463 When Hammond Times reporters approach citizens “at random” on the street 
following the indictments, they “got almost similar comments from each person.” “Many of the 
citizens, complaining about high taxes and high cost of living, said they were pleased to see that 
the federal government stepped in to compel those in high public office to pay their taxes too,” 
the paper reported. Thelma Kmetz, a press operator, told the Times, “We’re hard working people 
and pay plenty of taxes and just because they’re in high office doesn’t give tem the right to evade 
paying taxes.”464 
The trial that followed proved to be as much a commentary on the dysfunction of the tax 
system as an investigation of political corruption. During the trial the jury was treated to 
testimony cataloging one shocking act after another. Chacharis was said to have received $8,787 
in payoff money in exchange for one sand mining contract and $100,00 for another. A 
construction firm working on Indiana toll roads funneled $10,000 to the mayor. In exchange for 
a $208-a-day sewer-cleaning contract, a company kicked $20,750 back to Chacharis. 465 
Moreover, the graft-ridden projects seemed doomed to failure. The roof of city hall leaked. The 
top floor of the city’s newly constructed parking garage crumbled because the cement mix 
contained too much sand. The city’s new two million dollar storm sewer did not deliver the 
drainage promised.466 In a bizarre defense strategy, lawyers representing Chacharis and the other 
defendants argued that a whole range of federal tax deductions and exemptions, mainly for 
businesses, could be summed in such a way that Chacharis would not technically have been 
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guilty of tax evasion on the income from kickbacks and bribes, since they would not have owed 
federal tax at all.  Joseph Solon, one of the defendants’ attorneys, argued in his opening 
statement that the case boiled down to “what is deductible and what is not deductible.” Among 
other arguments, Chacharis’s lawyers said that taxing the former mayor for money funneled 
through dummy corporations amounted to double taxation, since either the corporations or others 
who had received the income already paid taxes. If the defendants had not used dummy 
corporations and simply accepted the bribes directly, they would have paid fewer taxes. “I didn’t 
know it was a crime to pay more taxes than you owe,” Solon argued. “The government wants the 
taxes paid for a second time.” The defense also argued that any bribes Chacharis plowed into the 
local Democratic Party counted as deductible political contributions.467 Moreover, many in the 
public harbored a sneaking suspicion that – even if they were convicted – Chacharis and the 
other defendants would still get off easy when it came to taxes. Oral Cole told the jury how the 
defendants had continually failed to provide key documents to the IRS. Without these “elusive” 
records, a full accounting of the mayor and his co-conspirators’ ill-gotten gains could not be 
made.468 In a moment of poetic irony, the courtroom had to be cleared during trial of Chacharis 
and his co-conspirators because of the overwhelming stench from a nearby refinery.469 In 
December 1962, Chacharis switched his plea to guilty and resigned as mayor.470 Chacharis told a 
hushed courtroom that he was guilty of “some of the things” alleged by the Justice 
Department.471 In sentencing Chacharis to three years in federal prison, Judge Robert A. Grant 
chastised the former mayor for betraying the public’s trust. The real threat to the U.S. came not 
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from communism, Grant declared, but from officials that undermine the public’s confidence in 
its government. Grant also criticized Chacharis for failing to pay his fair share of taxes. Average 
wage earners, Grant argued, could not avoid the taxes deducted from every paycheck. They pay 
their fair share even though they would rather keep the money. Chacharis, on the other hand, 
played by a different set of rules. “Just because taxes are heavy or unpleasant, it doesn’t make 
the cheating any less of a violation,” Grant said from the bench. “Cheating on taxes is the same 
as stealing.” Chacharis’s actions bred public cynicism and apathy. Grant told Chacharis that if it 
was legally possible to fine him more than the maximum $10,000, he would.472 
From the beginning of his career, Fadell was tied to the Chacharis machine. In 1958, 
Fadell, a young lawyer and former marine, announced that he would challenge Gersack for 
assessor, and Chacharis backed him over longtime friend Gersack.473 However, following 
Chacharis’s conviction, Fadell attempted to cultivate an image as a maverick. In 1962, Fadell 
publicly announced his break from “all county factions” in the Democratic Party, including 
Chacharis. With this declaration, Fadell “shouldered his way into the battle for ultimate control 
of Gary and County Democratic politics,” as one paper put it.” Local Democratic leaders were 
surprised, given Chacharis’s past support of Fadell. But the assessor claimed that, when other 
Democrats looked at his political team, they saw “an organization of champions, and they’re 
scared.”474 When Fadell ran unsuccessfully for mayor in 1963, in the wake of Chacharis’s 
inglorious fall, Fadell circulated campaign flyers attacking his opponent A. Martin Katz that 
depicted Katz in a crowd of local Democratic Party leaders, dubbed “The Collaborators,” 
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including Chacharis, who – the flyer noted – was in federal prison for tax evasion. “Vote for a 
Chance to End Graft in Gary, Elect Tom Fadell Mayor,” the flyer declared. “He Beat the 
Machine – His Hands are Clean!”475. Not surprisingly, though, Fadell had a hard time escaping 
his association with Chacharis. During the 1964 campaign, mysterious anti-Fadell flyers 
emerged featuring a photo of Fadell shaking hands with Chacharis in 1958 after Fadell’s first 
victory. “Machine Victorious – Fadell Wins,” the flyer read. “What machine did you beat Tom? 
Are your HANDS clean Tom?”476  
Despite his attempts to portray himself as independent, charges of corruption dogged 
Fadell from the time he took office. Though nominally supervised, an assessor like Fadell was 
virtually a “one-man legislature,” as ACIR put it in 1963.  Like in many states, assessors in 
Indiana were not required to have any professional training or qualifications. For many Indiana 
assessors, the position was only part-time. Fadell ran his own business, which allegedly had 
contracts with U.S. Steel, on the side.477 As noted earlier, IRS agent Cole had attempted to nab 
Fadell during his investigation into Chacharis, but had been forced to drop his inquiry into 
Fadell.478 Still, corruption in Fadell’s office was public knowledge. As early as 1962, for 
example, the Gary Crusader, a black weekly newspaper, accused Fadell of using his budget for 
political purposes and “padding” his payroll with well-connected individuals – including 
members of city council and their families, Chacharis’s relatives, and Fadell’s own family 
members – who performed no assessment work. Most Calumet Township residents had no 
knowledge of Fadell’s payroll, the Crusader charged, because Fadell met the legal requirement 
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to publish his payroll by submitting it to tiny, low-circulation, infrequently published 
publications in cities like Whiting and Hessville.479  
By the mid-1960s, Fadell was so powerful that he made little attempt to distance himself 
from charges of corruption. Most ostentatiously, Fadell gave Chacharis a job at the assessor’s 
office following Chacharis’s release from prison. Even worse, Chacharis ran afoul of the IRS 
again following his prison term. This time, the IRS investigated Chacharis for potential “gifts” he 
received at a “testimonial picnic party” in 1967. During the inquiry, Fadell served as Chacharis’s 
representative to the IRS, creating a somewhat incestuous employer-employee, representative-
client dynamic between Fadell and the disgraced mayor.480  Fadell also made no secret of his 
favoritism to businesses – at least the right ones. In 1966, Fadell distributed a letter to some local 
businesses announcing that his office would “look with favor” on companies’ depreciation 
claims, which he said would be judged on the “merits” of the business’s claims. This change, 
Fadell explained, was “to make our business and industrial assessments more favorable and to 
help a taxpayer reach a moral judgment to make full disclosure of his assessable property.” 
Fadell claimed that his new guidelines were “within the assessing laws of Indians.” However, he 
cautioned local business owners that “these ‘Fadell Guidelines’ obtain only in Gary, Griffith, and 
Calumet Township [Fadell’s coverage area]” before signing the latter, “Your Friendly Assessor, 
Tom Fadell.”481 
With the emergence of CCC and the involvement of Nader, BPI, and Crile, however, it 
seemed that the “friendly assessor” would soon found himself in prison too. Given how much of 
Gary’s tax dysfunction sprang from Fadell directly, “Raider” Silverman concluded, “[T]he first 
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priority is to get Fadell removed from office, and the second to get him thrown in jail.”482 Not 
surprisingly, as it became clear that his assessments were the target of the CCC and Nader-led 
coalition, Fadell came out swinging. In a press release, Fadell called CCC “a Hatcher front 
organization used to aid him in his illegal registration drive in Gary.” 483 Fadell’s release went on 
to charge that CCC had “only a handful of persons,” and that its supposed activities were 
actually directed by Hatcher, the Post-Tribune, and even the federal government.484 But, with 
Crile’s research in hand and their collective organizing and publicity muscle, the coalition had 
little concern that Fadell could stop them. Instead, the coalition’s members saw taking down 
Fadell as only the first step in cleaning up taxes in Lake County. Following their attack on 
Fadell, the coalition could move on to broader property tax reforms. “There is widespread 
community support for an overhaul of the property tax structure in Lake County,” Silverman 
wrote in a memo analyzing the situation in Gary, and Silverman believed that support for reform 
would grow as CCC and other grassroots groups continued to agitate for reform. 485 
However, as the CCC and Nader-headed coalition seemed poised to make sweeping 
progress in Lake County, the movement faltered. The coalition planned a “coordinated attack” 
on Fadell in late-1971.486 The grassroots muscle of CCC was key to this attack. However, with 
both Wright and Lynd – who would soon enroll in law school and become a labor attorney – no 
longer associated with the group, the coalition was severely weakened. The already limping CCC 
completely collapsed during its 1971 convention. George Sullivan, a former Teamster with a 
criminal past – whom the IAF staff dubbed “a con man” and “no damn good” – narrowly won 
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the presidency of CCC, after packing the convention with sympathetic attendees.487 Sullivan 
quickly moved to force former president Ken Tucker out of CCC as punishment for endorsing 
Sullivan’s opponent.488 He also tried to fire Mike Barnes, claiming that Barnes “lost his 
effectiveness as an organizer” by backing Sullivan’s opponent, too.489 “Unless the direction is 
changed and the wounds are healed, we’ll be in a lot of trouble…,” Tucker told the Post-Tribune. 
“We should be fighting government neglect and corruption, not each other.”490 However, the 
CCC senate voted 79 to 25 to keep Barnes, leading to Sullivan “threatening to kill people,” as an 
IAF memo reported to Alinsky.491 Eventually, Sullivan and his allies left CCC to form a rival 
organization. What was left, however, were two ineffective and weakened organizations that 
quickly petered out. Ultimately, then, the potent combination of the CCC’s early bowing to 
Krupa’s attacks and ousting Lynd, Father Baroni’s poaching of Wright, and boilerplate 
factionalism led to CCC’s downfall. Making matters worse for the coalition, the Gary Post-
Tribune quashed George Crile’s already-written series of article exposing Fadell’s corruption, for 
which Crile had hoped Nader would write an introduction.492 When local alternative newspaper 
The Catalyst published an article outlining Fadell’s corruption based on Crile’s as-yet-
unpublished series – which had circulated among CCC and Nader activists – Ridder newspapers, 
the publisher of the Post-Tribune, fired Crile (who would later become a correspondent on 
CBS’s 60 Minutes).493 With that, the coalition had crumbled, and the entire task of tackling taxes 
in Lake County fell to Nader. As we will see in the next chapter, though, Nader did not fail to 
follow through on the coalitions’ early promise, and, thanks to that persistence, Fadell would 
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eventually see justice. Moreover, as discussed later in this chapter, the ideas that CCC embodied 
would affect not only the Democrats and activists who praised it upon its founding, but also the 
Nixon White House and the president himself.  
 
Nixon’s New Economic Policy and the Backlash Against It  
After the 1970 midterms, the Nixon administration was determined to make a new start. 
On economic policy, it moved hastily to put inflation-fighting austerity in the rearview mirror 
and focus on a vigorous pursuit growth. Meeting November 19th, President Nixon, John 
Ehrlichman, and his economic advisers discussed why the economy was not growing the way 
they had earlier predicted. Herber Stein argued a seven percent growth in the money supply 
would not be enough to jump-start the economy and suggested a “more expansionary fiscal 
policy” in concert with monetary growth. Schultz and others agreed. 494 The CEA’s second 
public “Inflation Alert,” released in December 1970, made the transition clear. Despite the 
report’s title, it made plain that growth, not inflation, was the administration’s main concern. 
“The acceleration in the rate of inflation has been halted…. Nevertheless, the rate of inflation 
remains higher than had been expected at this stage…. At the same time there is considerable 
slack in the economy…,” the report noted on the first page. “While general policies must be 
tempered by the need to avoid a speeding-up of inflation, it is appropriate that these policies 
should now aim more vigorously at expansion. We believe it is possible for the expansion of 
output and employment to proceed while the rate inflation continues to subside.”495 The 
recession that hampered the GOP in the midterms officially ended in November, though the 
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unemployment rate continued to rise.496 If President Nixon had his way, the nation’s voters 
would never again associate him with the pain of unemployment, or the staid Republican 
ideology of tight-fisted inflation fighting. But the lingering conservatism in Nixon’s “New 
Economic Policy” would provide the administration political headaches in the form of challenges 
from Ralph Nader and other left-distributionist reformers. In the process, Nader and these 
reformers would strike a blow not only against Nixon’s remaining tax conservatism, but also 
against the very idea of impartial, fiscalist tax expertise. 
With a full docket of new spending programs – from Revenue Sharing to national health 
insurance – on the White House’s agenda following the year-end meeting, the administration 
continued to push Arthur Burns and the Fed to comply with Nixon’s new stimulus-focused 
mindset. Following the midterm debacle, even the slightest departure from a steady path of 
generous monetary growth was not only a cause of concern for the White House, but an event 
worthy of pushback against Burns by high-level advisers. “I should write Arthur a memorandum, 
indicating that it has been represented to us that the flattened money supply curve in the two 
months prior to the [1970 midterm] election resulted from a conviction that the General Motors 
strike would diminish the demand for money…,” Ehrlichman wrote in a December memo. “I 
think we should call the Fed on this and indicate that we strongly disagree with the philosophy 
involved in order to keep the maximum pressure on Arthur in this area.”497 Privately, Burns 
promised the White House an “adequate but not excessive” growth in the money supply, as 
Ehrlichman relayed to Nixon in a March 1971 memo. But the Fed chair also advised White 
House pursue further fiscal stimulus to bolster growth.498 It was advice Nixon was happy to 
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follow, but there proved to be one lingering impediment to full-throated “growth economics” – 
inflation.  
The 1970 recession had halted inflation. However, inflation’s decline proved to be less 
steep than White House advisers had hoped. After peaking at nearly 6.5 percent in February 
1970, the CPI dropped gradually to 4.2 percent in April 1971, barely lower than where it stood 
when Nixon took office and far above the 1.5-to-3 percent range where inflation had stood prior 
to the late-60s uptick. Even worse, after reaching its low in April, the CPI again moved upward 
slightly, then plateaued throughout the summer of 1971.499 The White House’s continued focus 
on raising economic growth and lowering unemployment, even in the face of persistent inflation, 
demonstrated a decided shift from the moderate conservatism embodied in its earlier policy of 
“gradualism,” which had been championed by Milton Friedman, among others. While Nixon and 
his “Friedman-esque” advisers, like Shultz, had paid keen attention to the University of Chicago 
economist’s advice at earlier points in the president’s term, the post-midterm shift towards 
growth was clearly out-of-step with the libertarian monetarist’s views. In mid-1971, Friedman 
cautioned the administration that progress against inflation would stall if Burns continued to 
increase the money supply. He also argued that a wage-price freeze or controls would be 
“disastrous.”500 Yet, it was at that very moment that the White House was considering controls 
more seriously than ever before.   
Any consideration of controls had long been fraught with politics – of both the inter- and 
intra-party varieties. Democrats had essentially been challenging Nixon to implement wage-price 
controls since granting the president authorization during the 1970 midterm campaign. On 
August 1st, 1971, the New York Democratic congressional delegation – led by left-liberal 
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luminaries Bella Abzug and Shirley Chisholm, as well as Ed Koch, Hugh Carey, and Charles 
Rangel, among others – wrote to Nixon to “respectfully request the immediate application of 
necessary controls on wages and prices as were authorized by Congress in 1970.” Given the 
suffering of “the consumers, the laborers, and the business leaders” because of inflation, the New 
York delegation argued, “there is no longer any reason or excuse for the failure to implement 
wage and price controls….”501 But the idea of controls had been strenuously resisted by Nixon’s 
formal and informal economic advisers, including, most vocally, Milton Friedman. There 
existed, however, one key dissenter within Nixon’s inner circle when it came to wage-price 
policies – Arthur Burns. 
Arthur Burns had long been one of Nixon’s closest – and most loyal – economic advisers. 
When it came to combating inflation, though, the man appointed by Nixon just months earlier to 
head the Federal Reserve now parted company with the president. Beginning in May 1970, 
Burns publicly advocated for wage-price guidelines as part of the fight against rising prices.502 
Nonetheless, with the support of his other key economic advisers, Nixon continued to resist any 
form of “incomes policy.” Into late-1970 CEA chair Paul McCracken encourage Nixon to resist 
any jawboning, wage-price guidelines, or controls. Instead, McCracken proposed that Nixon hit 
unions by suspending Davis-Bacon, among other maneuvers to lower wage increases. Moving 
towards guidelines, in McCracken’s view, would make Nixon appear weak. “[S]ince the 
chairman of the FRB [Burns] proposed this in a highly publicized speech, the administration’s 
moving in that direction would…be interpreted as the president being forced to capitulate on this 
issue,” McCracken cautioned.503  
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Burns would not be deterred, however. Echoing the Democrats, who hammered the 
president for the “Nixonomics” of simultaneously high inflation and unemployment, Burns 
lamented in his private diary that “the sycophants around the White House…keep talking about 
the money supply and the excessive caution of the Fed,” rather than recognizing the need to 
tackle inflation, too. “What the boys that swarm around the White House fail to see is that the 
country now faces an entirely new problem,” Burns wrote in a November 1970 diary entry, 
“namely, a sizeable inflation in the midst of recession; that classical remedies for fighting 
inflation or recession will simply not do; that new medicine is needed for the new illness…and 
that…‘income policy’ is absolutely necessary….”504 Burns increasingly sought to act on his 
conviction. In Congressional testimony, speeches, and Quadriad meetings at the White House, 
Burns continued to push Nixon to adopt some type of “incomes policy.” In early-1971, Burns 
joined George Romney and other pro-jawboning and guidelines cabinet officials in secret 
meetings. Other members of the administration, including Nixon, Shultz, and Ehrlichman were 
“totally unaware” of the group’s existence until word of it leaked in March.505 Burns also 
repeatedly expressed his belief that traditional monetary and fiscal restraint would not be enough 
to break the “inflationary psychology” that gripped the country. “I don’t think that our fiscal 
policy and our monetary policy are sufficient to control inflation,” the Fed chair told the Senate 
in March. “Experience indicates that pretty clearly in our own country and even more 
dramatically in other countries, particularly in Canada and Great Britain. Therefore, I urge on the 
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administration and on the Congress an incomes policy.”506 Burns also led the Federal Reserve 
Board in a series of votes in support of a wage-and-price review board.507 
Yet, throughout the spring and summer of 1971, the White House failed to act. In June, 
Burns sent Nixon a long letter firmly stating his oft-ignored position. “[I]t is doubtful whether we 
have made any progress in moderating the pace of inflation…,” he warned Nixon. “I realize that 
more optimistic interpretations have been made…both within and outside the administration. I 
have tried to read the evidence their way; I find that I cannot do so.” Just as Burns had recorded 
in diary, the Fed chair told Nixon that the country was facing “an entirely new economic 
problem….namely, an inflation feeding on itself at a time of substantial unemployment.” Burns’s 
explanation for this persistent inflation was decidedly conservative – labor unions, strong 
economic growth, and the welfare state, Burns argued, had made workers less fearful and 
therefore more willing to demand high wages. However, Burns solution recalled economic ideas 
usually proposed by Democrats and sharply opposed by conservatives and most Republicans. 
The Fed chair told Nixon to pursue “emphatic and pointed jawboning, followed by a wage and 
price review board...followed…by a six-month wage and price freeze.”508  
Nixon had long opposed wage-and-price controls, but after the 1970 midterms his 
opposition began to waiver. Nixon’s personal resistance to controls dated to his experience 
working for the WWII-era Office of Price Administration, and in the first years of his 
administration the president had often linked his opposition to controls with his time at the OPA 
in discussion with advisers. But in an early post-midterms meeting with his closest domestic 
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policy advisers Nixon seemed to open the door to using wage-and-price controls to deal with 
inflation.509 In January, Nixon broached the subject of a wage-price board and a wage-price 
freeze. McCracken predicted that a freeze would garner “much instant support, but a year later – 
1972 – [it] would be clear it doesn’t work.” While many advisers supported the idea of taking a 
strong stand against unions, Nixon demurred. “Unions [are] not the major source of the trouble,” 
Nixon said, before adding that they could “kick” the “locals that are irresponsible” at the same 
time that they kicked steel companies for raising prices. 510 Meeting with the Construction 
Industry Collective Bargaining Commission on January 18, Nixon made it clear that “the 
administration’s position and mine personally” was to avoid blaming rank-and-file workers. 
“Can’t blame union for asking [for] more wages when prices go up,” Nixon explained. “National 
leaders of unions can’t control pressures below,” Nixon noted later. Yet, the president still felt 
that jawboning had problems and that a “freeze would create inequity, unfairness.”511 Moreover, 
several key economic advisers continued to strenuously oppose any form of “incomes policy.” 
Most did so not because they were concerned about “unfairness” in the application of controls, 
but because they were philosophically opposed to government intervention in the economy. Peter 
Flanigan wrote a point-by-point rebuttal of Burns’s letter for Nixon and reserved his strongest 
suggestion of controls.512 Likewise, Milton Friedman soothed Nixon by noting that he had “made 
real progress against inflation.” Its persistence, the monetarist argued, could be blamed on the 
Fed’s “very large increases in the money supply over the past four months.” Pursuing a wage-
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price freeze would be “disastrous,” Friedman told Nixon.513 The Chicago economist also took 
time to send Burns a “scathing” letter denouncing the Fed chair’s support of an “incomes 
policy.”514 
Events outside the realm of technocratic policymaking, though, proved to be the most 
important factor in Nixon’s ultimate decision. However strongly conservatives opposed them and 
whatever Nixon’s own personal reluctance to pursue them, the political realities pointed towards 
the adoption of controls. More than 60 percent of Americans told pollsters that they supported 
wage-price controls in early-1970. In fact, surveys now showed, Nixon noted himself, that 
inflation – rather than unemployment – was now the top economic issue. Wage and price 
controls “have always polled 2:1 in favor,” the president explained. “Inflation is a big issue…,” 
Nixon said. “[We need to do] something every couple of months.” Or, as Nixon put it a few days 
earlier, [We] must let people know we care about the problem – that’s what it’s all about.”515 For 
political success, then, Nixon needed not only to pursue unemployment-cutting growth, as he had 
planned, but also lower inflation – a tall task given the unprecedented condition of high 
unemployment and persistent inflation. Nixon’s options were limited. The method of combating 
inflation preferred by Friedman and other economic conservatives – monetary and fiscal restraint 
– was a political nonstarter for Nixon. But, inadvertently, Friedman revealed the appeal of 
controls. The libertarian warned Nixon that controls “would lead to over stimulative polices, on 
the erroneous assumption that wages and prices are under control.” 516 This defect of controls, at 
least in Friedman’s view, was precisely what could make controls so attractive to Nixon. The 
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president wanted the economy roaring during the election year of 1972. After the midterms, the 
administration’s clear direction was towards more expansionary fiscal policies, and the White 
House’s continued pressure on Burns for looser monetary policy – a development that Friedman 
lamented – made clear that Nixon wanted both the budget and the Fed to be working to ensure 
rapid growth and falling unemployment in his reelection year. But if both fiscal and monetary 
policy were to be expansionary, a new tool would be needed to hold prices in check. As Burns 
understood, if Nixon enacted controls, he would be free to focus the Fed on lowering 
unemployment – just as Nixon desired – rather than attempting to battle inflation at the same 
time.517 But, though Burns grasped this economic reality, it was not yet clear if Nixon would 
reach the same conclusion. 
As it happened, a larger economic crisis gave President Nixon the political cover to 
recant his longtime opposition to wage-price controls and enact them in August 1971. Nixon’s 
newly appointed Treasury Secretary, John Connally, played a key role in this shift. The Texas 
Democrat was ideologically flexible, and his keen political instincts had earned Nixon’s trust. As 
Connally assumed his post in early-1971, the U.S. was facing a crisis in its balance of payments 
and, therefore, its gold reserves. It was an international monetary crisis years in the making. 
Under the international Bretton Woods monetary system negotiated by delegates of 44 nations in 
1944, the U.S. dollar became the de facto international currency, since other countries fixed their 
currencies to the dollar. Simultaneously, U.S. dollars could be converted into gold at a fixed rate 
of $35 per ounce, necessitating that the U.S. hold gold reserves for such conversions. 
Fluctuations in the United States’ balance of payments and the international market price of gold, 
among other issues, ultimately made the system unstable. Beginning with President Eisenhower, 
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each successive American president had to deal with the United States’ ballooning balance of 
payments deficit, attributable largely, though not wholly, to Cold War military excursions. 
President Johnson faced a run on gold sparked by a British devaluation of the pound. But the 
measures taken in 1968 to shore up the fracturing Bretton Woods system were only temporary 
solutions.518  
President Nixon faced the same crumbling system when he took office, and by 1971 the 
U.S. was facing crisis once again. The outflow of the U.S. gold reserves had become 
unsustainable. Connally, Nixon, and Shultz developed a plan in near-complete secrecy to close 
the gold window, effectively suspending the convertibility of U.S. dollars into gold, among other 
measures. On August 13th, Nixon called all of his closest advisers, including Burns, to Camp 
David to debate the plans that had been drafted in secret, largely by Connally. For the most part, 
the debate was perfunctory. Connally already had Nixon’s unflinching support. Arthur Burns 
strenuously argued against closing the gold window, but, ultimately, Nixon sided with Connally. 
The other elements of Nixon and Connally’s plan were less hotly debated. Yet, they were no less 
controversial. Connally called for a 90-day freeze on wages and prices – an action Nixon could 
take unilaterally, thanks to the Democrats’ previous approval of wage-price legislation. The 
Treasury Secretary also proposed several other measures, including a package of business tax 
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cuts to stimulate the economy. Nixon announced this set of historic policies, which the president 
told Americans would usher in a “new prosperity,” in a televised speech on the night of October 
15th. Outside observers would dubbed it the “Nixon Shock,” while the White House would 
christen it the “New Economic Policy” – a moniker that strangely recalled Vladimir Lennon’s 
policies for Soviet Union. Though few would confuse it with Soviet communism, the NEP’s 
elements – especially the wage-price freeze – nonetheless constituted an embrace of government 
interventionism out-of-step with Republican orthodoxy.519 Still, organized labor and many 
Democrats denounced the “Nixon shock” immediately. Notably, George McGovern called the 
NEP’s policies “economic madness.” 520 
To curry favor for Nixon’s New Economic Program, the White House – led by Colson – 
organized the ostensibly independent Citizens for a New Prosperity (CNP). Launched a few 
weeks after the NEP speech with a full-page ad in the Washington Post, the CNP was nominally 
concerned with encouraging “a nationwide spirit of self-sacrifice to hold the line on wages an 
prices,” as the Washington Post put it. The CNP was chaired by Nixon friend Hobart Lewis, the 
president of Reader’s Digest, and George Creel – famed director of the WWI-era Committee on 
Public Information – served as CNP’s publicity director. Under Creel, the CRP circulated 
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stickers, posters, and yardsticks, among other items, featuring slogans like “Follow the Yardstick 
to a New Prosperity” and “Stop Inflation: Prosperity Is a Job for Everyone.” Keeping with the 
theme of a group concerned with voluntaristic, public-spirited anti-inflation efforts, Creel 
compared CNP’s campaign with FDR’s “Blue Eagle” campaign for the National Recovery 
Administration.521  
Immediately, the CRP received criticism from prominent Democrats, including 
Oklahoma Senator and former DNC chair Fred Harris. Harris called the group’s tax-exempt 
status “nothing short of a public outrage” and wrote in a public letter to the IRS commissioner 
that CRP’s publicity campaign was little more than “an obvious effort to build support for 
President Nixon’s reelection campaign.” Harris’s objections were well founded. Lewis denied 
rumors that the White House had orchestrated the group, and told the press that the idea for CNP 
occurred to him “almost spontaneously” during a conversation with Marriott chair J. Willard 
Marriott, though Lewis did admit that they had “full cooperation form the White House.” Indeed, 
he White House held an October reception for 150 CRP members. In contrast to its public 
denials, private White House documents – and later public admissions – would reveal CRP was 
largely the orchestration of Charles Colson. Moreover, CNP’s direct-mail campaign was 
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organized by H.R. Haldeman’s former ad agency, J. Walter Thompson, as well as Nixon 
assistant Dwight Chapin and press secretary Ron Ziegler.522  
The words and actions of the CNP reflected its partisan genesis. The full-page 
Washington Post advertisement announcing CNP contained effusive praise for Nixon’s NEP. 
“On August 1, America set its course toward a new prosperity without inflation…,” the ad 
declared. “Citizens for a New Prosperity is a group of Americans – non-partisan, nationwide – 
who believe that the far-reaching objectives of the President’s new economic policy are in the 
interest of all Americans.” While CNP touted its “well-balanced” membership roster, it counted 
precious few Democrats among its members, with LBJ’s Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler the 
most notable. Instead, Republicans and business executives overwhelmingly populated CNP. 
Only three labor representatives joined the CNP – a serious weakness, for a president seeking the 
support of “hard hats” – and all three were from the Teamsters. Instead, most of CNP’s members 
were familiar faces in the conservative movement, like Lewis, Marriott, and Dart Industries chair 
Justin Dart. In its action, too, the CNP created yet another, arguably unseemly, link between the 
Nixon White House and major American corporations. Immediately upon its founding, CNP sent 
letters to executives of Fortune 500 companies, as well as 2,000 other U.S. corporations, 
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soliciting tax-deductible donations, suggested to fall between $2,000 and $25,000 per 
company.523 
The lingering, notably pro-business conservatism contained in the NEP would bring the 
Nixon White House into conflict with Democrats, labor, and the left. Eventually, the NEP itself 
would prove to be unpopular – largely because of its perceived pro-business slant. Immediately, 
Nixon’s call for further business tax cuts in the NEP also raised the ire of those on the left, who 
were already stewing over Nixon’s unilateral business-friendly changes to depreciation rules 
earlier in the year. In addition to speeding up the enactment of the already-passed $50 increase in 
the personal exemption, Nixon’s NEP speech proposed a 10 percent “job development credit,” 
which was really a cut for businesses who invested in new machinery or equipment.524 The 
proposal was met with skepticism not only by Democrats, but also the political press. “Only two 
years ago [in the TRA69] Congress killed just such a credit, the less potent 7-percent investment 
credit, because it considered the tax benefit an engine of inflation,” the Associated Press noted. 
Nixon’s proposal to revive an even more generous version of the credit came quickly on the 
heels of Nixon’s depreciation speedup, which the AP noted caused “many members of Congress 
[to] charg[e] that Nixon went too far in the same direction.”525 While the proposal for more 
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business tax cuts was the only element of Nixon’s NEP applauded by Milton Friedman, liberal 
economist John Kenneth Galbraith lambasted the proposed cuts as “very inefficient ways of 
expanding the economy because they put money in the hands of people who don’t need it.”526 
Making matters worse for Nixon, the debate over his earlier business tax cuts were still going on 
in Congress as he proposed the new tax initiatives in his NEP. At a time when the president was 
hoping to cast himself as a champion of blue-collar workers and the forgotten middle class, a 
lengthy debate over Nixon’s business tax cuts was the last thing he wanted. 
Nixon’s initial business tax plans, announced in January 1971, were designed not only as 
a supply-size stimulus to spur growth, but as a piece of business-friendly tax policy to placate the 
conservatives who were unhappy with what they saw as the consumption-centric TRA69.  To 
counter that consumption “bias,” Nixon’s Treasury Department devised a new accelerated 
depreciation system, dubbed “Asset Depreciation Range” (ADR). ADR provided a variety of 
benefits to business, but its most notable provision was shortening the depreciation period by 20 
percent. The White House contended that ADR could be implemented without the approval of 
the legislature, which is exactly what Nixon did with his January executive order. Congress cried 
foul. But Nixon was unmoved. The president claimed that ADR would “help create jobs for the 
unemployed as well as young people joining the labor force” and “promote the economic 
growth, which is essential if this Nation is to meet its domestic and international 
responsibilities.” He also justified the business-oriented nature of the cuts by reminding 
Americans of the sizable individual cuts in the TRA69 bill.527 The White House knew the 
political risks of this favor to conservatives. In a letter to Nixon, Peter Flanigan listed the 
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“positive effects of the proposed depreciation changes” as “stimulat[ing] the economy by 
encouraging capital investment,” “encourag[ing] growth in productivity,” and “improv[ing] 
corporate profit.” The “negative effects,” however, were headlined by both the corresponding 
revenue loss of such a tax cut and, especially, “opening the administration to the political charge 
of favoring big business by reducing corporate taxes.”528 But even Flanigan could not have 
anticipated the storm of controversy that the ADR executive order would unleash. The response 
from much of the press to the president’s order was swift and critical. It was often portrayed not 
only as an executive overreach, but also as a furthering of existing tax “loopholes.” An in-depth 
story on the proposal by the Christian Science Monitor featured a title that simply asked, “New 
Depreciation Allowance – A ‘Tax Crime’?”529  Privately, the administration bristled at this 
criticism, even drawing up talking points in response to the Monitor article, in particular.530  
But the main opposition to ADR came from the newly empowered “tax justice” left. 
Immediately, Ralph Nader’s Public Interest Research Group, Common Cause, Henry Reuss, and 
the United Auto Workers, among others, sued to stop ADR, arguing that it exceeded the 
president’s power and thereby constituted and unconstitutional giveaway to big business. 
Announcing the lawsuit, Nader called ADR “an attempt at redistributing wealth” to large 
corporations and predicted that the revenue loss caused by ADR would be paid by average 
Americans “either through higher taxes or reduced services.” PIRG’s challenge to ADR was led 
by staffer Tom Stanton, a Harvard Law graduate, who called ADR “just a flagrant violation of 
the law.” Stanton’s success in garnering not only media attention, but also the notice of the 
Nixon administration, led Nader to place Stanton in charge of the newly created Tax Reform 
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Research Group (discussed earlier in this chapter). Numerous seasoned tax experts, among them 
Kennedy’s CEA chair Walter Heller, agreed with the arguments of the public interest lawyers 
and unions. Yale tax law professor Boris I. Bittker went so far as to argue that, by the logic of the 
administration’s ADR order, “the Treasury could announce that any taxpayer who thought his 
taxes were too high and wanted a 10% tax cut need only say so on his tax return.” Taxation With 
Representation, another new “public interest taxpayers lobby,” also declared its opposition to 
ADR, while George McGovern – having already announced his presidential candidacy a full 
year-and-a-half before the 1972 election – also spoke out against the ADR. Further casting a 
shadow on Nixon’s ADR, Edmund Muskie released a confidential memorandum from Deputy 
Treasury Secretary John Nolan, which suggested that it was possibly illegal for the Treasury to 
implement ADR without congressional approval.531  “The limits of our administrative authority 
in this area are very vague, and the limits outlined above are merely our judgment as to the 
extent we should go without legislation,” Nolan wrote.532 Indeed, the extent of Nixon’s executive 
action was actually determined by how much revenue Nixon’s economic advisers were willing to 
lose, rather than what the administration believed was legal.533  
In response primarily to the PIRG-led lawsuit, the Nixon Treasury agreed to hold public 
hearings on the proposed changes, including allowing critics to testify. However, as the Wall 
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Street Journal reported, the hearings were clearly stacked to cast the administration’s proposals 
in a favorable light. Witnesses were questioned by IRS and administration officials, including 
Nolan and Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy Edwin S. Cohen.534 While Nader, 
Nathaniel Goldfinger of the AFL-CIO, and the National Welfare Rights Organization George 
Wiley (who will be discussed later), among other left-distributionist voices, requested to testify 
at the hearings, they were far outnumbered by the parade of corporate representatives and 
lobbyists testifying. 535  Moreover, it was clear that witnesses from different sides of the 
ideological spectrum were not accorded the same respect. “The treatment afforded the witnesses 
differed sharply…,” the Journal noted. “Critics of the administration proposals frequently were 
peppered with technical questions, particularly from Mr. Cohen and [IRS counsel] Mr. [K. 
Martin] Worthy. But advocates of the changes [including Norman Ture and C. Lowell Harris] 
often were praised for their ‘definitive’ analyses or for being ‘recognized experts’ on the subject 
and often were only asked to elaborate on the benefits of the liberalized depreciation guidelines.” 
“[Officials were] conducting a cross-examination [of critics] rather than listening to the 
important contributions that were being brought out,” Stanton complained. Likewise, Birch Bayh 
called the hearings “an elaborate charade,” while Charles A. Vanik quipped, “We’re just here to 
celebrate a hanging that’s already been decided.” The administration had a powerful ally. Before 
announcing ADR, the White House had sought advice from – and won the support of – House 
Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills.536  
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 With the legal battle surrounding Nixon’s executive order still unfolding, Mills and the 
Congress stepped in to, in effect, retroactively ratify the ADR provisions that Nixon had insisted 
he did not need congressional approval for in the first place. 537 The subsequent Ways and Means 
hearings saw a heightening of the ADR debates. The hearings also expanded to include the new 
“Nixon Shock” tax proposals, including the 10-percent investment tax credit and Domestic 
International Sales Corporations (DISCS), an entity for shielding export-related profits from U.S. 
corporate taxation.538 To mitigate the likely unpopularity of the business-centered proposals, 
Nixon also requested increases in the personal exemption and standard deduction – changes that 
were not only popular with voters, but would provide a stimulative boost to the economy and, 
most importantly, potentially attract the support of otherwise-leery Democrats.539 
 Defense of Nixon’s new tax business policies came, not surprisingly, from conservatives 
and business lobbyists. Representing the White House-tied CNP, Sumner Whittier appeared 
before the Senate Finance Committee to “heartily endors[e]” Nixon’s proposals. The business 
tax breaks, the CNP argued, would “stimulate investment and consumption simultaneously.”540 
National and state Chambers of Commerce, along with the National Association of 
Manufacturers, came out strongly in favor of ADR and DISC. George S. Koch, the finance chair 
of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce, argued that the provisions would help offset the 
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“tax bias against investment in the 1969 act.” Representing the national Chamber of Commerce, 
taxation chair Walker Winter said the Chamber gave its “general support” for Nixon’s proposals, 
but objected that they “do not go far enough.” Tax incentives for business investment, Winter 
argued, would “reduce inflation.” Business representatives said such tax cuts were fair since 
inflation itself was pushing up the cost of business equipment and machinery. NAM taxation 
chair Melvin C. Holm praised ADR and DISC as combating “the tax system’s clear-cut bias 
against capital formation and productive investment.” 541  Likewise, conservative economic 
consultant Norman Ture – a former adviser to Wilbur Mills and an early advocate of “supply-
side” economics – praised the Nixon’s proposed business tax provisions, such as ADR, which he 
said would encourage the “expansion of private capital formation.”542 
 PIRG continued its fight against the bill and were joined by various left-leaning 
grassroots groups, tax reformers, and unions, as well as congressional Democrats. In a letter to 
the New York Times and congressional testimony, Ralph Nader and Tom Stanton charged that 
Nixon’s proposed tax plan, even including the individual tax reductions, would simply “make the 
rich richer,” since upper-income people received greater benefit from increases in the personal 
exemption, as well as the business tax incentives. They likened the DISC provision, in particular, 
to a legalized tax shelter for U.S. corporations. 543 In his Ways and Means testimony, Nader, 
accompanied by Stanton, stridently opposed ADR, DISC, the auto excise repeal, and other 
business-friendly tax breaks. Nader called the ADR regulations an “unauthorized 
and…unconscionable tax subsidy which will be of little value to stimulate the economy.” Nader 
argued that the country faced “a cost-push inflation, not a demand-push inflation,” meaning that 
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tax breaks designed to boost business investment would exacerbate the problem. Instead, Nader 
suggested, “I would prefer to generate the kind of [consumer] demand through tax cuts to lower 
income groups.” This would ultimately trickle up to businesses, Nader added in a fiscalist 
flourish, because consumers’ purchasing choices would ultimate generate profits for successful 
businesses and “generate the kind of production and investment that would occur through the 
marketplace” absent the creation of specific tax incentives written by Congress. Moreover, Nader 
charged that, by seeking to subsidize all businesses, rather than let Americans select economic 
winners with their purchasing dollars, conservatives were actually anti-consumer and anti-
market. “It is really amazing to watch the transformation of conservative ideology, here,” Nader 
said. “[N]ot only do they shift in this kind of fiscalism [away from touting the sanctity of 
consumer choice] but they don’t any more consider what [the] marketplace can do with liberated 
consumer purchasing power to generate according to consumer preferences the kind of 
production and economic expansion that apparently is desired [by consumers].” The tilt away 
from consumers and towards business was driven not by economic logic, PIRG argued, but by 
the GOP’s political, distributional considerations. “At the end of the 1969 Tax Reform Act we 
assume the Congress made some judgment as to the relative burdens on corporations and 
individuals,” Stanton told the committee. “The president, through a combination of what we 
would contend is an unlawful ADR system and through the other proposed tax cuts, is now 
trying to undue that very balance.” 544   
 PIRG advocated not only redistributing tax benefits downward, but also the very political 
power that influenced U.S. tax policy. “Would the administration be willing to support individual 
tax cuts which would not provide primary benefits to the rich, in contrast to the present 
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administration proposals?” Nader and Stanton asked rhetorically. Instead of the president’s 
package, they proposed a one-time tax refund of $50 or $100 to each taxpayer, rather than 
business tax breaks, if the economy needed stimulus. To prevent legislative over-emphasis on tax 
policies that benefitted elites, PIRG also proposed the creation of a Small Taxpayers Advisory 
Group within the Treasury Department to articulate the viewpoint of average taxpayers. “The 
economy cannot be allowed to become another Vietnam – where the public is told that the 
subject is so complex that only the executive branch can provide answers,” Stanton told the 
Senate Finance Committee. Like Vietnam, in Stanton’s view, a “credibility gap” was opening 
between the public and policymakers when it cam to tax policy. Citizens needed more input into 
tax policy, Stanton argued. “The Treasury could be made aware of the potential outrage of 
American taxpayers at having their taxes raised in order to fill the coffers of General Motors, 
United States Steel, and other powerful corporations who will gain so much from Revenue Act 
of 1971,” Stanton said.545 
The entrance of grassroots left-leaning tax groups to the policy arena in the early 1970s 
disrupted the cloistered “tax policy community” that had dominated tax policy throughout the 
post-WWII era. Members of this “community” could, like Norman Ture, move freely between 
government, think tanks, and lobbying organizations without having their expertise, or even 
neutrality, questioned. But the implicit ideological tilt – often couched in the terms of ostensibly 
apolitical fiscalism – was clear. Many of the community’s experts already viewed organized 
labor’s unapologetically populist left-distributionist tax lobbying with disdain, and now groups 
like PIRG were attempting to wrest policymaking away from the “tax policy community,” in part 
by questioning the very existence of impartial technocratic expertise on inherently distributional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







issues like tax policy.546 While the entirety of the Senate Finance Committee treated groups like 
NAM and lobbyists like Ture with respect, the committee’s conservative members made their 
contempt for PIRG clear by questioning not only the substance of PIRG’s positions, but its very 
legitimacy. Indeed, the dynamic of the Congressional hearings was a perfect mirror to that of the 
IRS hearings, as noted earlier by the Wall Street Journal. “I think it is worthless to ask some 
questions on such biased testimony,” declared Arizona Republican Paul Fannin following 
Stanton’s prepared statement to the Senate Finance Committee. Fannin charged that Stanton was 
not qualified to even question the views of the Nixon administration’s economic advisers. “What 
is your background and experience in business and government?..,” Fannin asked Stanton, 
cutting Stanton off before he could answer. “Still you are criticizing people with long experience 
in government affairs….” Utah Republican Wallace Bennett agreed. “I object,” Bennett 
interjected when Stanton began to answer an earlier, apparently rhetorical, question posted by 
Fannin to Stanton about tax incentives. “I think this witness has had his time and he has indicated 
his bias, and I think we should go on to the next witness.” Democrat Gaylord Nelson defended 
PIRG, arguing that Stanton had as much expertise as others testifying. “He sounds as qualified to 
me as most of the rest [witnesses] I heard here,” Nelson retorted. As Stanton began to answer 
Fannin’s earlier question, Bennett interjected again, saying, “How long are we going to have to 
listen to you?” In materials submitted to the committee following his appearance, Stanton noted 
Fannin and Bennett’s hostility towards him. “The response of Senators Fannin and Bennett to my 
appearance give one insight to some of the causes of the ferment stirring in America today,” 
Stanton wrote.547 PIRG’s reception from Republican Ways and Means members was little better. 
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There, Illinois Republican Harold Collier challenged not only the critiques of ADR and DISC 
offered by Nader, but also by mainstream liberal economists like James Tobin, whose work 
PIRG cited. “I wonder whether…[Nader and economists like Tobin] have ever operated a 
business or have ever had any experience in planning expansion and procuring machinery,” 
Collier asked rhetorically, suggesting that only businesspersons were qualified to evaluate such 
proposals. 548 
Both left-leaning economists and organized labor sided with PIRG. Stanley Surrey called 
DISC called “a billion dollar loophole in the income tax, through permitting U.S. exporters – 
especially our largest corporations – to escape that tax.” That the Nixon administration would try 
to pass DISC in the midst of a clear public and professional outcry for loophole-closing reform 
particularly galled Surrey. “It would be a cruel irony to have the first significant technical 
income tax legislation to pass the Congress after the 1969 Tax Reform Act...open up one of the 
largest tax escapes ever legislated by the Congress. Yet we find the Treasury Department being 
the moving force behind this attempt.” While, in theory, DISC allowed only for the “deferral” of 
“export profits” from taxation, provided that the company used these profits for export activities, 
Surrey argued that “under the terms of the actual legislation, it turns out that the ‘deferral’ would 
in practice become exception.” Moreover, Surrey noted, non-export profits could be shielded 
from taxation, too. Even more troubling, he continued, despite the fact DISC’s were supposedly 
designed to boost exports by U.S. corporations they would be “in practice an inducement to form 
foreign subsidiaries and, moreover, to form them in tax-haven countries….”549 
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AFL-CIO president George Meany likewise objected to the Nixon administration’s 
proposed tax incentives, declaring full opposition to ADR and DISC on the grounds that they 
were aimed solely at businesses. Organized labor, Meany said, supported “job creating programs 
and economy-expanding programs” but only if they were “within an equitable and progressive 
tax structure.” Nixon’s proposals, Meany charged, would create very few jobs and very little 
growth, while making the tax system much less equitable. “What is proposed hear is a radical 
redistribution of the nation’s income and wealth in favor of the rich and at the expense of the 
public interest,” Meany said, echoing PIRG’s earlier charges. “The proposal before you is a giant 
raid on the federal treasury that would transfer billion of dollars in public funds into the private 
treasuries of business. It is the ‘trick down’ economic theory of the 19th century: heap more 
wealth upon the rich and some benefit will filter down to the masses below. This is an economic 
falsehood. The whole history of the United States has proven time and again that they exact 
opposite is what is good for America.” Making up for the lost revenue would be difficult, too, in 
Meany’s view, and he made it clear that the AFL-CIO opposed tax hikes on average Americans, 
cuts to the public sector, or the delay of Nixon’s promised welfare reforms and revenue sharing. 
“Every dollar of taxes given away to business and industry is a dollar more than must be paid by 
someone else, or a dollar’s worth of public facilities and services that are foregone,” Meany told 
the committee. “In the main, that ‘someone else’ is the American wage and salary earner – that 
broad spectrum of Americans that the president likes to call middle Americans. They are now 
paying more than their share of taxes as a result of an unfairly rigged tax system. Increasingly, 
they find it difficult to convince themselves that they are getting a fair shake from their 
government.” Nixon’s proposals, Meany suggested, would only increase public cynicism about 






president’s program is loaded overwhelmingly in favor of big business and against workers, 
taxpayers, and the public interest,” Meany concluded. “What America needs is tax justice, and 
this proposal is certainly not just. America needs to close tax loopholes – especially in the areas 
of capital gains, depreciation, depletion allowances, tax-exempt bonds, and the like. America still 
has far too many millionaires who pay no taxes at all.” Provisions like ADR and DISC 
represented “tax injustice compounding the tax injustice already on this law.” 550 
 Thanks to the support of Wilbur Mills, the president’s proposals moved successfully 
through the House, though not before the Ways and Means Committee – with the support not 
only of liberals like Henry Reuss, but Mills, too – added an increase in the low-income 
allowance, which the Nixon Treasury opposed. But the bill faced even fiercer opposition in the 
Senate, where it was wildly unpopular not only among left-distributionst Democrats, but also 
among the vast majority of Democrats. Though no one could confuse him with a progressive tax 
reformer, Russell Long proved to be highly critical of the bill passed by Mills and the House. 
Long’s criticism of the bill, it seemed, stemmed from pressure from his left as well as the general 
tax reform mood of the Democratic caucus in the Senate. Perhaps serving as a measure of just 
how much the balance of power in the tax debate had shifted towards left-distributionist 
reformers, Long’s stance on the Revenue Act of 1971 seemed markedly out-of-step with the 
opinions he had voiced during the TRA69 debates less than two years earlier. Beginning the 
Senate Finance Committee debates on the bill, Long provided a largely unfavorable summary of 
the bill, on the whole. While Nixon’s Treasury officials pitched the RA71 as business-friendly 
legislation designed to counteract the alleged consumption bias of TRA69 – an analysis of 
TRA69 that Long had agreed with at the time – Long lambasted the House-passed version of 
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RA71 as “trickle down” economics. “In large measure, the personal income tax reductions under 
this bill are illusory – illusory in the sense that they involve nothing more substantial than a 
speed-up of the tax cuts already enacted by Congress. The increase in the low income allowance, 
which was not recommended by the President, is the lone exception,” Long declared. “In its 
present form, the bill appears to be too much of a ‘trickle down’ operation, with too little of it 
ever getting down.” Rather than praise the reinstatement of the investment tax credit as a supply-
side inducement to inflation-fighting capital formation – a view to which Long had seemed in the 
past – Long now echoed the left, worrying aloud that the credit would set off “another round of 
undesirable interest rate hikes,” thereby “preventing hard-working American from finding the 
credit they need to buy houses, automobiles, and other costly items.” Long suggested decreasing 
the business tax benefits and increasing those for individuals. “We can make it a better bill and 
still be fiscally responsible in the Senate if we scale down the business tax benefits contained in 
the depreciation speed-ups and the investment tax credit,” he argued. “The revenue thus saved 
could be used to provide across-the-board personal tax cuts, possibly by increasing the personal 
exemption or by reducing tax rates.” Moving in that direction, Long said in a nod to the 
ascendance of the tax left within his party, would “make it [the bill] more responsive to what I 
perceive as the mood of the Senate.”551 In the end, however, the Finance Committee bill differed 
little from the House version, and the committee passed it 12-2, with the committee two most 
left-distributionist members, Fred Harris and Gaylord Nelson, casting the only negative votes. 
Much to the chagrin of conservatives, left-distributionist Democrats staged several 
attempts on the Senate floor to swap the ADR’s business stimulus for more progressive forms 
aimed at individual taxpayers, particularly low- and middle-income ones. Two attempts by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Indiana’s Birch Bayh came close to making this substitution, only to be defeated by the near-
unanimous opposition of Senate Republicans and the defection of a small number of business-
friendly Democrats. Bayh’s first amendment sought to replace the ADR’s liberalized 
depreciation allowances with individual tax credits – a favorite instrument of left-distributionist 
tax experts, since, unlike increases in the personal exemption, it gave low- and upper-income 
taxpayers the same amount – of $25 for individuals and $50 for couples. “It all gets down to 
whether we feel we need to have an equitable economic stimulus or whether we need to go ahead 
with the economic stimulus provided by the Administration, which is very uneven in its impact 
as it greatly favors business over the consumer,” Bayh said in proposing the amendment. 
Republicans strongly disagreed, arguing that prosperity and jobs come not from consumer 
expenditures, but from business investment. “It has been obvious all day,” Bennett said, “that 
there are those in this body who have no thought of what it takes to provide a job and develop 
business which will keep jobs.” The amendment failed by the narrowest of margins – 35 to 37 – 
with all but one member of the Senate’s GOP caucus opposing the bill and Democrats supporting 
it by a 34 to 11 margin. Ultimately, those 11 Democratic defections were composed primarily of 
southern Democrats and fiscally conservative northern Democrats, like Connecticut’s Abraham 
Ribicoff. Keeping with his newfound progressivism, Russell Long – who noted during debate 
that Bayh’s amendment would save the Treasury $3.5 billion by 1975 – voted for Bayh’s 
amendment.552 Bayh revised the plan, proposing the same $25 credit, but this time reducing the 
ADR percentage from 5 to 20, rather than eliminating the ADR entirely. Once again, Bayh’s 
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amendment gained only one GOP vote. This time, Democrats favored the measure 38 to 6, but it 
was still not enough. The amendment failed by a single vote.553 
 The final legislation was, at once, a step backward for reform and a step forward for 
reformers. Ultimately, the conference report passed both the House and Senate by large 
bipartisan margins. In the House, 66 Democrats – mostly left-liberal stalwarts like Reuss, 
Augustus Hawkins, Shirley Chisholm, and Bella Abzug – opposed the bill, while only four 
Democrats – Galylord Nelson, most notably – bothered to oppose the conference report in the 
Senate. While tax reformers remained staunchly opposed to ADR and DISC, the support of 
powerful Democrats like Mills made the measures nearly a fait accompli.554 That the RA71 
represented a step back from the TRA69 was clear to all. “After taking a modest plunge into 
reform waters in the Tax Reform Act of 1969,” Georgetown economist Gerard Brannon quipped, 
“in 1971 Congress enacted measures which suggest a congressional scrambling back to the more 
familiar dry ground of tax incentives.” Though he did not believe it meant the end of tax reform, 
it was nonetheless clear that RA71 was not designed to reform the tax code by to address “a 
fundamental problem, real or imagined, in the tax system – the over-taxation of capital.” 
Likewise, Boston College tax law professor Paul McDaniel wrote that the RA71 “produced for 
the cause of tax reform a number of wounds (some serious, some minor) a few small gifts, and 
some valuable lessons.” The “most serious setbacks” were the restored investment tax credit and 
ADR. Likewise, the Nixon administration’s justifications for the passage of the DISC provision 
– which McDaniel called “a pure windfall to corporate exporters” – “were so embarrassingly 
weak as to be humorous,” according to McDaniel, though he found nothing funny in the fact that 
the DISC provisions meant that other taxpayers “either paid $170 million in additional taxes in 
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1971 or had to forego government services that such funds would have otherwise provided.”555 
Brannon took a dim view of the business incentives contained in RA71, specifically, arguing that 
they were based on “poor economic and tax analysis” and “arguments based on emotion” rather 
than evidence. He suggested that such bad legislation passed not only because the Treasury had 
requested it, but also because, “Congress contains a bloc of pro-business votes as well as a bloc 
of liberal votes and…an issue such as the investment credit is decided by a relatively small 
number of swing votes in the center.” These swing votes, Brannon suggested, were evidently 
persuaded by the emotional argument that the tax code was too hard on investment. 556  
Yet, evidence of the tax left’s new power could be seen throughout the TRA71 debate. In 
past years, Nixon’s initial sweetening of the package with token increases in the personal 
exemption and standard deduction would have been enough to wring substantial Democratic 
support for the package. But, this time, those minor personal tax breaks were not enough, even 
for many moderate Democrats, which led to the addition of the low-income credit. The tax left 
also scored a victory in stripping an inflation-fighting hike in the Social Security tax that had also 
been proposed by Nixon. Perhaps most significantly, Russell Long’s sudden interest in left-
distributionist tax reform signaled the increasing popularity among the public of progressive 
reform, as well as the increasing power of groups like PIRG.557  
 If the predictably unpopular tax provisions of the New Economic Policy met with even 
less favor than the White House anticipated, the seemingly popular wage-and-price provisions 
fared just as poorly. Following the initial 90-day wage-and-price freeze, Phase I of the Nixon 
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controls began on November 13. The president argued that the 90-day freeze begun on August 
15 had met its objectives of breaking the rise in wages and prices, of turning around the 
inflationary psychology that had gripped the nation, and of making it possible to establish the 
machinery for post-freeze stabilization.”558 Stabilization would take several phases beginning 
with Phase I of controls.559 Most of the responsibility for the administration of controls fell to 
Donald Rumsfeld. As the director of Nixon’s Cost of Living Council, Rumsfeld declared that the 
CLC’s primary goal was to “reduce inflation to an annual rate of 2 to 3% by the end of 1972.” 560 
Rumsfeld was careful to explain that Phase I was “not a freeze.” While the initial freeze was 
needed to set the stage for the controls that would follow, freezes were inherently 
“inequit[able],” Rumsfeld argued. Controls, in contrast, could be adjusted to individual 
circumstances and, unlike a freeze, did not prohibit all increases. “Prices and wages, in some 
instances, can go up,” he explained, as long as such rises were consistent with the goal of two-to-
three percent inflation by the end of 1972. 561 Yet, the public not only found the initial freeze to 
be “inequitable,” but also the controls that followed, and what had initially been a popular idea 
quickly turned in a political liability for the White House. 
 Exemptions from controls of certain sectors of the economy, including agricultural 
goods, opened the White House to charges that the controls were unfair.  Almost immediately, 
Democrats attacked the specifics of Nixon’s controls. The DNC argued that the NEP “clearly 
favored corporate interests over those of the average American family.” While Democrats 
supported the general idea of a wage and price freeze, they chafed at Nixon’s leaving profits and 
dividends uncontrolled, which the party argued would “disriminat[e] heavily against salaried and 
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hourly workers.”562 As the freeze began, the AFL-CIO’s George Meany – like most labor 
leaders, as well as rank-and-file workers – was harshly critical of Nixon’s failure to control 
prices as effectively as wages as well the complete failure to control profits and other economic 
outputs. “If the freeze genuinely called for equality of sacrifice, we would give it full 
endorsement…,” Meany said. “But the current program of the president does not call for 
equality. The controls and the sacrifice fall on the million of average America wage and salary 
earners and their families while corporate profits, dividends, interest rates, and many prices are 
not restrained by the executive order.” 563  Meany argued that 35 percent of goods were not 
subject to price controls, meanwhile contractually negotiated raises were not being paid out 
because of the very effective controls on wages. If this imbalance was not bad enough, in the 
labor leader’s view, the wage controls were artificially boosting companies’ profits by letting 
them pay lower wages. “Million of dollars are going into the pockets of the corporation, who sat 
across from the union and bargained out a contract,” Meany noted. “Under the president’s 
[wage-and-price control] order, the president said that money can’t be paid….”564 “Where is that 
money [the difference between negotiated wages and the maximum allowable wages under the 
controls] going?” Meany asked rhetorically. “It is not going to the federal Treasury. It is not 
going to charity. It is going into the pocket of that employer.”565 
 Study after study showed that the public viewed saw the controls as unfair – just like the 
DNC and organized labor. Most Americans said they were “dissatisfied” with the controls.566 
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Thirty-seven percent of those “dissatisfied” said it was because the controls were “not fair,” 
while an additional 21 percent complained that “wages [were] not equal to prices,” 27 percent 
cited the fact that “prices [were] going up,” and another 21 percent said simply that the controls 
were “not working.”567 Overall, half of Americans said the controls were not “fair and just.”568 
Multiples polls found that nearly half of Americans thought “whole price-wage control program 
was thought up to help big business and not working people who suffer most from inflation,” 
while less than one-third disagreed.569 The group singled out most often by American as likely to 
be hurt by the controls was “union workers.”570 More than half of Americans said they wanted to 
“keep wage-price controls but change the way they apply,” while only 12 percent wanted to end 
the controls.571 More Americans wanted the controls to be made “more strict” than “less 
strict.”572 Nixon was viewed as personally responsible for these flaws in the controls. Only 25 
percent of American rated Nixon as “pretty good” or “excellent” at “keeping effective controls 
on wages and prices,” while 30 percent rated him as “only fair” and 40 percent said the president 
was doing a “poor” job.573  
The polls showing public disapproval of the administrations’ wage-price controls were a 
headache for the White House. The CAC struggled to explain why the public had been 
supportive of controls in the past, such as during WWII, and had clamored for controls 
throughout the early-1970s, but now viewed the administration’s program so dimly. While the 
surveys made it clear that the “loopholes” in the controls were the root of their unpopularity, the 
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administration tried to explain away that clear conclusion. “There is a pretty high figure in the 
recent Gallup Poll, as to those who would like it stricter, as opposed to more lenient, and, of 
course, that is something that one has to recognize,” Rumsfeld conceded. Nonetheless, he 
attempted to slough off suggestions calls for more comprehensive controls. “I don’t think the 
kind of support that might be engendered by a more totally inclusive program would last very 
long,” he said. Ultimately, the CAC head seemed to blame average Americans’ ignorance of the 
complexity of controls for their dissatisfaction. “[I]t is very difficult for an individual citizen who 
goes into a store, buys a series of items – some of which are controlled, some of which are not 
[to understand the system]…,” Rumsfeld argued.574 
Indeed, average Americans’ experiences at the store as the calendar turned over into the 
election year proved to be a key stumbling block for the controls. While Americans saw their 
raises cut, it did not seem that prices were receiving the same treatment. Rumsfeld and the White 
House faced pressure from the public and the press over rising food prices.575 By March, internal 
Nixon polls showed that less than 40 percent of Americans would vote to reelect Nixon if the 
election “were being held today.” The public’s number one complaint was that the president was 
“not stopping inflation.” Food prices, in general, and meat prices, specifically, were at the top of 
the public’s price concerns. Colson advised Nixon that he needed to focus on prices and 
pocketbook issues, more broadly, if he hoped to secure reelection. “(1) we have to be very 
sensitive to this issue [inflation] and alert to price increases, food in particular, (2) public 
attitudes are very volatile today especially on a pocketbook issue like this,” Colson advised the 
president, “and (3) political support for anyone in today’s environment is fragile.”576 “Most of 
the recent rise in consumer prices is attributable to the food component, and most of the increase 
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in food prices is attributable to beef and pork,” the OMB’s Arthur Laffer explained to OMB 
director Shultz in an April 1972 memo forwarded to Ehrlichman.577 Rising food prices helped 
increase Nixon’s popularity in farming areas, but they were “no help for the housewife,” as the 
Los Angeles Times put it. “Caught in a political year squeeze between the farmer and the 
consumer over food prices,” the Milwaukee Journal quipped, “President Nixon chose the 
former.”578  
The White House’s attempts to spin rising food prices – and the CAC’s struggles to 
control them – were tepid, at best. Talking points prepared by the Department of Agriculture for 
Ehrlichman argued that “controls of food prices won’t work,” since they could cause shortages, 
rationing, or lines, that “food prices have come down,” despite the public’s beliefs to the 
contrary, and that, even if food was expensive, it was “really a bargain” compared to the cost of 
food in some other countries.579 In June, the White House relented. First, it suspended quotas on 
meat imports, in order to increase supply and, the administration hoped, drive down prices. 
Second, it applied controls to some previously exempted raw agricultural products, like fruit, 
eggs, and fish. However, the controls applied only to transactions after the first sale, meaning 
that they applied primarily to wholesalers and retailers. Moreover, the shift on controls did little 
to affect meat.580 When prices resumed their downward trend – following a brief upward trend in 
the first months of 1972, after the 90-day freeze had expired – in mid-summer 1972, the White 
House was overjoyed.  “The power of prayer, slightly assisted by seasonal adjustment, is 
revealed in the CPI for June,” Stein quipped in a memo to Nixon. Together with strong growth 
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and falling unemployment, the falling CPI gave the administration “quite a story,” as Stein put it, 
going into the fall election.581  
The president, however, needed more than good economic news as he reelection 
campaign approached. He needed a new strategy to replace the “hard hat” one deployed in the 
1970 midterms, and he needed to make progress on the key issue of the tax revolt. Increasingly, 
the president understood that the rise in regressive taxes at the state and local level was having a 
real effect on average American’s pocketbooks. Indeed, they were even having an effect on 
Nixon’s wage-price policies. Stein had reported to Nixon in February 1972 that continued 
increases in the price of services despite controls were “worrisome.” “Increases in taxes, 
insurance, and public utility rates and public transportation were important here…,” Stein 
explained. “It may be that we still have to go through a period of catch-up on the legislated and 
regulated taxes and rates which will increase the difficulty of squeezing down the overall 
inflation rate.” 582 If even the White House was not immune from the effects of rising state and 
local taxes, it was no longer possible to deny the material reality of the tax revolt. Indeed, Nixon 
already had advocated one formerly Democratic policy designed to combat rising state and local 
taxes – revenue sharing – and the advice of advisers following the midterm debacle, as well as 
the events of the 1972 Democratic primaries, would pull him even further the left as the 
presidential election approached. 
 
Nixon’s Leftward Pivot  
The task of wooing working- and middle-class voters away from the Democrats and to 
the GOP remained for Nixon after the failed “hard hat” strategy of the midterms. The day after 
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Christmas 1970, McCracken sent the president polling data that pointed to the issue at hand. For 
modest-income voters, pocketbook issues predominated, and their economic anxiety was making 
them pessimistic about the future. McCracken noted that the decline in consumer sentiment 
leading up the midterms “was heavily concentrated in the lower income groups.” Pessimism was 
not evenly distributed. “Families with incomes over $10,000 are more optimist than those with 
lower incomes,” McCracken told Nixon. “They [those above $10,000] expect to be better off 
financially in the years ahead.”583 Donald Rumsfeld – the former OEO head, elevated to a 
Cabinet-level “Counselor to the President” position, before eventually landing at CAC – advised 
Nixon in is counselor capacity to strike a new tone after the midterms. And a change in direction 
– and image – was just what Nixon needed when it came to pocketbook issues in the 1972 
election. While Nixon would still pursue policies such as federal revenues sharing with states 
and localities under the banner of “New Federalism,” he would increasingly give these existing 
policies a leftward spin. Moreover, he now also advocated new, more clearly left-distributionist 
policies, ones that the more conservative Nixon of 1968 or 1970 would have shunned. This shift 
was prompted both by popularity of the grassroots left, as exemplified by Nader’s attacks on 
business tax preferences, and by the increasing success populist Democrats found in echoing the 
tone of left-distributionist activists. 
First, Nixon needed a new slogan. Rumsfeld suggested that “A New Era of Opportunity” 
be advanced as the administration’s theme in 1971 and 1972. Unlike the cultural “hard hat” 
approach pursued in the 1970 midterms or the vague, fiscalist “growth economics” message 
proposed by Safire, Rumsfeld’s suggestion edged closer to a distributionist understanding of 
policy, even echoing critiques of both government and business offered by members of the New 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Left, progressive unionists, and reformers like Ralph Nader. “It is difficult to find any area where 
our institutions have not grown enormous, slothful, and insensitive – government, business, 
labor, health, welfare, education – one could enumerate many more…,” Rumsfeld wrote. “From 
an individual’s vantage, opportunity means freedom, mobility and human dignity, and the 
change to secure the fundamental elements of a decent life without having to hurdle artificial 
barriers” – observations that Nixon underlined. Rumsfeld’s language could easily apply to 
Nixon’s “New Federalism,” but framed the programs in a way that diverged from the language 
usually used by conservatives, which uncritically praised the private sector and localism. Even 
when sounding typical themes of “individual… responsibility,” Rumsfeld applied it to the 
Family Assistance Plan – Nixon’s guaranteed income/negative income tax-based welfare reform 
plan that had languished during Nixon’s first two years – not to cutting welfare. “[The country 
envisioned by Nixon’s policies should be] a land where government accepts the political 
responsibility of abolishing artificial barriers to opportunity (segregation) and is prepared to take 
part of the financial burden of mitigating substantive barriers to opportunity (poor education, bad 
housing, outdated welfare, inadequate health care, poor transportation, etc.),” Rumsfeld wrote. 584  
Instead of taking the pocketbook concerns of the “hard hats” for granted, the Nixon 
White House now sought not only to address them, but to understand how left-distributionist 
reformers had tapped into these concerns in an end-run around the White House’s cultural 
appeals. President Nixon asked Geno Baroni – one of CCC’s biggest supporters – to the White 
House in 1970 to hear his take on the white working class. Charles Colson told Nixon that 
Baroni was attracting “considerable publicity and has become a public symbol for the 40 million 
lower middle class white workers.” Baroni, Colson told Nixon, was “understanding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






motivations of Americans of European descent and devising ways for the church to prevent 
alienation of these groups as well as help them work in harmony with black communities.” 
Colson noted that Baroni sought to overcome the “increasing alienation between white ethnics 
and the black community” by “identifying their common goals.” The work of Baroni and the 
groups he supported, Colson added, “covered much of the same ground as the ‘Rosow Blue 
Collar Worker’ report prepared by the Labor Department.”585 “The non-white poor and working-
class whites in particular have many socio-economic problems in common,” Baroni had written 
to the president in a letter. “Indeed, they live in a symbiotic relationship where the fate of one is 
profoundly related to the destiny of the other.” 586  
The Nixon administration’s interest in the grassroots left’s appeals to white workers was 
not limited to leaders like Baroni. Shortly after CCC’s founding congress the White House also 
contacted Baroni to ask about the group.587 Continuing the interest in CCC, the White House and 
the RNC conducted two confidential studies of CCC to analyze the group’s appeal, as well as 
ascertain its threat to Nixon. “I have discussed with Chuck Colson and George Bell the extent of 
their ethnic-oriented operations and our concern about the Gardner-Baroni organizational effort 
[CCC]…,” Tom Charles Huston wrote to Ehrlichman shortly after CCC's founding. “The thrust 
of my concern is that we are only hitting the surface of the ethnic problem – the cosmetics if you 
will – while Gardner, et. al. are mobilizing at the grass-roots.” Huston suggested that the White 
House either “sabotage” CCC by attempting to divide its leaders or study and emulate the 
group's appeal to the working class.588 The national party likewise worried about the strategy for 
the left that CCC represented. “From these reports [two CCC studies], and from the information 
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obtained by the Chairman of the Republican Nationalities Council of Indiana (Mr. Frank Mitan – 
who knows several of the organizers and key participants in the CCC), it is clear that this whole 
new ethnic movement represents a danger to the Republican Party and our chances in 1972,” 
Lazlo Pasztor, the director of the RNC’s “Heritage Groups (Nationalities) Division” wrote in an 
early-1971 memo to Chuck Colson and Harry Dent, among others. “It is not only motivated by, 
and used as a source of propaganda for, liberal democrats, but it is a very well organized and 
financed attempt to ‘woo’ the nationalities back to the Democratic Party.”589 To compete with 
the appeal represented by groups like CCC, Nixon needed to change.  
By early-1971, the president began moving away from race-baiting elements of the “hard 
hat” strategy. In January 1971, Assistant Secretary of Labor Arthur Fletcher – the architect of the 
Philadelphia Plan, and one of the few African Americans in the Nixon administration – wrote to 
Nixon to urge him to drop the use of the term “forced integration,” which Nixon had uttered in 
an early-January press conference. “This phrase is considered a ‘code word’ in both black and 
white communities…,” Fletcher noted. “To the blacks, it says the president will not enforce 
either the housing opportunity nor employment opportunity laws…. To whites, it says they will 
not be forced to face the problem of equal housing opportunity in the suburbs.” Nixon needed to 
tack to the left of racial matters, Fletcher argued. “Local zooming laws – fostered and 
encouraged by FHA over the years – have institutionalized economic segregation of housing 
which has resulted in racial ghettos,” he wrote. “Economic integration of housing sponsored or 
financed by federal funding is needed in the cities.” 590 The best way to woo black voters was to 
make substantive policy proposals, according to Fletcher. “The greatest desire of the urban black 
trapped in the inner city is to first, have the economic ability to exercise a choice in his living 
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style, whether in the inner city or in the suburb…,” he wrote.591 Other administration officials 
suggested that any appearance of race-based appeals to whites should be abandoned. Rumsfeld 
advised Nixon in January 1971 to explain to key members of the press in a private conversation 
that “there is no southern strategy” and that Nixon had “a national focus” – two points Nixon 
underlined while reading the memo. Even though Rumsfeld argued that the White House had 
always had a national focus, he explained to Nixon that emphasizing this to the press “would – in 
the perception by the public – indicate a change in direction.”592 It seemed like this advice found 
some favor with Nixon, too. The president followed Fletcher’s suggestion of dropping “forced 
integration” from his vocabulary. When asked in a February press conference about his past use 
of the term, Nixon distance himself from it, and indicated the administration’s commitment to 
integration, while, in a sop to conservatives, simultaneously making it clear that Nixon had no 
plans for any new programs along those lines.593 
Just as the president had vowed in the post-midterm strategy session, the second half of 
his first term would see the White House move towards making its most ambitious policy 
proposals a reality. After making little progress on either the Family Assistance Plan or his plan 
for federal revenue sharing with states and localities in his first two years, now these two policies 
moved to the top of Nixon’s agenda. Increasingly, the president seemed open to stressing the 
material needs of working- and middle-class Americans, rather than simply deploying the 
cultural, race-bating rhetoric that had previously sufficed in the “hard hat” strategy. In January 
1971, Nixon took copious notes on a Chicago Tribune article written by an electrician, Michael 
Schneider, titled “The White Worker: A Study in Frustration.” While the piece contained a few 
brief recitations of the typical race-and-welfare complaints stressed by conservative members of 
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the administration, the majority of the article was dedicated to white workers’ economic anxiety 
– both in terms of their own pocketbooks and related to fears that their children were not 
receiving the same educational and career opportunities and the kids of the rich. “It’s a Money 
Problem,” a subtitle of the article declared. “A good proportion of the frustration of the white 
worker relates to rising prices and taxes,” Schneider wrote. “He gets a dollar raise and 70 cents 
of it goes to inflation.” Rather than turning to Colson and members of the conservative Middle 
America Committee, Nixon forwarded the piece to Rosow and asked, “What is your comment on 
this?”594 Indeed, the article seemed to confirm the exact points made by Rosow in his report to 
the president the previous year. Tending to the pocketbook anxieties of Americans would 
increasingly consume Nixon during the run-up to the 1972 presidential election, even if this 
tending meant a turn to the left when it came to domestic policy. Indeed, Nixon publicly signaled 
his leftward turn in economics by telling ABC’s Howard K. Smith in January 1971, “I am now a 
Keysian in economics” – a comment Smith said was like a Christian saying, “All things 
considered, I think Mohammad was right.” Smith also predicted a conservative backlash to 
Nixon’s proclamation, noting that Calvin Coolidge would “turn over in his grave” if he heard a 
Republican president declaring his allegiance Keynesian economics.595    
Indeed, indications that Nixon would be moving to the left following the midterm debacle 
alarmed conservatives. In early-1971, Buchanan warned the president of “trouble on the right.” 
Notable conservative movement leaders and groups like the American Conservative Union and 
the Young Americans for Freedom believed Nixon was “adopting a liberal Democratic domestic 
program, indistinguishable from what an Ed Muskie or Ed Kennedy would propose.” These 
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conservatives resented things like FAP, Nixon’s national health insurance proposal, and the 
administration’s “actively pursuing a ‘full employment budget,’ which will deliberately produce 
deficits that violate the First Article of GOP Dogma (‘balanced budget’) for forty years,” 
Buchanan told Nixon. With Arthur Burns now out of the White House and at the Fed, 
conservatives felt they had no policy voices inside the administration, since people like 
Ehrlichman and Shultz were viewed as unreliable by the right. “There is serious talk heard now 
among conservatives to urge Governor Reagan to begin to become a focal point of public 
opposition to the President’s domestic initiatives,” Buchanan warned Nixon.596 Indeed, in time, 
Reagan would not hesitate to make his opposition to FAP well known.597 But, in the short term, 
even Nixon’s seemingly innocuous “Keynesian” quote caused a stir among conservatives. Ohio 
Republican John Ashbrook penned a long New York Times editorial denouncing Nixon’s 
comment, along with the president’s budget deficits and “guaranteed income scheme,” among 
other policies. “[M]aybe, though I doubt it, that is what the American people want,” Ashbrook 
wrote. “But it certainly isn’t what I voted for [at the Republican National Convention] in Miami 
Beach in August, 1968, nor is it the platform that Richard Nixon ran on that year….” If Nixon 
had run in 1968 on a platform of “domestic spending programs…, defense deterioration, and… a 
guaranteed income. Or if candidate Nixon had said, ‘I am now a Keynesian’…,” Ashbrook 
predicted, “I feel the voters would have stuck with the party with real expertise in those areas, 
the Democratic Party.” Nixon won, in his view, because the public wanted conservatism, and 
now Nixon was giving them liberalism. This development was “agonizing for conservatives” 
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like Ashbook who attempted to convince conservatives to pick Nixon, rather than Wallace, in 
1968. “This is why there is a genuine rumbling on the American right,” Ashbrook concluded.598 
This conservative backlash against the Nixon administration was covered in the press by 
Evans and Novak, David Broder, and Stewart Alsop, among other national commentators and 
reporters.599 Alsop quipped that Nixon was “to the left of himself,” with Keynesianism and his 
proposals for federal revenue sharing and “establ[ishing] a floor under the income of every 
American family,” as Nixon had put it when proposing FAP.600 Evans and Novak devoted 
several columns to a “darkening Republican mood” when it came to Nixon, as well as litany of 
complaints from conservatives, elected and unelected, named and anonymous, including the 
recently defeated Claude Kirk’s $100-bet backed prediction that a conservative Republican 
would challenge Nixon for the 1972 nomination and win.601 Buchanan believed that, “given the 
nature of our new domestic program,” many conservatives would never return to the 
administration. At the very least, Buchanan suggested, the administration needed to focus on 
rhetorically framing domestic policies as conservative and emphasizing foreign policy with 
conservatives more often, given the liberal direction of Nixon’s domestic policy.602 
As Kirk hinted, one of conservatives’ key threats was the possibility that someone would 
challenge Nixon from the right, placing him in the type of three-way race that nearly cost him the 
presidency in 1968. This threat, in part, animated Nixon’s race-based appeals in the 1970 
midterms. But it no longer held as much sway over the president following the midterm results – 
a fact that Buchanan lamented in another long January memo delivered to Haldeman and passed 
on to the president. The conservative speechwriter specifically slammed “the ‘changes’ in 
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emphasis and goals and purpose of 1971, from [those of] 1970.” Witnessing Nixon’s leftward 
turn, Buchanan sought both to defend the “hard hat” strategy and to reignite Nixon’s fear of a 
threat from the right. “The impression among sophisticated conservatives – now being conveyed 
to the rank-and-file – is that the president, subsequent to the harsh (and unjust) criticism of his 
1970 campaign, has moved leftward in force to cover his exposed plank,” Buchanan wrote. “The 
‘full employment budget,’ the open embrace of an ‘expansionary deficit;’… the admission ‘I am 
a Keynesian now;’ the enthusiasm for both FAP and for the forthcoming FHIP [national health 
care] – these are part of a pattern left and right both recognized.”603   
Buchanan suggested that, while “an electoral cost accountant could argue that Nixon 
must move leftward to win moderate and liberals from Muskie,” such a maneuver assumed that 
Wallace would not run again as an independent and that Ronald Reagan would not challenge 
Nixon for the nomination in 1972. Those outcomes could not be assumed, Buchanan wrote, 
given the level of dissatisfaction with Nixon among conservatives, not simply because of 
Nixon’s new tone, but because of the substance of his policies. “Over the course of two years, 
but especially in the last month, the president has conspicuously abandoned many of the 
sustaining traditions of the Republican Party…,” he wrote. “Two brief examples. In both 
‘reducing the size of the federal government’ and ‘balancing the federal budget,’ the president 
has swept these traditions aside with an ease and facility that must have astonished millions of 
Republicans who have held them as articles of faith for forty years.” Nixon was courting a 
conservative revolt, Buchanan warned, by abandoning “the conservative political traditions of 
the GOP.” “Can one seriously imagine in 1972 those little old ladies in tennis shoes ringing 
doorbells in Muncie for ‘FAP,’ ‘FHIP,’ and the ‘full employment budget’[?]…” Buchanan asked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






rhetorically, referencing the “little old ladies in tennis shoes” variously referred to as the 
backbone of the John Birch Society and Barry Goldwater’s 1964 campaign. “The president’ 
recent moves…have taken him further to the left in a month than the average Republican travels 
in a lifetime…. [I]n openly appealing to moderates and liberals, in adopting programs and 
policies warmly endorsed by American liberalism, we are becoming the administration of more 
of the same.” This shift, Buchanan argued, opened a “political vacuum” on the right that “will 
not go unfulfilled.” “Either Mr. Wallace or Mr. Reagan can apply for the vacancy,” Buchanan 
warned darkly. 604   
Nixon read Buchanan’s memo closely, underlining numerous passages. In a note to 
Ehrlichman and Conally recommending that they read it, Nixon called Buchanan’s memo a 
“brilliant analysis.” But substantively, Nixon seemed to have little desire to turn back to the 
right. 605  Indeed, some administration conservatives saw not only Nixon’s move to the left – but 
also the right’s resulting indignation – as a political boon to Nixon. Looking towards the 1972 
strategy in the days following the midterm defeat, the reliable conservative William Safire wrote 
to Nixon suggesting that they “begin twisting arms and publicly fighting for the Family 
Assistance package,” as well as a “big health[care] proposal” and economic appeals to the 
“workingman.” “Controversy on the right” resulting from Nixon’s left-leaning domestic 
programs, Safire argued, “will position us firmly in the center.”606 
Rather than shift directions on economic policy to the right, Nixon sought to assuage 
conservatives by having the White House frame its centrist and left-leaning policies as 
fundamentally conservative. The administration’s handing of one of the most controversially 
Keynesian elements of the administration’s new economic philosophy demonstrated this new 
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spin-doctoring strategy in action. Facing mounting budget deficits – and eager to justify fiscal 
stimulus – the president and his economic advisers adopted the fiscal yardstick of a “full 
employment budget.” The concept of declaring the budget balanced if it would create a surplus 
were the economy operating at full employment was associated in the minds of many 
Republicans with Kennedy-Johnson Democrats, given that the idea was justified and defended at 
length in the 1962 Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers as a “somewhat 
unfamiliar but highly useful” tool for analyzing the budget and used by Democratic 
administrations thereafter.607  
Given continued resistance to this idea by small-government conservatives, 
administration economist Herbert Stein went on the offensive, casting the “full employment 
budget” as a fundamentally conservative idea, despite its association with liberal Democrats. 
“[T]he idea of a budget that would be balanced when the economy is operating at full 
employment and have a deficit when the economy is operating below that has a long, 
conservative, Republican pedigree,” Stein wrote in a New York Times editorial, tracing the idea 
to the proposals by the Committee for Economic Development, which Stein characterized as “a 
group of businessmen and bankers, overwhelmingly Republican,” in 1947.608 Not coincidentally, 
Stein was the CED’s economist at the time the proposal was crafted.609 Just a year later, Stein 
noted, Milton Friedman had endorsed the idea in an article. “The Nixon administration did not 
have to search the files left by their [Democratic] predecessors to find the full-employment 
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balance idea and they did not have to abandon any deep Republican convictions to use it,” Stein 
concluded.610 Nixon loved the editorial. “Excellent,” Nixon noted. “H[alderman] – get this to our 
Republican conservatives…[and] [h]ave it widely circulated to our speakers on this subject…”611 
Speaking before the Ways and Means Committee, Stein used fiscalist terms to defend the idea of 
targeting a budget that would be balanced “by the receipts that would be yielded by the existing 
tax system at full employment,” rather than a budget balanced by the current economic 
conditions and resulting revenue. “First, it would exert an automatic and stabilizing influence on 
the economy,” Stein explained. “If the economy fell below full employment, deficits would 
automatically occur…. If the economy rose in an inflationary boom…surpluses would 
automatically occur.” 612  
An even more difficult sales job faced the White House when it came to its most 
controversial domestic proposal – the Family Assistance Plan. In 1969, Nixon called for a “basic 
income” of $1,600 for a family of four, with work incentives and, in some cases, requirements. 
Nixon noted that his plan was aimed at the “working poor,” as well as current welfare 
recipients.613 The impetus for welfare reform was twofold. First, a variety of economic, social, 
and political forces led to the expansion of the welfare rolls during the 1960s.614 These forces 
included migration to urban centers, industrial dislocation, suburbanization, and employment 
discrimination. At the same time, social welfare activists – exemplified by the National Welfare 
Rights Organization – assisted Americans eligible for public assistance in registering for 
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services. The NWRO also lobbied for more generous benefits. Activists like those in NWRO, 
along with many academic and policymakers, believed that the rapid growth of the rolls in the 
United States’ patchwork, state-driven welfare system would eventually lead to a federal 
takeover of the system and the institution of some form of guaranteed minimum income. 615   
Nixon’s proposals followed a long-line of “guaranteed income” and “negative income 
tax” studies and proposals throughout the 1960s.616 The consensus view of LBJ’s President’s 
Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, as his Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy 
Stanley Surrey later summarized, was that a system of cash grants – “income oriented plans,” as 
Surrey put it – was desirable. Two categories of such plans existed. The first, broadly viewed as 
a “negative income tax,” would vary with income. The second, which would be universal, could 
be “identified as social dividends, demogrants, family allowances, children allowances, and so 
forth,” as Surrey put it. The difference between the two categories narrowed – even disappeared 
– however, when considering the fact that portions of the latter would be taxed away thanks to 
progressive tax rates. Moreover, the relationship between the tax distribution and these minimum 
income proposals was clear to the commission. “As respects tax equity, the taxes that the poor 
must pay contribute to their income deficiency,” Surrey explained. “The burdens of state and 
local property and sales taxes and the burden of federal Social Security taxes are particularly 
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hard on the poor.” Relieving low-income Americans of these regressive taxes was the first, but 
the only, step in removing them from poverty. The some variant of a guaranteed income would 
take that first step and, perhaps, go beyond it.617 Such plans’ anti-bureaucratic simplicity, indeed, 
attracted praise not only from many on the left, but also libertarian-leaning Republicans, which is 
how the FAP ended up on Nixon’s domestic agenda.  
Nixon’s welfare reform proposals went nowhere in the first two years of his presidency, 
thanks to disagreements between liberal and conservative lawmakers – including Russell Long, 
who, despite his occasional willingness to embrace tax reform, strenuously opposed guaranteed 
income plans from the right.618 Nixon called the failure of FAP and the Kent State and Jackson 
State killings as his “greatest disappointments” from his first two years.619  However, Nixon’s 
commitment to the FAP began to waiver following the difficulty it faced in the 91st Congress. As 
Nixon planned for the second half of his first term, he worried that the FAP could be 
“questionable politically” without “more emphasis on the work requirement.” 620 Nixon and his 
advisers even debated whether they should “sink FAP.”621 However, considering that Nixon had 
proposed it to much fanfare just a few years earlier, abandoning it completely seemed unlikely. 
Plus, welfare reform had other attractions beyond helping the poor and the working poor. 
Talking to Senators Michael J. Mansfield, Hugh Scott, Wallace F. Bennett, and Russell B. Long 
on December 30, 1970, Nixon pushed hard for both Revenue Sharing and FAP as way to aid the 
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states. “Major states are broke,” Nixon noted. “[There is] a crisis in government…. School 
finance [is] in trouble. [We] must have welfare reform and revenue sharing next year.”622  
Nixon’s appeals on behalf of FAP did little to aid its fortunes during the 92nd Congress, 
however. The combination of liberal Democrats and left-leaning activists’ calls for a more 
expansive guaranteed income and conservative Republicans’ intransigent opposition to almost 
any such plan made it nearly impossible for Congress to find common ground on a bill. Even the 
key Finance Committee senators Nixon had lobbied to approve FAP did not budge. Rather than 
back the president’s position, Bennett lamented that conservative interest groups were not 
fighting FAP more strongly. During Finance Committee hearings, Bennett slammed the National 
Association of Manufacturer’s leadership for failing to attack FAP vigorously. “I am going to 
say a harsh thing,” Bennett told NAM representatives. “You live in an ivory tower. You have 
made no attempt to find out what we are doing on this thing.” Bennett lambasted NAM’s 
“weakness” and critiqued NAM for not contacting him as an inside source of information on the 
welfare reform proposal. 623   Likewise, Russell Long remained adamantly opposed to a 
guaranteed income in any form. In Senate hearings, the Louisiana Democrat offered an almost 
conspiratorial explanation for the existence of the FAP. “The whole scheme was thought up 
before Richard Nixon ever became president of the United States. They took it down there to the 
White House and the Democratic president [Johnson] said ‘If I recommend that kind of thing to 
the Democratic Congress they would run me out of town,’” Long quipped, without specifying 
who “they” were. “Then they proceed to tell Nixon this is something that could only become law 
with a Republican in the White House. He did not understand what that meant. If you could get a 
Republican president to recommend this fool thing the public would think it was something 
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different than what it was.” 624 As with most pieces of economic policy, failing to have the 
support of both Mills and Long made passing FAP an uphill battle for its supporters. 
Supporters of a guaranteed income program not only pushed for a more generous plan 
than FAP, but also tried to eliminate the “taxpayer”/”tax eater” dichotomy by stressing the that 
any guaranteed income plan would not only constitute a benefit to the poor, but also a tax cut for 
many working- and middle-class Americans. Perhaps most significant activist group pushing a 
guaranteed income was the National Welfare Rights Organization. The NWRO’s head was 
George Wiley, a former chemistry professor and Congress of Racial Equality leader.625 Wiley 
would eventually found a new tax-centered organization aimed at uniting poor, working-, and 
middle-class families (as will be discussed in the next chapter). However, even while head of the 
NWRO – criticized by critics as representatives of the “tax eaters,” rather than taxpayers – Wiley 
was concerned with matters of tax justice. Wiley testified on behalf of NWRO during the May 
1971 IRS hearings on Nixon’s ADR change. “The proposed $3 billion tax giveaway [ADR]…is 
welfare for the wealthy,” Wiley charged. “It is a deliberate and calculated attempt by the 
government to steal from the poor and give to the rich.” ADR, Wiley argued, showed that Nixon 
was only concerned with “increasing the power and profits of the powerful and rich at the 
expense of the poor and the middle income taxpayer.” 626 In a NWRO press release, Wiley wrote, 
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“We need to close tax loopholes which benefit the rich – not open them wider.”  ADR would do 
little to stimulate the economy, Wiley argued. Instead, the NWRO leader wrote, Nixon should 
focus on spending and tax programs that would benefit the “$5 to $15,000 wage earners.” 
NWRO’s proposal for a minimum income would do just that, Wiley suggested, by providing not 
only badly needed income for “working in non-working poor,” but also “tax relief for most 
families under $15,000.”627  
Opposition to ADR was part of NRWO’s long-standing focus on revenue lost to the 
government in the form of “tax expenditures” and loopholes. The NWRO sought to place the 
country’s expenditures on welfare in contrast to expenditures on loopholes that benefitted 
corporations and upper-income individuals. NWRO’s release – titled “Welfare for the Poor – 
Poverty for the Rich” – outlined seven loopholes, including oil depletion and the capital gains 
exemption, totaling more than $51 billion per year.628 That total was more than ten times total 
AFDC expenditures on both the federal and state levels.629 “Every American could have an 
adequate income fro that same amount [$50 billion],” the NWRO flyer concluded. “NWRO’s 
$5,500 Adequate Income Plan would cost $50 billion.” 630 NWRO’s plan was based on the BLS 
“lower standard” family budget, which called for a $5,915 for a family of four in 1967.631 
Actually, the NWRO’s 1969 proposal initially came in below this standard, especially 
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considering inflation. It called for $1,900 for an individual and $5,500 for a family of four, with 
the grant reduced by two-thirds of the recipient’s earnings, thereby providing a work incentive 
by allowing the recipient to keep 1/3 of the earnings until the initial grant was phased out.632 By 
1971, NWRO called for $6,500 for a family of four, rather than $5,500, in order to reflect the 
increasing cost of living.633 Once again, NWRO called for funding the minimum income plan by 
closing tax loopholes. The NWRO also stressed that working- and middle-income taxpayers 
would be better off under their system, too, since, even as the grant phased out, it would 
essentially become a tax cut for families above the poverty line. For example, a family of four 
making $10,000 in 1973 would have an after-tax income of $9,833 under NWRO’s plan, 
compared to $8,445 under existing tax law. The break-even point for NWRO’s plan was just 
under $11,500, though other calculations pegged it as closer to $9,500.634 Wiley understood the 
political realities of the tax revolt, even as he was pushing for the most generous welfare benefits 
possible for NWRO’s members. “We feel that there ought to be relief for the local taxpayers and 
we feel that the system which uses property taxes and sales taxes as the base for subsidizing 
public assistance is really a very regressive tax system,” Wiley told Congress, “[Instead] the 
federal tax…should be used and it should be even more progressive and more heavily distributed 
on the corporations than it is at the present time.” 635 
Other guaranteed income supporters noted that – beyond the direct federal tax benefits – 
the federalization of welfare would help to lower regressive local taxes. Milwaukee Mayor 
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Henry Maier, representing the U.S. Conference of Mayors, told the House that mayors across the 
country wanted to see the federal government assume more of the costs of public assistance. 
Doing so, Maier pointed out, would help alleviate not only the “fiscal crisis” of states and 
localities, but also the rising property tax burden on citizens. “[I]t is folly to expect a tax that was 
designed for the simple functions of fire and garbage and sewage, the property tax, to carry the 
burdens and the problems of poverty and health and crime and education,” Maier said. “And this 
is the load that the property tax is being expected to carry in most of the central cities of 
America.”636 Likewise, William G. Coleman, ACIR’s executive director, explained to the Ways 
and Means Committee that the ACIR recommended the federal “assumption of [the] full 
financial responsibility for public assistance.” The ACIR viewed FAP as an important step 
towards that goal. Part of the end result, Coleman explained, would be a lessening of both the 
fiscal crisis and the roots of the tax revolt. “Federal assumption would free up nearly $5 billion 
of state and local revenue,” he explained. “It would (a) benefit most those states and cities where 
the poor have tended to congregate, (b) reduce tax differentials between the distressed central 
cities and their most affluent suburbs, and (c) diminish pressure on the regressive local property 
tax.” 637  This widespread support for FAP, or a similar federal assumption of welfare 
responsibility, did not prevent conservatives – led by Russell Long, who almost singlehandedly 
prevented FAP’s passage in both 1971 and 1972 – from repeatedly scuttling FAP prior to the 
1972 elections.638 
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The debates surrounding FAP would reemerge during the 1972 presidential campaign. 
However, in the meantime, with FAP stalled in Congress, those looking to address the “tax 
revolt” would turn to the debates surrounding another piece of Nixon legislation with a long 
lineage on the left – federal revenue sharing with states and localities.  
 
Revenue Sharing as Progressive Tax Reform  
By the time Richard Nixon made federal revenue sharing with states and localities the 
centerpiece of his “New Federalism” – a phrase devised by William Safire and Richard Nathan – 
in his 1971 State of the Union Address, revenue sharing had a long and winding history. At 
various times over the previous decades, revenue sharing had been proposed by conservatives 
and liberals, Democrats and Republicans, albeit often for different reasons. As the Washington 
Post wryly observed, “Few programs in recent years have been advocated as a remedy for so 
many diverse and conflicting ills as revenue sharing.”639 For Nixon, perhaps the best reason to 
push the enactment of sharing prior to the 1972 elections was its political popularity. By late-
1970, revenue sharing enjoyed the support of 70 percent of Americans, regardless of party.640 
But exactly what about revenue sharing made it so popular was hotly contested. The meaning of 
revenue sharing not only affected which party should view it as a political victory, but also what 
form it should take and what elements of the legislation should be emphasized for maximum 
political effect. Indeed, just as the tax revolt was itself a contested term, so was the very idea of 
revenue sharing. For Nixon and Democrats, alike, the debate surrounding revenue sharing shifted 
– both before and after its enactment – uniformly towards a more left-distributionist 
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understanding not only of revenue sharing itself, but also of the tax revolt and the relationship 
between the two. 
The idea of revenue sharing had a long lineage before Richard Milhous Nixon finally 
embraced it. In 1805, Thomas Jefferson suggested in his second inaugural address that excess 
federal revenue be distributed “by a just repartition among the states.”641 Nearly two decades 
later, Henry Clay proposed the idea of sending federal revenue to the states as part of the Whig’s 
philosophy of federalism in the “American System.”642 The idea of the federal government 
sharing revenue with the states continued to gain traction until Congress passed the Distribution 
Act of 1836, which was signed into law by Andrew Jackson, even though Jackson had vetoed a 
different revenue sharing bill just three years earlier and had long argued that the federal 
government sharing money with the states would promote fiscal irresponsibility.643 In his 1833 
veto message, Jackson had argued that “it is neither wise nor safe to release the members of their 
local legislatures from the responsibility of levying the taxes necessary to support their state 
governments and vest it in Congress….”644 
Democrat Andrew Jackson’s reasons for opposing revenue sharing, in fact, prefigured the 
anti-RS arguments of Arthur Burns’s and other conservatives in the 1960s and 1970s. Jackson’s 
first objection to revenue sharing was that it was unconstitutional. Jackson argued that letting one 
level of government spend revenue that another had raised would lead to profligate spending, 
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soaring taxes, and, possibly, a tax revolt. “All will admit that the simplicity and economy of the 
state governments mainly depend on the fact that money has to be supplied to support them by 
the same men, or their agents, who vote it away in appropriations. Hence when there are 
extravagant and wasteful appropriations there must be a corresponding increase of taxes, and the 
people, becoming awakened, will necessarily scrutinize the character of measures which thus 
increase their burdens….,” Jackson explained in his 1836 SOTU address. “But if the necessity of 
levying the taxes be taken from those who make the appropriations and thrown upon a more 
distant and less responsible set of public agents, who have power to approach the people by an 
indirect and stealthy taxation, there is reason to fear that…[t]he state legislatures, instead of 
studying to restrict their State expenditures to the smallest possible sum, will claim credit for 
their profusion, and harass the General Government for increased supplies.”645 Proponents like 
Clay eventually secured the reluctant Jackson’s support by labeling the funds dispersed by the 
Distribution Act as loans that the federal government could call in should it find itself in deficit. 
“It was an open secret that all of this was a false front, and yet President Jackson glossed over his 
reluctance to sign the bill by pretending that the deposits were genuine…,” as a 1946 history put 
it. All told, $28 million was distributed in 1837 by the federal government to the states according 
to their representation. An additional $9 million in payments scheduled for distribution was 
suspended due to the deep recession following the Panic of 1837.646 But after this brief flirtation 
with revenue sharing in the 1830s, the issue would remain dormant for over a century.  
Eventually, states would institute their own version of revenue sharing. In the 1930s, 
many states began sharing revenues with localities in substantial amounts. At the turn of the 
century state revenues had made up just over six percent of local governments’ revenue. But by 
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the late-1920s, that percent had topped 10 percent. A decade later, state aid made up nearly 25 
percent of local revenue. However, the percentage of state sharing with localities largely flatlined 
between the late-1940s and early-1960s, remaining at just under 30 percent of local revenue. By 
the 1950s and 1960s, many states faced their own budget crises and, consequently, localities 
could no longer count on larger and larger shares of their budgets being provided by the state. 
Much of this state intergovernmental revenue sharing went to education and welfare. State 
revenue made up nearly three quarters of local “public welfare” expenditures by the 1960s.  In 
contrast, state aid composed far less than half of local expenditures on education. For education, 
which was modernizing and expanding in the post-WWII era, flat state expenditures proved to be 
a significant problem.647  The budget issues facing states and localities by the 1960s proved to be 
both complex and inherently structural, which called into question the entire edifice of U.S. 
“fiscal federalism.” 
Throughout the postwar era, both state and, especially, local governments’ abilities to pay 
for services were tested. “[S]ince the end of WWII, the state and local expenditure growth rate 
has far outpaced both that of the federal government and the private sector,” the ACIR noted. 
“While the national government’s share of GNP (purchases of goods and services) crept up 
between 1946 and 1966 [from 8.3 to 10.4 percent of GNP], the state and local government share 
more than doubled – from 4.7 percent of GNP in 1946 to 10.4 percent in 1966.” Thus, even with 
the growth of Cold War expenditures and federal safety net programs in the postwar era, 
expansion of state and local governments dwarfed federal expenditures. The pattern in taxes 
proved to be the same. “The growth in in state and local tax collections has likely far outpaced 
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growth in federal tax collections since the end of WWII,” the commission noted. “To achieve 
this result, states and their political subdivisions enacted new taxes and increased existing taxes.” 
Indeed, while federal taxes had hovered around 19 percent of GDP for the twenty years 
following the end of WWII, state and local taxes had climbed from less than six percent to more 
than nine percent of GDP. But this increase in tax revenue still was not enough to finance state 
and local government growth. Instead, states and localities took on an enormous amount of debt. 
Between 1948 and 1966, federal debt rose 26 percent, while state and local government debt 
increased more than 400 percent.648  
Reasons for the steep post-WWII increase in state and local expenditures – and taxes – 
were multifaceted. Some, such as population growth and urbanization were simple. Others were 
more nuanced. Rising living standards – as both longtime Bureau of the Budget economist 
William H. Robinson and the ACIR noted, writing 20 years apart – drove by the public’s demand 
for new and better services, which, in turn, necessitated higher expenditures. 649 Yet, localities, in 
particular, often lacked the revenue opportunities meet the public’s rising demand for new and 
better services. And, even when those tax sources were available, convincing the public to 
approve higher taxes proved to be difficult. As Robinson noted, the incentives were mismatched 
when it came to the costs and benefits of some public goods. The cost of education, for example, 
was “borne fully by the local community while the ‘benefits’ may be lost when trained people 
leave the area.” Education, then, like many resources, were better provided by higher levels of 
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government, Robinson argued.650 As economists Selma J. Mushkin and Robert F. Adams 
concluded in 1966, summarizing a widespread public finance conclusion, “where there are large 
geographic spillovers, the taxpayers rationally decide in favor of lower expenditures…and bring 
about an underallocation of resources for those services….”651 Making matters worse, studies 
found that demand for services did not increase proportionately with population. Instead, it 
increased almost exponentially because, as the ACIR put it, “in an increasingly urbanized 
environment their needs take on new dimension and as they become more affluent, their 
demands for public services become more sophisticated and still more insistent.” Because of the 
service-oriented, labor-intensive nature of government activity, this lead to a rapid increase in 
costs – and taxes.652  
Throughout much of the post-New Deal era, the federal government complicated matters 
by instituting programs with joint federal-state and federal-local financing systems, including 
Aid to Dependent Children and the Federal Highway Act, among others. Such program 
structures not only necessitated more state and local revenues, but also complicated the 
budgetary process for states and localities, since the federal portions of this aid usually came 
with strings attached. As the ACIR put it, “most of the major grant programs require some 
matching on the part of the state… [and] this portion can represent a significant element in a 
state budget.”653 Indeed, grants-in-aid assumed a larger and larger role in the system of fiscal 
federalism throughout the 20th century, particularly during and after the Great Depression. As 
ACIR noted in 1967, “categorical grants have grown steadily in terms of programs affected, 
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expenditures, and the proportion of the national budget.” These categorical grants became “the 
predominant type of federal intergovernmental transfer.”654 Between 1947 and 1968, grants-in-
aid rose from less than 5 percent to nearly 10 percent of total federal expenditures. Likewise, 
federal grant-in-aid expenditures rose from approximately 12 percent to approximately 18 
percent of state and local revenue in the same period.655 
Additionally, the regressivity of both state and, especially, local taxes ensured that low- 
and middle-income taxpayers were squeezed, while those with better ability to pay were taxed 
lightly for services like public safety, education, infrastructure, and social welfare. Some taxes 
faced more public resistance than others. But, throughout the 1950s and early-1960s, while the 
federal government enjoyed the relatively well-tolerated and highly elastic graduated federal 
income tax, localities were stuck with unpopular property taxes, and states mostly relied on 
regressive consumer taxes. “The revenue side of fiscal federalism resembles more closely the 
‘layer cake,’ dominated by federal income [taxes], state consumer [taxes], and local property 
taxes,” the ACIR noted in 1967. In 1966, the federal government collected nearly 93 percent of 
all income taxes, the state governments collected more than 50 percent of the nation’s 
consumption taxes (with the federal government accounting for more than 43 percent), while 
local government collected 97 percent of all property taxes. These distributions had remained 
roughly unchanged since the 1920s, with the exception of sales taxes. Over the period, states had 
effectively claimed consumption from the federal government, which had once collected nearly 
70 percent of all consumption levies.656 “[T]here is no question that the unremitting pressure for 
additional revenue poses a clear-cut challenge to a decentralized system of government,” the 
commission noted. “Political influence and control, of necessity, gravitate to that level of 
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government that experiences the least political difficulty in raising revenues. It is this fact that 
has given the revenue-sharing issue its sharp political and fiscal focus.”657  
As fiscal federalism became more and more complex, policymakers on all levels of 
government increasingly returned to the idea of federal revenue sharing as a solution to the fiscal 
woes of states and localities. In 1947, the Council of State Governments created the Joint 
Conference on Federal-State Tax Relations. Attended by 15 governors, 10 House members, and 
6 senators, the conference produced a series of recommendations, including that “the States 
should avoid encroachment upon tax fields which are peculiarly adaptable to Federal use.”658 But 
that same year, a Senate Subcommittee to Study Intergovernmental Relations recommended 
“improv[ing] the equity and administrative efficiency of the country’s overall tax structure” as a 
goal for U.S. fiscal federalism.659 Likewise, the “Hoover Commission,” appointed by Harry 
Truman in 1947 and headed by Herbert Hoover, was tasked with studying Federal-State 
relations. In its final report, the commission made a strong case for the artificiality of the barriers 
between the levels of government. “There is no past in which these governments were 
completely separate entities,” the commission argued. “There is no future in which completely 
separated, strong governments may exist.” The Hoover commission endorsed increased federal 
grants to the states, arguing for something in between narrow grants-in-aid and broad, no-strings-
attached distribution of federal revenue to the states. Grants should be made “on a broad 
functional basis,” the commission argued. In other words, the federal government could provide 
grants in general spending areas to the state, while allowing the states wide leeway in how they 
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were spent. In terms of the tax mix, however, the Hoover Commission was very traditional. It 
argued that “the national government relinquish to the states the field of retail sales and excise 
taxation” and that the state government’s cease “encroach[ing] on sources more properly federal, 
such as the income tax….”660  
In 1953, Congress established yet another commission to study “intergovernmental fiscal 
relations” dubbed the “Kestnbaum Commission,” after chair Meyer Kestnbaum, a business 
executive who was appointed by Eisenhower. From the start, the Kestnbaum Commission was 
torn between conservatives who saw it as a vehicle for attacking New Deal-era expansion of the 
federal government and liberals who sought to defend those programs. Its largely-ignored final 
report, rife with dissents on specific points and a disappointment for both sides, read like a 
“middle-of-the-road” hymn to federalism. It called vaguely for “[L]eav[ing] to private initiative 
all the functions that citizens can perform privately; us[ing] the level of government closest to 
the community for all public functions it can handle…[and] reserve[ing] national action for 
residual participation where state and local governments are not fully adequate…” When it came 
to taxes, the commission called for restraint in spending and revenue-raising at all levels of 
government. For localities, the “solution” to their “revenue problems” was “strengthening the 
property tax and in greater assistance from state revenues,” though at least one member called for 
local income taxes. The commission came out strongly against general sharing of revenue by the 
federal government with states and localities. “The federal government does not and should not 
attempt to equalize fully State fiscal capacities…,” the report declared. “The commission 
believes that, whenever possible, decisions to spend and decisions to tax should be made at the 
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same governmental level, thus encouraging financial responsibility.”661 After an intervening 
series of additional commissions and hearings – including a “Second Hoover Commission,” 
crafted by conservatives to propose downsizing government and “eliminating” government 
competition with “private enterprise” – Congress created what would be the longest-running and 
most influential repository for analyzing fiscal federalism in 1959 with the inauguration of the 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.  
The ACIR became a permanent commission composed of three U.S. senators, three U.S. 
congressional representatives, four governors, three state legislators, three county officials, four 
mayors, and three citizens. (Three representatives of the executive branch would be added later.) 
While its primary concern was increasing the fiscal health of states and localities, the ACIR, at 
least initially, fell short of recommending no-strings-attached revenue sharing between. Instead, 
much of the ACIR’s efforts revolved around devising reforms to help states and localities make 
“more effective use of their own taxing powers.” Yet, the ACIR also argued for an increased 
federal role in equalizing revenue between states and localities for specific program areas. Even 
more boldly, ACIR called for a federal tax credit for state income tax payments, a policy that the 
ACIR believed would encourage states, via a “mild inducement,” to enact income taxes, which 
the commission – with some controversy – saw as the best form of taxation.662 Though the 
potential encouragement of state income taxes would prove to be one of the most contested 
issues in discussing federal revenue sharing, especially for conservatives, a conservative 
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Republican was one of the most vocal advocates of revenue sharing in the 1950s. 
As revenue sharing become a viable policy option in the 1960s, many observers pointed 
to congressional representative Melvin Laird, a Wisconsin Republican, as the one of the earliest 
proponents of modern revenue sharing. “Laird has been pushing this idea since 1958,” Business 
Week quipped in the mid-1960s.663 Laird’s fondness for revenue sharing grew out of his time as a 
state senator, where he helped devise a plan that sent 50 cents of each state tax dollar back to the 
locality and 10 cents to the county, with the state keeping the remaining 40 cents. When Laird 
attempted to gain support for his federal bill, introduced in 1958, it gained few supporters. Most 
federal legislators were not thrilled with the prospect of handing states and localities tax monies 
that federal policymakers felt entitled to spend themselves. But Laird, like many conservatives, 
viewed it as a small-government measure designed to shrink the federal government and return 
power to the local level. Year after year Laird continued introducing revenue sharing bills and 
delivering speeches touting revenue sharing’s virtues to no avail.664 Crucially, however, Laird’s 
vision of revenue sharing differed in one significant way from subsequent, more left-leaning, 
proposals. Laird envisioned the program as a replacement for existing federal grants-in-aid, 
rather than as an additional source of revenue.665 The explicit goal of revenue sharing, in the 
view of Laird and other conservatives, was to shrink government, overall, and dismantle much of 
the federal welfare state. As a result, the early conservative revenue sharing proposals gained 
little traction outside of the political right. Indeed, the most significant liberal proponents of 
revenue sharing had a very different purpose in mind. 
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 Liberal Democratic economists revived the idea of revenue sharing during the heady 
economic days of Kennedy-Johnson era as an alternative to the federal tax-cutting model of 
“growth liberalism.” The 1962 and 1964 tax cut packages were criticized by many left-leaning 
economists for several reasons. Some, such as John Kenneth Galbraith, said that the revenue lost 
in the tax cuts would have had a more simulative effect if spent on public infrastructure and 
services. Other economists were more supportive of tax cuts, but argued that the JFK-LBJ 
packages should have been focused more on lower- and middle-income taxpayers, rather than 
giving so many benefits to businesses and upper-income taxpayers. Left-labor economists 
derisively dubbed this emphasis on business incentives and across-the-board individual cuts 
“commercial or domesticated” Keynesianism.666 Though these critics failed to alter the Kennedy-
Johnson cuts, their arguments did not fall on deaf ears. Though he was perhaps the main architect 
of the Kennedy-Johnson tax cuts, JFK’s CEA chair Walter Heller joined with tax economist 
Joseph Pechman to become the prime Democratic advocate for revenue sharing, which was 
conceived by Heller and Pechman as an alternative to further federal income tax cuts. Heller, 
Pechman, and other policy experts on the left saw revenue sharing proposals as a solution to 
what had become an undeniable set of interlocking problems: the fiscal crises of state and local 
governments and the burgeoning revolt against rising state and local taxes, especially property 
taxes. “If state and local treasuries could be buttressed with general purpose financial aid they 
would be freer to shape responsive remedies to their particular local needs,” the ACIR 
summarized of Heller’s proposal. “To the extent that federal taxes collected through the 
progressive income tax could be substituted for further increases in state and local collections 
from regressive sales and property taxes, the fairness of the overall American tax system would 
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be improved.”667 Heller’s own attention to the struggles of states and localities and the prospects 
of sharing revenues between the levels of government was informed by his work as an adviser to 
the governor of Minnesota.668 
The contrast between confident exuberance of the “commercial” or “domesticated” 
Keynesian tax-cutting of the Johnson-Kennedy White House and the struggles of states and 
localities during the same period was marked. “While Federal officials have worried alternately 
about inflation and the drag on tie economy imposed by rapidly rising federal tax revenues, state 
and local governments have struggled, frequently with only indifferent success, to provide the 
wide variety of services their citizens are increasingly demanding,” Berkeley economist George 
Break noted in 1967. “All too often in the governmental sector, the money is not where the needs 
are: or if it is there, the means for mobilizing it are far from obvious.”669 In that way, 
“commercial Keynesianism” and the fiscal crises of states and localities were inextricably 
intertwined. The federal government’s coffers were overflowing while those of state and local 
governments’ were empty for much the same reason. Rising federal revenues, spurred by both 
growth and inflation, financed the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut of 1964. Growth swelled tax rolls 
because it enlarged the economy, while inflation pushed taxpayers into higher income tax 
brackets, since the brackets were not indexed to the cost-of-living. For states and localities, 
dependent primarily on regressive or flat taxes, neither growth nor inflation generated the same 
rapid rise in tax collections as occurred from the federal income tax. In contrast, Keynesian 
policymakers in D.C. actually saw these rising revenues as a problem. They created what 
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economists dubbed a “fiscal drag,” since the federal government was siphoning off a larger and 
larger share of consumers’ purchasing power with each point of increase in the national income 
or the CPI.  Usually only two options were considered for combatting this “fiscal drag”: 
increasing spending on new federal programs or cutting federal income taxes. But a third option 
existed, proponents of revenue sharing argued. Instead of either creating new federal programs or 
pursuing “further tax cuts,” the federal government could dispose of its excess revenue in the 
form of “unrestricted grants to the states,” as the ACIR explained in 1965.670  
Experts with an eye toward the entire edifice of fiscal federalism – not just the federal 
budget – saw the “fiscal crisis” facing states and localities as a solution to the federal “fiscal 
drag” problem, and vice versa. “Those troubled with the fiscal constraints with which the state 
and local governments contend as they strive to respond to the people’s burgeoning needs are 
understandably attracted to suggestions that the federal government deploy more of its resources 
to their needs,” the ACIR noted in 1967. “They received strong encouragement at the time of the 
1964-65 federal tax reduction, when much public discussion inside and outside the federal 
government focused on the striking revenue growth potential of the federal tax structure….” 
Many observers argued that at least some of “excess” federal revenue should be used to relieve 
the fiscal pressure on states and localities – allowing them to increase spending and reduce the 
use of regressive property and sales taxes – rather than to cut federal income taxes.671 The ACIR 
predicted that either an “unconditional grant approach” or a “conditional grant approach” to 
revenue sharing would be the most politically saleable to conservatives and liberals. To some 
degree, the ACIR noted, both approaches would equalize states’ revenues, and both would either 
leave the overall tax burden unaffected or make it slightly more progressive. The commission 
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also held out the possibility that a “tax credit option approach” could win the approval of 
Congress. The ACIR’s tentative proposal called for giving federal taxpayers the option of either 
itemizing their states and local taxes as a deduction or receiving a tax credit for state and local 
tax payments above a certain percentage of income – the latter of which would have great appeal 
to low- and middle-income taxpayers.  Though this plan offered “no significant” equalizing 
effects between states, it would be a progressive reform, since – given state and local taxes’ 
regressively – “low and middle income tax bracket taxpayers [would] receive larger write-offs” 
under the plan. The plan would also increase progressivity, ACIR predicted, by encouraging 
states to increase income taxes – a goal embraced by distribution-minded Democrats.672 
Walter Heller developed his proposal for a left-leaning iteration revenue sharing system 
in cooperation Joseph Pechman, who chaired a revenue sharing task force in the Johnson 
administration. 673  Rather than replacing existing federal aid, as conservatives like Laird 
envisioned, Heller and Pechman believed that existing federal grants-in-aid “should remain the 
basic method of providing assistance,” with revenue sharing providing a supplement of “no 
strings attached” funds to states and localities.674 The Heller-Pechman plan called for two percent 
of the federal income tax base to be set aside for sharing with states and localities. Given that 
federal income tax revenues had risen to nearly $50 billion in 1964, Heller and Pechman were 
effectively proposing a $1 billion no-strings-attached program of revenue sharing in addition to 
existing grants-in-aid. 675  However, both Heller and Pechman considered the two percent 
suggestion to be “illustrative.” Depending on the needs of states and localities and the condition 
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of the federal government, the percent could be lower or higher.676 Under the Heller-Pechman 
plan, revenue was to be allocated on the basis of population, tax effort, and per capita income.677 
Thus Heller’s proposal for revenue sharing served as an alternative solution to the “fiscal drag,” 
predicted to reach as high as $6 billion per year, as growth and inflation pushed tax revenues 
beyond federal needs. 678 Rather than continuing to cut federal income taxes and returning federal 
revenues to individual Americans – and disproportionately to upper-income taxpayers, as many 
critics noted – revenue sharing would return the federal revenue to states and localities which 
could, in turn, also return the money to the public, but in the form of cuts to largely regressive 
taxes. 679  
The Johnson administration clearly understood the fiscal dire straights facing states and 
localities. “Since World War II, state and local expenditures have been growing far more rapidly 
than federal outlays,” the 1967 Economic Report of the President noted. 680 Indeed, the Johnson 
White House justified many of the Great Society’s most ambitious attempts at localism financed 
by federal dollars – like Model Cities and the Community Action Program – in terms of states 
and localities constrained ability to address pressing social and economic issues. “The cost of 
dealing with the overwhelming problems of poverty, housing, physical and human renewal 
exceeds the revenue potential of many cities,” the 1967 Economic Report of the President 
concluded. “If each city were required to achieve a financial balance within its own borders, it 
would be forced to neglect some of the most pressing social problems of our time. There is no 
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escape from the conclusion that the Federal Government must continue to provide a share of the 
resources cities need to remain engines of economic and social progress.” The fiscal imbalance 
in the federal system, the report explained, could be explained by a disconnect between service 
delivery and revenue raising.  “To finance their budgets, these governments have increased tax 
rates and assessments frequently; yet state and local debt has increased sevenfold,” the report 
noted. “Over the same period, federal receipts have generally kept pace with expenditures in 
peacetime, despite reductions in tax rates….” While the federal government’s revenue-raising 
abilities were substantial, those of states and localities were decidedly limited.681   
Johnson’ economic advisers linked the poverty of states and localities in the midst of the 
federal government’s budgetary plenty to the distribution of their respective tax burdens. The 
administration distilled the essence of the studies of American “fiscal federalism” undertaken 
since WWII. By mid-1960s, the LBJ economic team explained, the federal government enjoyed 
a near-monopoly on progressive income taxes. “Partly by historical accident, the federal 
Government has developed the best source of revenue, namely the income tax…,” the Johnson 
economic team declared. “Despite its imperfections, the federal individual income tax is one of 
the best taxes ever devised. By taxing larger incomes at higher rates, it squares with the 
American notion of equity. Its revenue yield rises strongly as the economy grows. It serves as a 
built-in stabilizer by varying with economic fluctuations. By comparison with other taxes, it 
interferes least with job choices and expenditure decisions.” While the federal government relied 
on individual income taxes for more than 40 percent of its revenue, it supplied less than six 
percent of states and localities revenue. Instead, states and localities received over 20 percent of 
their revenue from sales taxes and more than 30 percent from property taxes. This system was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






flawed for several reasons, according to the Johnson White House. “Sales and property taxes are 
regressive. A poor family pays a substantial sales tax in most states even if it owes nothing under 
the efderal income tax. Sales taxes also discriminate among taxpayers in similar economic 
circumstances. Families with the same incomes but different patterns of consumption may pay 
different amounts; and large families may bear a relatively heavier burden than small families,” 
the ERP noted. “Moreover, the yield of sales taxes is less responsive than that of income taxes to 
economic growth. Property taxes, which are the major source of financing for education, are 
especially objectionable to homeowners who have no children and cause hardships for those who 
own their own homes but have relatively low current incomes. They can also discourage private 
efforts to rehabilitate and upgrade declining neighborhoods.” Yet, several historical factors had 
created a situation by the 1960s whereby many of the services for which the public’s demand had 
increased most were the province of states and localities. “[I]ncreasing urbanization and other 
factors have swelled the demand for public services which are regarded as primarily the 
responsibility of State and local governments – both by tradition and by the preference of the 
American people for keeping government as close to home as possible…,” the ERP noted. “The 
States and localities have not been idle in the face of mounting demands for public services. 
Since 1959, for example, the 50 States have enacted about 200 increases in the rates of their 
major taxes, and imposed 15 new taxes, including 8 new retail sales taxes.” 682 This pattern was 
unsustainable.  
While the Johnson economic team hoped that the “financial pressures on states and 
localities” would “moderate somewhat” in the coming years, it predicted that “the financial 
problems of state and local governments will persist” even if demands for increased state and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






local services slowed. Its proposed solution was increased federal aid to states and localities. 
This proposed aid took two forms: categorical “grants-in-aid,” which would be tied to specific 
types of spending, and “no strings attached” “general support” grants, which states and localities 
could use as they saw fit. 683 The “grant-in-aid” model had a long history, including public 
assistance programs in the 1930s, highway funds in the 1950s, and several of Johnson’s own 
Great Society initiatives. 684 “General support” grants, on the other hand, had few precedents. 
They also garnered objections from across the ideological spectrum. “Critics of general support 
grants have questioned whether state governments would spend the added revenues wisely, 
whether they would maintain their own revenue efforts, and whether they would provide 
adequately for their own cities….,” the ERP noted. “Also, if States had a claim on a share of 
federal revenues, they might oppose federal tax reduction even when needed to combat 
recession.” Other suggestions to provide states and localities with federal aid included “a credit 
against federal personal income tax liability be given for up to 40 percent of state income taxes 
paid.” This “powerful incentive” would encourage the 17 states without personal income taxes to 
add them. But such measures would do little for localities and would favor rich states over poor 
ones. Nonetheless, such measures were viewed by the Johnson economic team as a more 
efficient way of aiding states and localities than the existing federal tax exemption for state and 
local bond interest, which provided only minor assistance to states and localities and did so at the 
expense of the federal tax code’s progressivity.685 Lending support to the idea of no-strings-
attached revenue sharing, Johnson’s budget director, Charles Schultze, told Congress in 1967 
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that federal aid was “being provided through, too many narrow categorical grant and loan 
programs.” The grants-in-aid system, he argued, was “overly complex.” 686 
Despite the Johnson administration’s seeming openness to federal intervention in the 
state and local fiscal crisis, revenue sharing went nowhere while Johnson was in office.687 
Following his initial interest in revenue sharing, Johnson dropped the idea late in the 1964 
campaign, at least in part to criticism of widespread leaks of the still-in-progress Heller-Pechman 
proposals.688 Though advisers would attempt to revive the plans several times during Johnson’s 
tenure, rising expenditures on Vietnam helped sour the president on revenue sharing. However, a 
variety of other RS proposal gained supporters in the mid-1960s. During his 1964 presidential 
campaign, GOP candidate Barry Goldwater proposed returning to states and localities “a share of 
[federal] taxes collected from them.” But Goldwater’s support for revenue sharing came with a 
crucial caveat. Like Laird, he envisioned these “grants without strings,” as he put it, “gradually 
replac[ing] the present system of grants with strings, which the federal government uses to 
control more than $10 bullion of spending at the local level.”689 The “replacement” emphasis 
became the official GOP party line in the mid-1960s. In 1966, the Republic Coordinating 
Committee proposed replacing the grant-in-aid system with revenue sharing comprised of 10 
percent of federal individual and corporate income tax revenues. These funds would be allocated 
based 50 percent on the revenue’s state of origin and 50 percent on population. The population 
percentage, however, would be partly contingent upon a vague tax effort standard, which 
required states to contribute “a fair proportion of their per capital incomes to the cost of their 
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own state and local services.”690 By the late-1960s, revenue sharing gained traction in both 
parties. The 89th Congress (1965-1967) saw the introduction of 51 revenue sharing bills with 57 
sponsors and cosponsors, while the first session of the 90th Congress alone saw the introducing 
of 90 separate bills with 110 members as sponsors or cosponsors. Some of these proposals were 
left-leaning, others leaned right, but, overall, revenue sharing proposals remained more popular 
among Republicans. Contrary the left-liberal vision of these funds being used for not only for 
increased spending but also for the reduction of regressive taxes, some Republican bills 
explicitly forbade the use of federal revenue for local property tax relief. In contrast, proposals 
that included a “tax effort” measurement – to ensure that funds flowed primarily to fiscally 
strapped areas that had already exhausted their tax resources, rather than areas that simply 
refused to use available taxes, like the state income tax – began to attract notable Democratic 
support.691  
Thus, Nixon stepped into a political culture acutely aware of the possibilities of revenue 
sharing. Keeping with RS’s general popularity among Republicans, the 1968 GOP platform 
called opaquely for “federal revenue sharing” to “help provide the resources” for “human 
development” programs like education, health care, and crime reduction.692  On the campaign 
trail, Nixon spoke only of a “streamlined federal system with a return to the states, cities, and 
communities of decision-making powers rightfully theirs.”693 When Nixon outlined his domestic 
policy vision to Congress in April 1969, just three months after taking office, he justified his RS 
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proposals in less lofty and ideological terms. In fact, Nixon did not explicitly endorse the small-
government vision of RS pushed by Laird and other conservatives. Rather, the president pointed 
to the practical issues of local tax politics. Nixon requested “a start on sharing the revenues of the 
Federal government, so that other levels of government where revenue increases lag behind will 
not be caught in a constant fiscal crisis.”694 This contrast – conservative small government 
rhetoric justifying a program that would have the ultimate effect of reducing reliance on local 
regressive taxes and increasing reliance on the progressive federal income tax – proved to be an 
ongoing feature of the revenue sharing debates within the GOP during the Nixon years and, 
perhaps, an essential irony necessary in securing both liberal and conservative support for the 
program. This juxtaposition was not lost on the Nixon team. “You will note a duality of 
justifications which continues to this day: the political science concern with the decentralization 
of government power and the closely related concern of the economist over the adequacy of the 
financial base for state and local government,” Weidenbaum would note in 1974. And, indeed, 
despite his role as economist, the conservative Weidenbaum would often stress what he dubbed 
the “political science concern” addressed by RS, rather than the “economic” one.695 
 In July 1969, Nixon summoned a collection of Democratic and Republican governors, 
mayors, and county officials to the White House to discuss the outlines of a revenue sharing 
proposal that could secure bipartisan support from officials at all levels of government. The basic 
agreement arrived at involved the use of a clear formula to fairly distribute a specific amount of 
federal tax revenue each year to both state and local governments with no strings attached. The 
specification that some revenue would be sent directly to localities was a key feature, according 
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to Weidenbaum, because it secured the support of mayors and city council members who were 
skeptical of plans allotting money to governors with no guarantee that it would actually find its 
way to the cities.696 In September 1969, Howard Baker, with 32 cosponsors in the Senate, and 
Jackson Betts, with and 75 cosponsors in the House, introduced the administration’s first revenue 
sharing bill. The legislation went nowhere, but the appeal of revenue sharing not only persisted, 
but grew in the years that followed.697  
In December 1970, the ACIR – featuring the likes of Edmund Muskie, George Romney, 
Raymond Shafer, and Ronald Reagan as members – declared revenue sharing “an idea whose 
time has come.” The commission not only endorsed revenue sharing, it also endorsed the 
“assumption by the federal government of all costs of public welfare and Medicaid,” the 
assumption by states of “substantially all local costs of elementary and secondary education,” 
and the “encouragement of a high-quality, high-yield state tax system through a federal income 
tax credit for state income taxes paid,” among other reforms.698 “A well-financed Federal 
revenue sharing plan is needed to ease a growing fiscal squeeze at the State and local levels,” the 
ACIR noted. “On the revenue side, these governments, already hobbled by fears of 
intergovernmental tax competition, are meeting increasing taxpayer resistance as they push 
property, sales, and income tax rates ever higher. On the expenditure side, the unremitting 
demand for safer streets, better schools, a cleaner environment, and rapid urban transit, all 
combine to place massive expenditure pressures on these jurisdictions.”699 The ACIR dismissed 
complaints that “divorcing tax and spending authority” would lead to “wasteful” spending, as 
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well as arguments that revenue sharing should not go forward given the Vietnam-driving federal 
budget woes. Domestic state and local needs, the ACIR argued, were just as important as federal 
or international ones. 700 
Crucially, the ACIR underscored revenue sharing’s potential impact on the tax revolt, as 
well as the relative popularity of progressive taxes over regressive ones, including how this 
dynamic interacted with the system of fiscal federalism.  “The dominant income tax position 
enjoyed by the federal government helps to insulate federal policymakers from irate taxpayers,” 
the ACIR noted. The progressive federal income tax’s structure angered Americans less than 
other revenue sources, according to the ACIR, and its highly elastic structure allowed income 
growth to generate rising income tax receipts. In contrast, states and localities had to rely more 
heavily on inelastic, regressive revenue sources. As a result, state and local policymakers were 
“forced to take the politically risky course of imposing new taxes and raising rates of existing 
taxes to meet the rising expenditure requirements of an urbanized society.”701 If Washington 
policy makers cut federal income taxes, they would “reap all the political credit for tax 
reductions,” while state and local policymakers would continue to face taxpayer resentment as 
they raised state and local taxes. Beyond the issue of political credit and blame, distributional 
concerns were at the heart of the ACIR’s objection to further federal income tax reductions. 
“This proposition [cutting federal income taxes and making state and local policymakers raise 
their own taxes] would have the overall effect of weakening our total state-local revenue system 
if states and localities made more intensive use of property and consumption taxes,” the 
commission argued. “When compared to the local property tax and the state sales levy the 
federal income tax stands out as a far more equitable and productive revenue instrument.” States 
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and localities could not be expected to raise income taxes, even if the fiscal room was created by 
federal tax cuts, the ACIR explained, because “interstate tax completion fears…place[d] 
powerful constraints on the ability of states to pick up all or even most of the slack on the 
income tax front.” In this ACIR’s view, only the federal government could be counted on to 
make the U.S. tax system fairer and more progressive.702  
With revenue sharing popular among the public and policymaker, Nixon made a pitch for 
his revenue sharing plan in the 1971 SOTU address. Nixon mixed the practical appeals of 
revenue sharing that interested a broad array of local officials and homeowners with peons to 
small government that animated the tenuous conservative support for the program. “All across 
America today, states and cities are confronted with a financial crisis. Some have already been 
cutting back on essential services – for example, just recently San Diego and Cleveland cut back 
on trash collections. Most are caught between the prospects of bankruptcy on the one hand and 
adding to an already crushing tax burden on the other…,” Nixon explained. “Let us share our 
[federal] resources. Let us share them to rescue the states and localities from the brink of 
financial crisis. Let us share them to give homeowners and wage earners a chance to escape from 
ever-higher property taxes and sales taxes.” Turning to conservative rhetoric, Nixon next 
presented an ideological defense of revenue sharing. “Let us share our resources for two other 
reasons as well. The first of these reasons has to do with government itself, and the second has to 
do with each of us, with the individual. Let’s face it. Most Americans today are simply fed up 
with government at all levels. They will not – and they should not – continue to tolerate the gap 
between promise and performance in government...,” Nixon said. “I have faith in people. I trust 
the judgment of people. Let us give the people of America a chance, a bigger voice in deciding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






for themselves those questions that so greatly affect their lives.” Nixon called revenue sharing a 
“new American revolution – a peaceful revolution in which power was turned back to the people 
– in which government at all levels was refreshed and renewed and made truly responsive,” one 
that could be “as profound, as far-reaching, as exciting as that first revolution almost 200 years 
ago.” 703  
Nixon’s specific proposals, revealed the following month, mixed the liberal and 
conservative versions of revenue sharing. He proposed two forms of RS. The first, dubbed 
“General Revenue Sharing,” was closer to the liberal vision. It would allocate $5 billion in new 
revenue with no strings attached. The second, “Special Revenue Sharing,” was closer to the 
conservative vision. It would include $1 billion of new revenue and $10 billion in revenue from 
existing programs and group them into six categories, including education, law enforcement, and 
transportation. The revenues would be allocated among states and localities according to 
population and tax effort, though without encouraging the use of specific forms of taxation, such 
as the income tax.704 The author’s of the Democratic plan discarded by LBJ were, on the whole, 
pleased to see the new Republican president embracing their ideas. Pechman called it 
“remarkable that the administration’s proposal follows the original [Heller-Pechman] plan almost 
to the letter.” Despite being critical of some of the Nixon administration’s divergences from the 
original Heller-Pechman plan, Pechman said that he “still believe[d] revenue sharing would 
make a significant contribution toward the improvement of federalism in this country, and I am 
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delighted to welcome the President of the United States and members of his Administration into 
the club of revenue sharing enthusiasts.” 705 
Nixon’s revenue sharing proposals were not without competition. A few revenue sharing 
plans came from Republicans, like a new, more generous proposal introduced by Baker and 
Betts, each now with more cosponsors.706  But the most serious competing revenue sharing 
proposals were authored by Democrats. Senator Hubert Humphrey, who served as Vice President 
when Johnson decided to forgo revenue sharing, now embraced the idea. The perennial 
Democratic presidential contender believed revenue sharing would at least slow the increases in 
state and local taxes that had been accelerating over the past five years. “If we don’t do 
something like this [revenue sharing] you are either going to close up services, vital services 
back home, or you are going to raise those property taxes or some other kind of taxes,” 
Humphrey said. “I think this money will come from a tax source that is more equitable than 
putting an extra few mills or increasing the millage on homes out in Minnesota or Nebraska.”707 
Humphrey also cast the issue of revenue sharing in civil rights terms. “I consider the whole 
subject of adequate revenues for cities at the heart and core of civil rights and human rights at 
this time,” he said. “The people that live in the inner cities are the people that are being denied 
and deprived when there is a shortage of funds for municipal government.” 708 Revenue sharing, 
Humphrey said, was an important step towards in making services for all Americans more equal 
and less depending on localities. In addition to revenue sharing, Humphrey envisioned “councils 
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of government” and common metropolitan services as a long-term reform. People should not 
move between cities or localities, he suggested, and encounter vastly different levels of service. 
709 Humphrey and Henry Reuss co-introduced a revenue sharing bill, S241, in early 1971. “One 
reason for the fiscal plight of the states is their insufficient reliance on progressive income 
taxes,” Reuss argued. “States still lacking an income tax….[or that] have narrowly based or flat 
rate income taxes…compete unfairly with other states for industry. Worse, their reliance on 
property and regressive sales taxes unfairly burdens their middle-income homeowners and poor 
people.” 710 
Humphrey’s most powerful pitch for revenue sharing sounded like it could have been 
ripped from a speech by Nader or a CCC flyer. Humphrey framed RS as an antidote to the urban 
crisis, fiscal and otherwise. Services were so bad in most cities, the Minnesota Democrat argued, 
that it was impossible to attract businesses. “So you have a vicious circle here. Industry goes out 
to the suburbs and leaves no tax base, and it gets worse and worse, and the only answer is to 
draw a halt on it some place along the line and be able to provide services,” Humphrey said. “I 
am going to lay it on the line. Working people live in the inner-cities. Ordinary people live there, 
black people live there, poor people live there, and those are the areas suffering today from lack 
of municipal resources, and we might just as well be frank about it. When there is money to be 
cut out of the city budget because there is no money left, who gets hurt?” The people in the 
“country club” would not get hurt, Humphrey responded in answer his rhetorical question, but 
the people in city neighborhoods would. “The streets are not repaired; they are dirty; the parks 
can’t be taken care of; the property taxes have been raised 15, 20, 30 percent in the last 2 or 3 
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years,” he said. “Who is going to provide the money?” The federal income tax, Humphrey made 
clear, should. 711 
Yet another likely Democratic presidential candidate, Edmund Muskie, introduced his 
own revenue sharing bill, S1770, in 1971.712 Muskie’s proposal provided $6 billion in general 
revenue sharing money “as a supplement to and not a substitute for the [existing] grant 
programs,” as Muskie put it. The soon-to-be presidential contender contrasted his approach to 
revenue sharing with that of conservatives, as well as the Nixon administration’s bill, which 
some liberals believed left open the possibility of subsequent reductions in categorical aid 
programs. In addition to provisions preventing discrimination in the use of revenue sharing 
funds, Muskie’s bill encouraged the use of state income taxes by providing “a bonus equal to 10 
percent of the state income tax revenue.” Muskie argued that this provision distinguished it from 
the White House’s bill and bragged that his bill “includes strong incentives for the states to make 
greater use of the progressive income tax.”713 The ACIR officially endorsed Muskie’s bill. 714  
Despite mountains of reports calling for federal revenue sharing with states and localities, 
the first challenge for the White House and revenue sharing’s supporters was overcoming 
opponents who argued that RS was unnecessary. The primary attack against RS came from those 
who insisted that the previous rationale for RS, the “fiscal dividend,” no longer applied and that 
the new justification, the state and local “fiscal crisis,” did not exist. Indeed, an idea that had 
most recently been proposed as a way to spend projected federal surpluses was now seen to be 
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unnecessary in an era of Vietnam-driven federal deficits.  “[T]he fiscal dividend never 
materialized. It was a causality of the expanded war in Southeast Asia, of tax cuts, and of the 
burgeoning social welfare programs of the Great Society,” a New York Times report summarized. 
“Faced with mounting deficits rater than surpluses, the Nixon administration therefore had to 
come up with a new rationale when it introduced revenue sharing. So it was that the ‘fiscal crisis’ 
[of states and localities] replaced the ‘fiscal dividend’ as the program’s raison d’etre.”715 
Therefore, the simplest attack on revenue sharing was denying that states and localities actually 
needed more revenue or that, even if they did, the federal government could not afford it. Both 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers argued that that 
states and localities faced no “fiscal crisis.” 716 Roland Bixler of NAM’s state taxation committee 
argued that the notion of a state and local fiscal crisis had become “axiomatic” only “by virtue of 
uncritical repetition.” 717 Business groups and conservatives found support for their view from 
conservative academics. Political scientist and urban policy scholar Edward Banfield questioned 
the rhetoric of “crisis” in a long Public Interest article.718 Writing in the Washington Post 
economist Robert Reischauer slammed revenue sharing, arguing that the “fiscal crisis” of the 
states was a temporary issue that would resolve itself on its own. The economic stagnation and 
rising inflation of the recent past, Reischauer wrote in 1972, would soon be a thing of the past. 
Therefore, revenue sharing was not necessary.719 
Revenue sharing’s opponents’ best hope came in the form of Ways and Means chair 
Wilbur Mills, as well and the committee’s ranking Republican, John Byrnes. Both declared their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
715 Robert Reischauer, “Revenue Sharing: Matching the Money and the Needs,” Washington Post, May 11, 1972 
716 Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House, General Revenue Sharing, Part 4 of 8, June 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 
15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 24, 28, 1971 (GPO 1971) 
717 Revenue Sharing: Hearings Before the Committee on Finance United States Senate, June 29, July 20, 21, 25, 26, 
and 27, 1972 (U.S. GPO, 1972) 
718 Edward Banfield, “Revenue Sharing in Theory and Practice,” Public Interest 23 (Spring 1971) 






early opposition to revenue sharing. Despite their different parties, Mills and Byrnes shared the 
same fiscal conservatism. Both believed that the federal government should not undertake any 
new spending programs with the budget already in deficit.720 “How anyone can suggest general 
revenue sharing with a straight face, in full view of federal deficits of that magnitude and the 
chronic string of deficits over the past forty years, is beyond me,” Mills said in a June 1971 
speech.721 The Arkansas Democrat objected to the idea that the deficit-facing federal government 
would be sending money to state and localities. “Revenue sharing isn’t anything but a gratuity in 
a will signed by a pauper,” Mills quipped.722 Mills and Byrnes spoke for a large number of 
balanced-budget fiscalists. Soon, these critics of revenue sharing began to sarcastically dub it 
“deficit sharing.” They insisted revenue sharing should be scrapped. 
Proving that Nixon intended to make good on his desire to move to the left, the White 
House now found itself joining with distributionist liberals to combat anti-revenue sharing 
arguments. A revenue sharing question-and-answer sheet released by the White House asked 
rhetorically, “Is there a ‘crisis’?” The firm answer was “Yes.” “Many have been proclaiming it 
[the state and local fiscal crisis] for several years – and [they have been] called Cassandras,” the 
informational sheet explained. “But it is finally upon us.”723 Democratic revenue sharing 
architects agreed. “The fiscal plight of states and local governments is not a new phenomenon,” 
Pechman noted, “yet the national government has not, until recently, seriously considered the 
adoption of a permanent set of solutions to this problem.” 724 Pechman directly refuted the claims 
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of Mills, Byrnes, and other conservatives. The only reason the overall fiscal picture of states and 
local governments was not even worse, according to Pechman, was that “many elected officials 
took seriously their responsibilities and asked for tax increases, even though they knew that their 
political lives were at stake.” But overall figures masked inequalities between states and 
localities, Pechman noted. “There will be many communities with a surplus. And then there will 
be many communities with deficits…,” Pechman explained. “The point is that you can’t use 
aggregate figures to evaluate the nature of the state-local fiscal problem in this country…. In the 
large urban states and cities, most of the governors and mayors are in trouble. And they are in 
trouble, not once every 5 years, they are in trouble every year…. [T]here is a state-local fiscal 
crisis.”725 Proponents also argued that addressing states and localities’ large deficits would, 
indirectly, help the federal government erase its modest deficit. Stimulating the economies of the 
states and localities, the suggested, would stoke growth, which could help the federal 
government reach its full-employment surplus.  Waiting until the federal government had a 
robust surplus before instituting revenue sharing, proponents added, suggested that the federal 
government’s priorities were greater than those of the states and localities, when the opposite 
was true. “To get a down-to-earth illustration,” Muskie said, “it is like saying that the 
breadwinner of the family ought to be free to spend all of his income for his won personal 
pleasures, before he worries about feeding his kids” – an analogy that Heller called “beautiful” 
and Pechman dubbed “excellent.”726    
Another prominent conservative critique of revenue sharing was that it would lead to vast 
expansion of government. The level government that collects the taxes, Mills and Byrnes said, 
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should also have the benefit of spending that money. To divorce the two – taxing and spending – 
encouraged profligacy, because the politicians who would be spending the money would not be 
the same ones who had endured the political pain of raising the revenue. 727  Echoing 
conservative-libertarian anti-tax arguments and recalling the rhetoric of Andrew Jackson, Byrnes 
argued, “[T]he ‘free money’ revenue sharing provides may actually result in a proliferation of 
expensive programs, ultimately requiring even greater taxes at [all] levels of government.” Bynes 
quoted conservative Wisconsin columnist John Wyngaard approvingly, who wrote, “all the 
lessons of modern political history shows that availability of free money generates new 
programs, new services, and new pressures for higher budgets.”728 Likewise, Mills called the 
difficulty state and local politicians were having raising taxes a “necessary discipline on any 
governmental authority.” “In my view, we already have too little restraint on spending programs 
at the present time,” Mills told the House in January 1971. Brynes agreed, predicting “fiscal 
chaos” at all levels of government if revenue sharing was passed. To remove that “discipline” by 
giving state and local politicians revenue sharing money, Byrnes and Mills argued, would lead to 
profligate spending at the state and local level.729 “If Uncle Same raises the money,” Byrnes 
argued, “Uncle Sam should pretty much determine how it is spent.”730  
The response to this line of critique by revenue sharing’s supporters was swift and 
highlighted the distributional effects of such a separation in taxing and spending. Edmund 
Muskie argued that, contrary to revenue sharing critics, most taxpayers would prefer splitting the 
collection of revenue from its spending. “The tax rate [in Newark] is something like $930 on a 
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home that has a market value of $10,000 on today’s market,” he said. “That means the value of 
that house is consumed by taxes in 10 or 11 years. I suspect that the property tax payer would 
like to see the spending and taxing authorities split so that the burden of social services is lifted 
from his back by a more equitable system of taxation, namely, the federal income tax.” 731 This 
redistribution was just what worried critics on the right.  
Many conservatives implied that revenue sharing was a plot by urban political machines 
that had placated radicals and unions who demanded expanded welfare programs and higher 
wages. Pennsylvania Republican Herman Schneebeli rhetorically asked, “Why are we doing 
this? Merely to accommodate a handful of big city mayors who have gotten themselves into a 
fiscal bind and who have pressured their colleagues into joining them in this raid on the public 
treasury. Let the taxpayer beware….”732 Likewise, the arch-conservative Liberty Lobby slammed 
Revenue Sharing as an expansion of government likely to raise taxes all to finance the whims of 
“selfish” politicians and “profligate do-gooders.” 733 These conservatives had powerful business 
allies in advancing this argument. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce said that RS would “destroy 
fiscal responsibility within our state and local governments,” and eventually lead to “increased 
federal taxes,” which the Chamber would also opposed. In the Chamber’s view, the public’s 
revolt against rising property and sales taxes was a good thing, since it placed constraints on the 
size of state and local governments. Revenue sharing, the Chamber argued, would “weaken the 
already too-weak constraints on spending by governmental bodies.”734 Similarly, the National 
Association of Manufacturers saw expanding behemoths gobbling up ever-increasing amounts of 
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tax dollars, rather than a “fiscal crisis,” when it looked at states and localities. Public employees, 
in NAM’s view, were mainly to blame for whatever fiscal strains faced state and local 
governments.735 In an editorial following the SOTU, the Washington Post slammed Nixon’s 
revenue sharing plans, even critiquing Nixon’s use of the word “revolution” – a term the paper 
said it “would just as soon see retired.” The Post’s editorial questioned whether local 
governments really needed the money, suggesting instead that “labor unions capable of creating 
an endless series of service crises to be met could end up as the principal beneficiaries of the 
plan.”736 The end result of RS, Banfield agreed, would be rising federal taxes and higher state 
and local spending, creating a bigger government that the public desired. “Not only is it unfair to 
shift the cost of essentially state-local benefits to the national public; it is also very wasteful, for 
when someone else is to pay the bill, the natural tendency is to be prodigal,” he wrote.737 
Anticipating resistance to revenue sharing from both liberals and conservatives, albeit for 
different reasons, President Nixon’s instructed the administration to engage in a far-reaching 
public relations blitz on behalf of his proposal. The blitz included television appearances by a 
variety of administration officials; briefings with Republicans, Democrats, and interest group 
leaders; and the organization of a “Citizens Committee for Revenue Sharing” in March 1971, 
which the White House hoped would “educate the public on revenue sharing” and “popularize 
the concept,” among other goals.738 The Citizens Committee saw the White House currying favor 
with liberal supporters of revenue sharing, rather than exclusively, or even mostly, conservatives. 
Despite Buchanan’s pleas to use revenue sharing to appeal to the right, the White House 
approached Nelson Rockefeller – passing over Ronald Reagan – to lead the CCRS. It also sought 
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to get Daniel Patrick Moynihan “out front publicly” in support of revenue sharing – a plan Nixon 
praised as “good.”739 The full membership of the CCRS featured mayors, business executives, 
federal legislators, and governors – including former Pennsylvania Governor Raymond Shafer. 
Perhaps most significantly, it also counted Walter Heller and Joseph Pechman among its 
members. 740 Speaking on behalf of the National Citizens Committee for Revenue Sharing Heller 
noted the “fiscal mismatch” between the revenue needs of states and localities and their tax 
systems. “[W]hile the federal government was cutting its progressive income tax again and 
again,” Heller testified, “state and local governments were forced to push up their regressive 
taxes, thereby imposing harsh burdens on the poor.” 741 CCRS mixed this more progressive 
message with ones aimed at conservatives. Economist Murray Weidenbaum served as the chair 
of the CCRS. Weidenbaum framed revenue sharing as “not…just another program of sending 
federal dollars around the country.” Instead, he stressed revenue sharing as “unlike any existing 
grant-in-aid program.” In a nod to conservative framings of revenue sharing, Weidenbaum 
argued in speeches touting revenue sharing, it was “a small-government initiative designed as a 
“shift of decision-making power to state and local governments.”742 However, as the White 
House would soon discover, conservative supporters of revenue sharing were harder to come by 
than liberal ones.  
Nowhere was the White House’s shift to the left more apparent than in the task given to 
Vice President Spiro Agnew. After sending Agnew out to attack “radical liberals” in the 1970 
midterms, the White House sought to turn its most visible conservative into salesman for its 
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center-left social programs. The White House, as columnists Evans and Novak put it, was 
undertaking “a complete retooling to convert Agnew from swashbuckling political hatchetman to 
leading lobbyist for social welfare causes,” brining Agnew “into sympathetic contact with the 
urban masses and what White House aides call ‘progressive’ programs.”743 While Agnew would 
not now, nor ever, be confused for a “progressive,” he nonetheless struck a more centrist tone – 
appealing to conservatives in more moderate terms and even mixing in some surprisingly liberal-
sounding rhetoric as he made the White House’s pitch for revenue sharing. Agnew sold RS as a 
solution to the “fiscal crisis” of states and localities. The Vice President dismissed both 
conservatives who insisted that the fiscal crisis was not real and liberals who argued that revenue 
sharing should encourage progressive types of taxation in the process of providing fiscal relief to 
states and localities. “With expenditures fast outstripping revenues, state and local governments 
need help now,” Agnew argued. “Academic discourse concerning which states have the most 
appropriate tax structure does not solve the crisis.”744 For conservatives, Agnew noted that 
revenue sharing was an opportunity to stanch the flow of power to the federal government by 
returning it to states and localities. 745  In his role as the White House’s revenue sharing 
evangelist, Agnew did not shy away from attacking the proposal’s critics – especially powerful 
Ways and Means chair Wilbur Mills. Speaking to 250 southern members of the National 
Association of Counties, Agnew said that critics like Mills “distrust[ed]” state and local officials. 
Yet, Agnew argued, most Americans “probably know you [local officials] a lot better than 
Chairman Mills, and they probably have more confidence in you than they do in him.”746 Unlike 
Byrnes, who argued that revenue sharing was unconstitutional, Agnew claimed that revenue 
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sharing would help restore “the genius of the federal system devised by our forefathers.” 747  
Agnew also took aim at one of his favorite targets – the supposedly liberal media. The Vice 
President said he regarded the Washington Post’s critique of revenue sharing as a compliment. 
“If anything would restore my confidence in [revenue sharing’s] validity, that is it,” he quipped. 
The Post’s panning revenue sharing revealed the paper’s “basic distrust or skepticism about local 
government,” Agnew said.748 Agnew’s shift was representative of a larger change in the 
administration’s domestic policy orientation. 
By 1971, the Nixon administration changed the interpretation of the tax revolt that it held 
in 1969 and 1970. This shift was borne of past political failures, particularly on pocketbook 
issues. In early 1971, Nixon prodded his White House staff to devise ways to combat the 
administration’s defects. In May, Charles Colson – Nixon’s blue collar Svengali in the midterms 
– wrote a “response to the president’s request for ‘some fresh thinking’ on how to make our 
programs more meaningful to the people.” It was a blueprint for how “the president’s base of 
political support can be strengthened for 1972” following the disappointing midterms. Colson 
considered domestic policy to be “our biggest problem at the moment but, at the same time, our 
biggest opportunity.” While “on the merits” Colson considered Nixon’s domestic program 
“excellent,” he conceded that “it is hard to make a plausible, understandable case of what they do 
for the pocketbook.” The Democrats would continue to dominate the White House on domestic 
issues as long as the latter failed to make a compelling case for the efficacy of its pocketbook 
policies. “It is possible – there is time – to reorient our domestic efforts and to capture the high 
ground…,” Colson counseled. “There are things we can do at this point to position ourselves and 
our programs on the right side of many of the pocketbook issues [important to voters].” The 
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administration needed to pursue new policies as well as repackage its existing ones. The key, 
according to Colson was understanding voters’ pocketbook “self interest.” “It is not hard to draw 
the profile of what comprises the average individual’s economic self-interest today,” Colson 
wrote. “Obviously jobs and employment rank on the top of the list. High also on the list are taxes 
– particularly real property taxes….” Colson suggested refashioning and reframing Revenue 
Sharing as a property tax relief program. “Revenue sharing, for example, could be made 
appealing as a way to stop rising property taxes but it is [currently] not being sold that way…,” 
Colson wrote. “Unfortunately our revenue sharing [plan] does not have any tangible, economic 
meaning to the individual. We haven’t made the case that it could mean a reduced property tax 
burden.” Colson suggested not only reselling RS as a program of local tax reduction, but even 
proposed rapidly shifting the White House’s proposal from a system of grants to state and local 
governments to a system of tax credits for individual taxpayers based on state and local taxes 
paid. “It would be ideal if we could find a way to do this in the present Congress…so that next 
April 15 [1972] every taxpayer would be able to check a new box on his Form 1040 and receive 
a federal credit refund – a direct abatement for local taxes,” Colson wrote. “We could argue that 
we – the Nixon administration – had brought tax relief to homeowners and taxpayers across the 
country.”749 Colson even advocated renaming revenue sharing the “Property Tax Relief Act.” 
Providing relief from rising local property taxes, Colson argued would create “a damn good issue 
which people understand” for the White House. By proposing it, it would position Nixon as 
“trying to help the 66 million homeowners in America – most of them middle class working 
people who carry the heaviest tax burden and are increasingly restive about it.”750 
For both the White House and many left-leaning supporters of revenue sharing, the key 
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strategy for selling RS was pitching it as at least a partial response to the tax revolt. Nixon 
explained to Ehrlichman that “the taxpayers at the local level…[wants] relief from the crushing 
burden of increasing property and other local taxes… We should find a way to present our 
Revenue Sharing proposals which will appeal to those who are part of the ‘Tax Revolt.’”751 Or, 
as Jon Huntsman wrote to Ehrlichman, “Tax relief is the only sex appeal in Revenue Sharing.”752 
The rhetoric arguing that RS would help local governments combat the “fiscal crisis” was 
scrapped. Instead, Nixon instructed, RS should be referred to as a vehicle for tax relief. “As far 
as most voters are concerned, they want tax relief at the local and state level, particularly where 
property taxes are concerned…,” Nixon wrote in a memo to Ehrlichman. “I accept your analysis 
that states and local governments need all the revenue sharing we can provide simply to avoid 
having to raise taxes and even then they may not be able to achieve that goal. On the other hand, 
I think that our Revenue Sharing proposal must be sold on the basis that it provides an 
opportunity for local and state governments to first stop the rise in property taxes and other local 
taxes; and second, if they get proper efficiency at the local and state level even provide some tax 
relief.”753 Nixon also asked the CCRS to link revenue sharing with the tax revolt. “Presidential 
talking points” for a June 1971 meeting with the New York CCRS placed revenue sharing in the 
context of the revolt. “From 1966 to 1970 American homeowners paid over 12 billion dollars in 
property tax increases…a 45% increase in just 4 years!!!” the talking points read. “Excessive 
property tax increases in many areas have caused a ‘taxpayers revolt’…. Bond referendums for 
education, which were passing at a rate of 89% in 1960 have, have plummeted to a low of 48% 
[approval]….”754 In a June Rochester, New York, speech, Nixon claimed that RS could reduce 
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local property taxes by “approximately 30 percent.” “Revenue sharing is the only hope of 
stopping the rise of property taxes,” Nixon declared. 755   
Rather than arguing, like conservatives, that it represented a rejection of all taxes, the 
president echoed left-distributionists in making clear that the tax revolt was specifically directed 
at regressive local taxes. “[T]he property tax not only is the most unpopular; it is the fastest 
rising. It is the most unfair. It is the most unfair because it hits the people in the lower income 
brackets the hardest,” Nixon said in the Rochester speech. “We all know that if an individual is 
moving up in the income area, his ability to deduct property taxes from his gross income means 
that the burden of property tax, while still significant, is not all that important. On the other hand, 
for the lower income taxpayer, the individual who perhaps takes the standard deduction, as those 
property taxes escalate, the burden is much, much greater upon him. And also, all surveys show 
that the lower a family's income, the larger a proportion of his income goes to housing and, 
particularly if he is a homeowner, to his property tax.” Because of rising property taxes, in 
particular, Nixon explained, “We are having a taxpayers’ revolt….”756 Text versions of Nixon’s 
speech later qualified the “30 percent” claim by noting that it represented a “possible…offset” of 
future property tax increases, based on the fact that “revenue sharing proceeds to all communities 
were estimated to equal 30 percent of total projected property tax increases in an average 
year.”757 Nonetheless, the New York Times noted of the speech, “Mr. Nixon’s suggestion that 
homeowners would receive a net tax break from his plan was not without considerable political 
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appeal and represented a new wrinkle in his campaign to overcome the opposition of key 
Congressmen.”758 Keeping with the theme, full-page newspaper ads taken out by the National 
Citizens Committee for Revenue Sharing – which blared “REVENUE SHARING…Why WE 
Can’t Wait!” – explained in its first sentence that “Revenue Sharing will help rescue our local 
governments and provide relief to the local taxpayer…[by] halt[ing] the spiraling cost of local 
taxes.”759 Likewise, material for Agnew speeches in Southern California – ground zero of 
soaring property taxes – touted RS’s ability to lower “skyrocket[ing]” property taxes.760 A 
proposed television ad touting Nixon’s program declared that it “represent[ed] a $16 billion 
investment in revitalizing state and local government, while stemming the pressure for ever 
higher state and local taxes.”761  
For Democratic proponents of revenue sharing, the relationship between the regressivity 
and unfairness of state and local taxes and the tax revolt was self-evident. Regressive taxes, they 
suggested, were the primary driver of the revolt, and shifting to progressive revenue sources 
would help alleviate the tax discontent of lower- and middle-income Americans, in particular. “I 
sense in so many areas of the country an incipient property tax revolt because of the inequality of 
the tax, its tremendous burdens, and especially as those burdens bear upon people who aren’t 
able to pay the taxes or support the services that the property tax now has to support,” Muskie 
said. Hubert Humphrey agreed. “These cities are, in many instances, nearly bankrupt: they have 
stretched to the ultimate, to the limit, their taxing power on whatever they have to tax,” he said. 
“And there is a taxpayers’ revolt on property taxes in the country…. We just cannot go on 
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forever like this.” 762 Encouraging the use of progressive, rather than regressive, taxes, Ruess 
argued, would help assuage the public’s tax discontent. “No tax is really delightful,” Reuss 
conceded, “but certainly a progressive income tax much more closely follows the principle of the 
ability to pay than either the sales or the local property tax.”763 At least when it came to the 
politics of the tax revolt, left-distributionist Democrats and Nixon were seeing eye-to-eye. 
However, that did not mean that all was simpatico between Nixon’s vision of RS and that of the 
labor-liberal left.  
The primary differences between Nixon’s proposals and Democratic alternatives – 
besides Special Revenue Sharing – were to be found in the details of the distribution formula. 
The Nixon White House’s initial proposal made no distinction between revenue sources.764  
Edmund Muskie, among other Democrats, opposed this revenue source neutrality. One of the 
prime goals of revenue sharing, in the view of many Democrats, was shifting the tax burden 
upward. Revenue sharing should, as Humphrey put it, “encourage more progressive taxation 
policies.” 765 Likewise, Reuss called the “central idea” of revenue sharing that “the federal 
government is a par excellence tax collector; that the states and localities cannot push their 
taxpayers much more because they rely mostly on the sales and property taxes which are very 
regressive; hence, you have got to get some way of getting the federal taxing capacity at the 
service of local and state governments.” 766 Walter Heller argued that “the adoption of revenue 
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sharing would serve the interests of progressivity in our federal-state-local tax system.” By 
giving higher priority to aid to states and localities than to further reductions in the federal 
income tax, Heller argued, revenue sharing should begin to tilt the balance of fiscal federalism 
against regressive taxes and towards progressive ones. “To forgo reductions in federal income 
taxes in the interest of slowing down the rise in regressive, inequitable, and inefficient 
consumption and property taxes would strike most persons as a good tradeoff,” Heller said. 767  
But, while the simple act of replacing future sales or property tax increases with federal 
income tax revenue would slowly make the system more progressive – a fact noted by the Nixon 
White House, too – some Democrats wanted to use RS’s distribution formula itself to encourage 
tax progressivity. Both the Muskie bill and Humphrey-Reuss bill incentivized use of the state 
income tax. Humphrey and Reuss gave state income tax revenue double the weight of other 
revenues in their distribution formula.768 Reuss even indicated that his support for any RS plan 
might be contingent upon whether it encouraged states to adopt progressive income taxes.769 
Muskie’s proposal also tied part of the allocation of revenue sharing dollars to states’ usage of 
the income tax.770 The explicit goal of this income tax “bonus,” as Muskie dubbed it, was 
rewarding states that used an income tax. The goal, Muskie said, was “to encourage the states to 
make better use of the progressive income tax rather than continuing to rely so heavily on 
regressive taxes like the property tax and the sales tax.” 771 Joseph Pechman argued that Muskie’s 
incentive for state income taxes would be a “tremendous corrective” for “states that have been 
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laggard in enactment of income taxes.” “[T]he property taxes are quite high in the cities,” 
Pechman said. “Anything that would help to alleviate the burden of the property tax would be a 
great gain.”772 Heller supported incentives for states to utilize the income tax, like the provisions 
included in the Muskie bill. “This extra bonus [for using the state income tax] would do much to 
resolve the dilemma that has plagued many supporters of revenue sharing, including myself,” 
Heller said. The economist called it “a bit unseemly to distribute shares of the federal income tax 
to states that have not yet seen fit to use the income tax themselves, or are taxing incomes very 
lightly.” 773 The provision excited rank-and-file Democrats, too. Oregon Democrat Al Ullman 
praised the House revenue sharing bill’s encouraging all states to institute income taxes, arguing 
that “this objective alone is enough to warrant the passage of this bill.”774 Likewise, Ohio 
Democrat John Seiberling said that he was “particularly pleased with the incentive to encourage 
adoption by the states of progressive income tax statutes – a significant step toward state income 
tax reform.”775 Not surprisingly, governors of states with progressive income taxes also were 
delighted by the idea of using revenue sharing to reward the adoption of state income taxes. 
Wisconsin’s Patrick Lucey noted that “only the income tax is generally progressive, reflective of 
ability to pay, broadly based, and responsive to economic growth. Likewise, Oregon’s Tom 
McCall declared, “We support the formula of the act under consideration to reward progressive 
income tax states such as Oregon.” 776  
The ACIR supported the inclusion of an income-tax incentive in revenue sharing. ACIR 
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pointed to the distributional issues inherent in the federal government’s slashing of the 
progressive federal income tax at the same time that states and localities were being forced to 
raise regressive sales and property taxes in a time of fiscal crisis. The ACIR also noted the irony 
of this pattern at a time when the federal government was committing itself to fighting poverty. 
“[N]ational preoccupation with social and economic policies to improve the lot of the 
economically underprivileged groups in the population is focusing attention on the pattern of 
state tax burdens and more particularly on the potential usefulness of the states income tax in 
reshaping the distribution of state tax burdens to harmonize better with national social policy 
objectives,” the ACIR noted. “Rising state and local consumer and property tax rates are 
increasing the weight of regressive and business cost taxes at a time when federal fiscal policies 
are reducing the progressiveness of the federal income tax. The increasing regressivity of the 
nation’s total tax structure undercuts the administration’s efforts to wage war on poverty through 
direct expenditure programs and federal tax revision.”777 The ACIR emphatically rejected the 
arguments that the progressive federal income tax made up for the regressivity of state and local 
taxes and that, since state and local expenditures were allegedly “pro poor,” that regressive state 
and local taxes were justified – since, under this logic, lower income taxpayers were receiving 
great benefits for their higher taxes. “A close look at the real world,” the ACIR argued, “clearly 
reveal[ed]” such arguments to be incorrect. “The elderly lady living on a $1,500 pension and 
paying a $300 tax on her residence, most of which goes for public education, can hardly take 
comfort in this form of tax benefit logic,” or in the nominal progressivity of the federal income 
tax. Instead of justifying the current system, the ACIR suggested that policymakers needed to 
come to terms with the necessity of making state and local taxes more progressive. “The 
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important thing…is to create political acceptance of the idea that an affluent society can afford to 
be ‘pro poor’ in both its tax and expenditure practices,” the ACIR argued in 1967. “At the very 
least, a wealthy nation should be willing to pay the modest cost of a circuit-breaker system 
designed to protect low income families from tax overloads.”778 
States had long been divided between income tax states and sales tax states, with the 
latter being in greater quantity in the 1960s. But the ACIR argued that the sales versus income 
tax debate needed to be abandoned by the states. Each state, the commission suggested, needed 
both. Utilizing only one of the two sources was “now a luxury few states can afford.” 779  
Graduated taxes were the fairest kind of taxes. The public was disenchanted with the property tax 
for a reason, the commission suggested. Unlike other taxes, it bore little relationship to ability to 
pay, unlike the income tax. “[T]otal household income stands out as a far more precise measure 
of taxable capacity in our modern urban society,” ACIR noted. 780 Most states needed a push in 
order adopt the income tax and make their tax system more progressive. However, a variety of 
strucutral factors – including states constitutions that either explicitly, or debatably, banned 
graduated income taxes – worked against states’ instituting substantive income taxes during the 
first half of the 20th century. The ACIR pointed specifically to a key political cause. “Because the 
graduated tax on income represented a substantial departure from the regressive (and 
proportional) incidence of the existing tax structures, it precipitated strong opposition,” the ACIR 
noted. “To some persons, the adoption of a graduated tax on net income represented the first step 
down the path to Marxian Socialism.” Ideological opposition to the income tax also had a 
practical justification for many conservatives. “There was also the contention that graduated 
income tax rates might drive the relatively mobile wealthy to non-income tax states…,” the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
778 ACIR, Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System, Vol. 1 (GPO, October 1967), 130 
779 ACIR, Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System, Vol. 1 (GPO, October 1967), xxii-xxiii 






ACIR noted. “[T]he growing intensity of interstate competition for industry also placed a damper 
on the individual income tax movement…. Opponents of income taxation often argued that state 
adoption of progressive income tax policies tends to create a tax climate somewhat hostile to the 
location and expansion of industry. These warnings undoubtedly carried weight, particularly in 
certain Northeastern state legislative bodies, many of whose members were keenly concerned 
about the emigration of industrial firms to the Middle Atlantic and Southern states.” 781 But two 
factors were now working in favor of the income tax, however: “fiscal crisis” and “a strong 
demand for property tax relief.” Even so, graduated state income taxes remained “polariz[ing].” 
The left “denounced” regressive taxation and “championed the cause of progressive taxation.” In 
contrast, the ACIR noted, “conservatives rushed to the defense of the sales tax and marshaled 
arguments in opposition to a graduated tax on personal income.”782   
The ACIR’s revenue sharing recommendations not only encouraged the use of the state 
income tax, but strongly titled towards recommending the use of progressive state income taxes, 
achieved either through progressive rates, flat rates with a personal exemption, using the federal 
income tax as a base, or some combination of those methods. While the report noted that states 
could, in practice, enact truly flat – or even regressive – state income taxes, the ACIR made it 
clear that graduated rates of some form were to be strongly preferred.783 Many conservatives, in 
particular, argued that it was not the ACIR’s place to tell states how to formulate their tax 
systems. The ACIR’s final report, however, argued that issues of fairness and progressivity 
trumped states’ freedom to choose different tax policies and some states’ desire to favor 
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regressive taxes in an attempt to lure businesses. “The commission….recommends….that in 
formulation their tax policies, sates without the personal income tax give early and careful 
consideration to incorporating it into their tax system and that those [states] presently employing 
a relatively ineffective income tax strengthen it.” Several Republicans and conservative 
Democrats dissented from this recommendation, but it carried a majority of ACIR’s members. 784 
Ultimately, the ACIR stopped short of calling graduated rates for state income taxes a “must.” 
Instead, given the variety of state constitutional restrictions on graduated rates and the politics of 
enacting graduated rates in some states, the ACIR noted that flat rates – provided they included 
exemptions “to protect the very poor” – could be used, since a flat rate with exemptions 
“provide[d] a substantial degree of progression.”785 However, “progression” was just what many 
conservatives were still fighting to avoid. 
Incentivizing the adoption of income taxes was not the only way in which the distribution 
formula in Democrats’ proposals different from that in Nixon’s. Many liberals also felt that 
“need” should be a distribution criterion, to ensure that poorer areas received extra funding. 
Joseph Pechman, in fact, framed the justification for general revenue sharing in terms of 
inequality between states and localities. “In my view, you wouldn’t need general revenue sharing 
grants if the distribution of income was the same throughout the country,” Pechman said. “If all 
communities had the same average income, the same structure could yield the same revenues 
revenues everywhere…. [N]o community would be thwarted because of the lack of fiscal 
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resources. But that can’t happen in a national system in which the distribution of income is 
unequal.” Poor areas needed to levy much higher tax rates in order to achieve the same level of 
revenue and, often, even with confiscatory rates, they could not collect the same taxes per capital 
as a rich area could with low rates. 786 Pechman viewed revenue sharing as the logical corollary 
to the guaranteed income/negative income tax proposals. A GI/NIT was for low-income 
individuals, while revenue sharing as for low-income governments. 787 Factoring “need” into the 
revenue sharing formula would help correct these geographic wealth imbalances. Additionally, 
many Democrats, as well as interest groups like the AFL-CIO, wanted federal government 
oversight in the use of revenue sharing funds, particularly civil rights standards, to ensure that 
RS was not “used in a discriminatory manner.” 788 Ultimately, the differences between the two 
main Democratic were relatively small. While the Humphrey-Reuss plan provided inly half as 
much funding as the Muskie bill – $3 billion – in 1972, the Humphrey-Reuss legislation ramped 
up the funding gradually, reaching $9 billion by fiscal year 1975.789 Both the White House and 
Muskie bills would eventually hit $10 billion per ear, but would take “eight or nine” years to do 
so, according to estimates by Joseph Pechman.790 Both Muskie and Humphrey and Ruess 
considered their competing bills to be mostly similar, especially given that both incorporated 
incentives for state income taxes. Reuss argued that the two bills’ divergent incentives for state 
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income tax adoption could be “adopted together or separately.”791 
The upward redistribution of the tax burden inherent in revenue sharing – and explicit in 
the Democratic proposals – drew strong conservative censure. Conservative political scientist 
and urban policy scholar Edward Banfield lambasted revenue sharing a “kind of income 
redistribution.” 792  RS, in Banfield’s mind, was simply a means by which liberals sought to 
circumvent the will of the American people and redistribute income. If sales and property tax 
increases were being defeated by voters, he reasoned, that meant they did not want greater 
expenditures, regardless of what experts in D.C. believed. 793 New Jersey Republican Charles W. 
Sandman, Jr. called argued that income tax incentives “would unfairly discriminate against 
States, including New Jersey, that do not have income taxes.”794 Likewise, Florida Democrat 
Charles Bennett, a signer of the “Southern Manifesto,” argued that his income tax-less state 
“would be continually penalized and discriminated against under the State and Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act of 1972.”795 Texas Republican William Archer argued that “in effect, Texas, 
which has no state income tax, is being punished for collecting revenue by other means.” By 
encouraging state income taxation, Archer charged, the U.S. House was doing “great injustice to 
the spirit of federalism, which has long been a cornerstone of our republican form of 
government.” There existed “no overriding federal interest that would justify legislation dictating 
the system of taxation practiced by the several states.” If taxes were going to be reduced, Archer 
argued, those reductions should occur at the federal level. Revenue sharing, in the Texas 
Republican’s view, amounted to little more than “a welfare program for state and local 
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governments.”796 Similarly, Texas Democrat J.J. Pickle argued that the bill “penalizes efficient 
government by offering inducements for states to pass a state income tax – and by penalizing 
those who do not.”797 Even some left-leaning Democrats worried about income tax provisions, 
though not for ideological reasons. Reuben Askew suggested that “to penalize any state for 
historical circumstances [a constitutional ban on income taxation] is very unjust.”798 Such 
opposition had its limits, however. Tennessee Republican Howard Baker, Jr. called the 
incentives in Humphrey-Reuss and Muskie bills “a direct intrusion into the constitutional 
functions of the state.” Yet, his opposition to income tax incentives, according to Baker, was 
“infinitely less important than my desire for revenue sharing.” 799 Likewise, while the governors 
of states without an income tax, like New Hampshire’s Walter Peterson, chafed at the House 
bill’s encouragement of income taxes, most were still willing to support the bill due to their 
overriding need for revenue.800 To those, like Baker and others, who argued that such incentives 
were “intrusive,” Walter Heller pointed to numerous existing deductions and incentives in the 
existing tax code.801 But the anti-income tax incentive forces had powerful allies.  
Business proved to be the most intransigent opponents of income tax incentives. The 
Chamber of Commerce argued that the revolt against property tax levies was proof that the 
public did not want any further taxes – regardless of type. “These is no question that a number of 
local tax increases and bond issues have been turned down by voters who have not been sold on 
the need,” the Chamber argued. “Don’t we have any faith in the wisdom of these voters at the 
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local level? Don’t we trust their judgment?” 802 Shifting from regressive taxes to progressive 
taxes was no achievement, in the Chamber’s view, since the business group downplayed issues 
of distribution. “Federal, state, and local taxes all come from one source – the American 
taxpayer,” the Chamber’s representatives told the Ways and Means Committee. 803 Echoing the 
conservative ACIR dissenters, the Chamber concluded, “We believe the federal government 
should not tell the states what taxing systems they should use….”804 The Chamber was more 
favorably disposed to categorical aid, such as Special Revenue Sharing, but only if it could “be 
done without an increase in federal taxes.” 805 If states and localities needed revenue, National 
Association of Manufacturers suggested, the federal government should simply “reduc[e] federal 
[income tax] rates and, by implication, federal responsibilities.” Then, NAM argued, states and 
localities could increase their own taxes, if they so desired. 806 Democratic revenue sharing bills’ 
encouragement of progressive income taxes particularly galled NAM’s representatives. “[NAM] 
question[s] whether it is the intention of Congress to increase tax graduation in this particular 
legislation through ‘back door’ means….,” NAM’s Bixler said. “We feel simply that that the 
present legislation would have the effect of putting the pressure on the remaining states and cities 
to establish income taxes that would be using the same base and the same progressivity that there 
is in the federal structure, whereas now they tent to be a flat rate or at least a very low rate.”807  
Practically the only dissenter among business groups was the National Association of Real Estate 
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Boards, who supported RS for decidedly pragmatic reasons. “[W]e sincerely believe that 
continued reliance of local governments on the real property tax as their principal source of 
revenue poses a serious threat to home ownership in American,” the boards’ representative told 
Ways and Means members. “The property tax….[is] a financially inferior revenue instrument…. 
Real property taxes, like sales taxes, are regressive…. Increased reliance on these regressive 
taxes serves only to aggravate this regression.” 808 The National Association of Real Estate 
Boards, in fact, produced a laudatory analysis of RS – including its projected effects on property 
taxes – in its 94,000-circulation newsletter and encouraged its members to lobby Congress for 
the bill’s passage.809 In general, however, business groups remained reliable opponents of the 
income tax. 
The labor politics of revenue sharing were more complicated. The AFL-CIO opposed 
general revenue sharing, arguing that “no strings attached” aid to states and localities because it 
lacked federal oversight, particularly related to antidiscrimination and labor standards. Instead, 
the union supported federal takeover of welfare costs and a continuation and expansion of 
categorical grants to aid states and localities. When it came to taxes, the union agreed that the 
federal income tax was preferable to local property taxes. However, if the federal government 
wished to encourage more progressive forms of taxation, the union suggested creating federal tax 
credits for state income tax payments, which it argued “would stimulate progressive income 
taxes” and “add a big element of equity to the tax structure.”810 The union also suggested 
expansion of existing grant-in-aid programs, federal takeover of “a greater share” of education 
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costs, national health care legislation, and “tax reform at all levels of government.” 811 The union 
had another key objection to existing RS proposals. “The income tax incentive is much too 
weak,” the union’s representatives told the Senate Finance Committee. “It is our view that if the 
states are to help themselves in closing the gap between public needs and resources, they must 
look to progressive taxes.”812 The national AFL-CIO leadership did not represent the entirety of 
the union, however.  
The AFL-CIO affiliated AFSME union endorsed revenue sharing. AFSME President 
Jerry Wurf applauded RS as an answer to the state and local fiscal crisis that utilized what the 
union called “the most efficient and equitable revenue source – the progressive income tax,” 
while lessening the using of sales and property taxes, which AFSME called “not only inequitable 
because of their regressive character, but also…ineffective revenue mechanisms because of their 
sluggish response to growth.” Most important to AFSME, though, was that revenue sharing 
would be used as a lever to force the adoption of more progressive taxes on the state and local 
levels. “What we face in America today, in terms of local property taxes and sales taxes, is that 
the poor pay the most,” Wurf argued. Revenue sharing, he argued, should be used to change that. 
“[A]s loudly as we have advocated revenue sharing, we have advocated the most dramatic king 
of tax reform in terms of the whole structure,” said Wurf. 813  Nonetheless, AFSME’s 
representatives leveled many of the same criticisms at Nixon revenue sharing plans as its parent 
union. Like the national AFL-CIO, AFSME wanted the entirety of the state revenue formula to 
be based on income tax effort. AFSME also advocated for greater “incentives for change in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
811 Revenue Sharing: Hearings Before the Committee on Finance United States Senate, June 29, July 20, 21, 25, 26, 
and 27, 1972 (U.S. GPO, 1972) 
812 Revenue Sharing: Hearings Before the Committee on Finance United States Senate, June 29, July 20, 21, 25, 26, 
and 27, 1972 (U.S. GPO, 1972) 
813 Revenue Sharing: Hearings Before the Committee on Finance United States Senate, June 29, July 20, 21, 25, 26, 






highly regressive tax structures” of states and localities. AFSME called for states to be “given 
larger entitlements as they effect restructuring of their tax systems, such as heavier reliance on 
progressive income taxes, the adoption of statewide property taxes, and the use of tax credits to 
offset some of the regressivity inherent in general sales taxes.” Specifically, AFSME suggested 
that the initial $1.8 billion state distribution to be based on the states’ income tax revenue, while 
they called for the yearly $300 million growth in state revenue sharing entitlement to be based on 
a formula allotting one-third to states with progressive income tax structures, one-third to states 
that adopt tax credits or rebates for sales taxes on food and drugs, and one-third to states that 
“substitute an equalized statewide property tax for the current local property tax.”814 Despite 
these asterisks on its endorsement, Wurf noted that the union had been “roundly criticized” by 
many within in the labor movement.  AFSME’s more favorable stance towards revenue sharing 
did not win it any Republican friends, either. Utah Republican Wallace Bennett – the former 
president of the National Association of Manufacturers – argued that AFSME was advocating a 
“form of coercion.” Instead of advocating for strings on how revenue sharing money would be 
spent, Bennett quipped, “[AFSME is] putting strings on the manner in which the money, at the 
state level, should be raised.” Arizona Republican Paul Fannin agreed, calling AFSME’s 
proposal “dictatorial.” Wurf pushed back. “What we are saying is that those states that are 
willing to pass progressive income taxes which put the tax burden on those best able to pay 
should be rewarded…,” the AFSME president explained. “We are saying those states that…want 
to put the tax burden where it does not belong should not be rewarded by further having federal 
funds flow into those states. That is not a matter of dictates, it is a matter of sound fiscal 
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Ultimately, the best advocates for federal revenue sharing were state and local officials 
from both parties. Not only would these be the recipients of its largesse, but they were also 
closest to the political fire of the local tax revolt. During hearings on the proposed Revenue 
Sharing legislation, Congress regularly heard invocations of the tax revolt and local fiscal crises. 
In the context of a debate over the direction of U.S. public finance, analyses of the tax revolt 
focused on the rising burden of property taxes on average homeowners as the cause of the revolt, 
rather than on the mood of voters. Pocketbook, rather than cultural or political, explanations for 
the tax revolt now predominated. Typical was a report submitted to the Ways and Means 
Committee by the Connecticut Conference of Mayors. “The local property tax, already pushed to 
the breaking point, can absorb no more of the growing cost of municipal government,” the 
report, titled Cities in Crisis, argued in its introduction. “The local property tax weights heaviest 
on middle and lower income families. For example, a family with $5,000 annual income pays 
almost three times as great a percentage of its income in property taxes as a family with $50,000 
income….”816 
Endorsements of revenue sharing came pouring in from state and local officials. 
Individually, these officials flooded the offices of key congressional leaders with letters 
supporting revenue sharing. Organizations representing these officials – including both the 
National Governors’ Conference and the U.S. Conference of Mayors – also endorsed Revenue 
Sharing enthusiastically.817  This support was not accidental. The administration worked to 
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recruit the support of governors, in particular, by drafting state-by-state analyses of the strength 
of each governor’s support for – or opposition to – revenue sharing.818 As the Conference of 
Mayors – represented by Newark’s Kenneth Gibson, New York’s John Lindsay, Boston’s Kevin 
White, and Milwaukee’s Henry Maier, among others – told the Ways and Means Committee, in 
Lindsay’s words, “We are for revenue sharing, and we are for it strongly.” In his testimony on 
behalf of the COM, Lindsay painted a picture of cities dealing with fleeing tax bases – from the 
flight of both businesses and middle-income whites to the suburbs – rising demands for services 
and an outmoded revenue system. Many cities were also dealing with skyrocketing rates of tax 
exempt property, either due to the use of property tax incentive to woo businesses back into the 
urban core or because of property abandonment and blight. Echoing Nader, CAP, and CCC, 
Gibson noted that the result of this process was that the remaining homeonwers had to make of 
the difference by paying exorbitant property tax rates. “I think that to best illustrate our property 
tax rate,” Gibson told the committee, “the owner of a $20,000 house pays $1,838 each year in 
property taxes…. I am sure you will all agree that this rate is confiscatory and is 
counterproductive.” 819 Gibson tried to “impress upon [Congress] the extreme urgency of the 
fiscal crisis which we face at the local level.” Like many cities, Newark faced a dwindling 
revenue base. Despite high taxes, it could not afford to provide the services its residence needed. 
“Sixty percent of Newark’s land area is tax exempt,” Gibson explained. “What that means is that 
40 percent of Newark’s land area pays all the property tax. The tax base is declining an average 
of three percent annually, and this is our primary source of revenue.” “So, our tax rate is now 
confiscatory,” Gibson continued. “In fact, in my opinion, it has been confiscatory for several 
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years, and it is actually counterproductive…. We have reached a point where our property tax 
has only hastened the flight of industry, commerce, and the remaining middle-class homeowners 
out of Newark.” Gibson supported using progressive income taxes for local services and had 
been lobbying the state of New Jersey to institute a statewide income tax with graduated rates 
and use some of the revenue for local needs currently supported by the property tax. “Not only 
must we use this inelastic source of revenue [the property tax] to keep pace with the inflationary 
spiral of maintaining such central services as police protection and garbage removal,” Gibson 
told the subcommittee, “but we must also rely upon the property tax to support major new 
endeavors such as good education, rehabilitation clinics, compensatory educational programs, 
summer recreational programs, and urban renewal.”820 
Not all state and local officials were sold on revenue sharing, though. While, as noted 
above, some remained either ideologically opposed to RS or worried about the effects of 
particular provisions on their states or localities, others believed that existing revenue sharing 
provisions were either not bold enough or not the most effective way to combat the “fiscal crisis” 
and the tax revolt. Instead, they pushed alternative plans. Many officials, particularly Democrats, 
made it clear that they preferred a federal takeover of welfare.821 Others, like John Gilligan, 
argued that the amount of money spent on RS would be too small a percentage of state and local 
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government outlays to make much of a meaningful difference on their fiscal crises. 822 Better, 
Gilligan and other critics suggested, would be a federal tax credit for state income taxes, which 
he argued would “provide an incentive for states to use income tax more extensively and rely 
less on property taxes than they have in the past.”823 
Left-leaning critics of revenue sharing rallied around alternative proposals to aid states 
and localities. Indiana Senator Vance Hartke offered on such alternative. Hartke agreed with 
Humphrey, Reuss, and Muskie that states should be forced to use progressive income taxes in 
order to qualify for any form of federal revenue sharing. “If you are really going to provide for 
any type of relief on a local level,” Hartke argued, “you are going to have to get away from 
regressive forms of taxation; not alone on a local level, but on a state and federal level as 
well.”824 However, Hartke offered a proposal that he argued was a direct way of ensuring that 
federal aid incentivized use of the state income tax. Hartke did not call his legislation a revenue 
sharing bill at all, dubbing it the Revenue Adjustment Act of 1971. It proposed to allow 
taxpayers to take a federal tax credit equal to 50 percent of their total state and local income tax 
payment, up to a limit of 19 percent of the taxpayer’s total federal tax liability. Harke’s bill also 
permitted the federal collection of state and local income taxes and called for the complete 
federalization of 90 percent of welfare costs. Hartke’s proposal was designed to both provide 
fiscal relief to state and local governments directly, by federalizing welfare, and to encourage the 
use of progressive income taxes at all levels of government.825  
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The federal tax code already allowed for the deductibility of state and local taxes from 
federal income taxes. However, its structure actually exacerbated the regressivity of state and 
local taxes while providing yet another loophole in the federal code that benefitted upper-income 
earners disproportionately. 826 The deductibility of state and local taxes from federal income 
taxes originated in the original Federal Income Tax Act of 1913. It was designed as protection 
against the possibility that, under the uncoordinated system of fiscal federalism, that the layering 
of the same tax at various levels might create excessively confiscatory rates in some 
jurisdictions. However, in practice, the deduction proved to a boon for upper-income taxpayers. 
“Persons in the highest bracket are able to write off their state and local tax payments against 
their federal liability at 70 cents on the dollar,” the ACIR noted. “Because the tax reduction 
benefit is a function of the marginal rate, the great mass of taxpayers in the 14 to 25 percent 
bracket receive relatively limited benefits from deductibility.”827 As a result, left-leaning tax 
reformers had long sought to transform the state and local deduction into a credit and, preferably, 
a refundable one. Hartke’s proposal was the embodiment of this goal.  
A similar proposal came from a surprising source. William V. Roth, Jr. – the fiscally 
conservative Republican Senator from Delaware – introduced his own $5 billion, five-year 
revenue sharing bill, which also included a 40 percent federal income tax credit for state and 
local income taxes paid, as well as a provision permitting the IRS to collect state and local 
income taxes on behalf of states and localities. Roth said he opposed making revenue sharing 
permanent, because he believed in decentralized government. His five-year plan was to help 
states and localities through their current fiscal crises. The long-term goal, Roth argued, should 
be to encourage “structural [tax] reforms on the parts of the states and localities. Unlike right-
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distributionist conservatives, who praised regressive taxes, Roth blamed them for the fiscal woes 
facing states and localities. “Perhaps the greatest obstacle faced by our states and localities in 
their struggle to fulfill their proper tasks is the weakness of their revenue systems,” Roth said. 
“These governments depend largely upon taxes which in comparison to the personal income 
taxes levied by Congress, are less responsive to the economy, less equitable in the burdens they 
place on individuals and social groups, and often detrimental in their effects on the economy, 
land use, and other aspects of urban growth.”828 Roth’s 40 percent credit was designed as a clear 
alternative to the existing deduction for state and local taxes, whose benefits Roth argued skewed 
towards upper-income taxpayers. Moreover, Roth made his credit available only to state and 
local income taxes that were “minimally progressive,” meaning that they needed to “include 
basic personal exemptions similar to those provided to federal taxpayers.”829 
As uncommon as it was for a conservative Republican to advocate for progressive over 
regressive taxes, Roth’s application of arguments usually reserve for the income tax to property 
and sales taxes was just as surprising. Property taxes, Roth argued, distorted investment 
decisions. Land speculators could use property tax laws to hold pieces of prime downtown real 
estate idle, thereby encouraging development in suburban areas. Roth argued that high property 
taxes discouraged investment in blighted areas, since improvements to land and buildings 
prompted rising assessments. “Such factors contribute to the vicious circle whereby the center 
city’s tax base continue to decline and tax rates on the remaining base climb,” Roth explained. 
“The suburban fringe, which does not suffer from as great a burden of public expenses, gains the 
tax base denied to cities.” Roth cited statistics noting that in many cities the property tax 
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constituted a 100 percent sales tax on the price of a house within 10 to 15 years of purchase. 
Both property and sales taxes, Roth argued, discouraged consumption and distorted the decisions 
of Americans on how to spend their money.830 
A paradox of tax credit proposals like Harke’s and Roth’s, however, was that their effects 
would be regressive, at least in the short term. Because of the progressive structure of income 
taxes, limiting credits to the income tax would boost the after-tax income of upper-bracket 
taxpayers. 831  However, including other taxes in the credit would defeat the income tax-
incentivizing purpose of the measure. In the end, the hope of tax credit proponents like Hartke 
and Roth seemed to be that, by encouraging states and localities to utilizing progressive income 
taxes, the national tax structure would become more progressive eventually. Yet, while that was 
a probable long-term outcome, some liberal critics doubted that it would not, in fact, work out 
that way. “In order to benefit from this tax reduction [federal credit], the state governments with 
income taxes would have to raise their own tax rates,” Joseph Pechman argued. “I needn’t tell 
you that it is difficult to raise nominal tax rates even if the net change in the effective tax burden 
for the taxpayer is zero.” 832 Likewise, Walter Heller noted, incentivizing the use of state income 
taxes through a direct credit to taxpayers would do little to help state and local governments. 833 
If only one could be chosen, Pechman saw revenue sharing as preferable to a credit, because the 
credit would skew too much towards rich states. However, Pechman supported the credit – 
federal budget permitting – as an addition to revenue sharing, and lauded the credit’s function as 
a “device to encourage states to adopt personal income taxes as part of their permanent revenue 
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streams.” 834 Given that it seemed both budgetarily and legislatively unlikely that both revenue 
sharing and the tax credit could be pursued, Pechman suggested modifying the Nixon proposal 
by “require[ing] all states to have effective income taxes (defined, say, as taxes that yield at least 
3 percent of personal income) to be eligible for the revenue sharing grants.” 835 Both the ACIR 
and the center-right Committee for Economic Development endorsed a federal income tax credit 
for state income taxes. The ACIR supported both the tax credit and revenue sharing, while the 
CED supported the tax credit but opposed revenue sharing.836 Many Democrats, as well as some 
moderate-to-liberal Republicans, also preferred the suggestion to provide credits on federal 
income tax returns for state income taxes paid. This credit system, supporters argued, would be 
simpler than any revenue sharing formula and would have the same effect of encouraging states 
to adopt income taxes, especially progressive ones.837 However, with revenue sharing having 
already secured the support of the White House, key legislators, and a variety of interest groups, 
a shift to the even more controversial credit approach proved to be highly unlikely.  
For all the arguments on both sides of the revenue sharing debate, the seemingly 
intractable bipartisan opposition of the Ways and Means committee leadership to revenue 
sharing seemed sure to sink RS just as it had hampered FAP. After an initial meeting between 
Mills, Byrnes, and Nixon to discuss revenue sharing prospects for any RS legislation passing did 
not look good. Both Byrnes and Mills, Byrnes explained to the press, “told the president we have 
philosophical differences with revenue sharing, and are basically opposed to it….”838  “I am 
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perfectly willing to have hearings [on revenue sharing],” Mills declared the White House 
discussion, “but not for the purpose of promoting the plan – for the purpose of killing it.”839 
Mills opposed General Revenue Sharing most strongly, while viewing Special Revenue Sharing 
somewhat more favorably – the exact opposite stance of most Democrats and left-liberal interest 
groups.840 The Arkansas Democrat also indicated that he might favor federalization of all state 
and local welfare programs, however, as an alternative to both revenue sharing and FAP.841 True 
to Mills’s word, hearings on revenue sharing were held by the House Ways and Means 
committee in mid-1971, but resulted in no action. 842 But both the public popularity of RS and 
Mills’s sudden – and unexpected – desire for national office conspired to shift the odds of 
revenue sharing’s approval dramatically. 
Mills’s resistance to General Revenue Sharing evaporated when he decided to undertake 
his ill-fated run for the 1972 Democratic presidential nomination – and, eventually, vice 
presidential nomination. Suddenly, the longtime opponent of RS declared his support for the 
program.843 In late-1971, Mills agreed to back a revenue sharing bill, given its wide popularity 
among voters, as well as state and local officials. But Mills did not want to simply endorse the 
Nixon White House’s plan, which Mills had spent months lambasting. Instead, he backed a 
competing revenue sharing bill, HR 11950, a $5.3 billion bill that was introduced by Mills and 
nine other Ways and Means Committee members on November 30, 1971.844 Mills’s initial 
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revenue sharing bill allocated the states’ share of the revenue sharing funds – $1.8 billion – 
solely based on the states’ income tax effort.845 Long advocated by left-leaning tax reformers, 
this provision had the effect of proving strong encouragement for states to adopt income taxes, 
particularly progressive ones. Mills’s support for this provision was short-lived, however. 
Hoping to curry the favor of voters in income tax-less New Hampshire, which was the first state 
scheduled to hold a primary in 1972, Mills now lobbied for the deletion of the income tax effort 
provision from the bill being constructed by his Ways and Means committee. But left-
distributionists pushed back against the chair and, in the end, an awkward compromise was 
struck. Mills succeeded in getting the addition of “general tax effort” to “income tax effort” in 
the Ways and Means bill’s distribution formula. Under the “general tax effort” calculation, states 
without an income tax – like New Hampshire – would be better off than under a formula that 
took the state income tax, in particular, into account.846 Not content with the compromise Mills 
plainly denounced the remaining income tax effort provision as a scheme designed “to encourage 
greater use of individual income taxes” by the states. The presidential hopeful now made it clear 
that he loathed such provisions – despite having introduced the original bill that included an even 
stronger version of it. “Some of the committee wanted to encourage a state income tax – a 
majority of the members. I had a different view,” Mills said on the House floor. “I wanted to 
look solely at the total of the revenues raised by the state in determining the states’ revenue 
effort, but a majority of the members of the committee felt that heavy reliance on the income tax 
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was the preferable system of taxation for states as well as the federal government.” Mills said 
that he strongly objected to encouraging states to use the income tax. “These differing views 
resulted in a compromise…,” Mills said. “In this respect in my view the bill before us is not as 
good a formula as one based entirely on tax collections generally. However, I am satisfied to go 
along with it.”847  
The White House had privately predicted that Mills would eventually recant his 
opposition to revenue sharing, though a presidential run by Mills did not figure in the 
administration’s prognostication. “Mills’ initial strategy of hitting revenue sharing hard, blowing 
a lot of smoke about alternatives for revenue sharing, and then hoping that the support for 
revenue sharing would disintegrate across the country had clearly failed,” an April 1971 memo 
by Ed Harper theorized. “His strategy failed because the support for revenue sharing among 
Democrats – especially big city Democratic mayors – held firm.”848  Indeed, Ehrlichman 
explained to Nixon back in April that the White House believed “Chairman Mills will be ready 
to make a deal on the general revenue sharing proposal within the next couple of weeks, this 
could effectively leave the Republicans out of the most important decisions to be made in their 
committee.”849  
With Mills’s awkward approval, RS now had legislative legs. The compromise bill was 
approved by Ways and Means and reported to the full House for consideration. The “fiscal 
crisis” of localities, in particular, proved to be Ways and Means Committee’s main justification 
for revenue sharing. The committee’s report cited the “most severe financial crises” faced by 
many localities. The general causes of the crisis, according the committee, included “the 
increasing demand for public services resulting from the substantial increase in urbanization in 
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recent years,” as well as the “twin problems of rising costs resulting from inflation and the lower 
than normal increase in revenues because of the stagnant condition of the economy.” Modest-
income urban areas – particularly those faced with industrial abandonment and suburban flight – 
faced an additional set of issues. These areas were “often called upon to provide services who do 
not live in their taxing jurisdictions,” while those that did reside “within their taxation 
jurisdictions are often poor and unable to pay for their share of the services demanded.” States’ 
problems were “less severe,” according to the committee. The committee’s “primary emphasis” 
for states was “encouraging them to help themselves – by making more extensive use of their 
own tax resources.”850 The Ways and Means Committee also argued that many states, unlike 
most localities, were not “mak[ing] effective use of their revenue sources, either by not using 
certain taxes (individual and corporate income taxes and general sales taxes) or by keeping rates 
too low,” as Congressional Quarterly summarized. 851  As a result, the Ways and Means 
Committee allocated nearly twice as much to localities as to states in its initial revenue sharing 
allocation – $3.5 billion to $1.8 billion. 852 Though it projected a $40 billion deficit in 1972 and a 
$25 billion deficit in 1973, the Ways and Means Committee argued that these shortfalls were not 
reason enough to delay revenue sharing, since doing so would imply that the federal 
government’s needs were more important than those of states and localities. This proved to be a 
marked change of view for Mills, who had spent years wrangling with Johnson and Nixon over 
deficits and who had initially eschewed revenue sharing by arguing that the fiscal needs of states 
and localities should be kept separate from the federal government’s.853 
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Byrnes and other conservatives were outraged by Mills’s defection. In a long dissent, 
primarily authored by Byrnes, revenue sharing opponents argued that RS was unconstitutional, 
unneeded, and unwise. States and localities, the dissenters argued, were not suffering from a 
“common fiscal crisis,” and that those that faced budgetary problems both could and should, in 
the view of the dissenters, solve it themselves.   The dissenters also argued that that “under the 
constitution the power to tax is carefully linked to and limited by the power to spend for 
specified purposes.” “The responsibility for raising taxes is divorced from the dispensation of 
public benefits [under the revenue sharing bill],” the dissenters wrote. This fact, they warned, 
would lead to soaring federal taxes. Byrnes and his other dissenters quoted Andrew Jackson’s 
1883 veto message approvingly. Opponents even went so far as to blame German revenue 
sharing instituted in the 1920s for the country’s post-WWI fiscal chaos. While the dissent did not 
mention Hitler, the allusion was unmistakable.854 To highlight Mills’s flip-flop, Byrnes also took 
to peppering his anti-revenue sharing speeches with quotes from Mills’s old anti-revenue sharing 
speeches.855 Keeping the heat on RS supporters, Byrnes lambasted the revenue sharing in 
bromides on the House floor and to local Chambers of Commerce, dubbing RS a “Trojan horse” 
for federal domination of states and localities. 856  Even worse for conservatives, Nixon’s 
categorical grant proposal – Special Revenue Sharing – was quickly tossed aside. Many on the 
left viewed SRS with hostility, considering that it proposed effectively eliminating a variety of 
federal categorical programs and turning over the money to the states in the form of block grants 
earmarked for spending in the same category. As a result, none found favor with Congress 
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during the 1971-72 revenue sharing debates and only a few were eventually enacted, albeit in a 
watered-down form.857 
Opponents to revenue sharing were now facing an uphill battle. The bill had undeniable 
political appeal, thanks in part to its framing as a response to both the “fiscal crisis” and “tax 
revolt.” The White House worked strategically to include analyses of the effect of RS on local 
property taxes into its publicity materials.858 They included “heavy emphasis on why [the] 
taxpayer should care” about RS. 859 As Walter Heller had told skeptical federal legislators, the 
political credit for helping relieve Americans’ state and local tax burden more than outweighed 
any objections to RS. “[A]s far as the voter is concerned, the most painful squeeze he feels today 
is not in federal taxes, it is at the state and local level,” Heller explained. “What better campaign 
platform can a congressman or senator have than to go to the people of his state or his district 
and say, ‘I have relieved some of the terrible pressure of rising state and local taxes? Or, I helped 
provide a better level of state-local services without higher state-local taxes?” 860 Heller was 
right. The accumulation of experts, interest groups, and state and local officials decrying heavy 
use of the property tax seemed to win over even some conservative Republicans. Following the 
testimony of Ohio legislator Charles Kurfess and David Bartley, the speaker of the 
Massachusetts House, New York Republican Barber Conable – a usually reliably pro-business 
member of the Ways and Means Committee who was nonetheless loyal to the Nixon 
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administration – declared, “I think we have too great a burden on the regressive taxes. I feel that 
progressive taxes should carry a greater portion of the burden of government….”861 “[H]owever 
imperfect our income tax system is, it is obviously more progressive – and that is what most tax 
reformers are looking for in their tax system – than the real estate taxes and sales taxes, the basic 
devices for generating revenue for state and local governments,” Conable said. “So anything that 
we can do to transfer an increasing portion of the total burden from the real estate and sales tax 
to the income tax is a step in the direction of tax reform…. [Revenue sharing] taxes pressure off 
a regressive tax, and that is what we are here to try to do in the pattern of government we are 
trying to establish.”862 Liberal Pennsylvania Republican John Heinz praised the bill for the same 
reasons. “The revenue-raising efforts by state and local governments are overly dependent on 
these regressive property taxes which penalize the poor and the elderly, as well as the middle-
class working man,” he said. “The bill we have passed today can help alleviate this burden and 
make our taxes fairer.”863 The White House knew all-too-well that the popularity of revenue 
sharing was a political boon to whomever received credit, which is why from the very beginning 
of the RS debate the administration bristled at the possibility that Muskie, McGovern, or Mills 
would take credit for revenue sharing and worked to make it clear to the public and the press that 
it was “our initiative.” 864 
 Revenue sharing passed the House in late-June. The final formula allocated $3.5 billion 
of the $5.3 billion according to population, urbanized population, and per capita income-
weighted population, with each population measure receiving one-third of the $3.5 billion, or 
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approximately $1.17 billion. The remaining $1.8 billion was split between measures of 
individual income tax effort by the states and a measure of general tax effort by states and 
localities, giving each $900 million. So, in the end, the final House bill made income tax effort a 
decidedly minor – though still significant – consideration in the allocation formula.865 Henry 
Reuss criticized the House bill as “little better than the administration’s revenue sharing plan” in 
many ways. However, the Wisconsin liberal praised the bill’s “important incentives to encourage 
the adoption of progressive state income taxes,” even if it did not go as far as he would have 
liked. “The formula under which funds are distributed to the states allocates half the funds given 
each state according to the amount of its individual income tax collections with some variations,” 
Reuss said. “While a total allocation under this formula would have been preferable, this should 
induce some of the 10 states which currently lack an individual income tax to enact such taxes. 
Other states which have narrowly based or flat-rate income taxes will have an incentive to make 
them more progressive.” For Reuss, encouraging state use of progressive income taxes was an 
issue of fairness both between the states and among taxpayers. “States without income taxes, or 
which make [use of] only a token income tax, often compete unfairly with other states for 
industry,” Reuss argued. “Worse, their reliance on property and sales taxes unfairly burdens their 
low- and moderate-income homeowners and poor people.” 866 Reuss also praised the House bill’s 
provision permitting states to voluntarily allow the federal government to collect income taxes 
on behalf of the states. In this model, states could simply levy an additional percent on top of 
federal rates and save large administrative costs by letting the feds collect the revenue for them. 
Reuss warned, however, that this “piggback” income tax provision would not be meaningful if 
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the federal code continued to resemble “swiss cheese” thanks to “flagrant loopholes.”867 
Moreover, at the White House’s request, the legislation only authorized federal-state “piggback” 
tax collections if five states requested it, making the likelihood that provision would be used 
much less likely than if states could request it individually.868 
 When the bill moved to the Senate, it seemed likely that it would be watered down 
further from the initial hopes of distributive liberals like Reuss. Nixon’s Treasury Secretary 
George Shultz requested that the Senate remove the House bill’s income tax incentive. “It has 
been the position of the administration not to favor particular state tax instruments, but rather to 
reward over-all state and local tax effort,” Shultz told the Finance Committee. “Accordingly, we 
would prefer to replace the income tax incentive with a provision closer to the President's 
original proposal.”869 Indeed, led by Russell Long, the Senate Finance Committee made several 
key changes to the House bill, including altering the balance of funds allocated between urban 
and rural areas and stripping the income tax incentive from the bill by making population, 
personal income, and total tax effort the distribution criteria. Echoing Shultz and other 
conservatives, Long said that the House bill “would have meant that the federal government 
would be dictating to the state governments what taxes they should use.” Long said that the 
income tax effort element in the distribution formula “discriminates markedly against states with 
either no income tax or low income taxes.”870 Not surprisingly, left-distributionist Fred Harris 
proved to be one of the few dissenters to the Finance Committee bill when it was approved and 
sent to the full Senate for consideration.871  
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Left-liberal Senators attempted to attach various provisions to the Finance Committee bill 
via the amendment process, usually with little success, thanks in part to Long’s aggressiveness in 
pursuing votes to table amendments he found undesirable. Most significantly, Ted Kennedy 
proposed an amendment to the RS bill requiring President Nixon to submit to Congress 
preliminary tax reform proposals by October 31, 1972 – a date which, likely not accidentally, fell 
just days before the presidential election – as well as final proposals by March 31, 1973. Long’s 
motion to kill the bill passed 52-24, with GOP members voting unanimously 34-0 to kill it, 
supported by a minority of Democrats, who voted 18-24 to table Kennedy’s amendment. 
Democrats’ votes manifested the typical pattern on tax reform issues, with left-liberals – 
including Kennedy, Hartke, Muskie, Humphrey, Mondale, and Nelson, among others – voting 
against killing the Kennedy amendment and conservative and business-oriented Democrats – 
including Long, Chiles, Eastland, and Bentsen – voting with the GOP.872 A Harke amendment 
prohibiting revenue sharing money form being used to “induce a business or industry to move a 
plant or other facility to one area from another” – in other words, using RS money for business 
tax incentives – was rejected by a 26-56 vote featuring much the same coalition as the one the 
killed the Kennedy amendment, with Muskie being the most significant Democratic opponent, in 
political terms.873 Eventually, the Senate adopted the Finance Committee bill with minor changes 
by a 64-20 vote, with 15 of the “no” votes coming from Democrats.874 
The conference report was adopted in two mid-October votes by the House and Senate. 
Though Republicans were, overall, more supportive of the bill, both parties passed it 
overwhelmingly, and few ideological patterns were evident in the voting, with many of the most 
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liberal and conservative members of both chambers casting their votes in favor of the final 
bill.875 The final bill allotted more than $5 billion per year to states and localities for five years 
beginning, retroactively, in January 1972. It also gave states the option of choosing between the 
House formula, which included an income tax effort provision, and the Senate formula, which 
did not. As a result, the already weakened incentive for states to employ income taxes was 
weakened further. The conference report also favored the Senate’s state/local distribution ratio 
and, as a result, the final bill tilted more towards “poor central city and rural areas at the expense 
of more affluent suburbs,” as CQ Almanac put it.876 The share of revenue going to localities was 
also increased to two-thirds in the final bill.877 Keeping with the shift away from emphasizing 
state income taxes, the JCT’s “general explanation” of the final State and Local Fiscal Assistance 
Act, as the RS bill was dubbed, included nearly all of the “fiscal crisis” language used by Mills’s 
Ways and Means Committee to justify revenue sharing. Notably, however, the phrase asking 
states to “mak[e] more extensive use of their own tax resources” was dropped. In its place, the 
JCT noted that states “also face severe financial problems,” which the JCT blamed vaguely on 
“the nature of their tax structures.”878 Despite being watered down, the income tax effort 
provision in the bill retained some of its teeth. For example, one analysis found that Ohio would 
increase its revenue sharing allocation by 35 percent by instituting the income tax and decreasing 
the states sales tax collections by the same amount.879 
Perhaps most significantly, from Nixon’s perspective, Congress substituted a five-year 
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fixed dollar amount for the administration’s plan to dispense a yearly parentage of the personal 
income tax base. While some advocates of the five-year fixed option argued that it would allow 
state and local governments to make long-term plans for the money, administration officials like 
Murray Weidenbaum argued that it had the opposite effect. Since state and local officials were 
unsure if the funds would continue after 1976, Weidenbaum wrote, they were “reluctant to 
incorporate the revenue sharing funds into their operating budgets.”880 Indeed, an ACIR survey 
of local officials found that the uncertainty about revenue sharing altered their decisions of how 
to use the money and, overwhelmingly, the officials told the ACIR that they tended to use the 
money on capital projects and other nonrecurring expenses, rather than incorporate it into the 
annual budget, because they feared it could be eliminated in 1976. 881  Overall, though, 
Weidenbaum’s worries proved to be premature. The first two disbursements of funds – 
beginning in January 1972 and ending in December of that year – did see state and local 
governments allocating their funds to capital and nonrecurring costs, as Weidenbaum predicted. 
And, indeed, officials surveyed cited uncertainty over the future of revenue sharing as their 
reason for their allocation choices. However, by the third disbursement period, which began in 
January 1973, state and local officials had begun using revenue sharing money for normal 
operating and maintenance expenditures. “Contrary to early speculation,” an Office of Revenue 
Sharing Report noted, “more money was earmarked for operating and maintenance expenses 
than for capital expenditures.”882 
The general revenue sharing legislation left state governments free to spend the money in 
any area, while it limited local governments to spending in one of five priority areas: public 
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safety, environmental protection, public transportation, health, recreation, libraries, social 
services for the poor and aged, and financial administration, including “ordinary and necessary” 
capital expenditures.883 Given that money is fungible, however, the categorical limits at the local 
level meant little, in practice. Additionally, state governments’ standard practice of sharing 
revenue with localities meant that states no-strings-attached revenue sharing money could, in 
effect, be used to assist states in areas not allowed under the revenue sharing guidelines. While 
localities could not use funds for education, states could – and did. Thanks to large education 
expenditures on the state level, education ranked a close second to public safety (22 percent to 
23.5 percent) of total state and local revenue sharing expenditures during the third entitlement 
period.884  
Even without the strong income tax incentive desired by left-distributionists, revenue 
sharing did, in fact, shift the tax burden upward, at least a little. One effect of the use of revenue 
sharing money for general operating expenses was to lessen the reliance of states and localities 
on regressive taxes. “Almost half of the $2.96 billion represented in the third entitlement period 
reports is being spent in such a way as to reduce taxes, prevent an increase in taxes, prevent 
enactment of new taxes, or reduce the amount of a tax rate increase,” the Office of Revenue 
Sharing reported in late-1973. 885 When “actual use” reports – in contrast to “planned use” 
reports – began to roll in during the first months of 1974, it became clear that revenue sharing 
was, indeed, having a substantial effect on the level and mix of taxes across the country. Nearly 
45 percent of all governments (states, counties, cities, townships, and tribes) used the revenue 
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sharing funds to reduce taxes or prevent an increase in taxes, while an additional 28 percent said 
it was “too soon to predict” if the money would be used to reduce taxes. Only 27 percent said 
revenue sharing would have no effect on the level of their taxes. Moreover, lower levels of 
government – counties, cities, townships, and tribes – were much more likely than states to say 
that they were using revenue sharing money to lower taxes. Thus, the levels of government with 
the most regressive taxes were also the most likely to be substituting revenue from the 
progressive federal income tax for their own tax sources.  Moreover, researchers at the Office of 
Revenue Sharing believed that, over time, the effect on state and local taxes would become even 
larger than the initial reports. “For all units of government, the proportion indicating revenue 
haring to have had such an impact [reducing taxes and reducing debt] increased as the proportion 
of funds spent increased,” the office noted in a March 1974 report. “This suggests that as more 
revenue sharing funds are spent even more recipient governments will indicate that the funds 
reduced or lessened tax increases and lessened or avoided debt increases.”886 
Left-distributionist proponents of shifting the tax mix in the system U.S. “fiscal 
federalism” towards progressive sources did not see the passage of revenue sharing as the end of 
their efforts, however. The 1972 presidential campaign quickly became a showcase for both left-
distributionist analyses of the “tax revolt” and proposals to make the American tax system more 
progressive at all levels of government. 
 
The Tax Revolt Presidential Campaign 
Though it did not offer quite the same alliterative ring, the conservative slander against 
George McGovern’s 1972 presidential campaign, as one of “acid, amnesty, and abortion” could 
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just have easily been amended to “acid, amnesty, abortion, and redistribution.” Indeed, 
McGovern’s fiscal platform was likely the most radical plan by a Democratic presidential 
nominee since FDR’s “Second Bill of Rights.” Moreover, this platform reflected the influence of 
both grassroots “tax justice” groups and the tax successes of populist Democratic governors. The 
popularity of these stances was unmistakable. Despite the fact that the South Dakota Democrat’s 
tax proposal were – like much of his campaign – marred by public relations missteps, 
McGovern’s openly left-distributionist proposals proved to be not only the most popular element 
of his campaign, but the only issue on which voters consistently preferred McGovern to Nixon. 
As a result, in the process of pulling the Democratic Party to the left on taxes, McGovern took 
Nixon with him, too. 
Perhaps more than any other domestic issue, the tax revolt dominated the 1972 
Democratic primaries. Influenced both by grassroots activists like CCC and successful state-level 
Democratic candidates like Askew, National Democrats eyeing the 1972 presidential nomination 
also began striking populist, distributionist stances on taxes. Nearly every Democratic candidate 
in the 1972 primaries made tax inequities, in general, and property taxes, in particular, a key 
issue in their campaign. From Ed Muskie to Henry “Scoop” Jackson, Humbert Humphrey to 
John Lindsay, and George Wallace to George McGovern, every major Democratic pledged some 
form of progressive tax reform as they barnstormed the country throughout the spring and 
summer of 1972.887 Echoing Reuben Askew, Jackson pledged a “fair share” tax plan he said 
would close between $12 and $20 billion in loopholes. The conservative Washington senator also 
“repeatedly emphasized” the “bruising impact” of property taxes on “middle income 
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Americans.”888 Lindsay pledged a loophole-closing tax reform package that he said would raise 
$10 to $15 billion. He also called for “immediate emergency” relief to property taxpayers in the 
form of a graduated federal income tax credit equivalent to 30 percent of property tax bills for 
homeowners making less than $30,000 annually, 15 percent to those making between $30,000 
and $40,000, and nothing for those making more than $40,000.889 The NYC mayor ran ads 
bragging that Lindsay was “the first mayor of New York to tax banks and insurance companies, 
and he’s the one candidate with a plan for immediate property tax relief now, not next year.”890 
Humphrey pledged “that new federal aid will allow reductions in local property taxes,” funded 
by closing federal tax loopholes.891 Most major candidates for the 1972 Democratic nomination, 
including McGovern, Muskie, Humphrey, and the long-rumored candidate Ted Kennedy also 
either introduced or endorsed the Tax Reform Act of 1972, a bill by Senator Bill Nelson 
designed to wipe away $17 billion in tax loopholes.892 Few Democrats seemed willing to forgo 
the rhetorical appeal of tax reform.  
The tax fever sweeping the Democratic primaries gripped even the most unlikely 
candidates. George Wallace’s tax proposals and rhetoric were the most idiosyncratic. Wallace 
simultaneously combined far-right general anti-tax, anti-weflare sentiment with left-
distributionist loophole-closing proposals. Like many ideologically amorphous populists, 
Wallace aimed his ire at both the bottom and top of the American economic structure.893 On the 
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one hand, Wallace deployed conservative rhetoric, charging that all his Democratic opponents 
knew was “Tax, tax, tax, spend, spend, spend – tax and spend.”894 On the other hand, Wallace 
called for loophole-closing in the federal tax code, including the repeal of tax-exempt status for 
churches and foundations. In Wisconsin, Wallace pledged, “And I say to you, if you vote for 
George Wallace and he wins in Wisconsin, something will be done about tax reform even before 
the election.”895 Likewise, one Wallace television advertisement in the state told voters, “The 
average working man, business man, and farmer pays taxes through the nose. About $200 billion 
of income and wealth is tax exempt in this country. A vote for Wallace will be a message to the 
National Democratic Party that we want tax exemptions removed.” 896  Speaking of the 
Democratic Senators running against him, Wallace quipped, “[T]hey have been in Congress 109 
years total. Why didn’t they do something about tax reform then?”897  If he had been in the 
Senate, Wallace claimed to a Milwaukee audience, he would have spent “365 days a year” 
yelling “Tax relief, tax reform, tax relief, tax reform!” 898 As Wallace promised to “get your taxes 
lowered and the loopholes plugged” on the campaign trail, he argued that he was the original tax 
reformer and that other Democrats were “stealing my thunder.”899 Indeed, as early as February 
1971, Wallace’s newsletter declared, “A tax revolt is brewing! Until the unfair burden is taken 
from the shoulders of the average taxpayer – we shall continue our cause.”900 His campaign 
brochures consistently embraced an odd mélange of conservatism and liberalism, touting 
Wallace’s bold “inquiries into forced busing, tax-exempt foundations, inequities in the tax-load, 
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welfare loafing and foreign giveaways” in the same sentence.901 Given his seemingly divergent 
ideological paths on taxes – progressive loophole-closing reformer one minute, conservative tax 
slasher the next – Nixon campaign analysts concluded, “What he [Wallace] would do about taxes 
if (God help us) he ever were elected is anybody’s guess.” 902 Even Eugene McCarthy – who had 
said precious little about domestic issues during his presidential run four years earlier and who 
had also been known for his often conservative stances on taxes during his time on the Senate 
Finance Committee – began calling for a “graduated property tax system, similar to the 
graduated income tax, to do away with the flat rate and assessed evaluation of determining 
property taxes” during his campaign in Illinois – and, perhaps not coincidentally, Illionis proved 
to be only state in which McCarthy garnered a substantial number of votes.903  
But no other candidates made the tax revolt more central to their campaigns than the 
Democratic frontrunner Edmund Muskie and the eventual nominee George McGovern. Though 
both would place tax reform at the center of their campaigns, Muskie began with the clear early 
lead. Thanks both to his position as the most recognizable politician on the ACIR and his 
association with Nader’s tax reform campaign, Muskie had spent much of 1971 drawing 
attention to the local fiscal crisis and advocating for progressive forms of revenue sharing. He 
solidified his position as perhaps the foremost expert on the tax revolt among the Democratic 
candidates by running radio ads in early primary states like New Hampshire proposing bold 
initiatives like monthly federal “housing security” payments to help struggling homeowners pay 
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for rising property taxes.904 Indeed, beginning early in the 1972 presidential contest, the Nixon 
White House worried that Muskie would use his place on ACIR to “embarrass the president” by 
pushing Muskie’s own plans “with regard to the school finance and property tax issue,” while 
giving Nixon’s initiatives short shrift.905 Despite his image as a sensible moderate, Muskie had 
no hesitation issuing fiery rhetoric when it came to taxes. One Muskie television advertisement 
began with a voiceover declaring, “The taxpaying citizens of America know Ed Muskie. As a 
senator he has fought to reduce the burden of property taxes and to restore some balance to our 
spending so that our problems at home will get first priority.”  The ad then cut to Muskie 
delivering an indoor speech. “Let me give you one city – one city. Property taxes on a $10,000, 
today’s market value, are over $900 a year,” Muskie declared emphatically. “In eleven years – in 
eleven years! – that house is consumed by its own taxes. You can guess what’s happening. You 
see property after property abandoned. The owners [are] walking away from it. They don’t want 
to touch it. Well what do you do about those problems? Build a space shuttle?!” Following this 
sarcastic, rhetorical closing, the voiceover intoned, “Muskie, for the country.”906 From any 
vantage point, Muskie’s position when it came to tax reform was unmistakable. The Nixon 
campaign team internally summarized Muskie’s tax platform as “incorporating virtually ever 
major proposal made during the last decade by liberal Democratic economists.”907 
McGovern’s initial forays into the tax debate were less refined, but no less passionate. 
McGovern was not a new convert to tax reform, as anyone who followed the TRA69 debates 
knew. However, as his campaign wore on, McGovern honed his domestic message, particularly 
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when it came to taxes. With each passing week, McGovern’s already sizable emphasis on taxes 
grew. His plans became more specific, his rhetoric more cutting. Like Nader and many other left 
reformers, McGovern was a moralist most at ease with issues that could be framed in binary 
terms of good-and-evil.908 Vietnam, the initial issue motivating his campaign, was one such topic 
that could be framed in that way.  Taxes – particularly seen though a left-distributionist lens – 
proved to be another. Though economic issues were initially far from McGovern’s forte, the 
Democrat became more and more interested in pocketbook issues his campaign developed 
throughout late-1971 and early-1972.909  During the New Hampshire primary – the third contest 
in 1972 – McGovern stressed tax issues, but his tax plans were short on specifics. At this early 
stage, the South Dakota Democrat called for closing loopholes that benefitted corporations 
providing tax-relief to low- and middle-income taxpayers, both on the federal level and on the 
local level, by having the federal government assume a greater share of welfare and education 
expenses.910 In New Hampshire, McGovern ran radio advertisements declaring that the South 
Dakota Democrat “proposes eliminating ‘outrageous’ loopholes that enable large corporations to 
shift their tax load to the working man. He proposes relieving the property tax burden by having 
the government assume the major part of education and welfare costs and he seeks to phase out 
oil and gas depletion allowances.”911  
Not only had candidates like McGovern and Muskie been influenced by the tax stances of 
Nader and grassroots groups like CCC, but tax populist Democratic governors also served as an 
animating for national Democrats. By early March, McGovern was telling members of the 
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Florida state legislature – who McGovern knew very well were no strangers to tax politics, 
thanks to Reuben Askew – that “tax reform should be the campaign’s major issue,” as a Nixon 
reelection campaign operative reported to the White House.912 Indeed, reforms in states like 
Florida tricked up into the 1972 presidential race. “It is McGovern’s theory – almost identical to 
the views expressed by Askew – that large economic interests in the state have been using racial 
animosity over the years to prevent the formation of a coalition of blacks and working class 
whites to take their share of economic and political power,” the Palm Beach Post observed in 
March 1972. “McGovern even is talking about basic reform in the federal tax system – not 
unlike the reforms which Askew as pushed on the state level…include[ing] a closing of all 
loopholes in upper income bracket, increased corporate income taxes, and the removal of 
personal exemptions.”913 During campaign McGovern praised Askew, specifically, “largely 
because of his successful fight to pass a corporate income tax last year and for his outspoken 
opposition to a constitutional amendment prohibiting school busing for purposes of 
integration.”914 
Following these examples from the grassroots and the states, taxes and other pocket 
issues joined Vietnam as McGovern’s strongest appeal as the Democratic presidential contest 
wore on. By mid-March, as a Washington Post headline explained, the McGovern campaign had 
settled on a simple strategy: “Stress the War, Taxes, and Inflation.” McGovern’s shift to 
domestic pocketbook issues was driven, in part, by his interpretation of George Wallace’s 
victory in the Florida primary. The McGovern team was convinced that Wallace’s strong 
showing in Florida was more than a simple “anti-busing vote.” Instead, they argued that voting 
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for Wallace represented a “general protest by working people against general conditions” in the 
country.915 Polls showed that McGovern voters most agreed with him on the issues of Vietnam, 
taxes, and national priorities, while the polls also showed that Wallace voters most agreed with 
their candidate on busing, taxes, and crime.916 If McGovern was going to make inroads with 
Wallace voters, the issue on which he could base his appeal was clear. While McGovern 
continued to denounce Wallace’s position on issues like busing, he believed that a greater 
emphasis on pocketbook issues could woo Wallace voters to his campaign. “Anger at local tax 
increases heads the list of McGovern’s new targets,” the Washington Post noted in mid-March. 
The first step in McGovern’s new strategy was to acknowledge the validity of the public’s anger 
about taxes. The second was to propose a solution. In a speech in Peoria, Illinois, McGovern 
declared, “There is a real tax revolt in this country.” The answer, McGovern argued, was to close 
tax loopholes for the well-off and make taxes fairer for lower- and middle-income Americans.917    
McGovern made Wisconsin the pivotal primary in his campaign, and taxes played a 
central role in catapulting the outsider candidate to victory in the Badger State. In New 
Hampshire, McGovern had delivered an impressive second-place finish to frontrunner Muskie, 
in part by courting “working people” on economic issues, thereby expanding his appeal beyond 
the antiwar crowd. But then McGovern’s momentum faltered. The Florida primary that followed 
saw McGovern come in a distant sixth place behind George Wallace, whose supporters 
McGovern was careful not to denounce, on the grounds that many Wallace voters, in the South 
Dakotan’s view, were simply disaffected with the government and economic issues, rather than 
out-and-out racists. The subsequent Illinois campaign – which saw the tax-centric Muskie win 
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with a whopping 62 percent of the vote – was a “disaster” for McGovern, as one of his staffers 
put it, and, following the disappointment in Florida, only served to heighten the upcoming 
Wisconsin race. Like many states, Wisconsin had experienced soaring property taxes, 
particularly in poor and working-class neighborhoods in Milwaukee. Nationwide, Wisconsin had 
the third highest property taxes in the country. 918 Grassroots activists understood the power of 
taxes in Wisconsin. Both the Madison Tenants Union and the nascent Madison Committee for 
Fair Taxes were beginning to organize around property taxes in early 1972. According to an 
MTU study, assessments in some Madison neighborhoods had risen as much as 240 percent in 
twelve years, forcing many low- and fixed-income Madison homeowners to sell their homes.919 
Like Nader, CAP, and CCC, the MCFT argued that businesses were underassessed, driving up 
rates for homeowners. . “[I]t is not just the rising cost of social services that makes our tax 
burden heavy,” the MCFT argued. “It is the unfair distribution of taxes that put us as working 
people under a burden that we can not and will not carry any longer.” The MCFT called for the 
abolition of the property tax, which it termed “regressive, inequitable, and impossible to 
impartially administer,” and its replacement with progressive forms of taxation.920  The IAF and 
Alinsky took note of the appeal of tax issues in Wisconsin. “McGovern, Wallace, Lindsay all 
made an issue of the property tax in the Wisconsin primary,” Harmon wrote to Alinsky in mid-
April. “So the scene is ripe up there….”921 Indeed, within a year, several Alinksy-trained groups 
would be working on taxes in the state. 922 Wisconsin politicians understood the significance of 
the tax issue in their state, too. Not only had Milwaukee’s congressmen, Henry Reuss, been 
pushing for progressive tax relief, but Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin also authored a 
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property tax relief bill, which he asked McGovern to cosponsor. At Nelson’s suggestion, 
McGovern campaigned around the Badger State touting the “Nelson-McGovern” bill and 
generally “capitalizing on voter discontent with rising property taxes,” as McGovern adviser 
Gordon Weil put it.923 Already high on McGovern’s priority list, taxes now effectively found an 
equal footing with Vietnam as his most-emphasized topic. Indeed, the Wisconsin Democratic 
campaign saw every major candidate emphasize tax reform, in general, and property taxes, in 
particular, as they attempted to woo voters to their side.  
The vibrancy of tax reform as a winning issue for candidates like McGovern in the 
Democratic primary worried the White House. “As is becoming apparent in Wisconsin, tax 
reform has the potential of becoming a first-rate political issue this year. I have the feeling that 
the initiative in the property tax relief area is being stolen from us by the Democrats…,” Colson 
warned in an April memo to Ehrlichman. “It seems to me that we need events that will elevate 
visibly our efforts to this area and that we really need a coordinated plan to keep the President 
out front on the property tax issue. Without knowing, I suspect that if we took a poll to 
Wisconsin right now we would find that the average citizen believes that the Democrats want to 
do something about their tax burdens and that we are not only insensitive to it but are allowing 
several hundred millionaires to go scott-free without paying any taxes.” Colson suggested that 
the White House begin touting the ACIR’s reform studies, among other measures to get Nixon 
talking about tax reform again. Colson also noted that many in the administration, including John 
Connally, worried that the Democrats would not only talk tax reform on the campaign trail, but 
would try to enact it during the election year in order to force Nixon to either accept or oppose it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Either way, under this plan, the Democrats would win politically. ”924 Nixon could not afford to 
give short shrift the tax revolt, or attempt to portray it as little more than the epiphenomena of 
working-class whites’ cultural grievances. Even revenue sharing was not enough. “[T]he tax 
issue [has been] forced upon us,” Ehrlichman decleared in an April memo. Evidence suggested 
that Americans were upset about not only the level, but the fairness of the tax system, 
particularly the “loopholes” that were receiving abundant coverage in the press. “[V]]oting in the 
primaries has, arguably, validated the issue,” Ehrlichman argued, because “Humphrey, Muskie, 
McGovern and Wallace have all made an issue of the need for tax reform, and the first three 
have backed specific legislation.”925  John Conally agreed. He believed that both Wallace and 
McGovern were succeeding in the primaries because they appealed to a frustrated populace. 
“They have raised the tax issue by harping on reforms and loophoes. There is a real issue 
here…,” Connally told OMB staffers in May 1972. “The tax issue is basic. When you see people 
turning down bond issues for schools and sewers and waters in their own hometowns, then you 
know they are fed up.”926 Nixon’s inner circle took note of what was transpiring in the primaries, 
compiling extensive accounts of the Democratic candidates’ tax appeals and seeking to discern 
how Nixon should craft his own appeal927  
Polling data analyzed by the White House in December 1971 made clear the futility of 
traditional conservative stances on taxing-and-spending. While avoiding tax increases was, as 
always, politically advisable according to Ed Harper’s analysis of the data, small-government 
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conservatism was not. The public, the data showed, cared little about a balanced budget. When it 
came to taxes, the public’s views were nuanced. Only nine percent of Americans said that they 
“disliked all taxes.” Property taxes were the most disliked (27 percent), followed by state and 
local sales taxes (22 percent), federal income taxes (18 percent) and state income taxes (15 
percent). In other words, according to the White House’s study, the two most disliked taxes were 
regressive levies. Predictably, regional variations existed in the data. Property taxes were more 
popular in the South, which tended to rely less on them. Likewise, state income taxes were less 
popular in the Northeast than in other regions.928 The administration also received a preview of 
ACIR’s survey of Americans’ views on taxes. It found that “clos[ing] loopholes” was the most 
popular response (offered by 40 percent of respondents) when Americans were asked how they 
would want the federal government to raise additional tax revenue. The federal income tax was 
labeled the “fairest” form of taxation (picked by 36 percent of respondents), and the local 
property tax was chosen as the “worst” and “least fair” form of taxation (chosen by 45 percent of 
respondents).929 The administration also paid attention to local polls. Lew Engman wrote to 
Ehrlichman to alert him of a Detroit News poll showing that a large majority of voters in 
Michigan supported amending the state’s constitution to “change...the way public schools are 
financed under a plan which would reduce local school property taxes, but increase the state 
income tax and enact a value added tax.” Even majorities of union members and renters 
supported the proposal, Engman marveled.930 
The Nixon campaign team documented the clear link between the Democratic 
candidates’ tax appeals and their success in the primaries. A Committee to Reelect the President 
“Competitive Analysis Report” noted that McGovern’s “emphasis here [Wisconsin] will be on 
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tax reform” and that “Wallace kicked off his Wisconsin campaign by stressing the need for tax 
reform.”931 “McGovern has hit the issues, and the opposition, hard in Wisconsin,” another CRP 
“Competitive Analysis Report” explained. “He has consistently spoken on the war, inflation, 
unemployment, tax reform, property taxes, farm subsidies and farm take-overs by businesses for 
tax write-offs.”932 These national analyses echoed the findings of Wisconsin CRP operatives. 
Nixon field staffers in the Badger State wrote a detailed memo – read by CRP deputy director 
Jeb Magruder and forwarded to director John Mitchell – on the successful economic appeals of 
Democrats in the Wisconsin primary. Contrary to commentators who saw the McGovern and 
Wallace campaigns as polar opposites, the CRP operatives viewed them as two sides of the same 
coin. “Only two smart campaigns emerge, Wallace and McGovern. There is a duality here that 
seems to escape the press experts,” the CRP memo noted. “McGovern has stolen the Wallace 
technique but with subtle touches and aimed at a wider audience. Both of these candidates have 
been badly underestimated and are potentially very dangerous to the President.” The Nixon 
operatives warned the president that Wallace’s appeal in a state like Wisconsin could not be 
dismissed as racially extremist. “There is no racist appeal being made in Wisconsin,” the memo 
argued. Instead, it suggested that both McGovern and Wallace were making a “class appeal” that 
was winning over voters in the Badger State. “This is bad for Republicans...,” the CRP staffers 
warned. “We are vulnerable because of their spadework in pinning the adjective rich to 
Republicans.” Despite Nixon’s longtime obsession with Wallace, the CRP field operatives saw 
McGovern was the more dangerous candidate. While Wallace’s “self-identification [with the] 
lower class is crude,” the memo noted, “The McGovern pitch has as its target the whole middle 
class. His villains are the richer, [the] corporations, and [the] Republicans in power.” While 
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Wallace directed part of his voters anger towards “welfare loafers,” McGovern was “redirecting 
these resentments towards the richer neighbor.” Taxes were a key issue in this “class appeal,” 
according to the CRP staffers. “Certain code words emerge – tax loopholes, corporate lawyer, 
and the military industrial complex,” the memo noted. Without a Nixon response, the attacks 
would only become more effective. If McGovern faltered in the Wisconsin primary, the memo 
predicted, “then we can relax a little.” But if McGovern “score[d]” in the Wisconsin, the CRP 
staff warned, “watch out.” The tax-based “class appeal” would soon become the Democrats’ 
standard line of attach against Nixon. “Humphrey and Muskie are catching on to this approach, 
too,” the memo noted. 933  So, when McGovern and Wallace finished first and second, 
respectively, in the Wisconsin Democratic primary, the takeaway for the Nixon White House 
was clear – Nixon would need to move even further to the left on taxes if he hoped to win the 
issue from the Democrats. Just how far Nixon would need to move depended on the outcome of 
the primaries, and as McGovern gained momentum, the answer seemed to be very far, indeed. 
During the primaries, both Muskie and McGovern ran television ads decrying unfairness 
in taxes at the local and federal levels, offering sympathy to the agitated taxpayers who were 
voting down local tax measures, and pledging progressive tax relief if elected. One commercial 
showed McGovern talking to a backyard full of people. A young white man asks McGovern, 
“Most of us feel that our property taxes are awfully high and we’d really like to know what you 
have in mind to provide some relief.” In response, the Democratic candidate argued that the 
federal government needed to step in and finance local property tax relief by closing tax federal 
“loopholes” that benefited the wealthy. “The ordinary family can hardly own their own home 
anymore, or their own business, or their own farm,” McGovern empathized in the commercial. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






“The only way I can see to reduce that load is for the federal government to move in and pick up 
a heavier share of the services that the states and cities are now carrying. The great injustice in 
the tax laws are in these loopholes that permit some of the richest people to pay little or no taxes 
at all. And that’s not right. That money is one source of money that you could use to take some 
of the pressure off the middle-income taxpayer.”934  One of Muskie’s ads showed him giving a 
speech addressing the tax revolt. “We need, in addition, in this country to more fairly distribute 
the burden of taxes,” the candidate declares in the commercial. “We find tax resistance all across 
this country, at the local level and the federal level. Why? It isn’t because people don’t want 
good schools. It isn’t because people don’t want to build good communities. But its because they 
perceive that the tax burden is not spread fairly.”935 Though McGovern would eventually secure 
the nomination, the decision by two of the top contenders for the presidency to focus on 
inequities in local taxation spoke to just how mainstream the left-distributionist tax reform had 
become. 
McGovern spoke the language of left-distributionist tax reform from the very beginning 
of his presidential campaign. However, McGovern’s specific tax policy proposals were slower to 
develop. Northwestern economist Robert Eisner, one of McGovern’s longtime friends, and John 
Kenneth Galbraith served as the South Dakotan’s first economic advisers during his early 
presidential run. They were soon joined by a who’s who of left-liberal economists, including 
James Tobin and Lester Thurow. Much of the policy that would form McGovern’s platform was 
devised during a June 1971 meeting, attended by nearly all of McGovern’s top economic 
advisers. There, Tobin pushed for fighting unemployment, rather than inflation, and Thurow 
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pushed for progressive tax reform.936 This general orientation – for jobs and tax reform – would 
persist throughout McGovern’s campaign, but details would come slowly, often to McGovern’s 
political detriment. Politically, one of McGovern’s faults was focusing on the substance of a 
policy proposal, rather than how it might be attacked by opponents or perceived by the public, 
leaving the Democrat on the defensive when assault inevitably came.937 McGovern’s earliest tax 
proposals – announced in a January speech in Ames, Iowa – openly advocated bringing about a 
“redistribution of income.”938 Nonetheless, McGovern’s initial tax reform suggestions were 
designed to be maximally effective while minimizing political controversy. Instead of choosing a 
Pechman-Ockner backed plan to close all tax loopholes and lower rates corresponding – which 
close advisers Frank Mankiewicz and Gordon Weil agreed would be easy for Nixon to attack 
politically, given the popularity of a few loopholes, like the mortgage interest deduction – 
McGovern backed a Thurow proposal to set a minimum tax of 75 percent of the statutory rate for 
those who made more than $50,000. Essentially, it was a much tougher version of Nixon’s 
minimum tax contained in the TRA69. McGovern also called for the repeal of a host of corporate 
tax liberalizations and investment credits, as well as a steep tax on inheritances over $500,000.939 
These initial proposals were good enough for the South Dakotan to win not only the Wisconsin 
primary, but also the following three – Idaho, Vermont, and Massachusetts – largely on the 
strength of his populist tax rhetoric.   
McGovern and his advisers revised his proposals over the first several months of the 
campaign until they were finally presented in an early May New York Review of Books article 
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coauthored by McGovern and economist Wassily Leontief.940 The article’s provocative title – 
“On Taxing & Redistributing Income” – made it clear that the Democrat had little fear of the 
public viewing him as too far to the left when it came to taxes. McGovern’s treatise provided a 
powerful argument for the notion that the income distribution could not be attributed to the 
natural workings of the market or cast as the just outcome of a morally neutral system. Instead, 
McGovern and Leontief wrote, “the distribution of income and of wealth naturally depends, to 
some extent, on every one of its social and economic institutions,” including the government’s 
“power…to levy taxes, to borrow and to print money.” These tools could either be used to bring 
about “a distribution of income compatible with the prevailing standards of social justice” or to 
“thwar[t] attempts to do so.” By the early-1970s, McGovern and Lontief argued, the latter was 
becoming more and more the case.941 “Many of the ills that both the federal and the local 
governments are now trying to cure, or at least to camouflage by various emergency measures,” 
McGovern and Lontief wrote, “will vanish with the elimination of their fundamental cause—a 
lopsided distribution of national wealth and income.” 942 
McGovern invoked the tax revolt in his call for left-distributionist reform. The Democrat 
also distinguished between the flaws in the federal tax system and those inflicting state and local 
levies.  The system of state and local taxation was fundamentally broken, in McGovern’s view. 
“The property tax revolt may be a major issue in the coming months. The federal government 
may have to step in to allow for a reduction of property taxes used to support education – 
perhaps their complete removal,” McGovern and Lontief wrote. “As I [McGovern] indicated in 
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July, 1971, in my proposals on revenue sharing, the states should be given the incentive to raise 
more of their revenues from progressive income taxes. In addition, the federal government 
should take over at least a third of the total bill for primary and secondary education.”943 The 
federal tax code, in contrast, was a “basically sound, although it has been riddled with special 
privileges for the rich.” Fixing it was a question of reform, rather than total overhaul. “[T]he 
cardinal importance of just taxation has receded in the American political conscience in the last 
thirty years…,” they charged. “Our once equitable and effective system of taxation has fallen 
victim to…[e]xemptions, accelerated amortizations, deductions, and credits of all kinds… 
[which] have fatally weakened, if not entirely destroyed, the progressive nature of the income, 
inheritance, and corporation taxes.” The loophole-driven decline in progressivity also 
undermined the public trust in the tax system, according to McGovern. “Many Americans feel 
themselves the victims of economic discrimination at the hands of the federal tax system,” he 
argued. “Although that system is, in many respects, one of the most enlightened in the world, it 
is an undeniable fact that millions of ordinary, working, middle-income families pay their taxes 
as required by law, while many of the wealthy use a variety of devices to escape their rightful tax 
burden.” When it came to taxes, the poor and middle-class both received the short end of the 
stick, in McGovern’s view. Ultimately, Democrat’s goal was “to restore and to strengthen the 
role of taxation as a stern guardian of social justice and an effective instrument of social reform” 
– no small feat. 944  
McGovern and Lontief proposed a minimum tax of 75 percent of the statutory rate for 
filers with incomes about $50,000, including “all income regardless of source” – meaning capital 
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gains, among other non-wage sources. 945 “Money made by money,” McGovern said throughout 
the campaign, “should be taxed at the same rate as money made by men.”946 Beyond individual 
income tax reforms, McGovern proposed curbing corporate income tax loopholes and the 
shifting of gift and inheritance taxes to the receiver, rather than the giver, with rates as high as 77 
percent for lifetime receipt of gifts or inheritances in excess of $500,000.947 McGovern also 
suggested the creation “inflation insurance,” which would take the form of a variety of measures, 
including tying Social Security payments and veteran’s benefits to inflation. He also proposed 
offering U.S. bonds that would increase with inflation, but offer lower real returns than riskier 
bonds. “People who want to hedge against inflation, and are willing to sacrifice the chance of 
larger gains for such security,” McGovern argued, “should be able to do so.”948  
The Democrat was unsparing in his criticism of Nixon’s economic policies – especially 
when it came to taxes. But McGovern also anticipated that Nixon would attempt to coopt 
McGovern’s tax plans – indeed, he challenged the president to do so. The White House was 
considering a Value Added Tax, McGovern and Lontief charged, calling such a levy “nothing 
less than a universal sales tax.” It would, in their view, “deliver a coup de grâce to the taxation 
system of which this country was once rightfully proud.” Tax reform – including local property 
tax reductions – had to be financed by the use of progressive taxes, not potentially regressive 
sources like the VAT. McGovern strenuously opposed reducing or eliminating the property tax 
with a VAT. “[T]he value added tax or national sales tax is against the interest of middle- and 
low-income people,” he wrote. “It is a regressive tax on consumption, which cannot, of course, 
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be reduced beyond a certain point necessary to ensure a decent life. And it represents a backdoor 
method of increasing individual taxes just after a reduction in taxation on individual incomes has 
been enacted.” McGovern and Lontief argued that tax reform proposals should become the 
central issue in the electoral campaign. President Nixon has again and again disarmed the 
opposition by making its proposals his own. It is most unlikely that he will want to do so in this 
case. What he would have to sacrifice are not lofty principles but hard cash.” McGovern, it 
seemed, was doubtful that Nixon would make that sacrifice.949 Of course, Nixon had already 
seemingly moved to the left on welfare reform with FAP, though McGovern planned to 
challenge him on that front, too. 
For McGovern, welfare reform and tax reform were intertwined, with each assuming a 
prominent place in his distributionist fiscal agenda. While Nixon sought to place a firewall 
between his tax and welfare plans, ensuring that tax reform would not be tainted by welfare’s 
unpopularity, McGovern integrated the two. Rather than foreground the racialization of welfare 
in the U.S., McGovern emphasized the economic roots of the public’s welfare resentment, which 
he compared to their frustration with tax loopholes that benefitted the rich. “Those with medium 
incomes find they are paying their taxes but not receiving either the kind of tax breaks given to 
the wealthy or the kind of public assistance payments made to the poor…,” McGovern wrote. 
“[T]he man in the middle sees billions of dollars going into welfare programs that don’t work. In 
short, many Americans pay their taxes dutifully and feel that others are exploiting the tax and 
welfare systems.” The unpopularity of the existing welfare system undeniably hurt Democrats 
politically. But, in McGovern’s view, the welfare system was not working well for the poor, 
either. “The poor find that, as soon as they go to work, they are subject to extremely high rates of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
949 George McGovern and Wassily Leontief, “On Taxing & Redistributing Income,” New York Review of Books, 






income taxation because of their sudden sharp reduction of public aid when they earn their first 
dollar,” he and Leontief wrote. “The net result is mounting frustration for those in the middle and 
a future of poverty for those who are heavily penalized when they seek to work their way out of 
welfare dependence.” McGovern’s proposed solution was a universal minimum income program 
– available to the poor and non-poor, alike – which the South Dakota Senator argued would end 
the current “two-class society [of] those who pay and those who receive.” 950 This goal – to 
eliminate the means-tested element of welfare – placed McGovern’s proposals in contrast with 
the current welfare system and Nixon’s FAP. 
Despite McGovern’s lofty welfare reform goals, at this stage in the primaries, the 
Democrat was short on specifics. McGovern called for a “minimum annual income” in his 
January tax reform speech in Iowa, but his welfare reform proposals were “offered somewhat 
more tentatively than his tax reform plan,” as the New York Times put it.951 “I propose that every 
man, woman, and child receive from the federal government an annual payment,” McGovern 
declared in the speech.952 Throughout the early campaign, McGovern offered his plan as a 
hypothetical, and suggested that any final plan would “require full examination by the best 
economic talent available.”953 What would become McGovern’s $1,000-per-person “Demogrant” 
proposal originated in the June 1971 meeting with liberal economists. Its most immediate 
intellectual inspiration was a “Fair Share” proposal by New York businessperson Leonard Green. 
But (as noted earlier in this chapter) the idea of a “guaranteed income” or “negative income tax” 
had a long lineage and a solid intellectual pedigree. Not only had McGovern adviser James 
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Tobin – who approved of McGovern’s “Demogrant” variation – previously proposed such a 
plan, but so had libertarian Nixon adviser Milton Friedman – a fact that, at first, seemed to guard 
against accusations that the program was too radical.  
McGovern initially mentioned the plan in a December 1971 interview with the 
Washington Post. It shared much in common with Nixon’s own FAP proposal. Every American 
would get a yearly $1,000 grant from the government. For a family of four, it would mean 
$4,000 per year. The possibility of the $1,000-per-person formula proposed by James Tobin 
years earlier in was mentioned by McGovern and Lontief in their New York Review of Books 
article, but so were alternate plans by Greene and Joseph Pechman.954 The grant would gradually 
phase out as income increased, reaching a break-even point, beyond which the entire grant would 
be taxed away, meaning that upper-income people would, effectively, never receive the grant. 
Those between the poor – who would receive the grant as a cash payment – and the break-even 
point would experience the grant as, effectively, a tax cut. “If the break-even income for a family 
of four were set at $12,000, about 20 percent of federal taxpayers would experience a tax 
increase, while about 80 percent would be able to keep all or part of the grant,” McGovern and 
Lontief in the New York Review of Books articled. The Democrat explained that the program 
would “actually provide more money to medium-income taxpayers than to the poor,” because 
$29 billion would go to those between the poverty line and the break-even points, while $14.1 
billion would go to those below the poverty line. Some of the funding would come in the form of 
additional taxes on taxpayers above the breakeven point, while $1.4 billion per year would come 
from saved federal welfare administrative costs. Likewise, states would save $5 billion in yearly 
administrative costs, while McGovern and Lontief proposed should be used to lower property 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






taxes.955 The “Demogrant,” like the “negative income tax,” the FAP, or many other guaranteed 
income proposals, avoided the work disincentive inherent in the existing welfare system. 
Because the grant was taxed away gradually, rather than taken away all at once, no one in 
poverty would be penalized by going to work, unlike the current AFDC system. Moreover, the 
“Demogrant” would also provide a boost to the incomes of working- and middle-class families. 
In short, it seemed like a political winner. It was, in effect, a simpler, seemingly more politically 
attractive, version of Nixon’s own welfare reform plan.956 Yet, the specifics of the plan – 
including its costs – remained vague, largely because many McGovern advisers felt it was better 
not to get into specifics. The public, they believed, did not expect or care about them. It was a 
decision that McGovern, in time, would come to regret.  
From the beginning, McGovern’s campaign was besotted with blunders and gaffes when 
it came to the details of his economic program. Because McGovern was quickly slingshot from 
outsider to frontrunner early in the primaries, his skeletal staff initially lacked the resources to 
properly calculate the effects of his proposals. “The process of seriously costing out various 
alternatives is a very complex job,” MIT economist and McGovern adviser Edwin Kuh told the 
New York Times. “Much more so than we realized when we started.”957 Flocking to his 
campaign, journalists immediately subjected McGovern’s proposals to scrutiny, at least in part 
because few other candidates – including the president – had offered much in the way of 
concrete plans, effectively shielding them from the type of scrutiny applied to McGovern’s 
proposals. The McGovern team, for their part, had no firm estimates for how much the 
“Demogrant” plan actually would cost. From the beginning, McGovern left the details open for 
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debate and tweaking by experts and Congress, should be elected, but that proved to be a dire 
mistake, given a press corps that not only expected hard numbers, but were willing to latch on to 
unflattering – or even outright implausible – outside estimates in the absence of numbers 
provided by the McGovern team. As Washington Post economics columnist Hobard Rowan 
noted, “[T]he cash giveaway, or ‘Demogrant,’ seemed ludicrous on its face to many people, 
although it, or variants of it, had been discussed in academic circles for years.”958 And 
McGovern’s early inability to offer firm details did not help. In a televised late-May interview, 
McGovern was asked if Americans should accept his “Demogrant” program, even though the 
candidate could not provide an estimate of its cost. “That is exactly right,” McGovern replied. In 
July McGovern would call that response, “Absolutely the worst moment of the campaign” – 
though, of course, it came before his ill-fated Vice Presidential selection.959 McGovern’s 
dismissive response “made his welfare plan – even though similar to proposals of conservative 
and liberal economists alike – sound like just another cheap campaign promise,” as one journalist 
put it, and gave the public reason to doubt his competence, as McGovern himself admitted later 
in the campaign.960 Indeed, attacks on McGovern’s welfare proposals would become a theme for 
his opponents throughout the campaign. 
By early spring, the Democratic primary field had narrowed to three candidates – 
McGovern, Humphrey, and Wallace.  Despite his strong tax platform, Muskie was outflanked on 
the issue by McGovern, who offered all that Muskie did and more when it came to pocketbook 
issues. Muskie was also badly damaged by appearing to cry when responding to a letter 
attributed to Muskie’s campaign team, which referred to French-Canadians as “canucks.” The 
“canuck letter” was later revealed to have been a Nixon campaign “dirty trick,” and in making 
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Muskie respond to it, the letter did its job. Following a strong showing in the March 21st Illinois 
primary – made possible by McGovern and Humphrey’s non-participation – Muskie quickly fell 
out the race and ultimately withdrew in late-April.961 Wallace would be the next major candidate 
to fall, both literally and figuratively – shot and paralyzed by a would-be assassin in Maryland on 
May 15th. The Nixon White House moved quickly, and unsuccessfully, to try to link Wallace’s 
shooter to McGovern and left politics, generally. However, such efforts were ultimately 
unnecessary. The effective removal of Wallace from the presidential contest harmed any 
potential Democratic nominee by ensuring that Wallace would not again run as a third party 
candidate, eliminating the possibility that the conservative Democrat would once again siphon 
votes from Nixon, thereby aiding the Democratic nominee, as Wallace had in 1968.962  
 With the field narrowed to two frontrunners in the run-up to the crucial California 
primary, Hubert Humphrey decided to attack McGovern from the right, filling the void left by 
Wallace. Thanks to his waffling on Vietnam and generally bland campaign in 1968, Humphrey 
was already loathed by many on the left. (“Gonzo” journalist Hunter S. Thompson, who covered 
the 1972 campaign for Rolling Stone, called Humphrey “a shallow, contemptible and hopelessly 
dishonest old hack.”963) And, despite his reputation as stalwart New Deal liberal on economics, 
Humphrey – desperate to win the nomination in what seemed certain to be his last opportunity to 
reach the White House – did not hesitate to embrace conservative rhetoric in the 1972 primaries. 
Humphrey tactical move to the right began early in the campaign, before the March 14th Florida 
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primary. In Florida, Humphrey threw his weight fully behind the welfare-resentment “backlash” 
thesis. One Humphrey radio commercial that ran in Florida pledged, “Humphrey will stop the 
flow of your tax dollars to lazy welfare chiselers” – a sentiment that a Nixon campaign memo 
declared “sounded like echoes of Wallace.”964 By the time Humphrey arrived in California to 
campaign prior to the June 6th primary, the Democrat had dropped any lingering hesitation about 
moving to the right or attacking his old Senate friend George McGovern’s economic proposals. 
The key confrontation between Humphrey and McGovern came during a series of three 
televised California debates. During the first debate, Humphrey took a question on Vietnam as an 
opportunity to launch into an attack on McGovern’s economic platform. The Minnesota 
Democrat called McGovern’s “Demogrant” proposal a “horrible mess” that would “post an 
unbelievable burden on the taxpayer.” Later in the first debate, Humphrey cited a Senate Finance 
Committee calculation of the cost of the National Welfare Rights Organization’s minimum 
income plan – which proposed $6,500 for a family of four – claiming the $72 billion estimate 
represented McGovern’s $4,000-per-family of four plan and referring elsewhere in the debate to 
the “a $72 billion welfare proposal that Senator McGovern makes today.” 965 (McGovern 
introduced NWRO’s bill in the Senate at their request, but he made it clear that he was doing so 
out of support for NWRO, not because he was endorsing the plan wholesale. 966) Humphrey’s 
coup de grace was an example of how much the McGovern plan would allegedly cost a few 
examples of average workers. “A secretary working in San Francisco making $8,000…would 
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have an increase in his or her taxes, under Senator McGovern’s welfare proposal, of $567…,” 
Humphrey claimed. “[A]nd a family that has $12,000 a year, a family of four, would have a $409 
increase.” After both examples, McGovern interjected to argue that they were “not true.” But 
Humphrey did not back down. “Now the senator can say it’s not true,” Humphrey retorted, “[but] 
he doesn’t’ even know what the price tag to his bill us.” Humphrey claimed that he did know, 
and that his figures were correct. McGovern continued to disagree, but could not provide the 
moderator with alternate figures. By the second primary debate, the Humphrey campaign 
cooperated with an unknown member of the Senate Finance Committee – possibly Russell Long, 
given his views on guaranteed income – to work up a private estimate of McGovern’s 
“Demogrant” plan, which his campaign then passed to conservative columnist Robert Novak, 
who sat on the second debate’s panel of moderators. Novak, not surprisingly, used the 
unpublished, unnamed study to attack McGovern and claim that Humphrey’s assertion in the 
first that the South Dakotan’s plan would, in fact, raise taxes on middle-income people was true. 
For his part, Humphrey claimed in the second debate that McGovern planned to do away with a 
variety of popular deductions, including the home mortgage interest deduction, even though 
McGovern’s plans made clear he intended nothing of the sort. This new attack, as McGovern 
adviser Gordon Weil noted, “hurt us badly in suburbia.”967   
Though Humphrey had been critical of McGovern in his California stump speeches, the 
ferocity of the Minnesota Democrat’s attacks in the California debates damaged McGovern and 
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stunned both the candidate and his supporters. “McGovern’s face literally dropped,” campaign 
manager Gary Hart remembered. “Here are guys who’ve served together, been on every liberal 
cause together. Humphrey was his next-door neighbor, for Christ sake. And you watch 
McGovern seeing a totally different guy across the table from him. This is Mr. Liberal 
[Humphrey] telling him [McGovern] he is ‘too far left.’ He’s looking at a guy who would do 
anything to get to the presidency, and it shocked him.”968 Humphrey’s attacks on McGovern also 
raised the ire of George Wiley. “You used to be the champion of poor people, Blacks, Chicanos, 
old people and other minorities,” Wiley began in a scathing May letter to Humphrey. “But you 
have changed your stripes…. You are rivaling Wallace and Nixon in spreading myths about 
‘welfare chiselers’ and the need…to ‘get the loafers off the taxpayers’ backs.’” Wiley took 
particular exception to Humphrey’s attacks on NWRO’s guaranteed income, which Wiley 
reminded Humphrey that he had supported at the May 1971 Democratic Policy Council Meeting. 
“You misrepresent it as a welfare program when it would benefit working poor people and 
moderate income taxpayers as well as welfare recipients,” Wiley wrote. The NWRO executive 
director also added that Humphrey’s identification of McGovern with the NWRO proposal was 
particularly absurd, not only in light of Humphrey’s past support for it, but also because 
McGovern’s proposal was different from NWRO’s. Wiley concluded his letter to Humphrey 
with the biting line, “No one as two faced and unprincipled as this deserves to be president.”969 
No matter how hypocritical or incorrect Humphrey’s attacks, the California debates undoubtedly 
damaged McGovern. “For many people across the country, the debates were their introduction to 
George McGovern,” Weil wrote later. “Humphrey had made sure that [McGovern]…made a 
very bad showing in his first major national appearance…. [Humphrey] had spent almost all his 
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time attacking McGovern and had said little to criticize Nixon.” Most significantly, Humphrey’s 
attacks set the tone for the remainder of the campaign when it came to McGovern’s tax welfare 
proposals by handing an attack plan to the Nixon White House.970  Nonetheless, despite 
Humphrey’s savage attacks on McGovern, the South Dakotan prevailed in the California 
primary. With his California victory, McGovern came close to assuring himself the 1972 
Democratic nomination, barring unforeseen finagling at the Democratic National Convention.  
Attacks from conservatives rose as McGovern’s national profile increased. Writing in the 
National Review Alan Reynolds spoke for many conservatives when he slammed McGovern’s 
critique of “loopholes” and call for tax reform as simply a plan for “the redistribution of income” 
– a fact, of course, that McGovern never denied.971 Conservative syndicated columnist Jeffrey 
Hart – a former speechwriter for first Reagan, then Nixon, during the 1968 campaign – wrote 
that “the assumption implicit in the McGovern proposals, and the spirit prevading [sic] the whole 
thing is…that the money a man earns is a resources of the federal government….the only serious 
question is what the government shall spend your money on, not whether you or the government 
will in fact spend it.”972 Syndicated finance columnist Sylvia Porter, though a Democrat, did not 
like McGovern and made it known in a June five-part series analyzing McGovern’s economic 
platform.973 If McGovern were elected president, Porter predicted, “wealthy American[s] with 
substantial earnings or investments carefully ‘sheltered from taxes’” would receive “a wallop in 
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the pocketbook.”974 Likewise, the “big businessman” and the “investor” could expect “higher 
taxes on [their] earnings and capital gains” from McGovern, according to Porter.975 The effects 
of McGovern’s program would be felt far and wide, though, in Porter’s view. “[McGovern] is 
fully aware that a business and stock market slump caused by his proposals would destroy him as 
well as millions of us,” she claimed.976 Erstwhile Democrat Porter was joined in her criticism of 
McGovern by Senate Finance Committee chair Russell Long, who rarely missed an opportunity 
to make it clear that McGovern did not represent his views, despite their shared party. In an 
appearance by NAM representatives before the Finance Committee to discuss revenue sharing, 
Long went out of his way to slam McGovern’s economic proposals. “All you have got to do is 
take the family assistance programs [proposal] and change that from $2,400 to $6,500 and that 
gives you the McGovern bill and that costs $72 billion,” Long said, “all of which is to be taken 
from your [NAM] members and people who work for your members.”977  
Indeed, the opposition of business and financial groups to the Democrat’s proposals did 
worry the McGovern campaign. The main sticking point for these groups was McGovern’s 
seemingly simple proposal of a minimum tax equal to 75 percent of the statutory rate. This 
proposal was actually too complex for many political reporters, who often wrote as if McGovern 
were proposing that everyone who made more than $50,000 pay a 75 percent tax rate, rather than 
75 percent of what they would owe under a loophole-free statutory rate.978 As donations began to 
dry up from many otherwise loyal Democratic business donors, McGovern’s national finance 
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chair, Henry Kimelman, asked McGovern to write an open letter to business for publication in 
the Wall Street Journal. The goal was to make it clear that the 75 percent was applied to the 
statutory rate, not all income over $50,000, as well as the fact that it was designed to be an 
alternative to – not an addition to – closing every specific loophole. The letter from McGovern to 
banker Belmont Towbin regarding his tax proposals was printed as an advertisement in the Wall 
Street Journal under the auspices of “Business and Professional People for McGovern.” In 
reality the advertisement had already been circulating privately for weeks among potential big 
contributors as a corrective statement on “what McGovern really believes about economic and 
tax matters.” But the public printing of the advertisement gave the candidate a public forum to 
counteract what the campaign viewed as dangerous misconceptions about the Democrat. 
Specifically, the letter was meant to stem what was a readily apparent exodus of well-heeled 
donors from the Democratic Party. The centerpiece of his proposal remained the 75 percent-of-
statutory rates minimum tax for earners making more than $50,000 – a position that allowed 
McGovern to, accurately, assure Townbin that he had not proposed eliminating the preferential 
rate on capital gains, even though the minimum tax would have exactly that effect, in all 
practical terms. Yet, the Wall Street Journal letter did little assuage business, which still viewed 
McGovern as a dangerous economic radical. 979 
McGovern’s distributionist emphasis on inequality fit with a growing trend among 
Democrats and on the left, more broadly – a trend that was influenced by the triumphs of 
grassroots activists and gubernatorial candidates and reflected in the congressional debates over 
tax reform and revenue sharing, among other issues. For many on the left, this emphasis on 
distributional questions was portrayed a break with the distribution-neutral fiscalism of “growth 
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liberalism.” However, it was also viewed as a logical extension of Keynesianism and New Deal 
liberalism, albeit one that went beyond their previous implementations. If government 
intervention in the economy was not only necessary, but unavoidable, these left-leaning critics 
asked, was there any such thing as being neutral when it came do distribution? No, they 
answered decisively. The only question was in what direction the government would work to 
distribute the country’s wealth and income. “We are in a new period in which there is no 
question of whether the government is going to determine, in broad measure, the distribution of 
wealth, but only as to how it is going to do so,” The Other America author Michael Harrington 
told Congress in 1972. “Therefore it is wrong to counterpose ‘radical’ redistributionists on the 
left to those who humbly submit to the free market distribution of income on the center and right. 
President Nixon is as radical a wealth redistributor as I am (and much more of a radical than the 
reasonable moderate, George McGovern)…. [Nixon] favors policies which redistribute wealth to 
the rich whereas I think that the government should channel resources to that majority whose 
basic, and crying, needs are far from satisfied.” While Harrington praised the work of left-
reformers like Fred Harris, Philip Stern, Joseph Pechman, Benjamin Okner, and Stanley Surrey 
as “expert and convincing,” the author also pointed out that they shared with their more 
conservative counterparts the assumption that “pretax income is market-determined.” Harrington 
disagreed. “Pretax income is not a given….,” Harrington argued. “It’s quantity and 
distribution…are increasingly the result of government intervention [both fiscal and 
monetary].”980 Based on McGovern’s programmatic tax statements, it seemed that the candidate 
agreed with Harrington, too.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Throughout 1972, the actions of earlier Democrats increasingly came under assault from 
left-distributionists, too. Previous Democratic administrations, in the view of these critics, had 
not focused enough on the distributional effects of their policies, instead focusing only on the 
fiscalist outcomes of growth and inflation. Yet, fiscalist Democrats’ insistence that policies could 
avoid distributional questions was a fallacy. The Keynesian revolution – made explicit by the 
Employment Act of 1946 and exemplified by Eisenhower’s inflation-fighting, Kennedy-
Johnson’s pro-growth policies, and Nixon’s “trickle-down economics,” as Harrington put it – 
made clear the government’s decisive role in affecting not just growth and inflation, but the 
distribution of income and wealth. No decision could be distributionally neutral. “Government 
economic management…in the entire postwar period has been to stimulate corporations, to 
stimulate the top – for the government to use its power to generate income at the top and to let it 
trickle down,” Harrington argued, pointing to JFK’s decision to pursue regressive tax cuts, rather 
than spending, as stimulus. “The decision made by President Kennedy to stimulate the economy 
by investment incentives rather than, say, through a massive middle- and low-cost housing 
program,” Harrington argued, “had a profound – and negative – impact on the way in which our 
resources were allocated.” No document better exemplified the profoundly political nature of 
income and wealth distribution for Harrington than the internal revenue code.  “The individual 
and corporate rich have invested millions of – tax deductible – dollars into drilling, and 
sometimes dynamiting, loopholes into the Internal Revenue Code,” Harrington charged.981 And 
such views were not limited to activists like Harrington. Influential Washington University 
economist Hyman Minsky argued that Keynes’s “first lesson” – that the government could help 
avert unemployment and depressions – was now “taken for granted,” but that Keynes’s second 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






lesson – that the government ultimately controlled the distribution of income – was not yet 
appreciated. “Income distribution and the contribution that economics can make to the quality of 
life are the policy issues,” Minsky argued. The alternation of the distribution advocated by 
McGovern, Minsky argued, would “make the American dream a reality” by assisting low- and 
middle-income Americans. The GOP, in contrast, had “no explicit policy toward income 
distribution,” but Minksy – expertly outlining the distinction between left- and right-
distributionists – believed it was possible to “infer” that Republicans were “wedded” to the idea 
that “the rich must get richer.” Minskey lauded McGovern’s employment and tax proposals, 
suggesting that they would “halt and reverse the drift toward two nations – a nation of the 
affluent and a nation of workers and the poor.”982 John Kenneth Galbraith agreed that “if a 
Republican administration should be tested by its service to the corporations and the affluent, 
then a Democratic administration should be tested by its service to minorities, blue-collar 
workers, and the generally poor.” But, according to Galbraith, “past Democratic administrations 
would fail that test,” since they paid greater attention to growth than to the distribution of that 
growth. In contrast, the GOP “had an unavowed commitment to the rich which they have kept.” 
What was needed was greater attention by Democrats to issues of distribtution. “This means that 
something effective must be done about the redistribution of taxes and income which, we should 
remember, was bad before Republicans made it moderately worse,” Galbraith told the Joint 
Economic Committee. 983 McGovern’s tax reform plan, thereby, was simply providing a badly 
needed corrective to the right-distributionism of the GOP. 
Rather than run away from accusations of redistribution, McGovern and his Democratic 
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supporters embraced this designation – as the title of McGovern’s New York Review of Books tax 
treatise demonstrated. But it did not end there. Like McGovern, Henry Reuss explicitly 
connected “plugging loopholes” with income inequality in 1972. “Ever since the New Deal of 
1933 until 1968 the income shares of America’s families have been getting more progressive and 
better distributed…,” Reuss said. “Well, since 1968 something alarming has happened. The 
progressive tendency [towards falling income inequality] which existed for 35 years started to 
reverse itself…as a result of almost doubling unemployment since 1968, as a result of allowing 
inflation to continue, and as a result of overall increase in the regressive taxes in this country, the 
property tax, the state sales tax, the federal payroll tax…. By 1970 the share of total income 
obtained by the top 20 percent of American families had begun to rise once again at the expense 
mainly of the middle-income group…..” Instituting “loophole-closing tax reform,” Reuss argued, 
was a key step towards reversing the trend of rising income inequality.984 “[S]ince then [the 
TRA69] the public awareness of the need for tax reform has risen greatly,” Reuss argued. “The 
so-called taxpayers’ revolt has hotted up [sic] a great deal….”985 When critics argued that 
McGovern’s supposed radicalism on economics made him the Democratic version of Barry 
Goldwater, McGovern’s team noted a key – distributional – difference. “McGovern is urging 
change in favor of the many who are in the middle or below…,” John Kenneth Galbraith 
explained. “It was Barry Goldwater’s romantic thought that the poor wanted more done for the 
rich, less for themselves. He had inveighed against the progressive income tax; when the 
campaign started, he was still worried about the effect of Social Security on the moral fiber…. 
The McGovern reforms – on employment, taxes, welfare, equality – are all designed to benefit 
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the majority. An important distinction.”986 This belief that they were on the side of the majority 
gave left-distributionists an aggressive edge in the early-1970s. 
Democrats made a concerted effort to put pressure on Nixon on the issue of taxes 
throughout 1972. It was a strategy endorsed at the top. DNC Chair Lawrence O’Brein noted in a 
March speech that the popularity of George Wallace indicated that many Americans believed 
that the government was “designed to protect those already in the club.” A strong stance by the 
Democrats on key issues like taxes would allow them to tap into this inequality-and-fairness-
themed discontent. “In my view, the issue of tax reform offers this opportunity in 1972,” he said. 
“It is a bit unusual – indeed some persons would say distinctly out of place – for a national party 
chairman to speak this directly about a public issue that has always been highly controversial…. 
Nonetheless, I repeat: Tax reform is an issue whose time is a lot closer to coming than many 
professional politicians admit, or even realize.” 987  The rise of left-distributionist tax reform to 
the top of the Democrats’ agenda in the 1972 primaries caught even many insiders off guard. “As 
far as issues are concerned, there have been two great surprises in the presidential campaign so 
far,” journalist and former DNC staffer Clayton Fritchey wrote in early June. “The first is the 
public’s sudden intense interest in tax reform. The second is the Nixon administration’s failure to 
recognize this explosive development as a political threat and do anything about it.” While (as 
the previous chapters have demonstrated), Fritchey was wrong that the public’s interest was 
“sudden,” his analysis of the dynamics of taxes in the presidential campaign was accurate.988 “It 
was assumed that the 1972 campaign would revolve around issues like Vietnam, unemployment, 
and the cost of living,” Fritchey wrote. “But then the primaries started, and both Sen. George 
McGovern and Gov. George Wallace began to hit the jackpot with their attacks on tax loopholes 
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and tax favoritism for big business and the superrich. Even they, however, were surprised at the 
passionate response they got.” Soon, other Democratic presidential hopefuls got into the act by 
offering their own tax reform plans, but “the White House, much to the mystification of many 
political pros, not only showed no interest in climbing aboard the bandwagon, but defended the 
loopholes[.]”989   
This turned towards populist economics worried the White House and its allies. Both 
Committee to Reelect the President chair John Mitchell and Treasury Secretary John Connally 
noted early in the election year that the Democrats 1972 strategy was “set[ting] the ‘have nots’ 
against the ‘haves.’” 990 It was a strategy, the White House knew, that inherently favored 
Democrats. Kevin Phillips, among others, praised the Democrats’ decision to make inequality-
themed issues like taxes the center of their campaign. Having learned from the midterms, Phillips 
now changed his analysis of the GOP’s losses in 1970. “The 1970 elections provided a trial run 
[of the populist strategy], inasmuch as Jesse Unruh, California’s Democratic gubernatorial 
candidate, used just these themes to attack Republican Gov. Ronald Reagan…,” Phillips noted. 
“After the election, Republican surveys and analyses of the election return uncovered these 
tactics as Unruh’s most effective vote-getter. In comparison with Reagan’s 1966 election 
support, Unruh made solid gains in typical ‘Middle American’ blue-collar and white-collar 
precincts of economically troubled Southern California.”991 Pat Buchanan also fretted about 
McGovern’s “populism.” If McGovern was seen “as a representative of the ‘outs’ against the 
‘ins,’ the fighter against the ‘interests’ for the common man who bears too much of the burden, 
while powerful corporations get off without paying there fair share,” then the Nixon team was in 
trouble, Buchanan explained. “There are few larger imperatives in our campaign than to move 
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McGovern into the position of the Establishment Candidate – running against the candidate of 
Middle American [Nixon]…,” Buchanan wrote to the president and Haldeman. “If we allow him 
to be perceived as his ads, and previous campaigns portray him, we could have a serious 
problem.” Therefore, the White House and the GOP needed to “portray McGovern as a 
Candidate of the Elite, ‘Professor McGovern,’ the leader of the party of the PhDs and limousine 
liberals, whole elitist shock troops took over the party of the people, the ‘noise-makers’ and the 
‘exotic,’ the tiny minority who are imposing an asinine social policy of bussing on a country, 
eighty-five percent of whose people do not want bussing.” 992 In contrast, letting McGovern 
claim the mantle of working- and middle class-centric economics would spell disaster for Nixon. 
Even the former architect of the “hard hat” strategy now worried about the Democrats’ new 
appeals. The threat from Democrats in 1972 came in the form of “The New Populism,” Charles 
Colson wrote in a mid-May memo. “Without trying to define this,” he wrote, “I think it falls 
right now into three categories; 1) we are for the big guy, the Democrats are for the little man; 2) 
taxes and 3) disenchantment with government – i.e. the bureaucracy.” A serious issue for Nixon 
going into the 1972 general election against a economically populist Democrat, Colson warned, 
was that it would be “hard [for Nixon] to shed” the “big business label.”993  
The polling data made Nixon’s tough task clear. A private Muskie campaign poll of 
California Democrats – which was subsequently leaked to the Nixon campaign – found that 
president received the highest “poor handling” ratings for inflation (62 percent) and taxes (60 
percent) among all issues.994 Soon, the Nixon reelection team was commissioning a variety of 
economic policy-centric public opinion studies – specifically ones with questions related to the 
perceived fairness of the U.S. tax system and to the public’s view of Nixon’s tax positions vis-à-
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vis the Democrats’ plans.995 These new studies generated telling, and bracing, responses for the 
Nixon campaign, demonstrating Democrats distinct advantage on this this key pocketbook issue, 
no matter how it was framed. Lloyd Free – Nelson Rockefeller’s personal pollster, the former 
editor of Public Opinion Quarterly, and the co-founder of the Institute for International Social 
Research – warned the Nixon reelection team in a private memo, eventually passed to Haldeman, 
that Nixon was perceived as too friendly to business.996 Free’s views were worth heeding. In 
1967, Free, along with his coauthor Hadley Cantril, had famously argued that Americans were 
“ideological conservatives” and “operational liberals,” and their work reportedly received 
“considerable attention” among Nixon’s 1968 campaign team.997 With this deficit on pocketbook 
issues, Nixon’s chances of reelection, Free wrote to CRP public relations expert Clifford Miller 
in early April, were “no better than 50-50.” “Americans generally are so frustrated, in fact, that I 
feel relatively confident that they will soon prove receptive to some new kind of individual and 
social philosophy of life…,” Free wrote. “[W]hat I have been saying for some years is that…the 
new philosophy that finally takes hold will involve large elements of populism…, [which] will 
almost surely include lashing out at big government, big business, big unions, bug what-have-
you[.]” Haldeman noted this observation. Free felt that on the question of “big government,” the 
president’s revenue sharing plan proved he wanted to “return power to the people.” On the count 
of business, though, Nixon’s image was not as favorable. “[F]orgive me for putting it so 
bluntly[,] the record in terms of complacency, if not permissiveness toward the wealthy and 
coziness with ‘big business’ could hardly be worse,” Free wrote in an observation underlined by 
Haldeman. The pollster listed a litany of reasons that the public viewed Nixon as “titl[ing] 
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toward big business,” including “tax breaks for business, viewed as being at the expense of 
individual taxpayers; tax loopholes which allow men with enormous incomes to get off scot-free 
of taxes; [and] a wage-price control system which large numbers of people are beginning to say 
controls the wages of the little man, all right, but not the prices charged by business[,]” along 
with the fact that “the Republican Party, in the public’s view, has traditionally been looked upon 
as more business-oriented than people-oriented.” The public perception of the Nixon 
administration on economics was bleak, in Free’s view. As he put it in another long passage 
underlined by Haldeman, “I suspect that by now the Nixon administration is considered by many 
to be the most business-oriented since literally the days of Warren G. Harding (of Teapot Dome 
fame), Cal Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover – a posture which is basically inconsistent, of course, 
with the platform of operational liberalism (cloaked in conservative terminology) which I 
personally feel it is necessary for Mr. Nixon to stand on if he is to be reelected.”998   
Free offered the Nixon reelection team five suggestions for correcting the president’s 
domestic image. The first two had to do with taxes. “(1) Advocate a new tax bill eliminating 
some of the tax breaks presently afforded business (meaning, in practice, big business); (2) 
Tighten up on tax loopholes for the wealthy so apparently drastically that it will seem that a 
‘soak the rich’ measure is being proposed,” Free wrote. “(3) Institute…severe anti-trust actions 
against some of the huge conglomerates…(4) Clamp down – really clamp down – on price 
increases; (5) Straighten up some of the regulatory agencies in their currently obvious ‘tilt’ 
toward big business.” Pursuing policies along those lines would position Nixon as an “operation 
liberal,” Free noted, and place him in the Republican tradition of Theodore Roosevelt, rather 
than that of the party’s more conservative wing. By moving to the left on economic issues, Nixon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






would align himself with the public’s views and, in the process, force Democrats to move even 
further to the left or to appear to agree with the president. Nixon needed to make liberal policy 
moves, but cast them in conservative terms in order to placate the “right-wing of his own party.” 
The goal for Nixon, Free wrote, was “opting for operational liberalism (cloaked in conservative 
terminology).” Even if Nixon alienated some conservatives and, especially, big business, they 
would have no place to turn, since the Democratic candidate – barring the unlikely nomination of 
“Scoop” Jackson – would be just as liberal, if not more liberal, than Nixon.999 Despite the clear 
need for Nixon to distance himself from big business, some of the administration’s own, 
ostensibly private, actions early in the election year made shedding the “big business” label even 
more difficult.  
As eager as Nixon would be to pitch himself as a bold tax reformer when the general 
election approached, some conservatives urged Nixon to reassure key business allies that favored 
tax preferences would be protected by the White House, no matter how strong the gale forces of 
reform would blow in the coming months and years. Just as the RNC and the Nixon White 
House had worried about curbs to the oil depletion allowance in 1969 hindering George H.W. 
Bush’s Senate chances in 1970, so, too, did Republican worry that key allies in the oil industry 
would be alarmed by talk of cutting or eliminating the depletion allowance during the 1972 
election year.1000 The White House knew that big business and Wall Street donors were also 
worried about attacks on other key loopholes, too. On the last Sunday in April, Nixon and 
corporate donors – particularly Texas oil executives – gathered at John Connally’s ranch in 
Floresville, Texas. The White House believed that this meeting could provide a private 
opportunity to assuage the fears of prospective donors. Several business execs who had once 
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been loyal to the Democratic Party but were now giving indications of concern over McGovern’s 
tax proposals were also invited to the Connally ranch soiree. Nixon wooed the disaffected 
business executives, answering questions for more than an hour after dinner. “[R]ather than 
moving in the direction of reducing the depletion allowance,” Nixon told them, “[the 
administration would seek] to provide incentive…for people to go out and explore for oil.”1001 
However, reports of Nixon’s private rendezvous with the businessmen leaked to the 
national press. “The guests arrived Texas-style, setting their executive jets down on the Picosa 
Ranch airstrip,” David Broder reported, “with the great red Santa Gertrudis cattle watching.” The 
president had wooed corporate donors, he noted, while a “strolling Mexican mariachi band 
[played] and…black waiters pass[ed] drinks.”1002 Liberals quickly pounced on the opportunity to 
skewer the president. “[T]he fiscal system has been fostering a whole new class of income-tax 
dropouts,” economist John Kenneth Galbraith wrote of the meeting, “who were even so gauche 
as to convene by private jet at John Connally’s ranch to hear the President defend their graft with 
wonderful indifference to the trouble the average citizen was having with the tax on his 
house[.]”1003 In a press conference following the business meeting at Conally’s ranch, Nixon was 
forced to meekly reframe the issue of business tax incentives as one that concerned the wellbeing 
of the American economy, in general, and, by proxy, the middle class. “[I]f we are going to be 
competitive, [we] have to have a tax structure which will encourage new investment in capital 
rather than discourage it…,” Nixon told reporters. “[T]here has been a lot of talk lately about the 
need for tax reform, and a great deal of criticism of so-called tax loopholes…. [T]his 
Administration has been subjected to considerable criticism on the ground that we are for big 
business and we are for rich oilmen and against people. I will tell you what we are for. What we 
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are for is for more jobs for America and for American industry to be able to compete 
abroad…”1004 All-in-all it was a tepid defense by the fiery Nixon.  
It had quickly become clear that attacking McGovern and other Democrats as 
demagogues and hoping that the tax reform storm would pass was no longer an option for the 
White House. Nixon could no longer even count on its former allies among conservative 
Democrats to defend the president against attacks from the left. “The White House was taken 
aback,” one news report noted, “when [Wilbur] Mills privately let the president know that he, 
too, was getting aboard the tax reform express.”1005  Indeed, Wilbur Mills would become – at 
least temporarily – one of the Democrats’ key allies in putting taxes front-and-center throughout 
the election year. Even though the conservative Arkansas Democrat privately had little stomach 
for McGovern’s reforms, political expediency dictated that Mills behave otherwise. Just as with 
RS, Wilbur Mills’s unexpected campaign for the presidency created new opportunities for left-
distributionist tax reformers.  Though a consummate inside-the-beltway fiscalist, Mills clearly 
understood that the public was with the left-leaning reformers. As a result, Mills 
uncharacteristically gave left-distributionists a big boost early in 1972. The first great election-
year showdown with the White House over tax reform came when the president requested an 
increase in the debt ceiling in early-1972. In February 1972, progressive Democrats in the 
Democratic Study Group pushing for the attachment of provision to Nixon’s desired debt ceiling 
increase requiring the president propose a tax reform program by May 1st. “The deficits we face 
result from the administration's mismanagement of the economy and from a tax system which is 
ridden with loopholes,” the letter argued. Wilbur Mills persuaded to DSC to drop their request in 
exchange for Mills sending Nixon a letter reminding him of his 1971 promise to submit a tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1004 Richard Nixon, “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Guests Following a Dinner at Secretary 
Connally’s Ranch in Floresville, Texas,” Public Papers of the President (April 30, 1972) 






reform program to Congress and asking Nixon to make good on that promise by March 15th in 
order to give Congress to debate and act on the proposal. Mills noted to Nixon that his August 
15th economic program included a promise to submit a tax reform program to Congress. “To me, 
and to most others,” Mills reminded Nixon in his letter, “this term means a program of further 
elimination of preferences and so-called loopholes in the federal income, estate, and gift tax 
system.”1006 
For the time being, at least, enough reform Democrats trusted Mills to wait for the effects 
of the letter. “A number of us…are supporting the debt-ceiling limitation today because we have 
so much faith in [Mills]…and in light of his request of the President to forward the 
administration's tax-loophole-closing recommendations within the next few months [the DSC 
was dropping its request],” DSC chair Philip Burton, of California, said. “The next trip around 
[debt ceiling increase request] we do expect, before we lend this issue our support, to see 
meaningful tax reforms….” Even the ranking Republican on the Ways and Means committee, 
Wisconsin’s John Byrnes, argued that “what is needed is a full-scale effort…to close the 
loopholes in our income, estate and gift tax system which now allow billions of dollars to escape 
taxation every year. These lost billions serve no real job-creating function and they make it 
necessary for millions of average, middle income taxpayers to pay more to the Treasury every 
year to make up for what the well-to-do fail to pay.” Despite this growing pressure on Nixon to 
submit reform plans, Mills received no reply to the letter. After receiving no reform plans from 
the White House, on March 15 – the day the debt ceiling was raised to $450 billion – the 
Democratic Caucus passed a resolution declaring that “passage of further debt ceiling legislation 
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would be jeopardized if the president did not either support meaningful, revenue-raising tax 
reform, or at least indicate which tax preferences Congress might revise without fear of a 
presidential veto,” as Reuss summarized. That resolution, like the Mills letter, yielded 
nothing.1007 
Whatever his previous promises, Nixon now made it clear that he would not make a tax 
reform proposal in 1972. However, he promised to do so early in 1973.1008 There was wide 
agreement, both within Congress and in the Nixon White House, that tax reform would be at the 
top of the agenda for 1973, regardless of Nixon’s proposals, or lack thereof.1009 But the 
administration believed it was “unwise to undertake a complete review of the tax laws at this 
time during a presidential election campaign,” as Edwin Cohen put it.1010 Such a debate would 
place the administration at a political disadvantage, according to the polls, which is exactly why 
the White House did not want and McGovern did. Hoping to tamp down the growing public and 
congressional demands for reform now, the White House argued that delaying action until 1973 
did not mean that Nixon was not committed to reform. “[T]his Administration has been 
committed since the campaign of 1968 to major tax reform, and within 90 days of the President's 
inauguration, you will remember that major and fundamental tax reforms were proposed,” 
Ehrlichman told the press in a May press conference, pointing to the TRA69. Indeed, the White 
House now attempted to downplay the more recent RA71. Ehrlichman provided a table to the 
press combining the distributional effects of TRA69 and RA71, masking the regressive features 
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of the latter and allowing Nixon’s total tax record to look progressive. “[T]he result [of Nixon’s 
tax policies] has been an enormous tax saving to the fellow in the low-income bracket,” 
Ehrlichman explained, “and has tended to put the load at the high end of the income brackets, 
and also on corporations.” 1011 Though Ehrlichman objected to Democrats hammering Nixon on 
loopholes, he explained that, when it came to tax reform, the “foremost” criteria the White House 
would apply to all tax reform proposal were “fairness to the average taxpayer, and that whatever 
result we come to doesn’t cost that average taxpayer more money in the long run, more taxes in 
the long run, rather than less.” 1012  
As the president debated how to better position himself on the tax issue for the general 
election, Democrats kept pressure on the White House. Determined to demonstrate his 
commitment to the red hot issue of tax reform in the election year, Ways and Means chair-
turned-presidential candidate Wilbur Mills joined with Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield in 
sponsoring a bill to automatically and systematically repeal 54 major loopholes – including the 
depletion allowance, accelerated depreciation, the state-and-local bond interest exemption, and, 
notably, the capital gains preference – in a waves by January 1, 1976. If Congress wanted to keep 
them, each would have to be reapproved individually. Mills bragged that the bill would eliminate 
“virtually all provisions” in the code that provided “any special exclusion or deduction or special 
tax rate to any particular type of group or category of income.” Longtime reformers and left-
distributionists – like Henry Reuss, who called it an “act of economic statesmanship –  
enthusiastically endorsed the proposal. Perhaps evidencing the turning tide on taxes, the Nixon 
White House, which had spent much time strenuously defending the very loopholes under attack 
by the Mills-Mansfield plan now offered a “qualified” endorsement of the bill, saying that it was 
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aligned with the spirit of reform favored by Nixon. But, privately, many White House staffers 
were shocked and angered. One unnamed aid called it “a stunner,” telling the New York Times, 
“Jesus, it’s drastic.”1013  
Opinions on the Mills-Mansfield view broke sharply along ideological lines, but its 
popularity could not be denied. Left-leaning reformers applauded Mills-Mansfield. The public 
interest law lobby, Taxation With Representation, called the bill “clearly one of the most 
innovative steps yet taken to reform our revenue laws.” Mills-Mansfield, TWR argued, would 
“insure that tax expenditures are subject to the same careful review as direct expenditures.”1014 
Common Cause hired Mitchell Rogovin – an assistant attorney general under LBJ who headed 
the Justice Department’s tax division – to lobby for the bill. In contrast, business conservatives 
trashed the plan.1015 In June, McGovern indicated that he might prefer the Mills-Mansfield plan 
to his own loophole-closing suggestions, noting that, by repealing 54 of the largest loopholes, the 
Tax Policy Review Act “would incorporate all the things we proposed and go considerably 
beyond that.”1016  The right, in contrast, viewed the bill with unsparing hostility. Despite 
Byrnes’s apparent favorability to tax reform, he lambasted the Mills-Mansfield bill, arguing that 
it suggested that Mills did not have in his “capacity….as a leader” of Ways and Means, since the 
plan suggested that the committee had a “reputation…[that] we cannot do anything unless we 
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give ourselves a loaded gun with which to shoot ourselves unless we do what we are supposed to 
do.” 1017 Likewise, the Chamber of Commerce slammed the election-year “refrain of ‘tax 
reform’” – including both McGovern’s proposals and the Mills-Mansfield plan – as “Robin 
Hood syndrome,” calling the idea that loopholes should be closed “the big tax reform myth of 
1972.”1018 The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board remarked that Mills “can’t be all that 
serious” in proposing such a measure, while Business Week argued that the bill “would introduce 
a paralyzing element of confusion and uncertainty into the tax laws at a moment when producers 
and consumers need confidence.” 1019  Senator Clifford Hansen, a Wyoming Republican, 
lambasted the Mills-Mansfield bill, arguing that it would both harm economic growth and punish 
investors. Defending “so-called loopholes,” Hansen said that many such provisions “encourage 
those with substantial capital holdings to invest that capital,” which he argued benefitted “the 
nation as a whole.” If the Mills-Mansfield bill were enacted, Hansen predicted, growth would 
slow, jobs would be destroyed, and “the American businessman would become and endangered 
species.” Moreover, Hansen also predicted that eliminating loopholes would actually cost the 
government revenue, since doing so would have such detrimental effects on the economy. “The 
probabilities are that the enactment of the Mills-Mansfield proposal would actually produce less 
revenues at all echelons of government…because of the [resulting] economic downturn,” he 
speculated. Taxpayers were not really angry about millionaires escaping taxes, Hansen 
concluded, instead “the so-called taxpayers’ revolt may in fact be a revolt against the burgeoning 
level of government spending.”1020 In the face of a mountain of evidence to the contrary, even 
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many Republicans could no longer swallow this line of reasoning. In fact, the Mills-Mansfield 
act proved to be so popular among ideologically diverse members of Congress that both left-
liberal Democrat Bella Abzug and libertarian-leaning Republican Jack Kemp sponsored identical 
bills.1021 At least initially, its momentum seemed unstoppable.  
In early June, Mills declared that tax reform “has to be enacted this year” and called 
adding his Tax Policy Review Act to the next debt ceiling increase, which was scheduled to fall 
before the presidential election, “one genuine possibility.” Mills told the press while 
campaigning for the Democratic nomination in California that he believed his bill was so popular 
that it could pass the House, whether attached to the debt ceiling increase or not.1022  Many 
Democrats met Mills’s announcement with applause. Charles Vanik and DSG chair Philip 
Burton, among others, quickly called for the inclusion of the Mills-Mansfield bill in the debt 
ceiling increase. 1023 Leading the charge, Henry Reuss argued that, unless the Mills-Mansfield 
bill was passed in 1972, there would not be proper time to debate the value of the expiring 
loopholes. Additionally, Reuss noted that attaching the bill to the debt ceiling increase would 
eliminate the possibility of Nixon vetoing the Tax Policy Review Act. “Unless President Nixon 
is willing to let the government grind to a halt in the middle of an election year [by vetoing the 
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debt ceiling increase],” Reuss argued, “the Tax Policy Review Act would then be sure for 
enactment.” Ultimately, the Mills-Mansfield bill was not just a question of “need[ing] the 
revenue,” Reuss noted, but of the government’s “need to restore the equity in our tax system if 
we are to avoid a taxpayers’ revolt.”1024 Texas Democrat Wright Patman proposed a similar plan 
to link tax reform with the debt ceiling increase. “I would not give the Treasury the $15 billion 
increase in the debt ceiling until we can assure the American people that we are doing what has 
to be done to obtain tax reform,” he argued. Instead, Patman proposed granting the Treasury only 
“month-to-month [increases in the debt ceiling] until a tax reform package can be drafted and 
passed by both Houses.” Patman believed that tax reform was a central – and perhaps, the central 
– domestic issue for many Americans. “I have recently gone through a primary campaign in the 
state of Texas, and no issue was raised more often in my district…than the question of tax 
reform,” he said. “This question was raised by people of all political persuasion[s]….The people 
are fed up with promises [to reform taxes later]…. [T]he people want tax reform now and they 
want the Congress to put aside everything else if necessary. They feel it is a job that should have 
been done in past years and anyone who thinks that we can delay on this issue is playing with 
political dynamite.” Patman also called for “a public interest test” when reviewing loopholes. 
Distributional issues were key, Patman claimed, noting that the percentage of total federal taxes 
paid by individuals had risen between 1936 and 1971, while the percentage paid by corporations 
had fallen. In 1936, revenues were divided 50-50. By 1971, individuals paid 77 percent. “Now, 
that is awfully hard for people to understand. Of course, the truth is that corporations have many 
ways of reducing and evading taxes…,” he said. “And a poor man has no opportunities [to do 
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so]….”1025 Mitchell Rogovin, Common Cause’s new general council, also urged the Ways and 
Means committee to link raising the deficit ceiling with the Mills-Mansfield bill. Rogovin 
challenged the committee to “channel the widespread public unrest and frustration with the 
inequities in the tax system into widely beneficial change.” 1026 
As it seemed closer to becoming a reality, the Nixon administration maintained its 
“heavily qualified” support for the substance of the bill, but it seemed clear that privately the 
White House opposed it. Indeed, the White House denounced not only any attempt to link the 
Mills-Mansfield bill to the debt ceiling increase, but also questioned the Mills-Mansfield’s view 
of loopholes itself. “I do not consider a capital gains provision of the tax law as a loophole,” 
Connally said. “I do not consider depletion allowances as a loophole.” Rather, the Treasury 
secretary argued, they were incentives. The kind of reform Nixon had in mind, Conally said, was 
the federal government “help[ing] alleviate…[the] great tax burden that is now borne by 
homeowners,” specifically in terms of the “inordinate increase in property taxes on homes 
throughout this nation.” Likewise, Fed chair Arthur Burns argued publicly that the Tax Policy 
Review Act would shake “business confidence.” The White House also received support from 
Senate Finance chair Russell Long, who made it clear that he not only opposed adding the Mills-
Mansfield bill to the debt ceiling increase, but also opposed it, generally. The White House need 
not have worried. Just days after opening the possibility of attaching his bill to the debt ceiling, 
Mills quickly announced that he would no longer attempt to do so. Other reformers, however, 
made it clear that they would continue to push for linking the two, with or without Mills’s 
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support.1027 However, Mills made such an effort impossible by ruling that the inclusion of such a 
measure as “not germane to the debt measure” and blocked its inclusion, though he promised to 
take up tax reform as the first issue when Congress reconvened in 1973. Mills’s sudden shift 
baffled pro-reform forces, and Mills gave no reason for his change of heart, though the New York 
Times attributed it to pressure from “business executives.” Without a doubt, Mills’s cratering 
presidential campaign – which peaked when Mills received a scant four percent in the New 
Hampshire primary – also influenced the Ways and Means chair’s decision to revert to his tried-
and-true conservative fiscalism.1028  
Other congressional leaders, however, maintained their commitment to tax reform in the 
election year. The Joint Economic Committee, co-chaired by Democrats William Proxmire and 
Wright Patman, provided several assists to left-leaning tax reformers throughout the election 
year. In March, the JEC published a study coauthored by liberal economist Lester Thurow and 
conservative economist Robert Lucas on “The American Distribution of Income” just in time for 
tax season. The Thurow-Lucas study argued that government policy was paramount in the 
distribution of both “market” and post-tax-and-transfer incomes. “One of the main functions of 
government is to establish the right distribution of economic voting power,” they wrote. “Not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1027 Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, $450 Billion Debt Limit, February 28m, 1972 (GPO, 1972); Peter Milius, 
“Mills Asks Action in ’72 on Tax Bill,” Washington Post, June 2, 1972; Peter Milius, “U.S. Debt Ceiling Increase 
Tied to Elections,” Washington Post, June 8, 1972; Eileen Shanahan, “Mills to Oppose Joint Fiscal Bill,” New York 
Times, June 6, 1972; “House Panel Gives Up Tax Reform Until ’73,” Los Angeles Times, June 9, 1972; “Tax 
Reform Barred from Debt-Limit Bill,” Washington Post, June 21, 1972; Peter Milius, “Linking of Tax Reform to 
Debt Bill Oppose,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 1972; “Debt Ceiling Rise Blocked in House,” Washington Post, 
March 14, 1972; “Action to Raise Debt Ceiling Blocked By Tax Reform Issue,” Los Angeles Times, March 13, 
1972; Peter Milius, “White House Opposes Tying Tax Reform to Debt Ceiling,” Washington Post, June 6, 1972; 
Peter Milius, “Committee Votes Debt Ceiling Bill Without Additions,” Washington Post, June 9, 1972; “House 
Committee Leans to U.S. Debt Ceiling Extension,” Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1972; Peter Miliu, “Connally Cool to 
Tax Reform Now, Opposes 20% Social Security Rise,” Washington Post, February 29, 1972; Eileen Shanahan, 
“Connally Maneuvers to Block Tax Reform,” New York Times, March 5, 1972; Peter Milius, “Mills Asks Action in 
’72 on Tax Bill,” Washington Post, June 2, 1972; “Tax Reforms Expected to be Put Off to ’73,” Wall Street Journal, 
May 12, 1972;  
1028 “Reform of Taxes Slowed in House,” New York Times, June 9, 1972; Eileen Shanahan, “Mr Mills Again 






only must it establish such a distribution initially, it must continually reestablish such a 
distribution.” The proper distribution of income was could not be determined by “economic 
analyses,” the author’s explained, rather it was a “moral problem.” “In essence,” they wrote, “the 
fights over progressive versus regressive tax structures, level so welfare, and social security 
benefits are all disputes over the optimum distribution of money incomes.” When it came to 
taxes, the authors made clear that the tax system was doing little to alter the pre-tax distribution 
of income in the U.S., contrary to claims that the American system was highly progressive. 
“When all of our taxes (local, state, and federal) are added together, progressive taxes seem to be 
cancelled by regressive taxes leaving a proportional tax system,” they noted. The Thurow-Lucas 
study also found that the wide inequality between Americans in the bottom income quintile and 
the top had narrowed only slightly throughout the postwar era in relative terms, while increasing 
in absolute terms – a conclusion that undoubtedly reinforced the critiques of Harrington, Minsky, 
and others. “The real gap between the poorest and richest 5 percent of all families rose from 
$17,057 to $27,605 (in 1969 dollars) [between 1947 and 1969] despite the sharply declining 
differences in relative incomes,” the study explained.1029 Unsurprisingly, the controversial report 
grabbed media attention, particularly regarding its tax distribution claims. 1030  
Following the Thurow-Lucas report’s release, the JEC held a series of hearings on both 
“tax subsides and tax reform” and the general state of the economy throughout the summer of 
1972. The JEC hearings ensured that issues of inequality and tax reform would remain in the 
news throughout the election year. Indeed, left-distributionist reformers made use of the hearings 
to publicize inequalities in the tax code and – sometimes subtly, sometimes overtly – tout 
Democrats’ tax reform plans. Ohio Representative Charles Vanik used the hearings to publicize a 
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study he conducted with a team of CPAs and tax experts that found widespread tax avoidance by 
the country’s largest corporations. Vanik highlighted the disparity between firms’ public face 
and their claims to the IRS. As a result, the Vanik study on corporate tax avoidance garnered 
press headlines.1031 Every year, the study showed, substantial numbers of the country’s largest 
corporation escaped taxation entirely. On average, larger companies paid lower rates, or escaped 
taxation entirely, while small companies paid at much closer to the statutory rate. ITT paid a rate 
of 14 percent in 1969, 5 percent in 1970, and no tax at all in 1971. “As ITT grows,” Vanik noted, 
“it’s tax rate shrinks.” The steel and oil industries was among the best at avoiding taxes. “U.S. 
Steel has paid a low effective tax rate over the past three years,” Vanik noted. “In 1970, U.S. 
Steel paid no federal tax, received a credit or reduction of its tax liability of $66 million – yet had 
an income before taxes of $109 million.” Among eight oil companies studied by Vanik’s team, 
they paid an average rate of 6.1 percent on $2.5 billion in income. Despite these low rates, most 
large companies were not doing anything illegal. Rather they were availing themselves of the 
myriad tax breaks and loopholes created by Congress. Small firms, in contrast, were effectively 
discriminated against, according to the findings of Vanik’s study.1032 “Corporate annual reports 
are a ‘mirage of ambiguous statements’ that lead stockholders to believe that business is better 
and profits are improving,” Vanik said. “The tax statements of these same companies to Internal 
Revenue often illustrate a completely different picture that reduces their profit figure, which in 
effect, reduces their total tax figure.” Many firms, Vanik charged, actually violated SEC 
disclosure rules in their attempts to obfuscate their true economic position. “Like the medieval 
European peasants,” Vanik quipped, “for their stockholders they wear their wedding clothes; for 
the tax man, they wear rages.” Many companies’ massaging of the numbers by picking and 
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choosing among accounting practices proved to be egregious, such as oil firms that included 
excise taxes paid by consumers in the accounting of taxes paid by the company. Individual tax 
filers, Vanik noted, did not have the same option, “When an individual making $10,000 files his 
income tax,” he told the JEC, “he has not choices among ‘generally accepted accounting 
principles’ so as to conceal his income and reduce his tax.”1033 Vanik’s report on corporate tax 
avoidance was buttressed by his House colleague Henry Reuss’s studies of individual income tax 
loopholes.   
In the months leading up to the presidential election, Reuss aided the left-reformer’s 
cause by unleashing a volley of reports, press releases, and speeches based on original research 
about the inequities in the individual income tax code. In March 1971, Reuss released a report on 
wealthy Americans who paid no income taxes in 1969, which prompted hundreds of letters from 
all over the country written by Americans upset about tax loopholes that benefitted the wealthy.  
The next month, he released a report showing that nearly five percent of millionaires paid no 
federal income tax, while taxpayers making between $10,000 and $15,000 had “only 1/26th as 
good a chance as the millionaires of escaping all taxes,” since less than two-tenths of a percent of 
taxpayers in that category did not pay any federal income taxes. “It just isn’t fair that the very 
wealthy should be able to use gimmicks and loopholes to reduce their tares to nothing or almost 
nothing, while the working can carries the load of taxation on his back,” he said. “The case is 
clear for a new round of loophole-plugging.” 1034 In March 1972, Reuss released another report 
showing that the 18,646 upper-income Americans subject to the minimum tax in 1970 – 
taxpayers who, by definition, benefitted from preferential rates on various types of “loophole 
income,” like capital gains – paid an average effective rate of less than seven percent, and 
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averaged at least $100,000 apiece in increased income thanks to their use of loopholes. 
Moreover, Reuss’s numbers, which were prepared at his request by the Treasury, excluded the 
nearly 400 taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of over $100,000 who paid no taxes. These 
taxpayers were not subject to the minimum tax, because some tax preferences – such as some oil 
and gas drilling expenses and interest on tax-exempt bonds – were exempt from the minimum 
tax. “This is just one more illustration of the gross inequity of our Federal tax system,” Reuss 
said. “Here we have thousands of wealthy Americans piling up $100,000 a year and more from 
capital gains, oil depletion allowances, stock options, real estate tax shelters, and other tax 
loopholes, and paying a tax on it of less than 7 percent – the same percentage paid by a wage-
earner making $6,500 a year!”1035 
McGovern supporters used the 1972 JEC hearings to make cases for their preferred left-
distributionist tax policies, which were almost invariably those advocated by McGovern’s 
campaign. Appearing before the JEC, Harvard economist and McGovern adviser Wassily 
Leontief argued that the loopholes in the federal tax code were even worse than what most 
Americans believed. “The average person would [be ‘incredulous’ to] learn that while the federal 
government spends $4 billion on Medicaid and Medicare and about the same amount in support 
of education, its subsidies to upper income groups – that take the form of income tax reduction 
on capital gains and special depletion and depreciation allowances on corporation – add up to 
some $11 billion…,” Leontif said. “The ignorance of the great majority of voters of the 
remarkable fact that some $12,300 of spendable income per family is being redistributed, most of 
it through massive subsidies not shown in the budget, should not be tolerated any longer.” 
Leontief also echoed left-reformers argument that the entire tax system needed to be considered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






as a whole. “To discuss each tax separately really is not a sufficiently broad approach,” he said. 
“What really counts to an individual is how the whole picture…affects him.” The economist also 
criticized Congress for allotting less than “a middle sized corporation [would spent] for 
promotion its products” on programs to educate the public about government spending and the 
tax system. The wisdom of the public, Leontief argued, was crucial for good fiscal policymaking. 
“Taxation is too serious a matter to be left entirely in the hands of experts...,” he told the JEC. 
“[D]istribtion of benefits and sacrifices…is a political question. There is no reason why, in 
arriving at an answer, the Congress should giver greater weight to the personal opinion of a tax 
expert, or of any expert, than it gives to that of any other voter.” Ultimately, Leontief argued that 
“as a citizen, not as an expert” that the country needed “a significant transfer of tax burdens from 
lower to the upper income groups and of benefits from various government subsidies in the 
opposition direction.”1036 Even the architects of the Kennedy tax cut now believed that the 
system had tilted too far in favor of the well-off. Walter Heller told the JEC that “new tax 
legislation should seek a significant increase in the relative tax burden of the upper income 
groups, whose share of the total burden has been reduced by (a) income tax cuts, (b) use of tax 
shelters, (c) the rapid growth of regressive payroll taxes.” 1037  
Though he spent much of his professional career focusing on the poor, Michael 
Harrington used most of his JEC appearance to attack the idea that working- and middle-class 
Americans were prosperous. “[I]t is wrong to imagine America as a society in which you have 
the rich who have too much, the poor who have not enough, and the vast number of people in 
between having roughly enough…,” Harrington argued. “[M]edian income [statistics] in the 
United States indicate that a majority of Americans do not have a modest but adequate income as 
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defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics…. [O]ur median income is a little over $11,000 and the 
BLS’s modest but adequate [family budget] is a little over $12,000…. [T]he point [of tax reform] 
is not simply to benefit the poor…but to benefit everybody.” Harrington made a pitch for 
Democrats to pursue policies that would unite the interests of poor and middle-income workers, 
rather than treating each group separately. “I think we made a mistake – some people made a 
mistake, myself included – in the early days of the rediscovery of poverty by implying that the 
problem was one of taking from a majority and giving it to a minority who were poor,” 
Harrington said. “I think the problem has to be defined as one in which the majority of people in 
America would benefit by…[left-redistributive] tax reforms…not just the poor…. [Y]ou should 
design a program which will help the poor and so to speak discriminate in their favor because 
they are the people of the greatest need, but also help the working people and the middle class 
people.” Harrington called for a “redistributionist approach oriented to the majority.” Such a 
policy was not only “justified on extra-economic, ‘ethical’ ground,” Harrington noted. It also 
provided “a greater economic stimulus,” since lower- and middle-income taxpayers were more 
likely to spend the extra income. Harringon praised both Nixon’s FAP plan and McGovern’s 
“Demogrant” and advocated the abolition of all local, state, and federal taxes, including the 
federal corporate tax, leaving a progressive, loophole-free progressive federal income tax as the 
sole source of revenue for the entire U.S. “It is clear that state taxes on consumption are 
regressive and so are local property taxes…[and] various federal taxes other than the income tax 
– social security taxes, for instance – are often regressive,” Harrington argued. “Therefore on 
grounds of progressivity – and of efficiency since Internal Revenue usually gets high marks in 
that area – that there is a very strong prima facie case for making the federal government the sole 






Harrington continued, to allocate funds back to states and localities. “It should be a goal of 
public policy to put an end to all of the regressive tax systems in America,” Harrington 
concluded.1038 
The president of the United Steelworkers of America and chairman of the AFL-CIO’s 
economic policy committee, I.W. Abel, appeared before the JEC to throw the AFL-CIO’s 
support behind left-distributionist tax reform. “In hardly any area of public concern is there so 
much at stake for the nation as the issue of tax justice,” Abel declared. Like Harrington, Abel 
used the BLS family income standards to note that the average factory worker, making $8,000 
per year, actually fell below the “moderate” standard of living for a family of four. Relieving 
these workers from some of their tax burden, Abel told the JEC, was a good first step towards 
increasing their standard of living. “What is surrendered to the tax collector…cuts very deeply 
into their living standards,” Abel argued, “since most working people are not enjoying a very big 
piece of the so-called ‘affluence.’” Union members had no problem “pay[ing] their fair share,” 
Abel argued, and members also “appreciated the value of public services” and wanted 
government at all levels to have the revenue to fund valued services. It was the distribution of the 
tax burden and the fairness of the tax system to which members objected, Abel said, echoing 
labor’s arguments from 1969. Like many left-reformers by the early-1970s, Abel discussed the 
tax system as a whole, arguing that tax reform at the federal level should take state and local 
provisions into consideration. “[T]he tax laws at all levels of government are rigged in favor of 
those who are already well-off,” he charged. By failing to address distributional issues, 
supporters of government services were courting public cynicism and, ultimately, the 
undermining of the legitimacy of government itself. “Clearly, there is a definite relationship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






between the public’s view of the fairness of the tax structure and its confidence in the integrity of 
government…,” Abel said. “We are, I fear, beyond the stage where inaction or ‘token’ measures 
will be tolerated.” The union leader predicted that “delay in real tax reform fuel growing 
disenchantment with government.” Only by “restoring fairness in the tax structure” could the 
“people’s faith in their government” be “restore[d].”1039 
Despite the AFL-CIO’s not-so-covert support for Nixon in 1972, Abel sharply criticized 
the Nixon administration for working to “frustrate tax justice” and “thwart any effort toward 
meaningful tax reform” by opposing loophole-closing reforms and expanding business tax 
breaks. Abel advocated “tax justice” by “overturning the business giveaways of the 1971 
Revenue Act” and “the elimination of those tax preferences and loopholes which are found 
almost exclusively in the realm of the well-off,” especially taxing capital gains at the same rate 
as ordinary income. “It is well to recall that before World War II, ‘earned income’…enjoyed a 
more favored status under federal income tax [laws] than ‘unearned’ income…,” Abel noted. 
“But since then, this situation has been completely reversed. The tax burden has been more and 
more shifted from corporations and wealthy families to those whose incomes are modest and 
whose taxpaying ability is limited.” There now was, Abel said, a “triple standard” for income. 
“One applies to ordinary income…which are taxed in full…. The second applies to income from 
so-called capital gains…[and] [o]nly one-half of these profits is taxed. A third standard is applied 
to income which never even appears on the tax form, such as the interest on state and local bonds 
or the income that is washed out by phantom, nonexistent costs, such as oil depletion, fast 
depreciation writeoffs, and bookkeeping farm losses,” Abel testified. According to the AFL-
CIO’s calculations, a family of four with an income of $10,000 would pay $905 if it came in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






form of wages or salary, $98 if it came from capital gains, and nothing if it came from interest on 
state and local bonds. Abel called that arrangement “shocking,” particularly since “almost all of 
the types of income that are sheltered from the heavy burdens of ‘ordinary’ income are those 
enjoyed essentially by the very rich.” The union leader also slammed “unjustified tax loopholes” 
for corporations, such as the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation. 1040 The press 
interpreted the AFL-CIO’s testimony as “siding squarely with Democratic presidential nominee 
George S. McGovern in advocating sweeping tax reform.”1041 News agencies and papers across 
the country reported that the AFL-CIO was “back[ing] McGovern” – at least when it came to tax 
reform. Abel’s arguments about the unfairness of the capital gains preference, in particular, 
received extensive coverage.1042 
Throughout the JEC hearings, left-distributionist reformers repeatedly linked the tax 
distribution with larger issues of income inequality. “I am disturbed by the comparison of the 
figures from the Federal Reserve…of the shares of the national income in 1968 and 1970,” Reuss 
told Cohen. “Whereas for a generation before 1968, the income shares of the five-fifths of the 
American people were getting more egalitarian, the discrepancy between the rich and poor was 
decreasing, something happened in 1968 and thereafter, so that in 1970, the last year for which 
we have figures, according to the Federal Reserve…the top fifth, the wealthiest families, went up 
a whole percentage point in their shares, and the other four-fifths of the American families went 
down in their shares, with the man in the middle hurt the worst.” To explain the new 
phenomenon of rising economic inequality, the Wisconsin Democrat pointed to both larger 
economic forces and tax policy. “Until somebody demonstrates to the contrary, I think what has 
been happening in this country – and I suspect it has gotten worse since 1970 – is that between 
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1968 and 1970, unemployment almost doubled, inflation greatly increased in its rate, and the 
share of total taxes paid by the progressive federal income tax was going down, while regressive 
local property and state sales and social security payroll taxes were increasing.” If that trend 
continued, Reuss predicted, “there [are] going to be some of the taxpayers’ revolts that we are 
talking about,” as well as a weaker economy, generally, because of reduced “purchasing power” 
for the majority of the public.1043  
Conservatives struck back against the tenor of the congressional tax debates. In a letter of 
protest to JEC chair William Proxmire, the National Association of Manufacturers derided 
hearings that NAM argued were “couched in terms of income distribution, tax equity, raising 
large amounts of addition revenue, and granting relief from existing tax rates.” NAM told 
Proxmire that it would reserve its formal recommendations until tax reform hearings in 1973, but 
the business group argued that true “tax reform” should be focused on “provid[ing] a better 
climate for productive enterprise.” As it did in 1969, NAM also defended the “so-called 
‘preferences’” that were “under attack” by left reformers, arguing that they “were designed 
specifically to relieve the burden of high marginal rates on some activity.” NAM would only 
support reducing those “preferences” if overall tax rates were reduced dramatically “across-the-
board.” Specifically, though, NAM advocated immediate cuts to reward “capital formation and 
productive investment.” It touted “the investment credit, ADR, the DISC tax regime, [and] lower 
rates of capital taxation” as existing examples of what NAM advocated. But the current system 
did not go far enough, in NAM’s view. “We believe tax policy should encourage job-creating, 
private sector investment, and indeed, should go further in such encouragement,” NAM argued. 
In an oblique reference to McGovern’s economic plan, the business group urged attention to “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






economic effects of any major redistributions by reason of tax reform,” such as the “‘feedback’ 
effects” of a “slower general economy,” which NAM predicted if capital-friendly tax presences 
were curbed. It also lambasted portrayals of the tax system as regressive or too-easy on 
business.1044  
 Appearing before the JEC, C. Lowell Harriss, a conservative Columbia University 
affiliated with the business-backed Tax Foundation, defended the rich against accusations that 
they benefitted from loopholes. “The top 20 percent pay half the tax,” Harris argued, without 
specifying the percentage of income received by that 20 percent or that he was referring only to 
the federal personal income tax. Harris accompanied his testimony with a table of the total 
income tax paid by each quintile, without reference to other forms of taxation or the percentage 
of income received by each quintile. But Harris hung his attack on McGovern and the 
Democrats, who Harris did not mention by name, on this table. “As the campaign 
proceeds…there will apparently be two kinds of arguments from at least one side – that because 
of loopholes some people in upper income groups are not paying as much as others and that the 
group as a whole ought to pay more,” Harris summarized. This was wrong, according to Harris, 
because the Americans who made most of the income paid most of the taxes – even though his 
data said little about either income tax rates on each quintile or the distribution of the entire tax 
burden.  Harris opposed graduated rates in all forms, which he called “discrimination against 
those with high incomes.” As a result, he lambasted the very idea of tax “reform.” “Let us not be 
tyrannized by words…,” Harris told the JEC. “ ‘Tax subsidy’ or ‘tax expenditure’…almost 
appear to imply…’government could take anything’ [so] the implication seems to be ‘its decision 
not to take what it could is a sort of act of grace.’ What government does not demand is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






subsidy.” Talking about “tax reform” and “tax expenditures” in the context of an election was 
particularly harmful, in Harris’s view, because such discussion might create cause resentment or 
“unrealistic expectations” on the part of the public. “Political campaigns invite emotionalism and 
exaggeration…. Taxes offer tempting opportunities. Inequalities can be cited…,” Harris claimed. 
“But attitudes generated will not be entirely harmless…. Unjustified conclusions may add to the 
sense of divisiveness in our society. Self-pity, anger, frustration, animosity will be enlarged 
perhaps among more than a tiny fraction of the public. The spirit of society will suffer….”1045 
 The status of investors’ pocketbooks and businesses’ bottom lines worried Harris even 
more than the “spirit of society.” “Almost any conceivable increase in taxation, corporate or 
personal, would reduce private saving and capital formation…,” Harris argued. “Heavier taxes 
on capital gains…would also bear heavily, per dollar of revenue, on net capital formation.” 
Harris articulated a supply side vision of tax policy. “Aggregate demand…we are told (and 
teach), holds the key to employment. But wrong!..,” he told the JEC. This emphasis on 
stimulating demand, Harris said, was born in “depression conditions.” The prosperity of the 
postwar era, though, called for different policies, in Harris’s view. Now, the economy needed to 
encourage capital formation, not demand stimulation, he argued, in order to both stimulate 
continued growth and fight inflation by spurring technology-based increases in productivity. 
“Tax policy, I repeat, should give more attention than has been fashionable for years to the 
supply of new capital,” Harris concluded. But, rather than moving towards more capital-friendly 
tax policies, the country was moving towards such left-distributive reforms as closing loopholes 
in the corporate income tax and taxing capital gains at the same rates as ordinary incomes. Harris 
fretted at the possibility of these reforms, arguing that they “bode[d] ill for ourselves and our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






children,” and blamed the left for pushing what he called “fashionable attitudes.” “Anti-business 
and anti-capital attitudes seem to me to be spreading. In spite of the evidence!...,” Harris argued. 
“‘Consumerism’ and ‘environmentalism’ account for some of what seems to be a rise in anti-
business sentiment. Such attitudes can spill over into tax policies which will impede, rather than 
help, business do the job for which we expect more and more.” The fact that the U.S. policy was 
anti-business was self-evident to Harris. But he “dream[ed]…of a time in which, with good 
justification, the business would could feel that government was really on its side,” a time when 
“the open, announced, and sincerely felt attitudes of government – lawmakers, policy officials of 
the Executive Branch, and the bureaucracy – were truly favorable to the productive system,” 
when “something in the tax world favorable – or less unfavorable – to the business system was 
not thought of as a ‘giveaway,’ a disreputable outcome of selfish transfer to the few at the 
expense of the many[.]”1046 
 Taxes on the only capital owned by most working- and middle-income Americans did not 
worry Harris, however. Americans concerns over rising property taxes were unjustified, in 
Harris’s view. Such complaints did “not warrant a second recognition,” since they paid for 
“community services and facilities which make the location more valuable” and “will have been 
deducted for income tax purposes” – arguments that assumed both that services were increasing 
the value of the property owner’s land and that the property owner was itemizing deductions, two 
assumptions that did not hold for many low- to middle-income Americans.  Not surprisingly, 
Harris denounced left-distributionists’ calls for property tax reform. “The lurking hope for Santa 
Claus, or Robin Hood, the search for ways to make the ‘other fellow’ pay pervades too much 
public discussion,” he argued in a paper on local school finance crises submitted to the JEC. “It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






fosters irresponsibility. ‘State assumption of the costs of education’ or ‘Federal revenue sharing’ 
can change the kinds of taxes and the distribution of total burdens among kinds of taxpayers. But 
there is one thing neither will do – reduce taxes.” Harris was skeptical of plans that would call 
for higher-income taxpayers to pay for the schooling of poor- and working-class children. He 
was more concerned about the tax burden on the former than the latter. “Many an American in 
the upper middle income group is troubled by present taxes…,” Harris said. “They are more 
likely to do so [pay more taxes], I suggest, the more they expect their children to benefit.” The 
idea of equalizing funding to schools was anathema to Harris. Forcing rich parents to pay to 
educate children in poor communities was unfair in Harris’s view and would affect “incentives.” 
Unlike owners of corporate stock or other forms of capital, the gains that resulted from property 
increases deserved to be taxed, Harris said “In contrast…[to other] type[s] of capital gains, 
increases in land values may result from rising population, income growth, and governmental 
spending on streets, schools, and so on,” Harris argued before Congress. “The justification for 
taxation [of property] seems to me much stronger [than taxation of other capital gains].” As a 
result, Harris argued that the current push to cut property taxes and raise capital gains taxes was 
completely incorrect. Rather, Harris claimed, the opposite should be done. In fact, Harris praised 
Nixon’s unpopular ADR provisions, arguing that more such incentives were needed.1047 By mid-
1972, though, ringing endorsements of Nixon’s tax policies from business groups and 
conservative economists did little assuage the president’s fears about the Democrats’ populist 
threat from the left and a discontented public in the midst of a bottom-up “tax revolt.” 
 At the mid-July Democratic National Convention in Miami Beach, Florida, McGovern 
and the Democrats struck the tone of left-distributionist tax populism, both in its criticism of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Nixon’s record and its tax proposals. “The tax system today does not reward hard work: it's 
penalizes it. Inherited or invested wealth frequently multiplies itself while paying no taxes at all. 
But wages on the assembly line or in farming the land, these hard-earned dollars are taxed to the 
very last penny. There is a depletion allowance for oil wells, but no depletion for the farmer who 
feeds us, or the worker who serves as all,” McGovern declared in his acceptance speech. “The 
administration tells us that we should not discuss tax reform and the election year. They would 
prefer to keep all discussion of the tax laws in closed rooms where the administration, its 
powerful friends, and their paid lobbyists, can turn every effort at reform into a new loophole for 
the rich and powerful. But an election year is the people's year to speak, and this year, the people 
are going to ensure that the tax system is changed so that work is rewarded and so that those who 
derive the highest benefits will pay their fair share rather than slipping through the loopholes at 
the expense of the rest of us.”1048 The tone of Democratic platform was just as strong. It 
reminded voters that Nixon “fought serious reform in 1969” and “favor[ed]…the well-off” with 
“corporate tax giveaways like accelerated depreciation.” The platform also suggested that Nixon 
had failed to offer comprehensive reform proposals in the election year because he had “no 
program, only promises, for tax reform.” The future of taxes under Nixon, the platform charged, 
would include “a hidden national sales tax (Value Added Tax) which would further shift the 
burden to the average wage earner and raise prices of virtually everything ordinary people buy.” 
Even replacing the local income tax with the VAT was insufficient, the platform argued, 
dismissing such a proposal as “reliev[ing] one bad tax, the property tax, by a new tax which is 
just as bad.” The platform also implicitly critiqued the tax policies of Kennedy and Johnson 
when noting, “The last ten years have seen a massive shift in the tax burden from the rich to the 
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working people of America. This is due to cuts in federal income taxes simultaneous with big 
increases in taxes which bear heavily on lower incomes – state and local sales and property taxes 
and the payroll tax.” The Democrats also promised to use the federal government to reduce local 
taxes beyond revenue sharing. “Greater fairness in taxation at the federal level will have little 
meaning for the vast majority of American households if the burden of inequitable local taxation 
is not reduced,” the platform read. On the federal level, the party called for the implementation 
of the Mills-Mansfield loophole-closing legislation as a first reform step, along with making the 
payroll tax more progressive. Indeed, left-redistributive justice and fairness was Democratic 
platform’s overarching theme when it came to taxes. “The cost of government must be 
distributed more fairly among income classes,” it declared. “We reaffirm the long-established 
principle of progressive taxation – allocating the burden according to ability to pay – which is all 
but a dead letter in the present tax code.” 1049 
The strong platform emerged not only from McGovern’s own inclinations and the clear 
popularity of progressive tax reform in the Democratic primaries, but also from the continued 
pressure of left-distributionists. Prior to the convention, Alinsky organizer-turned-journalist 
Nicholas von Hoffman critiqued McGovern’s tax plans as too timid. Von Hoffman scoffed at the 
idea that McGovern was a radical. McGovern was, von Hoffman argued, a “son of the middle of 
the road.” McGovern’s “radical” tax plan was, von Hoffman noted, simply to “return the 
corporation tax to the level of the last year of the Eisenhower administration” and, when it came 
to individual rates, “it turns out his big, radical reform is essentially nothing more than to collect 
the taxes” already enshrined in law by closing looholes.1050 Von Hoffman was not alone in 
longing for an even more radical tax plan. The Democratic National Convention featured a 
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spirited debate on minority planks dealing with tax reform offered by everyone from George 
Wallace to Fred Harris. The latter’s plank, in particular, proved to be popular – and 
controversial. The former DNC chair and soon-to-be-former Senator was already transitioning 
into the roll of tax activist. Branching from his own short-lived and underfunded presidential 
campaign, Harris pushed what he called the “New Populism” for Democrats and organized the 
“Tax Action Committee,” which in the years to come would coordinate with local left-leaning 
grassroots tax groups around the country. Harris, who served as a floor managed for McGovern, 
and his Tax Action Committee came to the convention armed with armed with 5,000 buttons and 
10,000 pamphlets denouncing the loophole-ridden tax code and declaring “Take the Rich Off 
Welfare.”1051 Indeed, the buttons were “perhaps the most popular button passed around the 
Democratic National Convention,” as one press report explained, because “it was clear that they 
[delegates and other convention attendees] felt the same way about its message.”1052 Harris also 
came armed with his own “Robin Hood” tax plank, that, among other things, called for removing 
nearly every tax preference in the internal revenue code. Speaking on behalf of the Harris plank, 
which he coauthored, California’s Fortney “Pete” Stark cited the recent revelation that California 
Governor Ronald Reagan had made millions tax free as a reason not just for tax reform, but for 
the Harris plank, in particular. “Let’s take the rich off welfare and let us go ahead and show that 
our tax reform will mean something to everyone,” he said. Civil Rights lawyer Wes Watkins of 
Mississippi also spoke for the minority plank, declaring, “The most crucial need in this country 
today is equitable taxation.”1053   
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The most eloquent proponent of the tough plank was Harris himself. “I personally am for 
George McGovern,” Harris told the delegates, “but whether you are for George McGovern or 
whether you are for George Wallace, whoever you are for, if you are an average taxpayer, 
average working person in this country, you are paying too much tax because a lot of rich people 
are not paying their fair share of taxes” – the last declaration delivered to applause. Harris, 
however, dubbed the official platform’s tax proposal “unacceptably weak,” since it called for the 
Mills-Mansfield plan, which Harris viewed as little more than a study to devise reform proposals. 
Citing U.S. Steel’s zero tax rate and the 122 people making more than $200,000 who paid no 
income tax, Harris argued that the time for study was over. “Sixty-three percent of all Americans 
lately said yes when asked if they would join in a tax revolt. I say the Democratic Party should 
not join in a tax revolt, it ought to lead a taxpayers' revolt in 1972,” Harris declared to yet more 
applause. “Let's give George McGovern a plank that he can go to the people with. The biggest 
issue in this country in 1972 is taxes. After all, if the way we finance government is not fair, 
what else is fair? I say let’s stand up now and vote for income and power for the people and take 
the rich off welfare.” Opponents of the Harris plank argued that the majority plank was already 
strong enough and that the Harris plan, which called for the immediate elimination of all tax 
loopholes and preferences, was too broad and invited controversy, since it would eliminate 
popular items, like the personal exemption, along with unpopular ones. Skittish McGovern 
advisers ensured that the Harris plank was controversially – and debatably – defeated by a voice 
vote.1054 But the fact that the key platform debate was between the leftmost tax plank ever 
proposed by the Democrats – at least in the post-WWII era – and one even more radical 
demonstrated just how far the Democratic Party had moved from JFK era.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








 Nixon continued to feel his own pressure, both from the left and from so-called “Middle 
Americans.” The White House knew that tax policy was its biggest weakness in a race with 
McGovern. “In spite of his waffling and careless tax analysis, the recent Harris Survey indicated 
that McGovern was slightly ahead of the president on only one of 16 key issues – tax reform,” 
Lew Engman wrote to John Ehrlichman in July.1055 Not only were the polls telling Nixon that the 
public preferred left-distributionist reforms, but Americans were telling Nixon themselves with 
the tax-themed letters pouring into the White House. “I consider myself a loyal American, a 
child of the depression, now a middle aged frightened American, as is the case of many I have 
spoken to,” one woman – a 45-year-old “divorcee supping a 15 year old son” – from New Jersey 
wrote to Nixon. “I was brought up with the belief that one must work to attain and la that way to 
gain pride…. Only once in my life was I forced to collect unemployment and still felt like a 
charity case.” Despite working, she was having trouble paying for necessities, let along luxuries 
like “a vacation.” “What I don't understand is why our property taxes have to be so high,” she 
told Nixon. “If I don't make it, they will be the reason…. [W]ith the cost of living as it is…I am 
unable to save. My son is in the second year of high school and if he is capable of [going to] 
college, I will be unable to help him…. The future indeed looks very grim.”1056 “The time has 
come to stop paying mere lip service to the necessity of protecting the elderly,” a New York 
homeowner wrote to Nixon, “and to make a real commitment to support specific legislation to 
ease the burden of property taxes for the older homeowners based on their ability to pay.” The 
letter writer suggested federal tax relief for property taxes based on a “sliding scale” for elderly 
making less than $10,000.1057 The White House responded to such letters by explaining that “the 
President recognizes the deficiencies in the property tax and knows that this tax has placed a 
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regressive and inequitable burden on taxpayers” and promising that that he was “committed” to 
pursuing legislation that provided property tax relief.1058 Convincing these voters that Nixon 
would address their left-leaning tax concerns as well as, or better than, McGovern became one of 
the Nixon team’s main priorities during the general election. 
Despite the fact that Nixon had already clearly moved to the left on taxes by selling 
revenue sharing as a partial solution to regressive state and local taxes, many conservatives still 
hoped that the president would return to traditional Republican economics. By feeding the 
president a flurry of memos and carefully selected articles, conservatives like Pat Buchanan and 
Arthur Burns renewed their efforts to convince Nixon that his turn to the left on taxes was a 
mistake. Beginning with the Democratic primaries, Burns worried that the president would 
follow the Democrats’ lead on issues like taxes. “The Democratic primaries carry a message that 
needs to be taken seriously: namely, there are many unhappy, disenchanted, confused, frustrated 
citizen in our midst…,” Burns wrote to Nixon in June. The Fed chair cautioned against copying 
the Democrats tax appeals, though, by making the tradition conservative argument that taxes 
were merely a small part of a larger milieu of social, economic, and cultural grievances. 
“[P]eople…are unhappy about taxes, about Vietnam, about privileges of the rich, about the 
integrity of government, about abuses of power by the trade unions, about military budgets, 
about inflation, about business, about the narcotics problem, and so on,” Burns told Nixon. “That 
is why McGovern and Wallace have done so well at the polls.” The Fed chair commented that 
Nixon would surely be receiving advice, from both the left and the right, on how to counter the 
Democrats. The key for Nixon, he said, would be to show “decisive leadership,” whatever the 
specific policies. However, Burns did tip his hand by noting, “Any tax reform plan that you 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







might present will look pale and unconvincing to the millions who are flocking to the McGovern 
and Wallace banner” – a point Nixon underlined.1059 Buchanan, for his part, insisted that 
McGovern, Muskie, and Wallace were really pushing a conservative tax politics – not a left-
distributonist one – meaning that Nixon needed to do little more than reassert the GOP’s 
tradition low-taxes, small-government hymn. Buchanan cited Democrats’ tax appeals in the 
Wisconsin primaries as proof of the party’s move to the right. “The old GOP argument of cutting 
taxes instead of increasing spending has now caught the imagination of the entire country,” 
Buchanan wrote to Nixon in April, “and the Democrats are starting to run away with what was 
our issue…talking about reducing the tax burden of the working man.”1060 
Nixon also read with interest Erving Kristol’s article, “Of Populism and Taxes,” in the 
summer 1972 issue of Public Interest. Kristol’s article was a pure distillation of the conservative 
interpretation of the tax revolt. It portrayed left-distributionist tax “populists” as “yesterday’s 
quasi-Marxist radicals” and argued that they had mistaken the cause of the public’s tax anger. “It 
seems generally agreed that a major cause of the present populist discontent is taxation," Kristol 
wrote. “[T]he tax issue, it [populistm] proclaims, arises out of the manipulation of our tax laws 
by ‘vested interests’ so that the rich are getting away scot-free while the common man bears the 
whole tax burden. The answer, obviously, is to soak the rich.” This view was completely wrong, 
Kristol wrote. “The average American, no matter what he may sometimes say or what is said in 
his name, is not rebelling against tax inequities. He is rebelling against taxes, period,” Kristol 
wrote, in a passage noted by Nixon. But even this seeming anger at taxes was illusory in 
Kristol’s view. It was not taxes themselves that angered Americans, but “the ways in which the 
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welfare state is spending its tax revenues – for ever-growing welfare rolls, for an educational 
system that seems to be falling apart, for a police force that cannot cope with increased 
criminality, for low-income housing that converts itself into instant slums, for Medicaid to the 
poor which inflates medical costs for the non-poor, etc.” They were all, the neoconservative 
made clear, “expenditures that benefit primarily the minority who are poor.” 1061   
Harkening back to the right’s original interpretation of the tax revolt, Kristol argued that 
it was a classic case of cultural anger masquerading as an economic complaint. “In short, he 
resents the present structure of the welfare state,” Kristol concluded, “and his ‘tax rebellion’ is an 
expression of this resentment.” Politicians were sometimes fooled into thinking otherwise 
because many blue-collar voters did, indeed, support elements of the welfare state. That 
working-class voters liked many of the other “benefits of the welfare state,” however, did not 
matter, in Kristol’s view. “This [embrace of benefits but rejection of taxes] may be short-sighted 
on the part of the working-class – but, then, it is in the nature of working-class people to be more 
short-sighted (to have a shorter ‘time horizon’) than middle-class people…” Kristol wrote. 
Ultimately, Kristol predicted, blue-collar workers would forego the welfare state if it also freed 
them from taxation. “The populace doesn’t want to be fed,” Kristol wrote in another passage 
marked by Nixon, “it wants more freedom to grace on its own.” The public’s anger was actually 
“directed against liberal politics – even when it [the public] votes for an ‘anti-establishment’ 
liberal politician.” The rest of Kristol’s article outlined why attempts at income redistribution 
were bound to fail – namely that the rich were not truly rich and that closing the capital gains 
loophole or raising taxes on corporations would “slow economic growth…and 
ultimately…diminish the tax revenues…..” It was a message unmistakably written by Kristol in 
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response to McGovern’s New York Review of Books article and aimed at Nixon. Indeed, the 
president heavily marked-up Kristol’s article and forwarded to Ehrlichman seeking his views on 
the article with the comment that Kristol’s article “may raise questions re[garding] our property 
tax ‘reform’” and a request to seek further input from Shultz, Connally, and Colson.1062  
Curiously, the primary – and really, only – evidence offered by Kristol for the correctness 
of his view was a New York Times article on New Jersey Governor William Cahill’s attempt to 
cut local property taxes by 40 percent by instituting a progressive state income tax. Nixon 
pointed Ehrlichman to this section of Kristol’s article. Kevin Phillip’s study of Cahill’s 1969 
election victory had interested Nixon a few years earlier and now, it seemed, the New Jersey 
Republican offered even more instruction to the president. However, the section of the Times 
article emphasized by Kristol – and underlined by Nixon – actually featured the observations of 
state legislator Anthony Imperiale, an Independent from Newark known for his racial 
demagoguery, including advocating white vigilantism. The Times observed that Imperiale 
believed – “probably rightly,” as the newspaper editorialized – that virtually all residents of 
“blue collar neighborhoods who stand to benefit most” from the tax reforms actually “opposed 
any kind of new taxes regardless of the higher benefits involved an regardless of any 
accompanying reduction in local taxes.” Indeed, reflecting on the tax issue, the paper drew a 
parallel to “working-class Democrats in New Jersey” supporting George Wallace. But however 
much that conclusion may have aligned with the skewed view of Imperiale and, perhaps, the 
Times, it did not accord with the facts. Indeed the Rutger’s New Jersey Poll found that a majority 
of New Jersians supported a progressive state income tax, generally, while two-thirds of 
respondents supported it if revenue from the income tax would be used to reduce other taxes, like 
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the state property or sales tax. Indeed, the poll shoed that majorities of every income class 
supported the income tax plan. When the state assembly rejected Cahill’s tax plan in July, it was 
defeated by Republicans – along with the Independent Imperiale, who vocally opposed the bill 
on the floor.1063 Once again, politicians’ perceptions of what the public believed – or willful 
misinterpretations of public sentiment – stymied tax reform. This time, at least, national 
conservatives did not have the intellectual firepower to sway Nixon from a more materialist, 
distributionist understanding of the “tax revolt.” 
 In his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, Nixon touted his record 
as a tax reformer, pledged to reduce local property taxes, and argued that McGovern would 
actually increase average Americans’ taxes. “Our Administration, as you know, has provided the 
biggest tax cut in history, but taxes are still too high,” Nixon argued. “That is why one of the 
goals of our next Administration is to reduce the property tax which is such an unfair and heavy 
burden on the poor, the elderly, the wage earner, the farmer, and those on fixed incomes.” 
Referring to McGovern’s proposals, without mentioning the Democrat by name, Nixon 
portrayed his opponent as a welfare-loving, tax-raising radical, suggesting that his policies would 
be costly for American taxpayers. “The proposal that they have made to pay $1,000 to every 
person in America insults the intelligence of the American voters…,” Nixon said. “Their 
platform promises everything to everybody, but at an increased net in the budget of $144 billion, 
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but listen to what it means to you, the taxpayers of the country. That would mean an increase of 
50 percent in what the taxpayers of America pay. I oppose any new spending programs which 
will increase the tax burden on the already overburdened American taxpayer.” 1064  Like 
McGovern, Nixon faced pressure on taxes from the left within his own party. Liberal GOP 
Senator Mark Hatfield proposed a progressive plank to the Republican Platform Committee that 
would eliminate all deductions and loopholes, except for the personal exemption, which would 
be converted into a tax credit. Under his “Simpliform” plan, a family of four making $5,000 
would pay no income taxes, while rates would rise to 50 percent above $1 million. Hatfield 
estimated that 85 percent of all families – those making below $20,000 per year – would pay less 
under his system. “Under the present law the ‘middle income’ American is really subsidizing the 
rich,” he argued.1065 Needless to say, it was a proposal far to the left of most Republican 
delegates. 
 In media appearances, congressional testimony, and speeches leading up to the election, 
the White House and the Nixon campaign tried to walk a fine line in appealing both to a public 
clearly sympathetic to left-”distributionist” vision of tax reform and to a Republican base still 
wedded to conservative tax ideology. Overall, the Nixon team leaned more towards 
accomplishing in the former than the latter. But many of its early attempts to tout Nixon’s tax 
record backfired. “We would to like warn against too ready acceptance of the idea that our 
impending budget problems can be solved by increasing taxes,” Herbert Stein told the JEC. 
“Probably the greatest delusion is to think that the problems can be solved by increasing taxes on 
other people – and particularly on a few other people – and most particularly on people who are 
not paying their fair share.” Yet, Stein continued, the administration did support such reforms. 
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“The president has said that the administration would propose a program of tax reform before the 
year is out,” Stein noted, contradicting the president’s past statements. “One of the objectives we 
seek in developing such a system is to increase the equity of the tax system.” 1066 The Nixon 
administration was now eager to claim credit for the reforms in the TRA69. Appearing before 
Congress in July, Nixon’s Assistant Treasury Secretary for tax policy, Edwin Cohen, pointed to 
the TRA69 as evidence of the administration’s commitment to progressive tax reform. “The Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, on which the administration and the Congress collaborated throughout 
almost the entire year 1969, was a landmark in the long history of tax legislation,” Cohen 
claimed, with a quite generous definition of “collaborate…,” considering the administration’s 
opposition to the TRA69. “[I]t represented a major achievement in improving the equity and 
efficiency of the tax system.”1067 Likewise, George Shultz explained to Congress that Nixon’s 
“revenue sharing is a form of tax reform that is a substitution in a sense of the federal tax 
structure for the state and local tax structure,” which he viewed as a “good measure.”1068 
In its zealousness to claim the mantle of working- and middle-class friendly tax reform, 
however, the Nixon White House exaggerated Nixon’s past achievements on taxes. During his 
appearance before the JEC, both Cohen and Shultz presented a table that Shultz claimed showed 
a “gigantic shift” in taxes away from low- and middle-income Americans and toward the rich 
between 1968 and 1972. It was a similar tactic to that used by Ehrlichman in his May press 
conference. This time, however, both Democrats in Congress and the political press pounced on 
the White House’s misleading table. By using the years ’68 through ’72, the table combined the 
mildly downwardly redistributive TRA69 with the business friendly, upwardly-redistributive 
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Revenue Act of 1971, which had the effect of concealing the latter within the former. Even 
worse, the numbers in the Nixon table were purposely skewed for effect. Using adjusted gross 
income as its base, the table effectively ignored numerous loopholes, including the capital gains 
preference. Cohen used the table’s questionable data to push back at those who “in the heat of a 
political campaign year…indicate that the rich somehow manage to avoid paying taxes.” Cohen 
said that, despite there being 112 taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of over $200,000 paying 
no tax, that upper-income Americans were, in fact, “paying heavy federal income taxes.” Cohen 
pointed to the table, which showed sharp falls tax rates for low- and middle-income Americans 
and steep rises in taxes on those with incomes above $100,000 between 1968 and 1972. “[T]he 
income tax burden has been reduced in the zero to $3,000 income class by 82 percent, and has 
been reduced in gradually decreasing percentages in each higher income class to the $50,000 to 
$100,000 level,” Cohen told Congress. “But in the income level above $100,000, the liability has 
been raised 7.4 percent.” Americans making more than $200,000 paid an average rate of 44.1 
percent in income taxes, according to Cohen.1069   
The administration’s tax distribution figures immediately came under attack. Henry 
Reuss questioned the administration’s use of adjusted gross income as the basis for its figures. 
“Well, that sounds reassuring to somebody who doesn’t know what adjusted gross income is,” 
Reuss quipped. “But is it not a fact that adjusted gross income is one of those lovely Treasury 
terms which deliberately excludes the very loophole income we are talking about – capital gains, 
oil depletion, tax exempt bonds, interest on life insurance savings, and so on? So that these 
people did make millions, taken together, on which they paid no tax whatever, and this 44 
percent figure merely related to that portion of their income which wasn’t loophole income, isn’t 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






that so?” Cohen agreed that “the use of adjusted gross income has great defects” and 
acknowledged that it “may be a defective concept,” but claimed the Nixon Treasury used it in its 
study because “the term adjusted gross income is found in the Internal Revenue Code.” He also 
suggested that using a fuller measure of income would be unlikely to increase the number of rich 
taxpayers paying no income tax. But Reuss argued that tax-free millionaires were not the whole 
story. “Let me suggest that I don’t think the real question which gets us tax reforms outraged is 
so much, as you suggest in your statement, that the rich manage to avoid paying income taxes 
entirely…,” Reuss told Cohen. “What does concern me is that a great number of very well-to-do 
people pay a pittance in federal income taxes while the average person pays much more.” A 
March IRS study, Reuess noted, had found that, even under the new minimum tax requirements 
in the TRA69, the wealthy paid an average rate of four percent on their “preference income” – 
income from “loophole” sources, like capital gains. “I don’t see how we can tell our constituents 
that they should stop their taxpayer’s revolt, that all is well, with that going on,” Reuss 
argued.1070 The next week, Reuss released his own report charging that Edwin Cohen had 
purposely used misleading statistics to make it seem that the rich were paying higher rates than 
they actually were by computing rates after “loophole income” had been deducted.1071 Reuss’s 
report was picked up by the Associated Press and received widespread media coverage.1072  
Making matters worse for the Nixon administration, George Shultz used the same distribution 
data offered by Cohen when Shultz appeared before the JEC the following week. Facing the 
same criticism as Cohen, Shultz sheepishly agreed, “Some things don’t get into adjusted gross 
income and that is a problem.” JEC chair William Proxmire also criticized the administration for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1070 Tax Subsidies and Tax Reform, Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, July 19-21, 1972 (GPO, 1972) 
1071 Reuss Release, July 22, 1972, HRP, B 83, F 7 WHS 
1072 “Data on Taxes Paid by Rich Called Wrong,” Milwaukee Sentinel, July 25, 1972; “Loophole Income Left Out of 






not including payroll taxes in their table, either, arguing that – instead of the image the 
administrations’ table painted – taxes had become “less progressive and more regressive than 
before” over the past several years.1073 
 The Nixon White House’s dubious tax claims also offered Nader’s tax warriors a chance 
to pounce, too. Thomas H. Stanton, the director of Nader’s Tax Reform Research Group wrote to 
JEC Chair William Proxmire, challenging Cohen’s portrayal of the progressivity of the federal 
tax system as “incomplete and possibly misleading.” In addition to reiterating Reuss’s criticism 
of using adjusted gross income in distribution tables, the TRRG criticized Cohen’s data on tax 
expenditures. Cohen’s tables did not include data on the number of taxpayers in each adjusted 
gross income class, making it appear as though low- and middle-income taxpayers received more 
benefits from “loopholes” than they actually did, given that more taxpayers fell into those groups 
than the upper-income groups. “Thus, for example, Mr. Cohen’s data showed that taxpayers in 
the $10-$15,000 income group receives $230 million in benefits from [preferential] capital gains 
treatment, while taxpayers in the $100,000+ group receive $2.9 billion – a ratio of 10:1, which is 
inequitable enough,” Stanton wrote in a letter reprinted by the JEC. “But the inequity is actually 
much worse than Cohen would admit. The 9% of all taxpayers in the $10-$15,000 group 
averaged only $16.31 in benefits from the capital gains loophole, while the 1/10th of 1% of all 
taxpayers in the $100,000+ group averaged over $38,000 each.” According to the TRRG’s 
analysis, the preferential treatment of capital gains was the single biggest loophole for the rich on 
a per-taxpayer basis. Other large preferences included the deductibility of charitable 
contributions, which netted $11,373 per return, and the property tax deduction, which netted 
$1,758 per return, respectively, for the nearly 78,000 taxpayers with incomes of over $100,000. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







For the 27 million middle-income taxpayers making between $7,000 and $15,000, the combined 
benefits of both of those exemptions was less than $100 per return, and for the poor, their value 
was even smaller, netting less than $10 each for taxpayers making between $3,000 and 
$5,000.1074 Like Reuss, the TRRG also argued that the Nixon administration should have 
calculated the tax distribution using gross income, rather than adjusted gross income, in order to 
reflect tax preferences included in adjusted gross income.1075 Stanton and the TRRG’s Alan 
Kamin slammed Cohen’s portrayal of the tax system in a letter to the Washington Post. “Mr. 
Cohen presented the deceptive figures in an attempt to disparage as ‘political rhetoric’ assertions 
that the wealthy are under-taxed,” they wrote. “In fact, the figures he omitted cogently make the 
case for tax reform: There is much revenue to be gained by closing loopholes, and many of these 
excessively favor the wealthy.”1076 The New York Times also covered the TRRG’s criticisms of 
Cohen’s testimony and figures. “The study by the tax reform group showed that even tax benefits 
that have been kept in the law primarily out of concern for persons of overage income benefit the 
wealthy more,” reporter Eileen Shannon noted in the Times report. The TRRG’s proposal to 
remedy the situation was the elimination of unnecessary tax preferences and the conversion of 
others into credits, instead of deductions, since credits benefitted all taxpayers equally, while 
deductions were more valuable to upper-income taxpayers.1077  
 The Nixon administration’s early attempts to discredit McGovern’s tax reform proposals 
proved to be as troubled as its assertions that the president had already delivered progressive 
reform. In a strategy that would be sustained throughout the campaign, Nixon spokespersons 
attempted to portray all of McGovern’s tax plans as little more than an extension of welfare, 
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hoping to spread the unpopular taint of “welfare” to the Democrat’s tax plans, too.  In a June 
speech to the Virginia Banker’s Association that William Proxmire later called “a direct attack 
on Senator McGovern,” Nixon’s CEA chair, Herbert Stein, lambasted the presumptive 
Democratic nominee’s tax and welfare reform plans “using a mix of sarcasm and detailed 
figures,” as the New York Times put it.1078  McGovern’s plans for tax reform and a universal 
guaranteed income were anything but “universal,” in Stein’s view. “What the new politician 
seeks is not the consensus issue, but the divisive issue,” Stein charged. “He seeks the issue on 
which he can divide black against white, young against middle-aged, poor against rich, and 
women against men.” What was so “divisive” about McGovern’s proposals, according to Stein? 
The fact that he was raising issues like welfare reform, tax reform, and income redistribution. 
Like many conservative critics of McGovern, both within the Nixon administration and outside 
of it, Stein portrayed McGovern’s proposal as one that would give to the poor and take from 
everyone above the poverty line. “The fact with which all income redistribution plans must 
contend is that there is a limit to the willingness of the non-poor to give income to the poor,” 
Stein argued. This “willingness” was necessary, Stein argued, because “the nonpoor greatly 
outnumber the poor and dominate the political process.”1079  
 Like the White House’s JEC appearances, Stein’s speech faced a swift backlash. 
Syndicated columnist Mitlon Viorst lambasted Stein’s criticism of McGovern, presenting Stein 
as little more than a traditional conservative defender of the rich. “Stein is furious that McGovern 
is promising a redistribution of income and a reform of taxation…,” Viorst continued. “What 
Stein seems philosophy incapable of contemplating is that there is a question of equity in the 
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presence of poverty amidst plenty, and of fairness in a tax system that permits the rich to pay far 
less than they should.” The columnist argued that McGovern’s proposals harkened back to an 
earlier conception of economics. Rather than concerned only with fiscal management, McGovern 
was concerned also with distribution. “What Stein is complaining about is that these Democrats 
no longer are satisfied with the economic issues which have dominated debate over the last 
decade or two – unemployment, inflation, and growth,” Viorst wrote. “These issues begin with 
the premise that, as the national economic pie grows larger, everyone gets a fatter slice. The 
economist’s job [in this view] is to find the way to make a bigger and bigger pie. In these terms, 
there is nothing divisive about economic policy, whether it is Democratic or Republican. What 
irritates Stein is that Democrats are returning to a more traditional conception of economics, in 
which they ask: In a pie of limited size, who gets what? He is quite right that the question is 
divisive. It raises all sorts of moral issues that his own economic premises ignore.” The idea that 
issues of distribution and fairness should not enter the discussion of economic policy was “the 
current economic philosophy of the Republican party,” Viorst argued. Though he did not use 
these terms, Viorst was distinguishing between fiscalist and distributionist visions of taxes. The 
public was moved by distributionism, not fiscalism, Viorst wrote. “He [Stein] seems unaware 
that people respond less to the intricacies of economic analysis than the injustices of economic 
reality,” Viorst concluded. “When Stein argues that it’s not worth the trouble to close some tax 
loopholes because it would bring in only a billion or two, I think he misses the point. It’s not the 
accountancy that bothers Americans; it’s the immorality.” 1080 
As the election approached, the White House refined both its boasts on behalf of Nixon 
and its attacks on McGovern’s economic proposals. The Nixon campaign’s goal was to “keep 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






McGovern on the defensive,” as Colson put it, “preven[ing] him from mounting a sustained 
attack on us” by “keep[ing] him defending his issues rather than attacking ours.” Specifically, 
they needed to target McGovern’s strengths, by “counter attack[ing] on taxes and welfare.”1081 
The president and his advisers saw “3 major issues” on which McGovern was weak, as 
Ehrlichman noted during a meeting with Nixon, Colson, and Haldeman. They were “welfare 
(black-white),” “taxes (income redistrib[ution]),” and the “social issue.”1082 Nixon personally 
instructed his staff to slam McGovern’s tax plans by linking taxes and welfare. The “McGovern 
Budget,” Nixon and Ehrlichman strategized, should be labeled one of “higher prices and higher 
taxes and recession/unemployment.”1083 The “simple points” to emphasize were “more on 
welfare,” “pay more to loafer,” “raise taxes [and] prices,” and “cause recession.” The White 
House’s goal was to “keep McG on the defensive” and “ignore his [attacks].”1084  “Obviously 
every effort should be made to keep reminding people of his [McGovern’s] extreme welfare 
plans and his high budget which would result in an increase in taxes,” Haldeman wrote to Colson 
in one strategy memo. “It is vitally important to keep the ball on his side of the court – in other 
words have the debate be about his plans and not about our tax reform plans which may come 
later on in the campaign.”1085 The Nixon campaign’s easiest strategy on that count was following 
the pioneered by Hubert Humphrey in the California primary and attempting to link McGovern’s 
popular tax plans to the specter of an unpopular “welfare” handout. It was an attack the 
McGovern team anticipated. “[Humphrey] provided the Republicans with all the ammunition to 
destroy McGovern,” McGovern adviser Gordon Weil argued after the campaign. “Humphrey 
had made charges which suck, so the Republicans needed merely to make them bipartisan issues. 
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It seemed to be of no importance to either Humphrey or the Republicans that most of these 
charges were totally false. And it did not concern Humphrey that he was providing the 
Republicans with ammunition bearing his own seal of approval.”1086 Indeed, Nixon did not miss 
the chance to use the welfare attack that had already been perfected by Humphrey to his own 
advantage, including using the Senate Finance Committee numbers touted by Humphrey in the 
first California debate. One of the most famous commercials run with Democrats for Nixon 
began with the wail of a factory whistle. As a voiceover begins, a white, middle-aged, hard-
hatted construction worker ambles onto a beam overlooking a city street and begins eating a 
sandwich from his lunch pail. “Senator George McGovern recently submitted a welfare bill to 
the Congress,” the voiceover intoned. “According to an analysis by the Senate Finance 
Committee, the McGovern bill would make 47 percent of the people in the United States eligible 
for welfare. Forty-seven percent. Almost every other person in the country would be on 
welfare…. And who's going to pay for this? Well, if you're not the one out of two people on 
welfare, you do.” With these final words, the camera zoomed in close on the worker’s distraught, 
haggard face before fading to the Democrats for Nixon logo.1087 “The combined effects of the 
original Humphrey charges and their repetition by the so-called Democrats for Nixon was to be 
devastating [to McGovern],” Weil argued, somewhat exaggeratedly. “And at no time during the 
fall campaign would Humphrey withdraw his original charges.” 1088 
 The flip side of the Nixon campaign’s emphasis on welfare was slandering McGovern’s 
tax plans as little more than a hike on the great “Silent Majority” that would be used to fund 
spending on the – presumably poor, black – minority. “McGovern’s ‘income redistribution’ 
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program amounts to a declaration of economic war against the American Middle Class, on behalf 
of the welfare class,” a Buchanan-penned attack treatise declared. “Politically, George 
McGovern has given a promissory note for $1000 to every welfare client, hippie and loafer In 
the Nation – payable on demand at the United States Treasury if McGovern is elected. And who 
will provide the Treasury with the billions required to make good on the McGovern promissory 
note[?] – the average taxpayer in this country every family in America that makes $12,000. The 
McGovern proposal – $1000 per person to everyone in the country – would end up leaving 85 
million more Americans on the welfare rolls, according to the Democratically-controlled Senate 
Finance Committee of Russell Long.”1089 Keeping with this “keep McGovern on defense” 
welfare-and-tax game plan, the CRP created “weekly attack themes” designed to allow the Nixon 
campaign to focus their McGovern attacks on a single issue each week, including a “Welfare 
Week” and a “High Taxes Week,” designed to hammer home how “McGovern's proposals mean 
high taxes for the working man.”1090 The administration believed that Middle Americans would 
not tolerate McGovern’s tax proposals once they understood how “redistributive” they were. 
“[W]e are probably fairly close to the present limits of the toleration of the transfer of income 
from the non-poor to the poor,” Herbert Stein argued. McGovern’s loophole-closing reform 
plans, he said, would ultimately hurt “the great mass of taxpayers who supply the great mass of 
revenue [and who] do not want their taxes raised but are instead quite eager to see their taxes 
reduced.”1091 Likewise, Edwin Cohen publicly declared that tax-and-welfare programs like 
McGovern’s would necessarily harm the middle class. “[W]hen you increase government 
expenditures and you have to finance them, you have roughly three groups, a lower income 
group, a middle income group, and an upper income group,” he argued. “And no matter how 
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heavily you tax the upper income group you can only get so much out them, because it is just not 
that large a group. And you can’t tax heavily the low-income group. So…you [tax]…the large 
body of middle class persons.” 1092  
Nixon campaign mailings and speeches likewise attempted to paint McGovern’s populist 
economic proposals as simply distribution from the middle class to the poor. The White House 
argued directly that middle-income Americans would see their federal income taxes rise under 
McGovern.1093 “He says he will just take it from the rich. But, even with the most extreme, 
confiscatory taxation of the wealthy, the revenue would not be anywhere near enough,” one letter 
claimed. “The truth is it would have to come from greatly increasing taxes on middle and lower 
income working people, removing the incentive among the great majority of American workers 
to work harder, to compete, to save, and to get ahead. In fact, if the McGovern spending and tax 
programs were enacted as a whole, achievement and success would be penalized. Private 
enterprise would be stifled…. Senator McGovern pays elaborate lip-service to tax reform but the 
only real ‘reform’ he proposes is increased taxes.”1094 Speech instructions for Nixon surrogates 
lambasted McGovern as a feckless tax hiker. “The question is not, Will Sen. McGovern mean 
higher taxes? The question is only, How much higher will those taxes be?” the suggested 
language read. “I offer you two estimates. The first is Senator Hubert Humphrey’s estimate of 
what George McGovern’s $1,000 per person welfare proposal alone would cost a single 
secretary making $8,500 per year….more than $500 in federal income taxes. Second, I offer an 
estimate by an economic study group. Their calculations conclude that if George McGovern 
were successful in putting into law every spending proposal he has mode in this campaign, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1092 Tax Subsidies and Tax Reform, Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, July 19-21, 1972 (GPO, 1972) 
1093 RNC Talking Paper, September 18, 1972, SMOF-Ehrlichman, B 18, F 1972 Election Strategy, RNPL 






taxes on a family of four earning $12,500 per year would be increased by $1,038 a year. That 
would nearly double what that family pays in federal taxes today.” The speech suggestions also 
argued that McGovern’s policies would stoke inflation which, though “not a direct tax” was “an 
indirect tax” that “would be paid by America’s working families.”1095 Nixon campaign talking 
points included shots against McGovern’s “New Left” “tax-the-rich” proposals, which the White 
House argued would “actually hit middle income groups,” “stifle incentives,” and were “actually 
massive tax increase,” despite being framed as “tax reform.”1096 In its campaign materials, the 
Nixon team also used a Wilbur Mills quote wherein the Ways and Means chair wondered money 
would come from for McGovern’s proposed programs, as well as a particularly devastating 
Hubert Humphrey quote: “Everyone who earns between $8,000 and $20,000 would be socked in 
the proverbial jaw with the tax load from McGovern’s ambitious programs.”1097 “[McGovern] 
hopes to buy the votes of the bottom half of American society with the tax dollars of the top half 
of American society,” Buchanan quipped. 1098 
This line of attack on McGovern found some success, but, ultimately, failed. Just as with 
the dubious graphs presented by the Nixon White House during throughout the summer, the 
question of how McGovern’s tax plans would impact the middle class could easily be answered 
by math. And, once again, the answer did not comport with the Nixon White House’s assertions. 
In an attempt to put firm numbers behind the Nixon team’s repeated assertions that McGovern 
would doom the middle class, Herbert Stein outlined the critique in detail during a speech to the 
Virginia Banker’s Association. In his speech, Stein hypothesized that McGovern would finance 
his tax and welfare plans with a flat-rate tax. “To do [McGovern’s plan]…,” Stein told the 
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Virginia Banker’s Association in June, “would require a flat federal income tax rate of 46 
percent of taxable net income in addition, of course, to the income rates now in force.” This 
shocking claim was designed to garner media attention, and, indeed, it succeeded. The press 
seized on the shocking 46 percent claim, which seemed to prove that McGovern was, in fact, 
going to sock not only the rich, but “Middle Americans” with a drastic tax hike.1099 This 
prompted debunking articles by economics reporters Leonard Silk and Hobart Rowen, among 
others, to explain that McGovern’s plan did not actually call for dramatic tax hikes on lower- and 
middle-class Americans. Speaking for McGovern, Joseph Pechman explained why Stein’s 
headline grabbing was wrong. Closing loopholes would increase the tax base, allowing for lower 
rates. Moreover, Stein did not account for the fact that the grant was replacing the current 
personal exemption and standard deduction – a proposal (as noted in previous chapters) long 
favored by progressive reformers – and there was no reason to assume that McGovern planned to 
levy a flat-rate.1100 In fact, Stein’s critique was self-contradictory. He said that McGovern’s “plan 
amounts to shuffling around $210 billion for the sake of giving something like $5 billion or $10 
billion to the poor people.” The rest, Stein noted, would go to families making between $5,000 
and $15,000 per year – families in the same middle-class the White House was claiming would 
be hurt, not helped, by McGovern’s tax plans.1101 As the Washington Post’s Rowen put it, “What 
Stein fails to say is that McGovern’s proposal is designed to help not only the poor, but less 
affluent families above the $4,300 poverty level.”1102 “It should be remembered,” Rowen added, 
“that the McGovern plan, although much more ambitious and costly, has a lot in common with 
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Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan.”1103 That simple reminder was the McGovern campaign’s best 
defense. “Is it a radical proposal or is it simply a more liberal variant of the negative income tax 
originally proposed by the conservative University of Chicago economic Milton Friedman?” 
economics reporter Leonard Silk asked, rhetorically. Joseph Pechman’s answer was, essentially, 
“yes,” to both questions, but especially to the latter. Under a NIT, Pechman explained, everyone 
received a minimum income, but that income – and all other income – was subjected to tax. The 
tax rate for under the House version of Nixon’s FAP was 66 2/3 percent. So, with a guaranteed 
allowance of $2,400 for a family of four, the break-even point was $3,600. McGovern’s plan was 
similar, Pechman argued. “What is new about Senator McGovern’s idea is that the negative 
income tax part of the plan is integrated with the positive income tax,” Pechman told the New 
York Times. The key was loophole-closing tax reform, which would increase the taxable income 
base, thereby funding the grants. “[O]ne of the crucial elements of the whole plan is tax 
reform…,” Pechman noted. Rather than confiscatory, as critics argued, McGovern’s plan could 
even provide enough revenue through loophole closing reforms to both fund the grant and lower 
top marginal rates. 1104  
For all the Nixon campaign’s attacks on McGovern’s tax plans, little disagreement 
actually existed about its effects. Rather, any confusion – genuine or willful – over McGovern’s 
plans stemmed from the divergent meanings of terms like “middle class” and “break even.” For 
example, Sylvia Porter gave the Nixon administration some of the little help it got from the 
mainstream press by summarizing the Democrat candidate’s plans thusly: “Higher taxes and not 
much, if any, cost of living relief for you, the middle income family. Lower taxes or elimination 
of taxes for you, the family in the bottom ranges. Substantial relief from property taxes for you, 
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the homeowner.” This description followed from Porter’s quixotic definition of “middle-
income.” “As a family earning $20,000 to $25,000 and up – middle to upper middle – the 
redistribution of wealth would mean it’s your wealth being redistributed,” she wrote.1105 Given 
that median household income in 1972 was less than $10,000, Porter’s description of those 
making more than twice the median as “middle to upper middle” seemed debatable, at the very 
least.1106 Pechman argued, in contrast, that McGovern’s plan could easily be financed with rates 
on the first $12,000 of income at 33 1/3 percent and a top marginal rate as low as 45 percent. Tax 
increases even for those in a generous definition of the middle-class would be tame. According 
to Pechman’s calculations, a family of four making $20,000 – nearly twice the median family 
income in 1972 – would pay only $90 more in federal income taxes than it did under existing law 
– a point that Porter, in fact, conceded in her series.1107 An additional part of art of the conflicting 
portrayal of McGovern’s plans arose from what exactly “break even” meant.  
Indeed, the break-even point in McGovern’s combined “Demogrant”-tax reform proposal 
proved to be too confusing a concept for the often policy-challenged political press. Aided by the 
McGovern campaign’s own prevarications, campaign reporters could not understand whether 
those making more than $12,000 would pay higher taxes, or whether those making over $18,000, 
$20,000, $22,000, or some other number would. 1108  For various reasons, McGovern’s 
hypothetical $12,000 family of four cutoff – as described by McGovern and Lontief meant in 
their initial New York Review of Books treatise – opened the candidate’s plan up to confusion and 
political attacks. McGovern and Lontief likely based their 20-80 tax increase-to-benefit ratio 
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calculations on 1970 income data. However, because of inflation and growth, family income – 
which always exceeds household income – was $11,116 in 1972, up approximately $1,200 since 
1970.1109 This made the $12,000 appear closer to some families than perhaps was McGovern’s 
intent. Moreover, the media’s understanding of the cutoff – and even McGovern’s own 
explanation of it – often created the impression that families making more than $12,000 would 
pay more in taxes under his plan. But that was not the case. What McGovern and Lontief 
actually meant in their initial New York Review of Books treatise was that $12,000 was the point 
at which the “Demogrant” would phase out for a family of four, not the point at which families 
would begin paying higher taxes. Rather, a family of four making $12,000 under McGovern’s 
hypothetical plan would pay no federal income taxes at all. Indeed, even a cursory glance at the 
federal taxes – income and payroll, combined – paid by a family of four in 1972 indicated that 
McGovern’s “Demogrant” would more than offset its federal tax burden.1110 That the $1,000-per 
person grant would cancel out the family’s taxes was demonstrated in the example presented by 
McGovern and Lontief in the New York Review of Books, which used the 33 1/3 percent flat-rate 
income tax proposed in Tobin’s plan.1111 Regardless of the precise cutoff, it was clear that 
McGovern’s plan would benefit even the highest paid of the coveted blue-collar demographic. 
For example, a coal miner working fulltime 50 weeks out of the year would make less than 
$12,000 in 1972, while an average manufacturing nonsupervisory worker would make less than 
$8,000 per year.1112  This federal tax savings, proponents noted, could then be used to help offset 
Americans’ rising state and local tax bills, which McGovern also promised to attack directly with 
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subsequent legislation.  
Even the Nixon White House’s own studies of McGovern’s proposals found that they 
were much more generous to middle-income Americans than even McGovern and Lontief had 
claimed. A private analysis of the plan by Nixon OMB found that every family making less than 
$18,500 – which the administration calculation as representing approximately 70 percent of 
families – would be better off under McGovern’s $1,000-per person grant program than under 
the current tax system, or under Nixon’s own welfare reform proposals. Moreover, because of 
McGovern’s vagueness in his proposals, the Nixon OMB team assumed that McGovern would 
adopt the 33 1/3 percent flat-tax rate contained in Tobin’s proposals, which the Nixon team 
acknowledged was unlikely. More likely, they noted, would be McGovern keep some type of 
graduated rate schedule – an outcome that would likely make McGovern’s plan even more 
beneficial to low- and middle-income taxpayers than the Nixon OMB’s estimates.1113 In a little-
commented upon section of Stein’s Virginia speech, Nixon’s CEA chair acknowledged that, with 
loophole-closing tax reform to expand the tax base, the tax rates necessary to fund McGovern’s 
plan would be much lower than the widely-quoted additional 46 percent on top of existing tax 
rates. With loophole closing reforms, Stein noted briefly, McGovern’s $1,000 per person plan 
“would have a break-even point of about $18,000 for a family of four.”1114 
The OMB’s numbers were not the only ones to show the viability of McGovern’s plan. 
The Nixon OMB’s calculations were supported by outside studies, too. For example, a 
University of Wisconsin-Madison Institute for Research on Poverty study estimated the cost and 
distributional effects of the tax plan outlined by McGovern in the New York Review of Books and 
assumed that $12,000 for a family of four was the break even point at which the family neither 
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paid taxes nor received the grant, since its tax burden and grant allotment – both $4,000 – would 
cancel each other out. And, like the OMB study, the UW estimates used Tobin’s 33 1/3 tax rate, 
even though McGovern had not committed to tax brackets and a true 33 1/3 percent flat-tax rate 
seemed unlikely, since it would provide a large tax cut to taxpayers making more than $50,000, 
which was undoubtedly the opposite of McGovern’s intention, given his stated goals and the tide 
of public opinion. Despite these shortcomings in the estimates, the UW study found that 
McGovern’s plan would create a huge $55 and $60 billion federal shortfall if imposed on the 
existing federal tax code. But, if broad loophole closing reforms were completed, McGovern’s 
“demogrant” plan would cost only $5.5 billion, in federal terms. However, since the 
“demogrant” would save the states $4.5 billion in welfare outlays, the total cost of McGovern’s 
plan actually would be a paltry $1 billion. In terms of its distributional effects, the UW study 
found, similar to the OMB study, that families of four making well into the $20,000-per-year 
range – more than 4/5ths of all U.S. households in 1972 – would be better off under McGovern’s 
plan than under the current tax code.1115 
Independent studies commissioned by the McGovern campaign painted an even rosier 
picture. In what would, by the final months of the campaign, become a seemingly endless string 
of revisions to McGovern’s initial fiscal proposal, the McGovern campaign hinted at a potential 
revision in the Democrat’s welfare and, by proxy, tax plans in June. A Mathematica study, 
completed at McGovern economic adviser Edwin Kuh’s suggestion proposed Demogrants” in 
varying amounts – rather than a flat $1,000 – ranging from $440 for children under six to $1,560 
per year for Americans over age 64, with two steps in between. The Mathematica study also 
included a flat 33 percent tax rate for all income groups, much like Tobin’s initial NIT 
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proposals.1116 Poor and working-class Americans would be much better off under McGovern’s 
proposed system than under current U.S. law, according to the Mathematica study. “If a family 
of four had a yearly income of $9,000, it would pay, assuming a flat tax rate of 44 percent, 
$3,000 in income taxes, but would receive approximately $4,000 in government grants,” the 
Washington Post explained. “Thus, the family’s total income, after taxes, would be $10,000 
rather than its $9,000 pre-tax income, or approximately $7,5000 in after-tax income under the 
present system. Crucially, the Mathmetica study also found that – even without the additional 
brackets –middle-class Americans, by any reasonably definition of the group, would pay much 
less in taxes under McGovern’s plan than under the current tax system. “For a family of four, an 
income of $12,000 would be the point at which it neither gained nor lost income under the 
proposed [grant] system,” the paper continued. “Those earning more than $12,000 but less than 
approximately $16,000 would have a net loss of income, although not as much as they now pay 
under the present tax system [emphasis added].” A family of four with an income of $15,000 
would pay $5,000 in taxes, under the Mathematica study’s hypothetical revised McGovern plan, 
while it would receive $4,000 in grants, meaning that it would only pay approximately $1,000 in 
federal income taxes, compared to approximately $1,500 under existing law.1117 When reports of 
the Mathmatica study hit the press, McGovern’s press secretary was quick to point out that the 
candidate had not adopted the proposals and might be especially likely to object to the flat tax 
rate. Indeed, other economic advisers hinted that, even if the 33 percent rate were adopted at the 
bottom of the income range, additional higher brackets above $50,000 and $100,000, in 
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particular, were likely to be added.1118 Regardless, between the Mathematica study and Stein’s 
subtle revelation of the OMB figures, it was clear that Nixon’s claims that McGovern’s tax-and-
welfare plans would slam the middle class were outright falsehoods. 
With their middle-class tax hike claims gaining little traction, some conservatives, both 
within and outside of the Nixon White House, decided – perhaps unwisely – to attack 
McGovern’s platform for proposing an effective increase in taxes on capital income, portraying 
such policies as growth-killing big government. Treasury Secretary George Shultz publicly 
argued that raising taxes on capital gains would hurt investment, the stock market, and the 
economy as a whole.”[T]his is the engine that makes the economy go,” Shultz said. Thanks to 
inflation, Shultz contended, taxing capital gains at 48 percent would actually be taxing them at 
80 percent.1119 Nixon adviser Pierre Rinfret agreed, saying that McGovern would “penalize the 
capital formation without which we don’t grow.”1120 Patrick Buchanan pushed the White House 
to go even further, claiming that McGovern would turn the U.S. into a “super-socialist society 
along the lines of Sweden…. The free enterprise system…simply could not survive…. The 
enormous tax bite would remake American society with intrusive government now everywhere 
visible….”1121 Some of McGovern’s fellow Democrats undercut his tax reform plans, too. 
Connecticut Senator Abraham Ribicoff, otherwise a reliable liberal, echoed the Nixon 
administration, said that taxing capital gains at the same rates as ordinary income would 
“discourage investment.” Ribicoff, a member of the Senate Finance Committee, was quick to 
point out that he agreed with McGovern “on the closing of many of the loopholes,” but argued 
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that, as a member of the Senate Finance Committee, he “wouldn’t buy” either McGovern or 
Nixon’s tax proposals – hardly a ringing endorsement of his party’s candidate.1122 In its monthly 
journal, the Chamber of Commerce lambasted McGovern’s tax plans as “redistribution of 
wealth” with “about as much substance as cotton candy.” Nonetheless, the Chamber was 
“concern[ed]” by “the serious and determined drive any candidate to destroy sensible tax 
incentives than have carefully been built into our tax structure over the years, or to create the 
impression that corporations and the well-to-do are deep reservoirs of revenue potential.” 
Loopholes did not exist, in the Chamber’s view, and the tax code certainly did not need to be 
made more progressive. “Tax provisions that allow different treatment for some taxpayers have 
been not loopholes but, in fact, relief or incentive amendments deliberately enacted to keep high 
tax rates from being too burdensome for some taxpayers or to encourage such economic 
necessities as saving or investing….”1123 Other Wall Street insiders, like Merrill Lynch chair 
Donald T. Regan – who would later become President Ronald Reagan’s first Secretary of the 
Treasury – argued that capital gains taxes were already too high.1124  
McGovern’s advisers quickly – and seemingly, happily – defended McGovern’s proposal 
to raise capital gains taxes. Responded to the fiscalist, growth-related critique, Joseph Pechman 
argued that investment levels were ultimately driven by growth, not vice versa. “The effect of tax 
rates on investment is, in my opinion, very small,” Pechman argued. “In a full employment 
economy, there are more than enough incentives for business to invest.”1125  “The effect of tax 
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rates on investment is, in my opinion, very small,” Pechman concluded.1126 Other McGovern 
surrogates went further, lambasting the White House’s arguments as absurd and untrue. 
“Although I have never met a computer that could laugh, or weep tears, or love, we apparently 
today have Republican and Democratic Computers,” Paul A. Samuelson quipped to the Joint 
Economic Committee. “A Chase Bank computer will tell you that McGovern economics will 
stop GNP growth in its tracks; a Wharton School or Data Resources computer will tell you that 
this [McGovern’s economic program] just what the doctor ordered for good health of the GNP 
vector.”1127 Even if higher taxes on capital would cut growth, Samuelson argued that it would not 
necessarily be an altogether negative outcome. “We don’t want growth just as growth…,” he 
said. The GNP did not measure social welfare. Rather, Samuelson continued, the effect of the 
growth on society and its distribution was what was most important. “[W]hat I am saying now is 
that the modern, if I may coin a phrase, affluent society,” Samuelson said, with a humorous nod 
to Galbraith, “can afford a slower rate of the old-fashioned growth, and a faster rate of welfare 
growth.” 1128 The difference between the two perspectives, Time summarized, was that “broadly 
speaking, Nixonians view investment as the most important force powering economic growth, 
while McGovernites give priority to consumer spending.” 1129  
But McGovern’s economic advisers and supporters went further, echoing their 
candidate’s moral and distributional criticism of the preferential rate on capital gains. According 
to figures prepared by the Nixon Treasury at the request of Democrat Henry Reuss, 83 percent of 
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all the individual capital gains went to taxpayers making more than $20,000 a year in 1971, a 
group that represented roughly 10 percent of the population.1130 Under JEC questioning, Cohen 
acknowledged the factuality of those figures, calling capital gains “the biggest item affecting the 
upper income group by far, the one we have been dating for 30 or 40 years.”1131 To continue 
treating income earned by selling stocks differently from income earned making cars or teaching 
children, McGovern’s campaign argued, was not only discriminatory, it also made little practical 
sense. “The ultimate fact is that however a man is enriched by a give amount, he is damned well 
enriched by that amount. And whether it comes to him from capital gains or [other sources]…he 
has the money. We should apply the same rate of taxation to the given amount of enrichment…,” 
John Kenneth Galbraith quipped. “The notion that a dollar is a dollar is something we need now 
to accept. “The kind of licensed discrimination we now have in favor of the affluent is something 
that we must bring to an end in the taxation.”1132 Once again, the dollars and cents calculations 
were on McGovern’s side. “An executive who earns $30,000 in salary this year could easily 
wind up paying $5,180 in federal income tax. His neighbor who also makes $30,000, but gets it 
entirely in the form of profit on the sale of stock, could pay less than half as much,” Time 
explained to its readers September. “Is that fair? To Richard Nixon’s economists, the lower tax 
on the stock profit is both a just reward for capitalist risk taking and a necessary stimulant to 
investment. To George McGovern’s followers, the preference is the biggest ‘loophole’ in the tax 
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code.”1133 Indeed, such explanations became a go-to portion of McGovern campaign speeches. 
“Money made by money should be taxed at the same rate as money made by men,” McGovern 
repeatedly argued. “Tax justice demands equal treatment for Americans who earn their living 
with a shovel or a slide rule and Americans who live on stock market and property gains.” 1134  
In short, while few of Nixon’s attacks on McGovern’s tax plans stuck, the president’s 
vulnerability on tax issues remained. Indeed, the public’s dislike for Nixon’s stances on 
pocketbook issues, in general, and taxes, in particular, was stressed by analysts both within and 
outside the White House throughout the election year. Perhaps the key warning for the White 
House on economic issues came in the form of July memo, titled simply “Inflation and Taxes,” 
by Nixon’s pollster Robert Teeter. “The President's ratings on inflation and taxes have fallen 
sharply since January and he appears to be vulnerable…,” Teeter reported. “Should McGovern 
begin to gain strength and segments of the Democratic coalition begin to come back together, 
inflation and taxes appear to be the issues that could be most effectively be used against us.” 
Whereas Americans had once given Nixon middling ratings on pocketbook issues like inflation 
and taxes, the president now received poor marks on both. Even worse, they were strengths for 
McGovern. Nor was this an effect of simply blaming the president for conditions in the country. 
Rather, most Americans genuinely preferred McGovern’s positions to Nixon’s on their merits. 
“Tax reform may be especially important in the campaign because it is an issue on which 
McGovern’s perceived position is closer to the general population's position than Nixon’s,” 
Teeter reported. The pollster illustrated the phenomenon with a series of graphs of data from key 
states. On a left-to-right scale of tax reform, with one being the most liberal and seven the most 
conservative, Ohioans, for example, rated themselves a 2.3, McGovern a 2.7, and Nixon a 4.3. “I 
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think that the President should take some action dealing with the inflation problem immediately 
and that the tax reform problem should be handled some time early in the campaign before 
McGovern has a chance to get a hold of it…,” Teeter argued. “Inflation and tax reform are 
problems the President should handle personally.”1135 As he put it in another memo to Haldeman, 
“In terms of issues we should concentrate on the major national issue[s] [of] Vietnam, the 
economy, taxes, drugs, and crime…. His  ratings on inflation and taxes are poor and down 
sharply from January. These issues are closely related and important to Presidential vote.”1136 
State-level polling found much the same. “On ability to handle the issues, RN receives a negative 
on only unemployment and taxes,” a New York state report noted. “McGovern has a positive 
rating on unemployment, and scores better than RN on taxes and drugs….”1137  
Perhaps even more discouragingly for the president, even Nixon’s own campaign team 
rated the president’s pocketbook platform poorly. When the Nixon team aggregated advisers’ 
views on Nixon and McGovern’s respective “best/worst” issues, 11 of 15 surveyed advisers 
listed “international issues” as Nixon’s best, with the rest rating “incumbency” as his “best 
issue.” None gave the president high marks on the economy or domestic issues, generally. In 
fact, only five rated the economy as Nixon’s second or third best issue. In contrast, Nixon’s 
advisers uniformly rated Vietnam, the economy, and the broader issue of “the haves and have-
nots” as strengths for McGovern. For example, Bill Safire listed McGovern’s “best (positive)” as 
his message that “the average man will get a better deal through tax reform.” In the view of his 
own advisers, Nixon’s weaknesses were broad and varied. Six listed “credibility, trust, ethics” as 
his number one weakness. Five picket Vietnam first, and three picked the economy first, with 
another 10 listing it in the top four. McGovern’s weaknesses seemed prosaic, in contrast.  All but 
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three Nixon advisers listed McGovern’s greatest weakness as either “the candidate himself” or 
“radicalism (non-specific issues).”1138 
Like the 1970 midterms, Nixon hoped to woo blue-collar Democrats in 1972. But this 
time his strategy was markedly different. A more nuanced view of working-class white voters’ 
motivations replaced the crude cultural appeals of 1970. Colson aide Douglas Hallett studied 
Nixon’s 1960 and 1968 campaigns to draw lessons from their successes and failures. Rather than 
tending to the hard hats’ cultural grievances, Hallett concluded that Nixon needed to “be holding 
down food prices, fighting inflation, taking after a big corporation or two, working on tax 
reform, solving pollution problems, bleeding a bit for the poor, and – although not as importantly 
since it has already been accomplished P.R. wise – bringing about a new structure of peace – and 
he should be doing all these things visibly, actively and dramatically.” 1139  “The target 
voter…makes $10,000 to $15,000 a year and probably his wife works,” an unnamed Nixon 
official told the Washington Post’s Lou Cannon in August. “He’s anti-welfare, or at least thinks 
that he doesn’t get the proper share for his own efforts. He’s not a hawk on the war – nobody is 
anymore – but he doesn’t want to bug out, either.” Replacing – or, at least, joining – the issues of 
welfare and busing in the Nixon appeal was “tax reform.” Likewise, Nixon tempered the GOP’s 
anti-union message. “[R]ight-to-work isn’t in the platform and for a damn good reason,” the 
Nixon official quipped. “The president didn’t want it there.” Cultural appeals were not enough to 
build the “New Majority,” the midterms had made clear to Nixon. Now, the White House sought 
to make erstwhile Democratic voters confident that Nixon would not harm their pocketbooks. 
The complex Nixon outreach plan included a phone bank to target potential “New Majority” 
voters, along with follow-up mailings on issues mentioned by the undecided voter, including 
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ones on busing and taxes.1140 
Quickly, progressive tax reform assumed center stage in Nixon’s new positive agenda to 
woo working- and middle-class voters on pocketbook issues. It was a strategy endorsed by 
innumerable Nixon advisers and confidants. Teeter and Colson, among other advisers, urged 
Nixon to put tax reform front and center in the campaign in an attempt to turn it into a positive 
issue for the president. 1141 Reviewing requested memoranda from a cross-section of Nixon 
advisers on strategy for the 1972 campaign, Dwight Chapin likewise concluded that Nixon’s 
“activities should concentrate on special voter bloc efforts, as well as key domestic efforts – in 
particular, taxation.”1142 Perhaps even more influentially, George Meany privately told George 
Shultz to advise Nixon to “say more about taxes.” On the one hand, Meany explained to Shultz, 
unionists associated welfare with high taxes, “because our guy thinks he’s paying his taxes so 
that somebody else can get welfare so cracking down on that is tax reform.” But that 
conservative interpretation of tax resentment would not suffice on its own. “[Meany] thinks that 
the President has  got to show that he’s willing to tackle the people who don’t  pay a tax but are 
rich,” a memo to Nixon noted. High-income tax avoiders were assumed to be Republicans and 
Nixon needed to show that he was “willing to take on these people who are assumed to be in the 
president’s corner.” Both concerns – with underserving welfare recipients below and tax 
avoiders above – drove shared the “psychology of somebody getting away with something,” 
according to Meany.1143  
The road to victory, many Nixon advisers now concluded, was paved with the tax worries 
of the working class. While it would be “hard [for Nixon] to shed” the “big business label,” 
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Nixon’s “hard hat” Svengali Charles Colson conceded, it would be possible for Nixon undertake 
“a number of blue collar initiatives” to blunt the effect. On taxes, Colson saw particularly great 
potential for meaningfully shifting the administration’s image prior to the election. “There is no 
way politically that we can defend the present tax structure, nor should we. Either Humphrey or 
McGovern will attack it hard…,” he argued. “[W]e should quite candidly acknowledge that the 
present system is deficient, inequitable, overly complex, that the heaviest burdens are on middle-
class people, that people shouldn’t get away scott-free without paying any taxes and that 
property taxes are the, most regressive and onerous of all.” Colson saw the latter, in particular, as 
a fruitful issue that had so far been little more than a missed political opportunity for Nixon. 
“Curbing property taxes is a natural issue,” Colson argued. “It should be ours; but we have 
skirted all around it. We made an unsuccessful attempt to equate revenue sharing with property 
tax relief and we hit the issue hard in this year’s State of the Union, but there has been almost no 
substantive follow-up.” The need to claim the high ground on taxes could not be more pressing, 
in Colson’s view. “We should proclaim it [tax reform] the number one priority of the second 
Nixon term,” he wrote. In order to keep Nixon from being forced to “reac[t] defensively 
throughout the months of September and October,” the White House needed to show it was 
actively moving forward on reform proposals that would communicate that “the rich must pay 
their fair share of taxes”1144 It was a strategy the Nixon reelection team would follow closely. 
While the Nixon team identified early in the presidential campaign that Nixon would 
need to shore up his support when it came to taxes, the events of the Democratic primary and the 
mountain of polling data that followed forced Nixon to move further and further to the left on the 
issue, both substantively and by adopting the rhetoric of left-distributionism. Indeed, early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






campaign strategy drafts largely overlooked the TRA69 as an achievement without hesitating to 
praise the RA71 – a stance that flipped as the campaign wore on. However, even at this early 
stage, the campaign’s “Taxation Issue Paper” noted that, while no one liked taxes, “the real 
issues arise both with respect to the best sources of the revenue needed and the relative tax 
burdens which should be borne by various segments of our society.”1145 By the summer of 1972, 
public comments and campaign materials prepared by administration staffers sought to clarify 
both Nixon’s plans going forward and tout his record as a tax reformer. The “theme” when it 
came to taxes during the election year was that “the president cares about the inequities of the tax 
system.”1146 Nixon aides did their best to publicize this theme. “You can trace the direction of the 
president’s cast of mind about taxes [by looking at his record]….,” Ehrlichman told reporters. 
“[In TRA69] some 9 million people were dropped off the tax rolls entirely…at the low end of the 
income brackets…. And $5 billion was added to the tax bill that corporations pay. That gives you 
a sense of the thrust. In addition, in the 1969 Act, the president proposed a minimum tax to make 
sure that no taxpayer escaped paying a substantial portion of the total load by reason of any 
shelter or preference.” 1147 Though the White House had opposed the tax reductions in the 
TRA69 and had initially envisioned RS as a small-government initiative, now Nixon embraced 
the former and framed the latter as a way to combat rising state and local taxes. “Since 1969 
taxes for the poor and middle income families have decreased and taxes on the wealthy and 
corporations have increased,” a sheet of “Key Facts on Tax Reform” touted. Nixon was 
“committed to tax reform,” the materials argued, both in his previous actions and moving 
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forward into the second term. “Although these facts indicate that the administration has already 
achieved a significant amount of tax reform,” one sheet noted, “there is a continuous effort to 
make our tax system more fair and more simple for the average taxpayer.” The White House 
promised to review all tax loopholes with an eye towards lowering the tax burden on the 
“average taxpayer.” Campaign materials also argued that eliminating unnecessary spending was 
a form of reform, noting, “federal spending is a major tax loophole.” The administration 
tentatively defended ADR and the investment tax credit contained in the RA71 as ways to “make 
U.S. business competitive and stimulate [the] economy.” 1148 
Nixon campaign literature used income tables to claim that low- and middle-income 
Americans had received bigger tax cuts than upper-income Americans during Nixon’s 
presidency. Indeed, they were strikingly similar to the tables lambasted by Democrats, Nader’s 
TRRG, and the press during the JEC hearings.1149 Other CRP materials bragged that, under 
Nixon, “the largest tux cuts in U.S. history have returned power to the people in the most 
fundamental sense, particularly in the lowest income brackets, while taxes for corporations and 
the wealthy have increased.”1150 Sounding startlingly like materials normally expected to be 
released by a liberal Democrat, one Nixon campaign flyer summarized the president’s tax 
accomplishments as “Individuals Pay Less While Corporations Pay More.” “Equally important,” 
the flyer noted, “is the fact that the greatest percentage reductions have been made in the low 
income groups, substantial reductions have been made in the middle income groups, and 
significant increases have been made in the highest income groups.” This was all part, the 
literature explained, of Nixon’s continuous effort to make our tax system more fair and more 
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simple for the average taxpayer.”1151 Nixon “has done more than speak of tax reform; he has 
actually delivered it,” CRP talking points explained, pointing to the TRA69, especially the tax 
cuts for middle-income taxpayers, which the White House had actually opposed at the time. 1152 
Likewise, letters and brochures aimed at seniors, Democrats, Jewish voters, as well as other 
targeted interest groups, included a variation of the claim that Nixon “has decreased federal 
income tax for a family of four earning $10,000 by an average of $320[,] [a]nd has proposed 
federal-state revenue sharing that would slash your property taxes,” which campaign literature 
also noted “affects not only homeowners but, eventually, many tenants too, through increased 
rents.” Some – especially those aimed at Democrats – also contrasted Nixon’s tax cuts for 
individuals with his supposedly tough stance on corporation, claiming, “Under president Nixon, 
Americans are paying $22 billion less in taxes and corporations are paying $10 billion more” – a 
statement underlined in red (the only such statement given that treatment in the pamphlet) for 
emphasis 1153 
The administration’s main emphasis on in its campaign tax materials was not on federal 
reforms, however. Like Democratic candidates from Muskie to McGovern, the local property tax 
revolt loomed large in Nixon’s tax strategy during the 1972 campaign. Indeed, the Democrats’ 
own plans factored into the White House’s strategy even before they became public. The CRP 
came into possession of a “stolen” memo – part of a pattern of “sabotage,” as Carl Berstein and 
Bob Woodward would later report – from Muskie pollster, Anna Navarro.1154 The memo argued 
that polling indicated that “property taxes are all important in this crucial state, and that capturing 
the issue is worth a gold mine to any candidate.” Focus on the property tax, they argued, would 
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pay dividends nationwide. “[C]apturing the property tax issue would be great in places other than 
California – think of all the schools that have closed in the last two years because citizens refuse 
to tax themselves anymore,” they wrote.1155 The White House hoped to beat Muskie and other 
Democrats at their own game. Thanks to revenue sharing, Nixon could argue persuasively that he 
had long been concerned about rising local property taxes.  
Though the popularity of tax appeals during the Democratic primaries drastically 
increased Nixon’s attention to the issue, as well as pushed him even further to the left, the Nixon 
administration began framing tax reform, in general, and property tax relief, in particular, as a 
key issue in his reelection campaign beginning in late-1971. Early drafts of Nixon’s reelection 
platform suggested pairing revenue sharing legislation with “some form of encouragement to the 
states and local governments to move away from the property tax as a primary source of local 
revenue,” as well as for the president to keep his pledge to offer “proposals to provide for 
property tax relief.” 1156 Private polling by the Nixon team in January 1972 found that his new 
rhetoric on revenue sharing and property taxes was exceedingly popular. Following Nixon’s 
SOTU statement that “soaring property tax rates now threaten both our communities and 
schools” and pledge to use federal tax dollars to fund local education, 75 percent of respondents 
said that they agreed “with the President that property taxes are now a major threat and must be 
reduced by federal action.”1157 The proof was not just in the surveys, but at the polls. “Voters in 
increasing numbers have been rejecting new property tax millage proposals,” one Nixon tax 
reform position paper noted. 1158  Even if most surveys showed that the public preferred 
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McGovern on the issue, it seemed clear that staying on the property tax reform issue could only 
help the president.  
Now, Nixon not only essentially touted revenue sharing as a “Property Tax Relief Act,” 
as Colson had once suggested, but also promised new federal legislation to further cut local 
property taxes for poor, working-, and middle-class Americans. Throughout 1972, administration 
domestic policy staffers collected news clippings and letters from around the country analyzing 
state and local taxes, as well as citizen protests of the rising tax burden, particularly when it came 
to property taxes.1159 Some Nixon advisers, like Charles Colson, worried that promising property 
tax relief without any firm proposals was a political mistake. “I am told that a decision has been 
made to do nothing in this [property taxes] area this year [1972],” Colson wrote. “If this is so, 
talking about it is the worst thing we can do because it will only lead to further credibility 
problems. We only want to hammer issues when, in fact, we can back it up with specific 
substantive recommendations.” In contrast to the administration’s stance in the 1970 midterms, 
Colson cautioned that mere “PR” was not the solution to the public’s tax anger. Instead, policy 
was.1160 But the Nixon campaign pushed forward, hoping that the strength of revenue sharing 
and the promise of bolder property tax reforms in the future would attract skeptical voters. 
“General Revenue Sharing will provide immediate tax relief,” the RNC argued during the 
campaign.1161 Or, as the Nixon campaign declared, “The President is committed to help the 
States find ways to relieve their property tax burden.”1162  
The White House was not simply promising further property tax relief as a political stunt. 
Rather, the administration had been quietly working on property tax proposals for more than a 
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year and intended to pursue them in Nixon’s second term. Indeed, many of Nixon’s closest 
advisers, such as Charles Colson and Lew Engman, had encouraged the president to go public 
with his plans before the start of the Democratic campaign so that Nixon could clearly mark.1163 
As Chuck Colson wrote to John Ehrlichman after reviewing January 1972 news summaries 
outlining Nader and Muskie’s property tax arguments, “[We] need to make this issue ours before 
Muskie or someone else really seizes upon it.”1164 The goal, Colson said, was to make federal 
relief of local property taxes “clearly identifiable as a presidential initiative.” Such an initiative, 
he wrote, should be progressive. “[It] must possess maximum appeal to middle income 
Americans and clearly relieve lower income groups of any tax burdens it may impose,” Colson 
explained. 1165 The political dividends for Nixon would be immense in Colson’s view. “We 
should proclaim it the number one priority of the second Nixon term,” he wrote to in a 
subsequent memo.1166Nixon had failed to follow this advice, since other advisers, such as John 
Connally, believed that any specific tax reform proposals would simply open the president up to 
criticism. But now the Democrats and the grassroots left had, indeed, claimed the issue, at least 
in the context of the 1972 elections. If Nixon had his way, the revelation of the administration’s 
real proposals would see the president overtake Democrats like McGovern as the true hero of the 
“tax revolt.” But, in the meantime, the best the administration could do was remind voters of the 
progressive tax effects of revenue sharing, promise bolder reforms in Nixon’s second term, and 
try to position Nixon as a leader, rather than a follower, when it came to left-distributionist 
solution to the “tax revolt.” Hinting at Nixon’s 1973 plans, Ehrlichman told reporters, “We will 
continue to work on the very difficult plight of the residential property owner who sees his 
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property taxes spiraling, being particularly difficult for the fixed-income citizen.” 1167 The 
administration’s goal in 1973, Ehrlichman publicly announced, was to reduce local property 
taxes by 50 percent, which would cost about $16 billion.1168 Nixon had tasked the ACIR with 
devising ways to provide “property tax relief,” CRP literature explained.1169 Nixon also met with 
ACIR chair Robert Merriam in order to “emphasize the long-standing nature of the President’s 
commitment to reduce property taxes, …reduce political pressure to reveal our 'secret' tax reform 
proposals (the ACIR's final recommendations are not due until after the election)…,” as one 
memo put it.1170 Nixon, not McGovern, the White House insisted, was the one who had 
recognized the importance of the “tax revolt” first. One piece of campaign literature even 
audaciously claimed that, compared to Nixon, McGovern was actually “jumping on the [property 
tax relief and reform] bandwagon.”1171     
Much to Nixon’s consternation, the White House’s studied attempts to avoid proposing 
specific plans did not shield the president from embarrassing revelations and criticism. In an ill-
considered attempt to underline the fact that, unlike McGovern, Nixon would never raise taxes 
on the middle class, the White House publicly pledged that Nixon would not raise taxes in his 
second term. “The president’s plans for the next four years call for no general tax increase,” one 
campaign press release declared. “But he plans to build on his first term's record by reducing the 
regressive property tax and continuing to make the tax burden mare fair for all.” The difference 
between Nixon and McGovern, the president’s campaign explained, was that the latter was 
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calling for a “tax increase,” while the former was calling for “tax reform.” 1172 One RNC flyer – 
titled simply “Tax Reform or Tax Increase?” – reiterated this point. It touted the TRA69’s 
removal of low-income taxpayers from the federal income tax rolls, as well as its tax increases 
on corporations. “President Nixon plans to build on his first term's record by ultimately reducing 
property taxes by 50% and continuing to make the tax burden more fair for all,” it explained. “In 
addition he will continue to keep taxes down by cutting wasteful Federal spending programs. In 
short, tax reform in the second Nixon Administration spells tax fairness, not tax increase.”1173 In 
September Ron Ziegler again stressed the “tax reform”/”tax increase” distinction, at least in the 
White House’s framing, by arguing that Nixon wanted reforms in 1973 “aimed at making the tax 
system more equitable in this country, and doing so in ways such as easing the burden of 
property taxes that plague many citizens of the country.” 1174 The problem for Nixon, however, 
was that few in the press or among Democrats believed the math would allow Nixon to provide a 
$16 billion, 50-percent property tax cut – as Ehrlichman had speculated – without raising taxes in 
some way. Unfortunately for Nixon, the only element of the administration’s private debates 
about specifics of future property tax reform legislation was that some conservatives in the 
administration were pushing for the use of a Value Added Tax to finance it – a politically 
embarrassing revelation for a president attempting to signal his displeasure with regressive taxes 
and one that led to repeated Democratic attacks throughout the campaign.1175 The administration 
immediately downplayed the VAT, noting that it was just one option under consideration and 
that the president had not committed to using it. Regardless, the Nixon campaign noted, striking 
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a left-distributionist tone, “One thing which the president has made clear is that he will not 
recommend the replacement of the regressive and unfair property tax with another unfair 
tax.”1176  
  But the denial that a VAT would be used again begged the question: How could Nixon 
cut property taxes so substantially without raising taxes? The Washington Post mocked Nixon’s 
pledge not to raise taxes in an editorial headlined “No* New Taxes for Four Years!” Below the 
headline, the asterisk read “Except in an ‘emergency,’ as that term may be defined after the 
election, and also excepting any value added tax, or substitution of new taxes for existing ones or 
loophole closing or reform of any sort whatsoever, and also excepting any case in which the 
Congress exceeds the budget, or in the event of serious inflation, or any other unforeseen 
circumstances requiring a reevaluation.”1177 Indeed, the paper’s mocking editorial was not far 
from the truth. The real answer, as the White House revealed, was that Nixon planned a 
downward redistribution of income, pure and simple. Taxes would not be raised overall, but they 
would be raised on upper-income taxpayers in order to fund cuts of an equal dollar amount for 
low- and middle-income Americans. Ehrlichman clarified to reporters that the White House’s 
promise not to raise taxes did “absolutely not” mean that Nixon would abandon property tax 
relief or tax reform. “The president favors property tax relief, particularly for the residential 
property owner. It is a particularly cruel and regressive form of taxation that penalizes the 
elderly, penalizes those on fixed incomes particularly. We will continue to press for some mode 
of substitution of a progressive and fair type of taxation to meet the expenses now covered by 
that regressive and unfair tax,” Ehrlichman explained. “Now, that will not involve any increase 
in taxation. That is simply a substitute. It may be a partial substitute of some federal tax for a tax 
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that is now being paid locally. It may be, to some extent, a redistribution. But we have always 
attempted and will continue to attempt to replace regressive and unfair taxes with equitable taxes 
wherever the opportunity presents itself.” Pressed further, Ehrlichman explained that Nixon was 
not actually pledging to hold the line on federal taxes “for the foreseeable future.” Instead, the 
president might seek an increase in federal taxes, though it would be used to reduce local taxes, 
meaning that “the net effect” would be neutral. When a reporter continued to push, asking if the 
president promised not to raise taxes “throughout the income scale,” Ehrlichman made the 
redistributive goal clear. “No,” Ehrlichman answered. “I won’t say throughout the income scale.” 
Rather, the ultimate goal was “considerable tax relief to those least able to pay taxes,” while 
upper-income taxpayers could see a tax increase. “[T]he people who now are most difficultly 
affected by property taxes are in the income range of $15,000 and below,” Ehrlichman 
explained. “It is possible to construct a system of assumption of local expenses by federal 
revenues which will actually result in a net saving in pocket dollars to those below $15,000, with 
a very modest…increase in taxes paid by those in brackets above $15,000, through a system of 
credits and rebates.” “Semantically,” Ehrlichman conceded, this was actually a tax increase, at 
least for upper-income Americans. Asked about the VAT, Ehrlichman said it was “one 
possibility” among many, including income tax increases, to raise federal revenue for local tax 
relief. The goal, Ehrlichman stressed throughout the press conference, was to lower taxes on 
those making below $15,000 and possibly raise them on those above.1178 Asked again in a 
subsequent press conference how Nixon could promise relief of local property taxes without a 
tax increase, Ehrlichman was even more candid. The White House wanted to “substitute” some 
federal revenue for state and local revenue, while leaving the overall level of taxation between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






the two levels the same. “The essence of this is redistribution, obviously,” Ehrlichman 
conceded.1179  
Just as Nixon suddenly became a fan of the TRA69 and bragged that he had raised taxes 
on corporations, his property tax reform literature assumed a markedly left-distributionist tone 
throughout the campaign. Talking points touted Nixon’s “proposed property tax reforms in the 
1972 State of the Union Message,” as well as the president’s “support increased state use of 
income taxes” as incentivize in the Revenue Sharing bill that (a provision that, as noted earlier, 
the White House had actually opposed). 1180 “The public clamor for tax reform is not only 
directed to the federal income tax, but to a great extend it is addressed at the local property 
tax…,” a programmatic Nixon campaign statement on his tax platform argued, noting that ACIR 
polls showed that Americans viewed the property tax as “least fair.” “The property tax has more 
than doubled in the past 10 years, and it is very regressive – placing the heaviest burden on 
senior citizens, low income families, families with fixed incomes, and farmers.” If reelected, the 
release explained, Nixon would use the power of the federal government to cut local property 
taxes. Another release, titled “Key Facts on Property Tax Relief,” argued that “the president has 
long recognized people’s problem with the property tax,” including its rising rates, its 
regressivity, and its unfairness, both as a form of financing schools and because “people in 
similar circumstances often pay property tax bills which are very different.” 1181 In a late-August 
U.S. News and World Report interview, Erlichman reiterated that Nixon was committed to 
reducing local property taxes by 50 percent. “The property tax is what the experts call regressive, 
which is to say it falls heaviest on the people of fixed income and in the lower-income brackets,” 
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Ehrlichman explained. “The federal income tax, as an example, is a progressive tax, which rests 
heaviest on those better able to pay. So the thought here would be to substitute a regressive tax 
with a progressive tax.” Though he cautioned that Nixon had yet to commit to any particular 
plan, Ehrlichman noted that one study indicated that taxpayers making less than $25,000 per year 
would see a tax reduction by substituting federal income tax revenue for local property tax 
revenue.1182 “[H]is Revenue Sharing plan would send federal tax dollars into states and localities 
to ease the tax burdens there which have risen out of all proportion in recent years,” another 
release bragged. 1183 
By late summer, Nixon campaign materials represented a relentless reiteration of the 
president’s commitment to left-distributions tax reform. A Nixon campaign mailing, dubbed 
“The Record,” framed revenue sharing as a program designed to cut regressive taxes. “In order 
to relieve the burden of taxes at the state and local level – property, sales, income, and other 
taxes – the president has proposed a program to make more monies available to local 
governments by sharing a portion of federal revenues with them.”1184 Another mailer, “The 
Clearest Choice of the Century,” declared, “President Nixon has cut federal income taxes by $22 
billion and is pushing Congress for a program to return more tax money to the states so that 
property taxes increases will stop.”1185 Following in the footsteps of McGovern and Muskie, The 
Committee to Reelect the President ran property tax-themed television ads, touting how Nixon’s 
Revenue Sharing program cut property taxes. “The whole purpose of this is to get property taxes 
down,” Nixon tells Ehrlichman in one commercial’s staged Oval Office scene. Then, a voiceover 
intones, “The president is determined to do something about property taxes. That’s why we need 
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President Nixon now more than ever.”1186 Even some of Nixon’s own staff saw the property tax 
commercial as dishonest, given that revenue sharing had not initially been formulated as a 
property tax relief measure and included no guarantee that RS funds would be used to reduce 
property taxes.1187 But, by now, Nixon was committed to making himself appear to be a 
progressive property tax reformer at all costs. Another Nixon commercial, titled “Older 
Americans,” explained that the president “know[s] how unfair property taxes are to older 
Americans.” So, the commercial explained, “he created a bold revenue sharing plan” to “retur[n] 
[federal tax revenues] to the states to help stop the rise in property taxes.”1188   
 The White House was very conscious of the fact that, in proposing progressive property 
tax relief, it was going up against many, often conservative, economists who argued “that the 
property tax is a good tax and is not burdensome,” as Lew Engman summarized. Instead, the 
president’s official position was that “property taxes are regressive.” 1189  Administration 
conservatives bristled at this stance, however. Pat Buchanan fed Nixon a speech by Hoover 
Institution economist Roger Freeman. Keeping with his longtime stance, Freeman argued that the 
regressivity of the property tax was exaggerated. He also debated whether the rise in the property 
tax was as dramatic as critics noted. The real reason the public was in revolt against the property 
tax, Freeman argued, was that “the taxpayer knows that he is paying it, what he is paying for, and 
who is taxing him” – though his explanation, notably, failed to explain why the tax revolt was a 
recent phenomenon. Nonetheless, Buchanan called Freeman’s speech “close to brilliant” – 
noting that it argued “against the prevailing notion that the property tax has suddenly become an 
onerous burden” – and Nixon read and heavily marked the copy of the speech provided to him 
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by Buchanan.1190 But ACIR chair Robert Merriam cautioned Nixon against defending the 
property tax, despite what conservative economists might say in its favor. “The property tax…is 
by far and away the most unpopular of all taxes,” Merriam noted, pointing to ACIR polling data. 
“Part of it, of course, is its visibility. You pay it in one or two lump sums.” When Nixon 
interjected, pointing to studies by conservative economists arguing that the property tax was not 
an issue, Merriam noted that such studies were “not a poll.” The ACIR head cautioned against 
the “Roger Freeman syndrome.” “Milton Friedman and Roger Freeman and some of these 
fellows say the property tax is a nifty tax,” Merriam explained. “And I'm sure from a theoretical 
standpoint…[some economists] believe that,” but, Merriam explained, the public said it was the 
“least fair” tax and the ACIR's statistics confirmed the dramatic rise not only the property tax, 
but all state and local taxes. 1191  Nixon was, at least publicly, leaving the conservative 
interpretation of the tax revolt in the dust. However, outflanking McGovern on the issue proved 
to be a near-impossible task for the Republican president.  
 McGovern’s general election campaign continued the fiery left-distributionist rhetoric of 
the Democratic primaries. When syndicated columnist Nick Thimmesch turned over his column 
to party spokespersons in early September, McGovern submitted his own response, while CRP 
chair McGregor wrote the GOP column. McGovern’s entry proved to be a tour de force display 
of the increasingly popular argument on the left that working-class voters discontent represented 
a logical complement to, and extension of, the 1960s’ protests by students and African 
Americans, among others. “For the last decade or so, it has been fashionable to imagine that the 
source of creative political energy in America are the black, the poor, and the young…., 
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McGovern wrote. “But what I discovered in the textile mills of New Hampshire, and found 
confirmed on assembly lines from Ohio to California, is that the grievances of the workingman 
and woman create just as much political energy for America as the grievances of the poor, the 
black, and the young did in the 1960s and continue to do today.” The issues motivating workers, 
McGovern argued, were kitchen table issues. “Pensions are not transferrable, or sometimes 
entirely disappear. Insurance rates are too high…Taxes cost the average citizen too much and 
deliver too little…. [Y]ou have to run harder just to stay in place,” he wrote, continuing to list 
grievances like high food prices and rising educational costs. McGovern’s argument was that the 
Democratic Party was uniquely positioned to address theses issues. He argued that Nixon and the 
Republicans were the party of the rich, citing GOP tax policy as a proof. “Mr. Nixon cannot help 
working people even if he wants to, for his basic constituency is corporate power and corporate 
interests…,” McGovern argued. “What can he do about tax relief for workers when his first 
obligation is to subsidize ITT, Lockheed, and Penn Central?... Democratic leadership will see to 
it that workingmen and women obtain a higher share of profits – and that corporations pay a 
fairer share of taxes.”1192 
McGovern argued that the tax revolt was driven by rising regressive taxes and an unfair, 
loophole-ridden tax code. McGovern made fairness the theme of his economic agenda. The 
solution to the problems of both “taxation and public assistance is to place far greater emphasis 
on fairness,” McGovern argued. No politician should expect the citizens to tolerate the mess of 
the American tax system. “The next President must go to Congress with a sweeping tax reform 
program or we will have a taxpayers’ revolt in this country. The United States is now socialism 
for the rich and free enterprise for the worker. The rich and powerful are heavily subsidized by 
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the government, while the working man is left to his own devices,” McGovern campaign 
materials argued, quoting the candidate. “Tax loopholes for the wealthy and for corporations 
force low-income and middle- income families to pay far more than their fair share of income 
taxes. In 1970, 112 persons with incomes over $200,000 paid no income tax. U.S. Steel had sales 
of $5 billion and net profits of $151 million, yet paid not a single dime in income taxes. Men 
who work in factories and earn $7,000 or $8,000 a year are paying more taxes than men in 
Boston and New York who earn more than $200,000 a year.” 1193 One theme that McGovern 
returned to again and again was that the dysfunction in the U.S. tax system was emblematic of 
the larger erosion of fairness throughout the country. “Americans Are Speaking Out,” one 
McGovern flyer declared. “Against the policies that led to Viet Nam. Against unemployment. 
Rising food prices. Unfair property taxes. Government waste. And especially some politicians. 
Politicians who give special favors to the special few…. U.S. Steel didn't report any federal 
income taxes last year. Most giant international oil companies paid lower tax rates than 
American workers. Some millionaires didn't pay any taxes at all. Meanwhile, middle-income 
families have trouble making ends meet. That's why George McGovern is fighting to change the 
tax system. He is working to close billions of dollars in tax loopholes for special interests-and to 
insure that every American pays his fair share…. McGovern says present property taxes are 
unfair to millions of homeowners. He wants to move some school expenditures to the federal 
level, so that property taxes can be cut.”1194 The class-based analysis offered by McGovern was 
that the well-off and well-connected were getting over on average, hardworking Americans. 
“Corporations take deductions for executive jets, executive retreats in exclusive resorts, 
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executive sales conferences in European capitals, executive lunches in gourmet restaurants,” 
McGovern quipped. “A factory worker can’t deduct the wax paper on his ham sandwich.”1195 
For McGovern, the school levy crisis served as a campaign rallying cry, as well as an 
entre into the larger issue of tax reform. Rather than view them as separate, the Democrat’s 
campaign stressed that the tax code needed to be revised from the local to the federal level. “I 
believe to help the  economy we must first  help people,” McGovern argued. “We need to reform 
our total tax structure. The ordinary citizen is now being asked to pay heavier taxes while many 
of the rich and powerful escape through loopholes'- in some cases, paying no, taxes at all, 
Further more, we must reduce property taxes across the board. Excessive reliance on property 
taxes has made home owner- ship impossible for millions of families.” 1196  Given this 
dysfunction, McGovern explained, it was no wonder that citizens were revolting against the local 
property tax. Rather than criticize them as anti-government conservatives depriving schools and 
law enforcement of much-needed funds, McGovern treated those who voted against local 
property tax initiatives sympathetically. McGovern’s California campaign literature, for 
example, criticized the declining share of state funding for local education and offered a 
sympathetic take on the levy and bond crisis. “As a result, a larger amount of the school-finance 
burden has been thrown back on the shoulders of local property taxpayers, who rejected 60% of 
school tax increases last year. (Nationwide bond rejection is up from 11% in 1960 to 52% in 
1970.)...,” it explained. “It is wholly improper to blame this sad state of affairs on the people who 
must bear the property tax burden. They are, for want of other sources of funds, stuck with a 
system which places the heaviest load on those who can least afford to pay it. Families with 
incomes under $2,000 pay, in pro- portion to their earnings, roughly three times as much as 
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families earning more than $15,000. There is no more regressive form of tax.” The flyer listed 
McGovern’s answers to the school finance crisis, including calling for the federal government to 
pay 100 percent of welfare costs and one-third of the cost of local schooling and various 
incentives within the funding system and revenue sharing to encourage equalization of per-pupil 
funding as well as of assessment rates.1197  
While McGovern was on firm ground when it came to taxes, the candidate recognized 
that Nixon’s attacks on his welfare reform proposals – though misleading – were hurting the 
Democrat in the polls. Just as Nixon distanced himself from his earlier conservative tax plans, 
now McGovern unwisely distanced himself from the “Demogrant.” As late as early August, 
McGovern pledged, “We will fight to assure a living income to all our people. And do not 
believe it when they tell you that average Americans will have to pay the bill. That is a lie. We 
can raise every citizen above the poverty level without raising the taxes of any family earning 
under $22,000 a year.”1198 But the GOP’s attacks on the “Demogrant” did not abate. Later in 
August, the House GOP released a study that it claimed proved McGovern’s proposals would not 
simply be a “body blow to Middle America,” but would “wipe out the middle class.” The 
conclusions of the study were presented by minority leader Gerald Ford, of Michigan, and 
Representative John Anderson, of Illinois. They claimed, once again, that to balance his budget 
McGovern would need to double taxes on families of four making $12,000.1199 McGovern’s 
advisers urged him to decouple his welfare reform plans, which polled poorly, from his tax 
reform plans, which were his most popular issue. However, that proved to be easier said than 
done. As McGovern and Lontief had explained earlier in the year, the “Demogrant” and tax 
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reform were one in the same. Now, in moving away from the “Demogrant” plan, McGovern 
offered a welfare reform program – dubbed “National Income Insurance” – comprised of public 
service jobs, expanded Social Security, and a backstop of $4,000 for a families of four unable to 
work.1200 This revision seemed designed to assuage those who – convinced by Nixon’s campaign 
– saw him as an economic radical, ready to vastly expand the number of Americans on the dole. 
McGovern was careful to note that this revised plan ensured that “no man or woman would 
receive less when working than on welfare” and declared that “jobs are the cornerstone of my 
policy.”1201 The “very fuzzy” program, as Washington Post reporter Hobart Rowan put it, “at 
first reading seemed to be less generous than Mr. Nixon’s for a family whose head is employable 
but was not working.”1202 Such an outcome was hard to believe, given McGovern’s previous 
enthusiasm for a guaranteed income, but, then again, with McGovern’s quickly changing welfare 
proposals, nothing seemed certain. Indeed, even after these August revisions, however, many of 
the nitty-gritty details of how his proposals remained unclear.1203  
 With the “Demogrant” gone, McGovern was forced to tweak his tax reform proposals, 
too. Joseph Pechman and Stanley Surrey, two of the most lauded tax experts in the country, 
urged McGovern to focus his new proposals on loophole closing, rather than his previous, more 
complex, 75-percent-of-statutory-rate minimum tax. In particular, they argued, any serious 
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reform plan needed to tax capital gains at the same rate as ordinary income. 1204 McGovern’s new 
tax proposals were drafted with the help of longtime Democratic economists Pechman, Surrey, 
Tobin, Heller, and Arthur Okum, among others.1205 Restating the slogan “money made by money 
should be taxed at the same rate as money made by men,” McGovern abandoned the Thurow 
minimum tax plan and embraced one closer to the original Pechman-Okner proposals of 1971. 
The new platform called for the gradual closing of all loopholes and using the revenue raised to 
lower rates. 1206 Instead of leaving existing tax rates intact and imposing the minimum tax on 
incomes above $50,000, McGovern now proposed to eliminate all loopholes – including the 
preferential rate for capital gains – while lowering tax rates down to a top marginal rate of 48 
percent. 1207 This new proposal would benefit middle- to upper-middle class singles, in particular, 
compared to his previous plan. “The single secretary making $9,00 a year who would have been 
hit hard before neither gains nor loses [under the new plan],” an unnamed McGovern economist 
explained to the Washington Post.1208 
 McGovern announced this shift in an August speech before the New York Society of 
Security Analysts, which was covered heavily by the press. 1209 Despite McGovern’s many 
platform revisions, his new tax proposals still “pulled no punches,” as Rowan put it. Likewise, 
the Wall Street Journal called the Democrat’s speech “bearding his Wall Street critics in their 
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den” by “pitch[ing] ‘tax justice’ for working people” instead of pro-business tax measures. 1210 
“Money made by money should be taxed at the same rate as money made by men,” McGovern 
said, “and tax justice demands equal treatment for Americans who earn their living with a shovel 
or a slide rule and Americans who live on stock market and property gains. You cannot justify to 
him the fact that there are millionaires who pay little or no taxes at all, the fact that Standard Oil 
pays a lower percentage of its income in taxes than he does, the fact that many of the wealthy 
enjoy tax preferences most Americans cannot share, and it is those facts that have fueled the fires 
of frustration and discontent across this land.”1211 Fairness remained McGovern’s theme. “I think 
you can probably explain a tax loophole to client,” he told those gathered at the NYSSA, “but 
it’s awfully hard to justify to a steelworker, and I’ve found that out over these last few years.”1212 
The new revisions, with its greater focus on loophole-closing, allowed McGovern to amplify his 
“tax justice” appeals, at least in some ways. “Let us treat all taxpayers alike, no matter how they 
make their living,” McGovern concluded. “Let there be no more mythical tax paupers who in 
fact receive hundreds of thousands of dollars in real income but pay little or nothing in taxes.”1213 
Despite the new tax reform plan, McGovern’s larger goals remained the same. Neither 
McGovern’s speech nor his tax plan revisions saw him backing down from his promise to push 
steep inheritance taxes, a reduction in the investment tax credit, and the repeal of Nixon’s new 
accelerated depreciation rules.1214 The Democratic nominee also stressed in the NYSSA speech 
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that he would use $15 billion of the revenue raised from his tax reforms to provide federal 
funding for schools and cut local property taxes.1215 McGovern argued that his proposed military 
cuts and tax reforms would raise $54 billion – enough to fund all of his proposed programs. 1216 
McGovern also used the NYSSA speech as an opportunity to hit Nixon on the idea of a VAT, 
which he said “would leave all the loopholes [in the federal income tax] wide open.” “[The 
VAT] would hit hardest the working class, the poor, the older people, and middle-income 
families,” McGovern said. “To take the sting out of it it will be called in all probability a ‘value 
added tax.’ But a sales tax by any other name smells just the same.” 1217 Property tax relief 
funded by a VAT was no relief at all, in McGovern’s view. “The Nixon answer to the grievances 
of taxpayers is to substitute one regressive tax for another,” he said. 1218 
 Reactions on the left and right to McGovern’s new plan were predictable. Liberal 
economist Paul Samuelson praised the new program, calling it “more feasible” than his initial 
proposals, while retaining the mantle of tax reformer. McGovern, Samuelson argued, had “stolen 
the [tax reform] thunder from President Nixon with his tremendous tax simplification program.” 
McGovern need not rely on idealism to sell his program. Rather, it was one that most Americans 
“can vote for out of self interest,” Samuelson said.1219 In contrast, the Nixon campaign’s 
criticisms remained just as unsparing. “Number one, I think McGovern’s [new] economic 
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proposals are socialistic in character,” Pierre Rinfret declared following the NYSSA speech. 
“Number two, they will produce stagnation in the American economy. Number three, it means 
tax increases for the American people, and number four, it means a material rise in 
unemployment.” 1220   Likewise, most businesspersons and investors were unmoved by 
McGovern’s NYSSA speech. Though some noted that his proposals were neither new nor 
“radical,” most still regarded McGovern with a combination of fear and contempt. One “major 
executive at a major Wall Street firm” told the New York Times that even McGovern’s revised 
plans “would destroy the American dream as it is understood by the investment community in 
general” – not that Wall Street’s dream was the same as that of the voters McGovern hoped to 
woo. In fact, the proposition that received the most scorn form business was, universally, the 
provision to tax capital gains at ordinary income’s rates.1221  Despite McGovern’s icy reception 
from most in business after the NYSSA, others on Wall Street defended McGovern’s capital 
gains proposals. Because McGovern’s revised proposals called for a top tax rate of 48 percent on 
income from all sources, brokers interviewed by the business press believed that taxing capital 
gains at the same rates as earned income “wouldn’t be likely to have much effect on the stock 
market at all,” nor did they think it would discourage investment, even among venture 
capitalists.1222 Perhaps most surprisingly, unlike the previous plan, it was a hit in the press, 
garnering “more coverage in the national media than any single proposal he ever made,” in one 
adviser’s estimate. Time, like many publications, praised the plan. “Even if he goes down to the 
crushing defeat now so widely predicted,” the magazine noted, “he has crystallized questions 
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about the equity of the tax system and the nation’s spending priorities that will not fade 
away.”1223 
 Indeed, as election night demonstrated, perhaps the only thing about the McGovern 
campaign that seemed poised not to fade away was the Democrat’s tax priorities. Nixon 
delivered a historic landslide defeat to McGovern. The president defeated McGovern 61 to 38 in 
the popular vote and won every state in the Electoral College, save Massachusetts. Much had 
gone wrong in the campaign for McGovern. The Democrat’s most notable mistake proved to be 
the selection of Senator Thomas Eagleton as his running mate – a decision McGovern first stood 
by then, uncharacteristically, reversed after it was revealed that Eagleton had once undergone 
electroshock therapy. It was a flip-flop that badly damaged McGovern’s image. As Buchanan 
noted just days before McGovern’s ill-fated selection of Eagleton, the Democratic campaign 
“consistently contrasts Mr. McGovern as an honest, open, straightforward, consistent candidate,” 
while Nixon was “portrayed as deceitful, closed, secretive, distrustful.” This posed a problem for 
the Nixon campaign, Buchanan argued. “[O]ne of or problems is to contradict this idea that, 
whether you agree or disagree with McGovern, you ‘know where he stands,’ and you know he 
can be trusted.”1224 Buchanan encouraged the president to make attacking McGovern’s image as 
an honest, empathetic straight-shooter a priority for the Nixon reelection campaign. With the 
selection, then abandonment, of Eagleton, McGovern did Nixon’s work for him. This feeling that 
McGovern was a different kind of candidate would evaporate quickly thank to the “Eagleton 
affair.”1225  Such dramatic campaign events can be overplayed, however. Like most presidential 
campaigns, both party’s fortunes rose and fell with the state of the country and, in particular, the 
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economy. As noted above, Nixon worked hard to pressure the Federal Reserve to stoke the 
economy in the run-up to the election.1226 Likewise, the president’s fiscal policies were designed 
to err on the side of growth, rather than inflation-fighting. While this pro-growth, pro-
employment stance helped generate the rising inflation that necessitated Nixon’s controversial 
wage-price controls, it also stoked remarkable growth and falling unemployment.1227  Indeed, 
with the controls holding down inflation to three percent by the end of 1972, GDP growth was 
soaring and unemployment had dropped to less than six percent.1228 Despite the focus on the ups 
and downs of the 1972 campaign – like “acid, amnesty, and abortion” or the “Eagleton affair” – 
elections are often about such economic fundaments and, ultimately, McGovern did about as 
well as could be expected, given the soaring economy that buoyed Nixon’s fortunes.1229 Leaving 
nothing to change, in official campaign outlays alone, Nixon also outspent McGovern two-to-
one.1230 Ultimately, McGovern’s defeat was not surprising. 
 Though later critics would argue that McGovern’s economic radicalism, particularly on 
taxes, sank the Democrat’s campaign, taxes remained McGovern’s strong suit up through 
Election Day. In fact, as noted above, taxes were the only issue on which McGovern consistently 
outpolled Nixon. McGovern’s advantage on taxes – regarded by both Nixon and McGovern as a 
key issue, and perhaps the key domestic issue, in the presidential contest – was readily apparent 
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throughout the campaign. “One of the political issues that cuts deeply with voters in this 1972 
election is the revolt of taxpayers across the nation,” pollster Louis Harris reported in October. 
“The complaints are twofold: By 67 to 26 percent, voters feel that ‘ the tax laws are written for 
the rich and not for the average man. By 58 to 32 percent, a majority also feel they ‘do not 
receive a good value for their tax dollars.’” When it came to addressing their complaints, the 
Harris study – echoing the earlier conclusions of Nixon’s pollster, Robert Teeter – found that 
Americans preferred McGovern. “Significantly, at a time when he was running 28 points behind 
President Nixon in the presidential trial heats, Sen. George McGovern was considered more 
dependable on the issue of tax reform…,” Harris noted, calling McGovern’s margin on taxes 
“remarkable.” 1231  
According to polls, McGovern’s general economic program was dragged down by his 
welfare plans. Many voters, according to pollster Louis Harris, believed McGovern wanted to 
raise taxes in order to fund higher welfare expenditures. Indeed, their negative view towards his 
“Demogrant” idea was unsurprising, given the campaign’s own poor explanation of its 
workings. 1232  Yet, surprisingly, the popularity of McGovern’s tax proposals was so 
overwhelming that public’s suspicion of McGovern’s welfare program did not poison their views 
of his tax proposals.  Largely, this was a result of the public’s left-oriented tax views. A majority 
of Americans felt that Nixon was “too close to big business.” Moreover, voters supported 
“closing tax loopholes for high-income people (88 to 6 percent), “raising the taxes of the rich and 
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lowering them for lower income people” (71 to 18 percent), and ensuring that “corporate profits 
[are] taxed at a higher rate” (68 to 16 percent). 1233 
Rather than opposing all tax hikes, the 1972 presidential election made clear, voters’ 
opinion of tax increases varied, depending on how the tax increases – and the related spending – 
were distributed. While the vast majority of the public opposed an across-the-board tax increase 
by the same percent on all taxpayers, they supported “raising federal income taxes with higher-
income people paying higher rates” by 63 to 24 percent. Likewise, even if a VAT on its own was 
unpopular, a VAT tied specifically to the lowering of local property taxes received the support of 
55 percent of the public. “[A] national sales tax by itself is not a popular idea, but if that is the 
way property owners can get some relief from local property taxes, then in the trade-off a 
majority of the public says it is willing to abide one,” Harris explained. “Raising the federal 
income tax might be palatable only if high-income individuals had their taxes raised at a sharper 
rate than the rest of the public.” In other words, distribution mattered above all else. The 
takeaway from the polls, as Lewis Harris put it, was that “the American people obviously now 
want substantial changes in tax laws.” “The prime targets for this tax reform,” Harris continued, 
“are rich individuals and corporations. The public is willing to see new taxes imposed, but the 
necessary precondition is that the rich and business be soaked first and hardest.”1234  
Regardless of which candidate won the presidency in 1972, tax reform seemed to be 
heading in an undeniably left-redistributionist direction.  
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As the calendar turned to 1973, commentators seemed confident that Americans would 
see historic reforms. Indeed, most had predicted that the election was almost irrelevant when it 
came to taxes, given how conservatives like Wilbur Mills and President Nixon had tacked to the 
left under the pull of Nader, McGovern, and other left-distrbutionist reformers. “The movement 
in the U.S. for tax reform is now so powerful and has so much momentum that a massive 
overhaul of our tax laws is a certainty – no matter who occupies the White House next year,” 
Sylvia Porter predicted.” And a closing of loopholes which permit the wealthy to escape most if 
not all taxes is a sure thing too.” 1235 Likewise, the Boston Globe argued, “[I]t seems certain that 
some examination of the capital gains tax will be made in the near future regardless of who wins 
the election [this] November.”1236  Even the most cynical experts agreed. “[T]ax reform, a much 
discussed topic in the past months, seems certain to become a subject of concern for the 1973 
Congress,” University of Virginia tax law professor Michael J. Graetz argued in late-1972. “In 
spite of the myriad nature of the [1972] proposals, a consensus on goals of tax reform is fairly 
easily obtained. President Nixon, Senator McGovern, and Congressman Wilbur Mills all agree 
that reform should simplify the tax laws, produce greater equity in taxation, and promote 
economic growth.”  Though the legislative process had never favored reform, Graetz suggested 
that both the mood of the public and pressure from new groups like Taxation with 
Representation and Nader’s Tax Reform Research Group could finally turn the legislative 
tide.1237 Indeed, despite his withdrawal from the presidential race, Wilbur Mills still promised 
that tax reform would be “the first order of business” in 1973, regardless of who won the 
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 The 1972 election, though, for its undeniable thrust to the left on taxes, contained a few 
cautionary messages, too. To be sure, the events pointing to the strength of left-reform included 
not only the grassroots efforts of CAP, CCC, and Nader, but also the victory in 1972 of the 
progressive income tax backed by Ohio Governor John Gilligan. At the same time that Ohioans 
were election Richard Nixon to presidency, they were also defeating a ballot measure submitted 
attempt by well-funded conservative and business forces to overturn the graduate-rate levy 
passed by Gilligan, as promised in his 1970 campaign. But the very strength of anti-income tax 
coalition still concerned left-distributionist reformers. In fact, in Massachusetts, at the same time 
Bay State voters were making themselves the only ones to select McGovern for president, they 
were also voting against constitutional amendment to allow a graduated income tax in 
Massachusetts. Prior to the election, polls showed that more than 90 percent of Bay State 
residents believed the graduated income tax was fairer than the current flat-rate one, and in the 
summer before the election 59 percent of Massachusetts residents told pollsters that they 
supporter the graduated income tax.1239 Yet, opponents of the ballot measure, the Committee for 
Jobs and Government Economy, outspent the pro-tax coalition, the Coalition for Tax Reform, by 
$120,000 to $7,000 and convinced most voters than the amendment was really a backdoor tax 
increase.1240 The initiative failed by a nearly two-to-one margin. It was an abject lesson in the 
continuing power of well-funding business groups and a cautionary tale for left-distributionist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1238 Hobart Rowan, “McGovern Proposes Traditional,” Washington Post, August 30, 1972; Norman Miller, “In Wall 
Street Speech McGovern Calls for End to Firms’ Tax Breaks,” Wall Street Journal, August 30, 1972; Peter Milius, 
“McGovern Reshaping Tax Reform,” Washington Post, August 25, 1972 
1239 Elliott Sclar, et al., “Taxes, Taxpayers, and Social Change: The Political Economy of the State Sector,” Review 
of Radical Political Economics (April 1973); Ted Behr, et al., “Perspective on Tax Organizing,” CAP, B 7, F 58, 
UIC 







activists who – though they were still growing in numbers and seemed to have public opinion on 
their side – would also be facing a resilient and deep-pocketed web of conservative anti-tax 
groups. 
In the next chapter, we turn to the clashes between the expanding grassroots tax left and 
newly founded right-leaning tax groups, the continuing federal push for local property tax relief, 



















The “New Democrats” versus the Distributionists 
 
 
By 1973, tax justice activists and left-distributionist reformers seemed to be in their 
strongest position yet. After all, Nixon and every major Democratic presidential candidate had 
dedicated themselves to reform of both local property and federal income taxes in 1972. Indeed, 
even those who had opposed George McGovern’s campaign proposals conceded the near-
inevitability of tax reform, given the nearly unanimous view among presidential candidates of 
reform’s desirability. Moreover, on the state and local levels, the grassroots “tax justice” left was 
expanding its numbers and increasing its coordination. However, the political and economic 
disturbances that followed the 1972 election – Watergate and “stagflation” – would permanently 
alter the direction not only of the tax justice movement, but also of American politics, economic 
and otherwise. Perhaps most significantly, these disruptions would shift the balance of power in 
both parties.  
For the grassroots left, the shifts within the Democratic Party were devastating. 
Following Nixon’s 1972 landslide, an increasingly vocal minority of moderates within the 
Democratic would blame McGovern’s sweeping loss not on the White House-stoked economy or 
Nixon’s “dirty tricks,” but on McGovern’s left-leaning stances on pocketbook issues. The 
unprecedented electoral opportunity created by Watergate and the rise of “stagflation” would 
allow these more economically conservative “New Democrats” – who generally had few 






in both Congress and at the state level. In the GOP, the more economically conservative Gerald 
Ford would temporarily fill the moderate Nixon’s shoes. In the long run, the right-distributionist 
Ronald Reagan would shake off both personal tax scandals and the embarrassing defeat of his 
own tax-slashing initiative in California to fill the leadership vacuum in the Republican Party. In 
the short run, however, these shifts within the parties meant that the grassroots left now would 
find itself butting heads with Democrats almost as much as Republicans, a dynamic that placed 
tax reform in question at all levels of government. 
The emergence of “stagflation” as a pocketbook issue – and policy problem – 
compounded the political shifts occurring in the mid-1970s. Beginning in late-1973, inflation and 
unemployment began moving upward simultaneously. The Consumer Price Index peaked at 
more than 12 percent in December 1974, while unemployment reached a height of nine percent 
in May 1975.1 According to conventional economic theory embodied in the “Phillips Curve,” 
inflation and unemployment should exist in a tradeoff. When one rose, the other should fall. 
Stagflation changed all that. Moreover, there was then – and continues to be – heated debate 
about the causes of stagflation. Unintentional miscalculations by the Federal Reserve, political 
manipulation of the money by Arthur Burns, Nixon’s wage-price controls, and, perhaps most 
persuasively, supply shocks wrought by the OPEC oil embargo and agricultural failures were all 
offered as explanations.2 Average Americans, however, cared little about stagflation’s precise 
causes. Rather, they wanted to know what policymakers in Washington were going to do to 
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combat the increasingly tight pocketbook squeeze. However, the combination of fiscal 
conservative Gerald Ford in the White House and the New Democrats in Congress stymied 
meaningful action. 
Both Ford and the New Democrats viewed stagflation through a fiscalist lens. The most 
pressing element of stagflation, many conservative Democrats and Republican agreed, was 
soaring inflation, and the only solution, they concluded, was balanced-budget austerity – not the 
type of tax reforms proposed by Nixon or Muskie, let alone grassroots activists. However, 
perhaps the most significant element of the inflation spikes of the mid-to-late 1970s came in the 
form of inflation’s effect on taxes. Inflation hit lower- and middle-income worst, as studies 
throughout the decade showed.  Moreover, the two elements of the pocketbook squeeze – taxes 
and inflation – had an additive effect, as rising inflation pushed taxpayers into higher income tax 
brackets and exacerbated sales and property taxes by raising retail prices and property values. 
Taxes, therefore, proved to be central to average Americans’ experience of stagflation. This 
incongruence between policymakers’ and Americans’ views of stagflation, ensured that one of 
the great ironies of the mid-to-late 1970s economic crisis would be that soaring inflation made 
mainstream policymakers less likely to consider tax relief and reform, even as it increased 
Americans’ demand for it.  
The ongoing pocketbook squeeze, combined with new headlines of high-profile tax 
scandals involving celebrities and politicians, ensured that the tax revolt remained unabated as 
the country approached its bicentennial. Meanwhile, the power shifts within the parties meant 
that the prospects for reform remained contingent upon which grassroots movement – the left or 







D.C. Turns to Local Property Tax Inequities  
Despite his defeat in the Democratic primaries, Edmund Muskie followed through on the 
property tax hearings that Ralph Nader had requested in mid-1972. More than simply inspired by 
the grassroots left, these hearings would prove to be a showcase both for the left-destructionist 
arguments advanced by these activists and for activists like Nader, CAP, and CCC themselves. 
Montana Democrat Lee Metcalf made the thesis that animated the property tax hearings 
abundantly clear in his introductory statement. “During these hearings,” Metcalf declared, “we 
will see that ‘property taxpayers’ revolt’ is not merely empty rhetoric. We se evidence of this 
revolt everywhere.” The intertwined sources of the revolt, the Montana senator argued, were the 
pocketbook squeeze created by rising tax rates and the resentment and cynicism generated by 
inequities in assessments. “In the last 10 years, property taxes have risen by 80 percent, while 
personal income – a good mearsure of family’s ability to pay – has grown less than half that 
fast,” Metcalf said. “And recently, homeowners and other concerned citizens have become aware 
that property taxes are not only too high, but are also unevenly and unfairly administered. 
According to the Bureau of the Census property tax assessments across the country are common 
in error by 20 percent.” Fittingly, then, given Nader’s role in inspiring the hearings, it seemed 
that the operating assumptions guiding them were the every same ones held by left-distributionist 
grassroots activists. The point of the hearings, Metcalf continued, was to “focus on the role the 
federal government can play in encouraging reform of the local property tax,” reform which, the 
committee hoped, would quell the spreading revolt.3 It was an argument that everyone from 
Nader to CAP to McGovern would agree with. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







The hearings, which stretched into late-1972, were long in the making. Beginning in mid-
1971, the Intergovernmental Relation Subcommittee staff, led by Ty Brown and Al From, 
worked with “Nader’s Raiders” like Jonathan Rowe and various other economists in activists in 
drafting property tax reform legislation planning the Senate hearings. Scheduling the hearings, 
however, proved to be a challenge.4 The initial idea for the hearings was for the subcommittee to 
hold hearings in select locations throughout the country. This plan would not only allow average 
citizens to vent their property tax frustrations, but also provide the weight of Senate 
investigations into local property tax administration, giving official credence to the charges of 
corruption and inequities alleged by CAP and CCC. Nader’s August 1970 letter to Muskie 
calling for Senate Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee hearings into the local property tax 
had unleashed a deluge of letters from average Americans to Muskie’s office backing Nader’s 
call for property tax hearings. Evidencing the widespread sense that property taxes were unfair 
everywhere, letter writers from California to Florida to Maryland nominated their own cities and 
towns for hearings.5  
Muskie’s conducted preliminary investigations into numerous sites for the hearings. 
Edwin “Ike” Webber compiled a long memo outlining the possibilities. The “Chicago-Gary 
region” was Webber’s top recommendation. Webber noted that “Nader reports that he has 
received more mail – requests for help, suggestions of abuses, documentation of 
underassessments – from this region than from any other area of the country.” The main “issues” 
noted for the region included “undersassessment of large commercial properties…[and] large 
industrial plants.” Other recommended locations included: Pittsburgh, which also suffered from 
“underassessment of large industrial properties”; the Savannah-Augusta, Georgia, region, which 
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likewise featured “underassessment of land held by large corporations” and “negotiated tax 
shelters offered to attract industry”; Southern Wisconsin, because of the “existence of a statewide 
taxpayers revolt with the possibility of a taxpayers strike within a year”; the West Virginia-
Kentucky “coal region,” because of its “underassessment and under taxation or large coal 
deposits”; the Austin-Houston-Dallas “Texas Triangle,” which allegedly featured rampant 
“underassessment of commercial…oil…timber…[and] industrial properties”; Northern 
Minnesota, due to “poor quality administration” and favoritism toward mining properties; “any 
area of the state” of California, which, though it was generally seen as having good property tax 
administration, had high property taxes and “substantial citizen discontent”; and the “New 
Jersey-New York region,” because of their cities’ “diminishing tax bases,” use of “negotiated tax 
breaks” to lure industry, and “probably corruption.” For good measure, Muskie’s home state of 
Maine was added.6 The abundance of dysfunction across the country, however, did not mean that 
Muskie’s subcommittee actually had an abundance of location options. The selection of a site, or 
sites, for hearings would have serious “political ramifications,” Webber noted. Regardless of the 
city, the subcommittee would have to “confront the local power and political base,” and in some 
cases that base was very powerful, indeed. Muskie and the subcommittee would need to be 
“diplomatic” in scheduling the hearings.7  
Concerns about the political pitfalls associated with on-site hearings divided Muskie’s 
staff. Webber and others advocated remote hearings, arguing that they would make the 
maximum impact.8 But other Muskie staffers saw things differently. John McEvoy, Muskie 
administrative assistant, told the senator that he had “serious reservations” about the property tax 
hearings. “[D]ifficult political questions exist about stirring up local hornets nests all over the 
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country by hearings which fixate solely on the real scandal of property taxation practice,” 
McEvoy wrote Muskie.9 Indeed, many politicians viewed the on-site hearings as an opportunity 
to score points against their local political opponents. Muskie’s Senate colleague, Illinois 
Republican Charles Percy pushed Chicago as a location. Percy echoed CAP’s claims that 
assessor P.J. Cullerton was underassessing steel plants and racetracks. Al From, though, 
recommended that Muskie not pursue Chicago as an option. Percy, From believed, was angling 
for a hearing that would embarrass Illinois Democrats in an election year. Besides, From 
continued, the IGR “staff resources” necessary to investigate the Daley machine would be 
enormous.10 A vague fear of politicizing the property tax hearings hung over their planning – a 
fear made odder by the fact that, as CAP, CCC, Nader, and other activists surely would argue, 
property tax inequities were inherently political. Ultimately, the Muskie staff’s hesitancy to 
politicize scuttled ideas that seemed primed to emphasize the property tax crisis. When 
California was under consideration as a site for the hearings, Al From and the committee’s 
California contact scuttled a “walking tour” of Los Angeles to examine properties and their 
assessments as a “TV-oriented gimmick.” Better to stick to traditional hearings, they decided.11  
Despite Intergovernmental Relations Committee staffers’ studied timidity, the taint of 
politicization found the property tax hearings, anyhow, thanks to Nixon’s “dirty tricks.” The 
same memo from Muskie’s pollster, Anna Navarro, that had found its way into the hands of 
Nixon’s CRP staff (as discussed in the previous chapter) also ended up in the hands of 
columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, who published excerpts of it in a December 1971 
column. Navarro had cited polls showing the importance of the property tax in California and 
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encouraged the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee to hold hearings in California before 
Muskie announced for president “to take advance of free TV time before it is too late.” The 
hearings, Navarro argued, would be “brilliant visual event, particularly if we can dramatize the 
effects of the property tax on elderly homeowners and school children in poor neighborhoods.”12 
Reporting on the memo, Evans and Novak charged that “the purely political motive of the 
hearings shines like gold.”13 The Evans and Novak column scuttled the plans for California 
hearings.14 Muskie staffers pressed on, however. Following the California debacle, Muskie staff 
turned to Wisconsin, since Navarro’s polls showed “that taxes – and property taxes in particular 
– are the third most significant issue in Wisconsin, behind the war and the economy” – an 
undeniable conclusion for those following the Wisconsin Democratic primaries (as discussed in 
the previous chapter).15 These plans quickly fell through, too. 
 By early summer, staffers on Muskie’s Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee 
settled on Gary, Indiana, as their target. Gary had first come to Muskie’s attention thanks to the 
efforts of CCC and Nader. Rather than simply rely on the data provided by CCC and Nader, 
however, the subcommittee staff conducted its own investigation of assessments in Gary. This 
investigation uncovered “substantial new evidence that the industrial properties owned by U.S. 
Steel and other large steel companies in the Gary area are grossly underassessed in relation to 
their real value,” as a comprehensive report delivered to Muskie in May explained.  Indeed, the 
study by the Intergovernmental Relations subcommittee confirmed all of CCC and Nader’s 
allegations. The subcommittee investigators calculated Gary Works’ assessment under “every 
responsible standard.” All revealed the same pattern. Using data from U.S. Steel’s own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Navarro and Louis to Mitchell and Cutler, Undated, Contested, B 27, F 4, RNPL 
13 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi,” Washington Post, December 12, 1971 
14 From to McEvoy, January 3, 1972, EMP, B 1180, F 16, BCASC 






documents, which were obtained by committee investigators from the Indiana Secretary of 
State’s office, the investigators calculated the plant’s 1971 assessment at between 21.9 and 23.7 
percent. Using the same method, the investigators calculated that the assessment had actually 
fallen since 1960, when it was assessed at a 24.6 percent rate. This assessment drop occurred 
despite the fact that, after depreciation, the value of the plant increased by ore than $300 million 
over the past decade. The company’s figures, the Senate investigators concluded, offered a 
“conservative” estimate. Using independent numbers, they found that “the underassessment of 
the Gary plant is much greater.” Calculating Gary Works’ assessment based on investment data, 
its assessment was less than nine percent of its real worth. Calculating based on the replacement 
method, its assessment rate was between four and seven percent.16  “No matter how you 
calculate the U.S. Steel assessment in Gary, it is only a small fraction of the value of the plant,” 
Al From summarized in another memo. 17   The Senate Intergovernmental Relations 
Subcommittee study found a similar pattern of assessment at other steel producers’ plants in the 
Northern Indiana. “We have compiled figures on the assessments of Inland Steel, Youngstown 
Sheet and Tube, and Bethlehem Steel…,” the report to Muskie explained, “[all] are a small 
fraction of their real value.” 18  The deleterious effects of these underassessments on the city were 
clear. According to the subcommittee’s calculations, the underassessment of U.S. Steel alone 
was likely costing the city $16 million per year, more than enough to cover the $9-to-12 million 
deficit facing the school.19  
The Senate study found that the underassessment of U.S. Steel and other large companies 
resulting from both legal “loopholes,” like Indiana’s “doubled accelerated depreciation,” and the 
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extralegal “special treatment” that companies received from officials “at all levels of 
government.” In Indiana, the process began when the company filed its own property tax return. 
The local assessor was then required by law to examine the company’s return and, “where 
appropriate,” compare it with a physical inspection of the property an examination of the 
company’s books. However, assessors often failed to conduct these inspections. Calling Calumet 
Township assessor Tom Fadell “inept,” the Senate study noted that, in his 12 years in office, he 
had never examined U.S. Steel’s books. If Fadell changed the assessment at all, he made an 
“arbitrar[y],” small pro forma increase in the assessment, almost to keep up appearances of an 
independent assessment.  After the local assessor, assessments passed through the county Board 
of Review, which, in the case of U.S. Steel, usually rubber stamped the local assessor’s number. 
The process ended with the state tax board. Companies often routinely challenged the final 
assessment rendered by the state board in court. Major companies could be confident that a court 
challenge would result in a better deal, since the board studiously avoided the contentiousness of 
a court battle and settled with companies, usually on terms favorable to the company. “At least in 
recent years, there has never been a full trial on a steel company’s assessment, because the State 
Board of Tax Commissioners has always been willing to settle the cases for much less than the 
amount determined by its own auditors,” the Senate study noted.20 U.S. Steel regularly used this 
process to lower its assessments, and it was not alone.  
Often, companies pyramided tax breaks on multiple levels of the assessment process. For 
example, the Senate investigation found that Youngstown Sheet and Tube’s East Chicago plant 
was not only initially assessed at a fraction of its cost, but also that the State Board of Tax 
Commissioners gave the company a “$4.8 million break on its assessment,” which the board 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






labeled an “economic adjustment.” The board granted the company this break “essentially 
because the company made a convincing argument that it was not doing well financially.” The 
report noted the obvious, when it added, “(Obviously, there are no economic adjustments for 
private homeowners.)” This “adjustment” was not enough, however, and when YS&T threatened 
to take the board to court over the already-reduced assessment, the board then settled with the 
company by giving it an additional break of nearly $15 million. When Senate staffers 
interviewed the head of the state tax board about this settlement, he argued that the board would 
have defeated YS&T in court, but explained that the board saw it as important that it reach an 
amicable agreement with the company, since “Indiana is a self-assessment state.” The 
subcommittee report criticized the State Board of Taxation not only for “negotiating secretly” 
with companies to arrive at these compromise final assessments, but also for sealing the 
agreements, making it impossible for both local government and the public to “determine the 
grounds on which the state tax board reduced [the assessment].” 21   
As the Senate staff’s parenthetical observation made clear, Gary homeowners faced a far 
different assessment procedure than companies like U.S. Steel. The Senate investigators gathered 
three independent appraisals of a 16-square block area of downtown Gary that had been 
commissioned by HUD during its planning to purchase the area for an urban renewal project. 
The appraisal data showed that the 88 residential properties, valued at less than $20,000 per 
home, were assessed at a rate of 29.48 percent. Mixed-use apartment buildings, which were 
valued at more than $20,000 each, were assessed at an average of 24.36 percent. The highest 
assessment in the area belonged to a fire-damaged brick building, which was assesse at more 
than 200 percent of its value, and the lowest belonged to a $78,000 apartment building, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






was assessed at just 13 percent. “[A] significant portion of residential property taxpayers are 
assessed at a higher rate than U.S. Steel,” the study concluded, “and, therefore, are not only 
paying their share of local property taxes, but part of U.S. Steel’s share as well.” “The burden of 
these relatively higher assessments falls on the poorest people in Gary,” the study continued. 
“The residents of the 16-square-block area now being redeveloped included 313 nonwhite 
families, 86 white families (of whom about half bear Spanish names), 254 single non-white and 
297 single whites.” When compared to the assessments offered to U.S. Steel and other large 
businesses in the area, the pattern was clear. “Nearly three- quarters (74%) of the 115 residential 
properties were assessed at rates above the conservative 21.7% applied to U.S. Steel, and 79% of 
the dwellings valued at less than $20,000 were assessed at rates higher than that applied to U.S. 
Steel,” the investigators told Muskie.22 
The Senate Subcommittee’s pre-hearing investigations revealed larger truths about the 
political economy of American property taxation. While the corruption in the Gary Democratic 
machine prior to the election of Richard Hatcher was well-known, the Senate subcommittee 
investigation made clear that the assessment process was a bipartisan handout. The local 
assessor’s office was controlled by Democrat Tom Fadell, but the state board controlled by 
business-friendly Republicans.23 The Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee investigation 
also revealed the economic power and political influence exercised over the assessment process 
by companies like U.S. Steel. With the scrutiny of CCC and Nader generating pressure to raise 
assessments, U.S. Steel turned to a new tactic – threats – in an attempt to maintain its favored 
status. “Our investigation has revealed that a few weeks ago U.S Steel brought some top Gary 
officials out to the plant and indicated that if the property tax assessment keeps going up, the 
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corporation may be forced to locate some of its operations elsewhere,” From reported to 
Muskie.24 This threat not only suggested that underassessment had become an expected privilege 
for large businesses in cities like Gary, but also that they were common elsewhere.  
 Indeed, with the idea of holding hearings in multiple cities in mind, the Senate 
Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee staff also investigated property taxation in cities 
beyond Gary. For a time, Birmingham, Alabama, seemed poised to join Gary. The Senate staff’s 
preliminary investigations turned up a pattern of assessment inequity in Birmingham similar to 
that found in Gary. The Birmingham hearings planned to explore underassessment of 
timberlands as well as land owned by “five major corporations, including U.S. Steel.” That land, 
From’s memo explained, was “assessed at far less than comparable property with less powerful 
owner.” Alabama also allowed the hearings to make a specific point contrasting the level of 
taxation versus the fairness of taxation. It could also emphasize the fungibility of money from 
various tax sources. “The theme of the Alabama hearing would be that even though property 
taxes are relatively low in Alabama, they are administered so unfairly and give such big breaks 
to the corporate interests that over-all consumer taxes in Alabama are higher than the national 
average,” From wrote. “In other words, if the corporate interests paid their share of local 
property taxes, the state would not have to rely so much on the sales tax which is among the 
highest in the country.” Other locations considered included Appalachia, “where several citizens’ 
groups in Kentucky, Tennessee, and West Virginia who have charged that land owned by coal 
and steel companies in those States is grossly underassessed,” as an IGR committee memo 
noted.25 Despite the legwork done to prepare for a the property tax hearings, they remained 
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unscheduled throughout 1971, thanks in part to legislative logjam created by hearings on Nixon’s 
revenue sharing and drug abuse control proposals.26 
With property tax hearings still unscheduled by December 1971 – a year after Muskie 
promised them – Nader wrote another long letter to Muskie pressing the need for an 
Intergovernmental Relations subcommittee investigation into local property taxes. “Since your 
announcement the need for such hearings has become increasingly more urgent,” Nader wrote. 
“Exposures of illegality and abuse the administration of the property tax have accelerated, and 
the magnitude of the tax burden falling as a result on unfavored taxpayers appears even greater 
than it did before.” Nader connected the countrywide cascade of local school levy defeats with 
“inequitable property tax administration” and told Muskie that the public was waiting for action. 
“The extent to which powerful corporate and local interests have exacted favored treatment from 
weak property-tax administration, shifting the tax burden regressively and intensifying the outcry 
for federal revenue assistance, would alone compel Congressional investigation,” Nader wrote.27   
The consumer activist listed examples of “corporate property tax-escapades” from the 
“past months,” including the revelations uncovered by CCC and CAP in Gary and Chicago. 
Other examples include the underassessment of timber and agricultural land in Maine and 
California and mineral land “throughout Appalachia.” In Augusta, Georgia, Nader told Muskie a 
group of taxpayers successfully sued to end a “special and illegal tax rate for new industry” 
developed by the business backed “Committee of One-Hundred.” The special rate, which stood 
at less than 13 percent of the standard rate, quickly attracted older businesses, too, “eroding the 
tax base and thrusting a still greater burden upon the taxpaying citizens of Augusta.” While the 
business-friendly Augusta “property tax dole” had been ended by the suit, Nader noted, there 
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was “no way to know how many analogous situations there are in cities and counties across the 
country” without federal investigation. It was, Nader wrote, an epidemic of “blackmail” by both 
businesses and wealthy individuals to “exact legal and illegal property tax concessions by 
threatening to move to another jurisdiction.” 28 
Nader also used the lengthy letter to outline his philosophy on property tax reform. The 
property tax, Nader argued, ought to be retained in some form to compensate for ‘the ‘Reagan 
Effect’ – the astounding phenomenon of exceedingly wealthy citizens with no taxable income.” 
The property tax, in Nader’s view, could serve as a backstop to the loophole-riddled income tax. 
By taxing individuals like Reagan, as well as businesses that used accelerated depreciation and 
other “sophisticated treasury raids,” the property tax at least ensured that “these [income] tax-
return paupers…contribute something to the society which protects and enhances their wealth.” 
With assessment reform, Nader argued, the property tax could become more progressive. 
Reform, he argued, needed to precede relief. Furthermore, any property tax relief, in Nader’s 
view, needed to be funded by a progressive source. It was unlikely, for example, that use of a 
national VAT “would result in more tax relief for the low and middle income taxpayer, and in a 
fairer sharing of tax burdens, than would a well-administered, state-wide property tax.” Nader 
did not want Muskie to misconstrue his argument as a defense of the property tax, of course, but 
the consumer activist pleaded for Muskie and other legislators to ensure that any property relief 
plans did not leave most Americans “worse off than they were before, with tax subsidies for the 
rich merely transferred to the less visible federal level under the false pretense of property tax 
relief for low and middle-income citizens.”29 Nader strategically released his letter to press to 
coincide with Muskie’s January presidential candidacy announcement, and the Muskie team 
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scrambled to craft a response to send to Nader – and the press – to ensure that Nader’s lengthy 
letter did not overshadow the announcement. 30  
By the time the Senate property tax hearings began in May, Muskie’s presidential 
campaign was all but over. However, the public’s demand for property tax relief and reform was 
stronger than ever. In his opening statement, Muskie declared that the hearings were designed to 
“focus on widespread property tax breaks for certain businesses at the expense of average 
homeowners.” Muskie methodically laid out the facts, as gathered by activsits like Nader and 
CCC, as well as his own staff. “In many States, corporations benefit from underassessment of 
their property. They benefit from favorable depreciation statutes that let them depreciate their 
equipment faster than it could possibly wear out. And they benefit from loosely written or laxly 
administered local laws which open up loopholes to avoid tax payments,” Muskie continued, 
citing data from Gary, Houston, and other cities. “These examples are symptomatic of a national 
pattern of property tax evasion. Originally, many of the loopholes were created by local 
governments to lure industry. Now, however, they are often sustained by corporate threats to 
abandon a community and throw its workers out of work. And as more and more localities and 
States join the competition for new industry by establishing new tax breaks, most Americans are 
paying too much in taxes in return for too little in services.” The property tax’s glaring inequities 
and the resulting rising burden on low- and middle-income Americans, the Senator from Maine 
argued, was the key to the “tax revolt.” “We start with the recognition that the inequity of the 
property tax is symptomatic of the inequity of our entire tax system,” Muskie said. “Every level 
of government has imposed heavy taxes – but no level of government has done enough to insure 
that taxes are fair. The tax revolt, as it has been described, is a protest, not just against the taxes 
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most Americans are paying, but against the tax burdens some Americans are evading.” Muskie 
concluded that “property tax relief and reform are urgent priorities for the country, the Congress, 
and this committee.”31 With these hearings, the Senate was, no doubt, taking the largest step yet 
by Congress to make local property taxes a federal issue. 
Though the hearings were ostensibly the doing of Muskie – and would have provided a 
political boost for the Maine Senator had Muskie prevailed in the Democratic primary – the 
hearing’s were, in many respects, a showcase for Ralph Nader and like-minded left-leaning 
grassroots groups across the country, such as CAP and CCC. In his opening statement, Muskie 
credited Nader with “expos[ing]” how “the property tax system too often permits powerful 
corporations to shift their share of local tax burdens to workers and middle-income 
homeowners.” And much of the second day of hearings was devoted to lengthy testimony by 
Nader and Jonathan Rowe, of Nader’s Tax Reform Research Group. Nader began by praising the 
grassroots tax groups across “throughout the country” who had been fighting for equal 
assessments, citing the findings of CCC in Gary and CAP in Chicago, along with a host of other 
studies in Kentucky, Texas, and Georgia, among others, demonstrating the systematic 
underassessment of large commercial and industrial property owners. Nader argued that property 
taxes often created a “crushing” burden on “the low- and moderate-income homeowner, on the 
elderly, and on the small farmer.” Beyond its rate, he argued, Americans were angry about the 
property tax was “rife with corruption, favoritism, antiquated laws, and secrecy.” This did not 
make the property tax unique, however. “We should not forget another reason that property taxes 
have become the first object of the taxpayers revolt: they are the only remaining significant tax 
over which voters have any semblance of direct control,” Nader said. “It is much easier to vote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







down a local bond issue than to vote reform in the Federal income tax. Thus to some extent, the 
property tax has borne the brunt of taxpayer dissatisfaction with the increasing unfairness of the 
entire tax structure.” Education was suffering as a result of the revolt not because Americans 
harbored anti-school sentiments. Had the property tax been tied to less popular public 
expenditures, Nader implied, the revolt would have been even worse.32 
Nader devoted much of his testimony to the preferential property tax treatment given to 
well-connected businesses and individuals. Nader pointed both to the informal breaks given by 
assessors like those in Chicago and Gary and to official breaks, like a special “low-tax industrial 
zone” enacted by the Georgia state legislature, which allowed the Union Camp company to have 
property worth between $375 and $550 million assessed at $80 to $90 million, according to 
Nader’s estimates. Jonathan Rowe charged that, in many cities, assessors sit down with “major 
industries” after assessing homeowners and then ask those “major industries” to pay only the 
difference between the money raised from homeowners and the localities budget figure. Nader 
also charged that the tax anticipation warrants criticized by CAP in Cook County were actually 
common throughout the country. “Delayed property tax collection is the national rule, not the 
exception...,” Nader said. “In 24 states, local property taxes were collected only once a year, and 
they were collected only twice a year in 21 other States. In only five States were they collected 
quarterly. So Chicago-style diversion of property taxes to big banks may indeed be widespread.” 
With his usual dramatic flair, Nader dubbed property tax assessment favoritism a national 
scandal. “If what happens daily many times in the administration of the property tax were to 
happen in plain view on the street we would call it unarmed robbery,” Nader said. “It is literally 
pilfering billions of dollars out of schools, out of streets and courts and parks, libraries and other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







services civilized people need. It is taking billions of dollars from the pocketbooks of the small 
taxpayers that have to make up the difference.” Once again, Nader tied inequities in the property 
tax to the tax revolt. “[W]ith special interests having made tile property tax their own private 
playground, it is no wonder that homeowners and small taxpayers are rebelling,” Nader quipped. 
The solution to the tax revolt, he argued, was to reform the property tax system and provide 
relief for overburdened moderate income Americans. Nader estimated “conservative[ly]” that 
closing loopholes in the property tax would allow for a nationwide 20 percent across-the-board 
reduction in property taxes. Rather than suggest across-the-board cuts, however, Nader called for 
using the funds culled from eliminating the special breaks for favored property owners to enact 
progressive property tax rates or some form of “circuit breaker,” thereby raising property taxes 
for well-off taxpayers and lowering them for others. To ensure that reforms were permanent, 
Nader recommending tying revenue sharing money, HUD money, and other federal aid to 
assessment reform, as well as instituting direct federal oversight of the assessment of large 
commercial and industrial properties. Such was the effect of Nader and Rowe’s testimony that 
they even won over many conservatives. “I have had occasional disagreement with you on other 
subjects but on this one we are in full accord and I commend you for your testimony,” Tennessee 
Republican William Brock told them.33 
Community groups from across the country influenced by Nader also received 
recognition at the Senate hearings. One such group was the 600-member New Jersey-based 
Cherry Hill League, a “nonpartisan public interest group.” The Cherry Hill League’s leaders, 
Alene Ammond and Rosemary Hospodor, were both “ordinary suburban housewives” who were 
“fight[ing] city hall from [the] kitchen,” as two press accounts put it. Hospodor was a former 
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teacher, while Ammond had been a part-time journalist.  “Ralph Nader was a big influence on 
us,” Ammond said. “We had read about him and thought if he could do it on a national scale, 
then we could do it locally much easier.” Following Nader’s lead, Ammond and Hospodor 
became the first registered “public interest lobbyists” in the state of New Jersey. “We felt we 
could develop a technique,” Ammond said, “to solve people’s civic problems which can include 
tax problems, zoning problems, problems with building contractors.” The CHL focused on 
pocketbook issues and local matters like taxes, prices, and zoning. “Inflation has helped us [gain 
suppporters],” Hospodor told the Philadelphia Enquirer. “People in the suburbs aren’t as mobile 
as they used to be because they can’t afford to move. We get more and more support every day.” 
With the assistance of Nader’s Tax Reform Research Group, the CHL formulated a tax reform 
plan centered on the insistence that “big business should pay its fair share.” Like CAP in 
Chicago and CCC in Gary, Ammond and Hospodor had earned the ire of many by challenging 
local government and business leaders and had received virulent criticism and hostility, 
including a barrage of anonymous threatening phone calls and Ammond mysteriously receiving 
five flat tires in one week. 34 Yet, the CHL remained undeterred. Ammond presented CHL’s tax 
study, which demonstrated an “unholy alliances between corporate lobbies, business, and 
government at the base of a degenerate tax system,” to the Senate committee. The CHL found, 
for example, that Standard Oil’s New Jersey Refinery was underassessed by $31 million. 
Likewise, properties in Cherry Hill’s major industrial area were assessed at between 1.5 cents 
and 24 cents per square foot, whereas residential lots in the community were assessed at between 
45 and 60 cents per square foot. The CHL also documented a pattern of land being bought by 
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speculators, assessed as farmland at fractions of a cent per square foot, then sold for a hefty 
profit after a favorable zoning change. Some of these property tax breaks were due to legislative 
tax incentives, while others were due to information assessment practices. Both, the CHL argued, 
needed to be ended. Ammond called it a “myth” that “tax shelters must be offered industry in 
order to attract them and keep them.” And, if that “myth” were true, Ammond argued, “the same 
economic principle should apply to tax shields and breaks for the middle-class taxpayer.” “The 
flagrant violation of the uniformity law in assessing real property is nothing less than condoned 
thievery,” Cherry Hill League’s tax study argued. “Unlike Robin Hood, local assessors are 
generally directed by their superiors to rob from the poor to give to the rich. Despite pleas for 
relief, the practice of favoritism toward industry and large corporations at the expense of the 
homeowner continues to flourish…. [O]ur State legislatures represent large financial interests 
and not the people.”35  
Even the influence of grassroots groups that did not attend the hearings was felt in the 
testimony of others – including Republicans. Like Muskie and others, Illinois Republican Percy 
had been influenced by the work of CAP and similar grassroots groups. “In Cook County, citizen 
action programs have revealed and documented some of the worse features of the county’s 
property tax system,” he said. “Citizens groups like Citizens Action Program and Businessmen 
for the Public Interest are forcing changes in what was a closed and virtually impregnable 
system.” Such groups, Percy said, had “exposed as arbitrary, intensively personal, political, 
closed, and unfair. Certain major properties have been assessed far below their fair market values 
and below that of comparable properties owned by less political influential owners.” Percy cited 
CAP’s racetrack assessment statistics, among other examples, in his testimony. These extralegal 
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tax breaks, the senator argued, drove up taxes for average Cook County residents, and they were 
understood exactly what was happening. This, Percy said, was the root of the tax revolt. “It is not 
that people in the country are revolting so much against the idea of paying taxes,” Percy said, “it 
is the fact that someone else is not paying any. That unjust situation causes the anguish, the grief 
and the concern, and causes what is talked of as the taxpayers’ revolt today.” Grassroots groups 
like CAP, Percy said, had done what local, state, and federal policymakers had failed to do. The 
senator proposed that Congress invite CAP’s leaders to testify, suggesting that, based on their 
success “fight[ing] and beat[ing] city hall,” groups like CAP could give federal legislators 
guidance in how to tackle the problems of unfair property taxation. 36 
Percy submitted his own proposal for tax relief, which limited property taxes to eight 
percent of income for the elderly, up to a maximum household income of $14,800, and Percy 
also suggested that the program be expanded to the entire population – in other words, a slightly 
more modest version of Nixon’s plan. However, Percy also called for assessment reform, making 
it easier for homeowners to appeal assessments, and the elimination the tax payment escrow and 
tax anticipation warrant process that CAP showed netted banks bundles while costing taxpayers 
(as discussed in the previous chapter). Percy called the latter a “racket” and suggested it would 
be “criminal” for Congress to allow it to continue, since “the taxpayer is paying the cost of that 
interest [collected by the banks].”Among other assessment reforms, perhaps the boldest 
suggested by Percy was that the Census Bureau conduct assessments of properties worth more 
than $200,000 in order to ensure that large property owners were “more fairly assessed.” Another 
tactic proposed by Percy was federal “spot checks” of large properties to ensure that property 
owners were not over-claiming depreciation, a practice that Percy suggested was common an “no 
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different from any other form of [tax] cheating…[or] evasion of taxes.”37 As Percy and other 
committee members knew, this type of cheating was not confined to Chicago. Indeed, Muskie 
and the IGR committee staff had settled on Gary, Indiana, as the prime example of such 
inequities and misbehavior.   
Though the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee did not travel to Indiana, 
property taxes in Gary took center stage at the D.C. hearings.  In fact, the entire third day of the 
property tax hearings were dedicated to taxation in Gary. Though it would receive a 
disproportionate share of the subcommittee’s attention, both Nader and Muskie wanted to make 
it clear that the afflictions of Gary’s property tax system were not confined to the Calumet 
region. “We have not chosen Gary for our first case study because its property tax problems are 
unique or necessarily more acute than those in other areas,” Muskie said. “In fact, many of 
Gary's problems are echoed in cities across America – a fiscal crisis in the schools which has 
cause teachers to go unpaid and reductions in school services; unrelenting pressure from industry 
to hold down the tax rate or face a job cutback; excessive secrecy in the property tax assessment 
process that prevents interested parties from determining its fairness….” Muskie began the Gary 
portion of the hearings by highlighting the findings of the Gary IGR staff study, which was 
published in full as part of the hearing record. The final report – a polished version of the 
preliminary memo presented to Muskie months earlier – found that “United States Steel's Gary 
Works is assessed at a lower percentage of its depreciated value than residential and commercial 
property in low-income areas of Gary.” It outlined Gary Works’ stagnant assessment over the 
past decade, assessor Fadell’s failure to examine the company’s books, and the state tax board’s 
“secret” dealings with the company to arrive at final assessments. Even the “most conservative” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Cherry Hill League tax study, in Property Taxes, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, 






estimate of U.S. Steel’s assessment, the Senate study found, was more than 1/3rd less than both 
the average assessment of residential property in Gary and the average assessment rates of other 
commercial and industrial property. Moreover, the final Senate analysis of 251 sample properties 
in Gary found slightly higher overall assessments for business property than for residential 
property. Homes had an average assessment-to-sales price ratio of 28.3 percent, whereas 
commercial and industrial property had an average assessment of 33.4 percent. For comparison, 
the Senate noted that a 1969 State Board of Tax Commissioners study of assessments had found 
that, within the Gary School District, residential property was assessed at 30.46 percent of “true 
cash value,” while commercial and industrial property was assessed at 30.85 percent. 38 
Additionally, though not noted by the Senate report, the Census had found statewide assessment-
to-sales price ratios in Indiana of 25.9 for commercial and industrial property and 25.4 for 
residential property in 1967.39 In 1972, the Census found ratios of 23.7 for residential and 20.0 
for commercial and industrial.40 Within the residential section alone, the IGR study concluded 
that, in Gary, “on the average, the higher the market value of the residence, the lower its 
assessment in relation to its market value.”41 
Gary Mayor Richard Hatcher and City Comptroller Arnold Reingold bolstered the Senate 
Intergovernmental Relations Committee staff study’s conclusions. Mayor Hatcher told the 
committee that he concurred with “Mr. Ralph Nader’s testimony” that “the Gary works of the 
United States Steel Corp is grossly underassessed.” Hatcher blamed the recent Gary teachers’ 
strike not on the union, but on the “inadequate financial resources available to the school,” which 
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the mayor said was “almost exclusively” responsible for the strike. “That strike – and its basic 
underlying cause – is the most recent example of the grave financial crisis in which the city of 
Gary, Ind., finds itself,” Hatcher said. “That crisis is directly and heavily linked to property tax 
assessment.” Hatcher pointed to lost revenue from U.S. Steel as the main culprit in the “fiscal 
crisis” facing the city, outlining a number of illegal practices by U.S. Steel that cost the city 
“sorely needed” revenue. Specifically, Hatcher told the Senate that company estimated its own 
building permit frees and its own property tax assessments, forcing the city to take the company 
“at its word.”42 During a 10-month period in 1971, the Hatcher administration calculated that 
U.S. Steel “evaded” more than $60 million in building permit fees and a nearly $10 million 
increase in assessed valuation. City Comptroller Arnold Reingold testified that, based on his 
calculations derived from publicly available information, the company was undertaxed by 
between $15 and $25 million per year. 43 (For perspective, Gary’s entire 1972 budget was $23.8 
million.44) Reingold had attempted to examine the company’s records – a legal process under 
Indiana statutes – the company sued to secure a temporary injunction preventing Reingold from 
doing so. That injunction had lasted since Hatcher took office, over three years, as the legal 
proceedings dragged on. Even the lower $15 million figure would allow Gary either to cut 
property taxes by 25 percent across-the-board or to more than solve all of its revenue shortfalls. 
Most likely, if U.S. Steel were assessed fairly, the city could enact a tax cut for homeowners and 
solve its fiscal crisis at the same time. While it was impossible to know without access to U.S. 
Steel’s books, Reingold that there was a “strong possibility that the steel company is 
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underassessed by a greater percentage than the typical other business in the area and the typical 
homeowner.” 45 
The key property tax battle taking place in Gary and cities like it was between average 
homeowners and large businesses. When challenged on its evasion practices, U.S. Steel told the 
city of Gary that it was effectively “above those laws,” as Hatcher put it. The company’s 
behavior, in Hatcher’s view, was “corporate arrogance and power of the worst sort.” In meetings 
with Hatcher to discuss Gary Works’ assessment, U.S. Steel officials repeatedly made reference 
to “the company’s competitive position,” in terms of its property tax rate in Gary, relative to 
rates for other companies in other cities. While Hatcher said company officials never openly 
threatened to leave Gary if the city raised its assessment, the mayor said the point was clear. “I 
do believe there was an implication that certain parts of the process of making steel which are 
presently being carried on at the Gary works would have to be transferred to other locales where 
there was not this high property tax rate…,” Hatcher told the Senate. This put mayors like 
Hatcher in a “difficult” situation. If he insisted that U.S. Steel “comply with those laws 
[regarding building permits and property tax assessment],” Hatcher noted, he might be placing 
both the city and its residents’ jobs “in serious jeopardy.” Taken to their logical conclusion, the 
effect of cities complying with the demands of companies like U.S. Steel could be drastic. 
“[T]hose of us who are fighting for the survival of our nation’s cities,” Hatcher predicted, “may 
well – with the problem of inequitable tax structure – be thrown into a cutthroat, 
counterproductive competition to retain and secure major tax assets [by granting assessment 
breaks].” 46 
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While Hatcher, along with CCC, Nader, Muskie, and others, opposed this business-
friendly race to the bottom, some conservatives on the Senate IGR committee disagreed. Florida 
Republican Edward Gurney, one of the most conservative members of the Senate, came to the 
defense of U.S. Steel. Because the company’s taxes paid were increasing in dollar terms, Gurney 
argued that the company was “becoming a better citizen every day.” He argued that Reingold’s 
belief that U.S. Steel was underassessed was “not backed up by any evidence at all 
except….some vague thought.” When Reingold referenced the Senate subcommittee’s own study 
of Gary assessments, Gurney dismissed it, claiming that he wanted “other” evidence. Muskie 
backed Reingold, though, noting, “One of the points in this whole inquiry is that it has taken a 
great deal of staff effort and investigative effort to get as much information as we have about 
United States Steel and about their relative tax burden…and United State Steel could resolve a 
lot of these problems by opening its book to the city of Gary and to its mayor as well as to the 
public. Then you [Reingold] wouldn't have to guess.”47   
The Senate subcommittee staff did not expect representatives of U.S. Steel to appear at 
the property tax hearings, but they invited them, anyhow. To the committee’s surprise, U.S. Steel 
officials agreed. The chair of U.S. Steel’s finance committee, W.A. Walker, testified alongside 
David Carr, the superintended of Gary Works, as well as two company staffers. They denied that 
refused to open its books to assessors. Walker argued that they had filed the injunction against 
the Hatcher administration because the company believed that it only had to open its books to the 
state tax board, not to local officials, even though a 1905 law said otherwise. The company also 
insisted, contrary to the claims of Nader, CCC, and other critics, that its plants in Gary and 
Chicago were not underassessed. Rather, Walker said, the Gary Works, in particular, was “too 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







high.” Walker’s baseline was not the value of each plant, however. Rather, Walker implied, the 
proper measure for fair taxation was the amount of taxes the company paid relative to its 
employment at the plant. Per $100 of payroll, Walker said, property taxes in Gary and Chicago 
were high compared to other plants, such as those in Pennsylvania. This imbalance, he said, 
“places our plant [in Gary or Chicago] at a cost disadvantage m comparison with others, and it 
certainly is inordinately high as compared with our other major producing area[s].” Taxes in 
Gary, Walker said, were the highest the company paid on any of its plants. “That means your 
lobbies may have been more effective in other communities,” Muskie quipped. “That doesn't 
mean you are necessarily right in Gary.”48   
Keeping with the post-“Powell Memo” mood of business assertiveness (as will be 
discussed later in this chapter), U.S. Steel’s representatives mounted a vigorous defense not only 
of the company’s taxes, but of low business taxes, generally. The Senate subcommittee had sent 
U.S. Steel a letter asking for an accounting of how the company had derived its assessment of 
Gary Works. However, the company never responded to the letter and, when asked about the 
company’s lack of response, Walker – to the frustration of an incredulous Muskie – offered a 
long justification for why it was too complicated for the company to explain its assessment 
figure in detail. Regardless of the precise assessed value, Walker insisted over and over that the 
Gary Works plant was assessed at precisely 33 1/3 percent of cash value, just as the law called 
for. In response, Muskie pointed out the state tax board’s figures suggested that the plant was 
valued at $793 million and assessed at $173 million, for a ratio of 22 percent. Walker’s position, 
however, hovered above the specifics of Gary Works’ assessment and went to the importance of 
a pro-business tax environment, more broadly. Businesses like U.S. Steel would simply leave 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







areas rather than pay property taxes they felt were too high, the executive noted. Therefore, 
corporate tax breaks benefitted everyone. Business, Walker said, “supplies the lifeblood for the 
economy of Gary and Indiana as a whole.”49 In somewhat contentious questioning, Muskie failed 
to push the U.S. Steel representatives off their prepared talking points. The largest fireworks of 
the hearings, however, came during the Calumet Township assessor’s appearance. 50    
Assessor Tom Fadell’s opening statement was an almost stream-of-consciousness 
amalgam of overwrought defenses and broad accusations. Fadell portrayed himself as a valiant 
public servant who had stood up to U.S. Steel by more than doubling the company’s assessment 
during his more than two decades in office. Fadell argued that his assessment office was the 
model of professionalism and that property taxes in Gary were exceedingly fair. Not only were 
the figures offered by Nader, CCC, and Reingold wrong, Fadell said, so was the study done by 
Senate staffers. Specifically, Fadell said that the notion that “ghetto homeowners” – a term 
Fadell rejected, since he “[didn’t] believe we have a ghetto in Gary” – were assessed at higher 
rates than U.S. Steel was “an out-and-out fabrication.” Fadell had been subjected to criticism not 
because of any faults in his assessments, he suggested, but because of a political witch hunt 
orchestrated by Hatcher. “Now, how did this controversy really start, gentlemen?” Fadell asked 
rhetorically. It started, Fadell claimed, because he refused to support Hatcher’s reelection. 
Hatcher, Reingold, Post-Tribune reporter George Crile (and his wife), Fadell charged, were 
“slander[ing]” him and engaging in a campaign of “political propaganda against [Fadell].” 
Another motivation, Fadell suggested, was Hatcher’s reckless, “criminal” spending. Whenever 
assessments went up, Fadell said, “spending increased to meet the revenue available.” “Isn't it 
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strange that the city administration can’t live with one taxpayer paying $30 million?” Fadell 
asked. City Hall was pressuring to raise Gary Works’ assessment not because it was too low, the 
assessor implied, but because Hatcher had a voracious appetite for tax revenue. 51  
The Calumet assessor also leapt to the defense of U.S. Steel and other businesses and, in 
the process, confessed that he did, in fact, give them preferential treatment. Fadell implied that 
U.S. Steel were victims in this case, too, since Reingold had merely “fabricated a figure” in 
alleging U.S. Steel’s underassessment. The assessor compared Reingold to “Don 
Quixote…fight[ing] windmills.” If the company’s assessment was too low, Fadell argued, it was 
wholly the Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners. Fadell conceded, though, that the 
company paid taxes based on “self-assessment.” He also explained that he “doesn’t follow” the 
Indiana statute requiring building permits from property owners like U.S. Steel. Nonetheless, 
Fadell went on to challenge a variety of allegations made by Nader, arguing that none were true. 
“What is the result?” Fadell asked rhetorically. “The committee again in my judgment, 
gentlemen, is investigating the highest assessed, proportionately highest assessed, steel mill in 
the United States. It, I feel, has picked a bad example.” Fadell defended U.S. Steel, arguing that 
the company was at a disadvantage vis a vis other nearby steel mills because Gary had higher tax 
rates than the surrounding communities in which other mills were located. “Even if all the steel 
mills in northern Indiana are assessed uniformly, United States Steel would still pay more taxes 
proportionately than its competitors,” Fadell said. 52 
Fadell told the Senate that he was justified in giving preferential tax breaks to businesses. 
The important measure of the company’s property tax burden, Fadell implied, was how it 
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compared to the company’s profitability and the property taxes of the company’s competitors – 
not whether it was assessed properly relative to homeowners or Indiana’s property tax laws. 
“Another important observation, and I can’t impress this too much on you, is this: In assessing, 2 
and 2 does not equal 4,” Fadell told the Senate subcommittee. “If you have a business that is 
losing money or is next to a competitor across a state line, it may be unjust to apply an 
assessment formula that says 2 plus 2 equals 4, and I think as soon as we accept the fact that 2 
plus 2 doesn’t equal 4 in assessing, a lot of our problems disappear.” Despite his insistence that 
Gary had not “ghettos,” Fadell recounted a laundry list of economic and real estate problems 
facing the city, including the flight of middle-class homeowners and businesses. Some 
neighborhoods, Fadell said, looked like Berlin “in the final days of World War II,” with homes 
that were “vandalized and ransacked.” The decline of the city, the assessor argued, was even 
more reason to cut breaks to business. “Now, the question is are we to raise taxes on the 
remaining few industries and businesses in Gary, and more specifically are we going to attempt 
to solve our problem by imposing additional millions of dollars in taxes on United States Steel?” 
Fadell asked. “I just ask the committee if that is the answer.” 53 
In a contentions question-and-answer period, Muskie questioned Fadell as to why 
assessments had stayed the same for homeowners when property values had been falling and 
why he believed the Hatcher administration should not have access to assessment information. 
Fadell’s often-convoluted answers frustrated Muskie. When Fadell repeatedly deviated from 
answering Muskie’s questions in order to to criticize the Hatcher administration’s spending 
decisions, Muskie interrupted, “The political issues surrounding the levels of spending in Gary 
are for the citizens to decide out in Gary.” Muskie also pressed Fadell on his criticism of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







Senate staffers’ study of assessments in Gary. Fadell told Muskie that he did not have his own 
assessment data refute the Senate study, only that, he was “personally familiar with enough 
houses” to suggest, from memory, that homes in low-income areas were assessed at “less than 18 
percent” of cash value, though Fadell would not let himself be pinned down on U.S. Steel’s 
assessment ratio. “Well, you don't like the State tax board study. You don't like our own staff 
study. But you have no study of your own. That leaves us rather up a tree,” Muskie quipped, 
calling Fadell’s off-the-cuff estimation “worthless.” 54  
In further justifying his deviation from Indiana property tax laws, Fadell indicted the 
entire system of property taxation. If any individual assessments were wrong, Fadell argued, it 
was because it was impossible to assess equal properties equally. “I mean you do as good a job 
as you can humanly do for all the people in the community,” Fadell said. The best that could be 
done was “rough equity.” To attempt equality – “fine equity,” as he called it – would be 
“foolhardy,” since “property values just change from day to day.” The property tax, Fadell 
suggested, was fundamentally flawed, since property assessment was more-or-less arbitrary. The 
only solution, Fadell seemed to imply, was the elimination of the property tax. “[T]he root cause 
of the rising spiral of property taxes...,” Fadell said, “is that there isn’t an adequate substitute for 
property taxes.” Ironically, this was a conclusion that even many of Fadell’s harshest critics 
likely would agree with. 55 While the notion of completely eliminating the property tax seemed 
unlikely, if not impossible, the hearings nonetheless cemented the conviction among 
policymakers in both parties that federal revenue should be used to lessen localities reliance on 
the property tax.  
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Perhaps the most startling element of the debate was the degree to which legislators were 
willing to question the very theoretical underpinnings of the property tax. Metcalf noted not only 
the burden of property taxes on the elderly, most of whom had already paid off their homes, but 
also the oddity of young homeowners paying steep property taxes on a capital good that they did 
not yet own. Federal housing policies helped Americans “purchase homes with as little as 5 
percent, and sometimes nothing, down. And yet the assessor comes out and assesses that home at 
the complete value.” “That young man and woman who are starting life have to pay tax on a 
debt, not on an asset,” Metcalf observed. “They are paying tax on a home that is almost 
completely owned by the bank or building and loan company. Yet, they pay the whole tax. We 
[Congress] have to do something about that.” 56 
Indeed, the argument that divisions between levels of government and types of taxation 
were inherently artificial was a theme ran throughout the hearings. “It seems to me that Congress 
faces two closely related tax reform responsibilities,” moderate Illinois Republican Charles Percy 
said. “First, we must reexamine the federal tax code in order to simplify it, to make it more 
equitable by closing loopholes and to increase revenue. At the same time, we must examine local 
financing, especially the local property tax…. For too long we in the federal government have 
turned aside consistent complains about unfair and excessive property taxes, considering them to 
be a local matter.” To change this pattern, Percy proposed using revenue raised from loophole-
closing reforms on the federal level to fund property tax relief and reform on the local level. The 
goal, Percy argued, was to “establish a progressive tax structure and eliminate inequities.” Both 
Percy and Democrat Lee Metcalf attacked tax abatements for local development, calling them 
unfair to other business and homeowners in the same community, in addition to being a drain on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







local coffers. Both also called for meaningful loophole-closing reform of federal income taxes. 
Closing loopholes, Percy noted, would not simply raise revenue, but also restore public trust in 
the tax system. He suggested instituting graduated rates in the minimum tax, which Percy said 
should be strengthened beyond the provisions in the TRA69. Likewise, Democrat Metcalf now 
mocked the inadequate TRA69 as the “Tax Loophole Act of 1969.” Percy countered with the 
“Lawyers and Accountants Tax Relief Act of 1969.” Indeed, both Percy noted how provisions of 
the federal tax code, such as the deductions for state and local taxes and mortgage interest, 
exacerbated the unfairness and progressivity of state and local taxes, since most low- and 
middle-income people did not itemize deductions. “It is a wonder we haven't had a revolt of low-
income people against [such tax benefits for high-income homeowners],” Percy said. 57 
The consensus at the Senate Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee’s property tax 
hearings seemed to be that continuation of the “tax revolt” was inevitable without federal action. 
The worst, many predicted, was yet to come – assuming that Congress did not fix the problem. “I 
think we have to move or face the expectation of a real tax revolt,” Percy said. “We are going to 
have a revolt unless we find ways to correct these grossly negligent or fraudulent practices.” 58 
Just whether Congress and the White House would “move” on property taxes remained to be 
seen, but by 1973 the prospects for action seemed better than ever.  
 
Grassroots Distributionist Tax Politics, Right and Left 
While Nixon may have abandoned tax conservatism in an attempt to outflank both 
Democrats like George McGovern and left-reformers like Ralph Nader, other Republican were 
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eager to test the popularity of right-distributionism with voters desperate for politicians to 
address tax revolt. California Governor Ronald Reagan – a vocal antagonist of Nixon from the 
right on issues like welfare reform – decided to stake all the political capital he had amassed 
during his two terms of governor of California on the idea that the public would approve a 
sweeping anti-tax initiative.  
By 1973, Californians had already rejected tax-slashing overtures from conservatives on 
numerous occasions. Most of these efforts emerged from Los Angeles County and its overheated 
real estate market. Businessman and conservative gadfly Howard Jarvis – the future hero of the 
conservative tax revolt – had tried repeatedly, with the help of an ad hoc coalition of small Los 
Angeles County tax groups and homeowners associations dubbed United Organizations of 
Taxpayers, to gather petitions for a statewide ballot initiative that would have radically slashed 
property taxes in California. Jarvis and UOT, however, never succeeded in meeting the state’s 
relatively modest signature requirements.59 Convinced of the public’s demand for right-leaning 
property tax cuts, Los Angeles assessor Philip Watson used the power of his office to get two 
property tax limitation initiatives on the ballot – one in 1968 and one in 1972. Too radical even 
for many elected Republicans, Watson portrayed his indicatives as a populist defense of 
embattled homeowners in the face of an indifferent legislature. Left-leaning opponents of the 
Watson initiatives, however, portrayed them as handouts to the rich, and both lost by a better 
than two-to-one margin.60 Reagan, however, believed that – with his personal popularity, the 
influence of the governor’s office, the help of right-libertarian activists, buckets of money from 
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business supporters, and, perhaps most importantly, the continued rise in California real estate 
prices and property taxes – his initiative could succeed where others failed. 
Reagan presented California voters with what would become known as Proposition 1, 
now-almost-forgotten plan to cap California’s spending and slash taxes. Prop 1 was designed by 
Reagan’s Tax Reduction Task Force, an all-star team of right-distributionist, libertarian-leaning, 
small-government economists, academics, and lawyers, including Milton Friedman, Martin 
Anderson, James Buchanan, Peter Drucker, William Niskanen, and Anthony Kennedy.61 Prop 1 
embodied the right-libertarian belief tax revolt signified the public’s turning away from big 
government and the welfare states. Voters did not simply want to curb the rise in regressive taxes 
like the local property levies, this view argued. They wanted to reign in government itself. 
Indeed, the experts and activists on Reagan’s TRTF explicitly connected Prop 1 to the national 
goal of curbing big government liberalism. “The New Deal ushered in a period in which 
government spending has been growing by leaps and bounds and has now reached 43%,” 
Friedman said. “Something historic needs to be done to stop that process.”62 Though pitched by 
supporters as a distribution-neutral “tax limitation” plan, the details of the measure revealed a 
clear purpose – to shift the tax burden downward. In its fine print, Prop 1 made it much harder to 
raise progressive taxes, such as the income tax, than to raise regressive sales and property taxes. 
Moreover, Prop 1 called for refunding future state surpluses proportionally based on each 
resident’s income tax payments, not sales or other taxes, making the overall effect of the refunds 
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regressive.63 Prop 1’s supporters, however, repeatedly denied the regressive implications of Prop 
1, and much of the campaign became a battle of who voters trusted more. 
With its clear benefits for business and well-off individuals, Prop 1 attracted enthusiastic 
support from deep-pocketed Californians. Proponents of the plan – including Dart Industries, 
Standard Oil, and the California Chamber of Commerce – outspent opponents by somewhere 
between a three-to-one and five-to-one margin.64 This vast funding advantage allowed pro-Prop 
1 to enact a vast advertising campaign. Governor Reagan personally appeared in radio ads and 
auto-dialed-calls for the measure. He appeared in direct-to-camera television commercials, too, 
as part of an extensive pro-Prop 1 campaign.65 Another series of pro-Prop 1 television ads 
featured a cast of “Silent Majority”-type characters. In one, a blue-collar welder explained, “My 
raises just can’t keep up with those big spenders in Sacramento. That’s why I’m votin’ yes on 
Proposition 1.”66 In another, a frazzled housewife standing in front of a kitchen filled with her 
husband and rambunctious children and told viewers, “Look, I’m no economists… We live on a 
budget, pay our bills, and if there’s anything left, we go to a movie. Why can’t the big spenders 
in Sacramento live on a budget the way we do? They spend and then they tax and keep balancing 
their budget by unbalancing ours. That’s why we’re voting yes on Proposition 1.”67  
Like many conservatives, the Prop 1 campaign based much of its campaign on the notion 
that the citizens who had been voting down local property tax levies and writing letters to their 
representatives about tax reform resented not just government spending, but particular types of 
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government spending – the tax dollars that found their way into the pockets of public assistance 
recipients and public employees. Throughout the Prop 1 campaign, Reagan and the pro-Prop 1 
group, Californians for Lower Taxes, sought to link high taxes to spending on government 
employees and welfare recipients. “Poll after poll has pinpointed welfare as the most unpopular 
of government programs,” task force chair Lewis Uhler wrote to Reagan. “The Federal 
government is in the dangerous position of stuffing more welfare down the people's throats, 
whether they like it or not. Is there a better definition of totalitarianism?”68 In a letter to voters, 
Reagan wrote of the mess tax-and-spend liberalism had created in California when he took 
office.  “The roster of state employees was increasing at the rate of 5,000 per year,” he 
explained. “Burgeoning welfare rolls were threatening even greater fiscal crises.” Prop 1, Regan 
argued, was designed to end that cycle and ensure Californians “permanent tax relief.”69 Other 
pro-Prop 1 materials included print ads with simple anti-tax messages attacking “fat cat 
spenders,” declaring “We’ve had it with skyrocketing taxes!” and “Are you as fed up as we are 
about taxes?” in bold letters.70 Reagan, his all-star roster of libertarian intellectuals, and the 
businesses that funded them were counting on voters answering “yes” and casting their ballot for 
the passage of Prop 1. 
The unions, tax groups, and Democrats opposing Prop 1 took the same approach to 
Reagan’s measure as they had to Philip Watson’s previous initiatives. Anti-Prop 1 forces 
lambasted it as a handout for the rich filled with “loopholes” that allowed local and state 
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legislators to raise regressive taxes, but not progressive ones.71 This time, however, the tax right 
responded forcefully to this argument. Californians for Lower Taxes retakiaged with provocative 
pro-Prop 1 ads featured a fictional closed-door discussion between a Democratic legislator and 
an aide. “Go back and tell my constituents and tell them that proposition 1 will benefit the rich at 
the expense of the poor,” the Democrat tells his aid. “But sir,” the aide interjects, “Proposition 1 
completely eliminates state income taxes for families making less than eight thousand dollars” 
The Democrat clears his throat. “Well, uh, how about this one? It’s never failed me yet. We’ll 
say that proposition 1 gives the rich new tax loopholes.” “But sir, it has nothing to do with 
loopholes,” the aide objects. “Loopholes are your job.” “Oh.” “Maybe we should stick to the 
facts, Sir,” the aide concludes, “and the facts seem to be that Proposition 1 is a way to keep state 
taxes in line with personal income. It’s actually quite simple.”72 With rhetoric like that, Prop 1’s 
proponents hoped to cast the liberal-left’s argument that Prop 1 favored the rich as little more 
than self-serving propaganda pushed by greedy public employees.  
Given Ronald Reagan’s high-profile involvement in the Prop 1 campaign and the 
possibility that one of the most liberal states in the union might slash taxes, the battle over Prop 1 
received wide media coverage. Nationwide, both the left and right viewed the measure as a 
defining event that would determine the direction of the “tax revolt.”73 An ABC Evening News 
report predicted that a victory for Proposition 1 would “immediately…suggest the enactment of 
similar tax-limiting programs in other states” and boost Reagan’s chances for the GOP 
nomination in 1976. Reagan himself predicted that the “tax eaters in the puzzle palaces on the 
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Potomac” would take notice and move to the right on taxes if California voters approved Prop 
1.74 The involvement of prominent out-of-state conservatives like Friedman and the vast funding 
offered by large businesses suggested that many on the right agreed with Reagan on Prop 1’s 
national implications. It was a battle that conservatives believed needed to be won at all costs. In 
the final days of the campaign, pro-Prop 1 forces pulled out all the stops. With dubious legality, 
Reagan even ordered an anti-Prop 1 get-out-the-vote hotline run by public employees to be 
shutdown days before the election.75 Even if Reagan had overstepped his bounds in issuing the 
order, the matter would not be settled until long after voters cast their votes on Prop 1. 
Despite conservatives’ best efforts, however, California voters voted down Prop 1 on the 
November 1973 ballot, 54 to 46 percent. The reasons for its defeat, despite proponents 
overwhelming funding advantage, were simple. Reagan and the conservatives supporting it 
misinterpreted the source of the public’s tax discontent. The pro-Prop 1 coalition’s own internal 
polling found that less than one percent of Californians saw reducing spending on welfare as a 
reason to vote for Prop 1. Instead, most Californians who supported the measure did so for out of 
pocketbook concerns. Opponents’ distributional arguments, however, shifted public opinion 
substantially in the months leading up to the vote. Early polls found that lower- and middle-
income people were most likely to support Prop 1. After months of an anti-Prop 1 campaign that 
portrayed the measure as a handout to the rich, support shifted, and by the end of the campaign 
lower- and middle-income Californians were the least likely to support Prop 1.76 Once again, the 
belief that the tax revolt was motivated by a general anti-tax, anti-government sentiment had led 
conservatives astray. As a result, Reagan’s defeated Prop 1 was the third conservative tax 
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limitation initiative to fail in California in last five years – not counting the initiatives Howard 
Jarvis had failed to quality for the ballot. 
Nor was Prop 1’s defeat merely a reflection of California’s liberalism. Just as Reagan had 
predicted early in the Prop 1 campaign, many conservatives across the country viewed it as an 
inspiration and a model for actions in their own states and, eventually, the nation’s capital. One 
of those conservatives was Arizona Representative Sandra Day O’Connor. Prior to Prop 1’s 
defeat, O’Connor had written to Reagan to find out more about the plan’s details. Eager to see 
the Prop 1 model emulated in other states, Reagan’s team sent O’Connor copious amounts of 
information on the proposal. Armed with Prop 1 as a model, O’Connor placed an almost 
identical measure on Arizona’s 1974 ballot. But Arizona voters defeated the measure just as 
surely as those in California had.77 Even Barry Goldwater’s home state, it seemed, was unwilling 
to buy the anti-tax conservatism that Reagan and his team of right-libertarian economists and 
lawyers were selling. 
While the right was faltering, more and more left-leaning activists were turning to taxes 
as an organizing issue by the mid-1970s. Former CORE and National Welfare Rights 
Organization leader, George Wiley, formed the Movement for Economic Justice in 1972. One of 
MEJ’s first programs was the Tax Justice Project, which focused on supporting tax activism and 
tax reform at all levels of government. MEJ lobbied the federal government while supplying 
organizational and financial support to dozens of left-leaning tax groups across the country. 
Indeed, Wiley’s NWRO and MEJ were just as pivotal as Alinsky or Nader in the left-
distributionist tax justice movement. Through his organizations, Wiley trained or funded  (or 
both) activists that would found pivotal grassroots groups engaged in the tax justice campaign 
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like ACORN and Massachusetts Fair Share. Like Nader and Alinsky, Wiley believed that tax 
politics – and progressive responses to the “economic squeeze,” more broadly – were a majority-
making issue.78 Wiley told Congress that he “hope[d] to unite welfare families with working 
families” by demonstrating to working- and middle-class Americans how tax loopholes put 
“literally millions of wealthy on welfare.”79 “We need taxpayers marching in the streets because 
they have to work two day out of five to pay all their taxes,” Wiley said, “while millionaires are 
paying nothing and corporations are paying a tiny fraction of their legal rate.”80 From his 
experience with NWRO, Wiley knew that the dichotomy between cultural issues and economics 
issues was false. Wiley argued that a broad constituency could unite across racial lines around 
issues like taxes, which included the same elements of injustice and unfairness that animated the 
success grassroots activism of the 1960s.81 “We need a taxpayers revolt,” Wiley argued in a 1973 
speech – a revolt that would stress the link between loopholes for the well-off and high taxes for 
low- and middle-income taxpayers at all levels of government.82  
Tax justice advocates built off the mainstreaming of left-distributionist visions of tax 
reform embodied in the 1972 Democratic Primaries by expanding their operations and 
integrating them into a national network supportive of left-grassroots tax activism. Nader’s 
Public Interest Research Group expanded its tax activism as the 1970s wore on, too. State PIRGs 
investigated taxes throughout the country. Nationally, Nader broadened his group’s scope from 
the property tax to taxes of all types, even changing the Property Tax Newsletter’s name to 
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People & Taxes to reflect the shift. Both publications not only spotlighted stories of grassroots 
tax groups, large and small, across the country, they also published how-to guides instructing 
would-be activists how to undertake actions such as challenging property tax assessments. Just as 
Prop 1 had been an expression of Reagan and his libertarian comrades’ belief that their vision 
embodied the spirit of the public’s resentment of taxes, Nader’s increased investment in tax 
reform was born of his conviction that the tax revolt reflected the public’s disenchantment with 
the fairness of the U.S. tax system. In 1972, Nader told Congress that Americans across the 
country were writing him to express their “outrage” at the unfairness of the tax code. They were 
angry about the inequities in all taxes, Nader argued. “The property tax has borne the brunt of 
taxpayer dissatisfaction with the increasing unfairness of the entire tax structure,” Nader said, 
because property taxes were the only tax citizens had the opportunity to approve or reject on a 
regular basis.83 MEJ’s Tax Justice Project and Nader’s new Tax Reform Research Group served 
as clearinghouses for the dozens of new tax-oriented left-leaning grassroots groups that had 
sprung up across the country in the early-1970s. In addition to organizing strategies, these groups 
exchanged handbooks, studies, buttons, and newsletters with names like Tax Action and Taxation 
with Representation. Even politicians were emulating the grassroots tax left. Former Democratic 
Senator and DNC chair, Fred Harris – who had staged his own tax-themed campaign for the 
White House in 1972 – formed the Tax Action Campaign, adding a mainstream voice the 
grassroots left’s organizing. 84 On tax day in April 1973, TAC staged “Tax Action Day,” which 
featured protests, rallies, and hearings in 31 cities across the country, featuring groups like 
ACORN, the AFL-CIO, and Common Cause, and individuals like George Wiley, Milton Shapp, 
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and Edmund Muskie.85 Indeed, in 1972 and 1973, it was becoming difficult to say where 
grassroots tax activism ended and mainstream Democratic Party policy positions began. 
Due to their strategy-sharing networks, many grassroots tax justice groups deployed 
similar techniques. The common refrains for left-leaning tax activists across the country became 
“Take the Rich off Welfare,” “Fair Taxation or New Representation,” and “Taxpayers for Tax 
Justice.”86 Tax justice groups also had a knack for using headline-grabbing spectacles to generate 
public and legislative interest in often arcane and opaque issues. Like the right-leaning activists 
who would follow them, many of these left leaning groups drew on the imagery of the American 
Revolution. Several groups, in fact, named themselves, their campaigns, or their newsletters the 
“tea party.” For both an Akron, Ohio, group and a Philadelphia group, “TEA” stood for Tax 
Equity for America. One St. Louis group even staged their own imitation of the tea party by 
dumping food and medicine crates into the St. Louis River to protest sales taxes on consumer 
necessities.87 One of the most popular methods these groups used to illustrate tax inequities came 
in the form of “tax avoidance tours” – a protest method recommended by MEJ. Groups from 
Arkansas to California took members of the public – and the media – around cities like Little 
Rock and San Francisco to illustrate the under-assessment of major commercial and industrial 
landholders and the over-assessment of homes in lower- and middle-class neighborhoods.88 
The goals of the “tax justice” left were national in scope. But their activism was rooted in 
the local. MEJ organized tax clinics across the country to help low- and middle-income 
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taxpayers file their federal taxes without having to pay for-profit preparers like H&R Block, 
which came in for withering criticism from the left tax grassroots. In San Francisco, the 
California Tax Reform Association saw more than 1000 people at clinics in the Mission district 
and Chinatown.89 By March 1973, MEJ had tax 43 tax clinics operating throughout the country. 
Wiley viewed the clinics not only as a practical assistance, but also as an element of “political 
education” that would demystify the complex, inequitable tax code.90 Numerous studies found 
that only high-income homeowners and businesses used the property tax assessment appeals 
process, even though low- and middle-income homeowners were often the most overassessed. In 
response, groups across the country substantial tax reductions for hundreds – perhaps even 
thousands – of homeowners each year in cities across the country.91 By establishing for an 
assessment board that houses in a particular neighborhood were overassessed, activists could 
secure de-facto reassessment of the entire neighborhood. “We had an action last year at City Hall 
when I came up for re-appraisement,” Pearl Ford, a Texas ACORN activist explained in 1978. “I 
spoke first about my problem – high taxes – and then I went on to talk about the people, my 
neighbors, who didn’t know how to fight. The council didn’t like what I was saying.” Still, Ford 
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received a $400 tax cut because of her appeal. “And after that,” she explained, “when anyone 
from [her neighborhood] went to the board, they automatically got a reduction.”92 
At the local and state levels, left-leaning tax groups were often able to secure more 
formal policy victories, too. ACORN’s 1972 assessment study found that homes in the low- and 
middle-income neighborhoods where most ACORN members lived were being assessed at much 
higher rates than properties in well-off neighborhoods and business districts, including 300 acres 
connected to the former mayor and his business partners. To publicize its findings, ACORN took 
its members in a bus on a “tax tour” of Little Rock. Further investigation by ACORN found that 
the county Board of Equalization had been granting favorable assessments to the friends and 
family of board members.93 Eventually, ACORN secured a complete reassessment of Pulaski 
County. Statewide, ACORN provided key lobbying support for a bill that exempting individuals 
making less than $5,000 from the state income tax. Eventually, thanks largely to ACORN’s 
activism, courts ordered statewide reassessment of property in Arkansas. 94  In Tennessee, 
environmental justice and tax justice collided. Just as Chicago’s CAP had initially been Citizens 
Against Pollution, other single-issue left-leaning groups also turned to tax politics in the mid-
1970s. Save Our Cumberland Mountains conducted a study challenging the assessment practices 
of coal property in the state. SOCM argued that unmined coal land should be at the rate that 
applied to commercial and industrial property, not the current practice of assessing the land at the 
lower rate reserved for farms. After a three-year battle, SOCM successfully pressured the 
Tennessee State Board of Equalization to reclassify coal land as commercial and industrial 
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property, bringing in new revenue for economically-depressed towns in coal country.95 In Texas, 
the Houston chapter of ACORN responded to assessment increases of several hundred percent in 
1977 by staging protests and organizing mass filings of assessment appeals. Often, the appeals 
resulted in substantial deceases in assessments for low- and middle-income homeowners. But the 
process was time consuming and piecemeal. Many of the most squeezed ACORN members were 
seniors. So ACORN focused on pressuring the school board to grant seniors a $10,000 property 
tax exemption. ACORN organizing door-to-door, launched letter-writing drives, and filed 
petitions. Finally, more than 100 ACORN members stormed a school board meeting carrying a 
model of the “scales of justice” with seniors on one side and the tax-exempt River Oaks Country 
Club on the other. “Seniors don’t seem to carry much weight,” it explained. “The scales of 
justice show ‘the rich get richer, the poor get poorer.’” After weeks on continued demonstrations, 
the board passed a $15,000 exemption for seniors making less than $7,000 for couples and 
$5,000 for individuals.96 In Indianapolis, Indiana, a local grassroots group united with the 
Indiana Education Association and the UAW to expose and block a sweetheart property tax 
exemption on four acres of downtown property that Mayor Richard Lugar had arranged for a 
developer friend.97 
As skyrocketing inflation and the energy crisis increased the already-intense squeeze on 
modest-income families’ pocketbooks, many left-leaning grassroots groups that had embraced a 
“distributionist” tax strategy applied the philosophy of progressive taxation to rising utility 
prices. In 1975, California’s ACORN-affiliated Citizens Action League led a coalition of labor, 
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church, and other community groups in pushing for a reform of the state’s utility pricing system, 
in which electric rates were levied on a “declining block” scale, with large users paying lower 
prices than small users. With protests at Pacific Gas and Electric stockholders meeting and the 
Public Utilities Commission, CAL organized a campaign that culminated in a 1,000-person 
“Citizens Lobby day” at the capitol in Sacramento, where members of the coalition met with 
over 100 legislators to drum up support for its “Lifeline” plan, which proposed to reverse the 
existing rate structure by charging small users the lowest rates. As a result, CAL’s bill passed the 
legislature and was signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown in September 1975 (a rare moment 
of common ground between the grassroots left and Brown, as will be discussed later in this 
chapter), making California the first state to introduce an “inverted” (graduated) rate structure.98 
“Lifeline” utility pricing soon became an organizing issues for left-leaning tax activists across 
the country in the mid-to-late 1970s. 
The tax justice coalition was eager to translate local success to the federal level. But, the 
Democratic Party that had seemed so amenable to – and influence by – the grassroots left in 
1972 would change rapidly following Watergate. In 1973, however, sweeping reform seemed 
within reach. 
 
The Nixon Landslide/Watergate Interregnum  
By the start of 1973, tax reform seemed inevitable. “[N]o matter who occupies the White 
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House in 1973,” Business Week predicted in late-1972, the country would finally get real reform. 
Previous “tax reform” bills had actually been tax cuts masquerading as reform, the magazine 
noted. Now, it seemed like that reform would raised revenue overall by closing loopholes and 
possibly shift this new revenue down the income ladder. The cause of this apparent shift in the 
meaning of reform was clear. “The public distrusts and resents the way in which the federal taxy 
system imposes its load,” the magazine noted correctly, except for the omission of state and local 
taxes. “Voters are increasingly unhappy with tax laws that they think hit the average man too 
hard and the rich and the corporation too softly.” Americans had “responded enthusiastically,” it 
noted, to McGovern’s argument that “the rich and powerful pay less than their fair share.” “[T]he 
taxpayers’ revolt, which Congress tried to stifle with the Tax Reform At of 1969, is back on the 
march,” the magazine concluded.99  
But not everyone agreed with this assessment. Despite all of Nixon’s reform-centric 
rhetoric in the election campaign, the president did not – with the exception of a few measures, 
like progressive property tax relief – support the type of sweeping tax reform favored by left-
distributionists. Even further to the right, a newly energized business movement sought to 
redefine reform as pro-“capital formation” tax cuts. Meanwhile, those on the left continued to 
push for the reforms that had been thwarted in 1969, reforms that they believed had been 
bolstered by countless measures of public opinion, as well as the success of left-distributionist 
tax activists like Ralph Nader.  
 Almost immediately following his landslide victory over George McGovern, President 
Nixon began backpedaling from his left-distributionist, pro-tax reform campaign rhetoric. Nixon 
insisted that, despite a reelection campaign to the contrary, he did not actually promise loophole-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






closing tax reform. “I only made two political commitments on taxes: 1) a tax credit for private 
schools… 2)…property tax relief for the elderly….,” Nixon told Wilbur Mills in a White House 
meeting. “I have no commitment on tax reform at all [from the campaign].”100 To this end, 
talking points prepared by Hank Paulson in February, an Domestic Council staffer, argued that 
Nixon’s victory proved that Americans had rejected McGovern’s tax reform proposals, despite 
the fact that McGovern, as the Nixon team well knew, McGovern bested the president on the 
issue of taxes. “[D]uring the last election [the 1972 presidential election]…the public didn’t fall 
for that line [closing loopholes ‘which benefit the rich’],” the new White House talking points 
claimed. “They recognized that close the ‘loopholes’ meant a tax increase for the working 
man….”101 But the White House did not actually believe its own talking points and, it seems, 
those prepared by Paulson were never used. 
 Privately, the Nixon administration knew that opposing reform would place it on the 
wrong side of public opinion. “It is extremely difficult to defend such special tax provisions as 
capital gains, the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) or the Investment Tax Credit in a public 
forum,” Paulson wrote to Ehrlichman in a March memo. “When we assume the unfavorable 
position of arguing for a ‘loophole’ for big business or the wealthy, any liberal worth his salt can 
‘out demagogue us.’” But Democratic politicians were not the White House’s main concern. 
Rather, it was the public. “If the public voted on capital gains, ADR, ITC, etc., we would 
definitely lose,” Paulson told Ehrlichman. The administration’s best hope, the conservative 
Paulson argued, was to “focus the debate on spending rather than loopholes.”102 However, this 
strategy, as many older administration staffers knew, had not worked in the 1970 midterms. 
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Paulson also suggested a full-throated defense of loopholes. “We should not be afraid to make 
the point that…[i]f we tax capital too heavily the economy will be seriously hurt and all 
Americans will suffer,” he proposed.103 But this, too, was not a strategy that the White House 
would follow.  
Despite his protests to the contrary, the clear implication in all of Nixon’s reelection 
materials was that the president supported sweeping reforms. Indeed, the president’s protests to 
the contrary seemed to be strategic. The White House had watched the Democratic Congress 
take Nixon’s 1969 reform proposals and expand upon them, much to the administration’s 
consternation. In terms of bargaining strategy, it only seemed logical to aim lower this time. 
Indeed, in yet another memo to Ehrlichman on the capital gains issue, Paulson noted that, 
“Although we will initially stake no changes in capital gains and estate and gift taxes, we will 
undoubtedly have to eventually work out some compromise with Congress in these areas.” In 
contrast, if the administration proposed its own capital gains reforms, rather than waiting for 
Congress, it would strengthen the Democrats’ hand and “give away the store.”104 Whatever the 
gamesmanship on capital gains, both publicly and privately, Nixon remained committed to 
federal property tax relief for elderly low- and middle-income homeowners and renters, as well 
as a handful of federal tax reforms, including a stronger minimum tax for upper-income 
taxpayers. Though timid compared to his reelection campaign rhetoric, Nixon sought to move 
forward with these reform proposals, despite the continued reticence of conservatives. 
 Beyond property tax relief, the main reform that Nixon pushed following the election was 
a stronger minimum tax. This plan, Nixon believed, would mark him as “reformer” without 
demanding the type of sweeping loophole-closing demanded by the left. The minimum tax also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Paulson to Ehrlichman, March 14, 1973, WHCF-FI, B 68, F Taxation/Income [22 of 26], RNPL 






seemed to thread the needle between doing nothing, which the public opposed, and closing 
individual loopholes – many of which, like the capital gains preference, were supported by GOP 
conservatives.105  Distancing the president from such conservatives – despite the fact that Nixon 
shared many of their views on loopholes – was one of the administrations’ primary goals. The 
minimum tax was, Nixon said, designed to “ge[t] the assholes who make $50,000 or more and 
don’t pay any taxes.”106 “I don’t care about the rich,” Nixon told advisers. The president wanted 
to break the public’s view of him – as well as the GOP, generally – as servants of the wealthy. 
The minimum tax would stress Nixon’s message that “the poor should pay no tax and the rich 
should pay some tax,” as the president put it.107  Shultz noted that, since there were “inequities” 
and “problems” in the tax, people had “legitimate” complaints. So the last thing Nixon wanted to 
do was fail to propose anything, since that would make it look like the president was saying that 
“the present system is fine,” which was a “weak position.” 108 At the same time, the White House 
sought to avoid needlessly stoking the tax reform fires. Philip Stern released his newest 
mucracking tax book – the unfortunately titled, Rape of the Taxpayer: Why You Pay More and 
the Rich Pay Less, which received raved from Henry Reuss and Stanley Surrey – in early 1973. 
It was promoted not only with full-page ads explaining how J. Paul Getty paid “almost no taxes 
at all” and promising to make readers “mad as hell!” if they read Stern’s book, but also with a 
Stern-penned attack on the administration in the New York Times.109 Initially, the White House 
planned to fire back with a response editorial, but Paulson decided to spike the story, arguing, 
“[W]e’ll only succeed in publicizing the ‘loophole’ issue  [if the White House submitted its 
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 Nixon’s push for minor reforms, like a tougher minimum tax, however, seemed to 
contradict his promise not to raise taxes – a point noticed by the press. Privately, Ehlrichman 
asked the president whether his reinvigorated pursuit of a tougher minimum tax squared with 
Nixon’s election-campaign pledge not to increase taxes. “Then [if you raise revenue with the 
minimum tax] you’re for no tax increase except,” Ehrlichman argued. Nixon disagreed. “Nope,” 
he countered. We’re for tax reform. You see my point?” If the president used the revenue from 
the minimum tax to give property tax relief, they decided, and it all “net[ted] out to zero” then 
that meant that “you haven’t increased taxes, you’ve increased some people’s taxes,” as Shultz 
summarized. 111  Indeed, it was this tenuous distinction between redistribution and a tax hike that 
Ehrlichman would convey to the press. Ultimately, Nixon said approvingly, the way to go on 
taxes was “a crass political decision.” Burns agreed that Nixon did not want to be seen as “in 
favor of the status quo.” The minimum tax, Burns suggested, was not about raising revenue but 
about “a sense of justice – that’s what you have to get across.”112 Nixon, however, wanted to 
ensure that any tax reforms, including the minimum tax, did not hit people making between 
$15,00 and $25,000 because “those are our people.” But the president did not care if it raised 
taxes on people making more than $50,000. Shultz, though, worried that increases on upper-
income people would “scare the hell out of our own [supporters].” Despite supporting the 
minimum tax idea, Arthur Burns agreed with Shultz, noting, “You have a lot of wealthy 
contributors and they will now be affected by this.” Nixon remained undeterred, though. “If…it 
was very clear that you were simply hitting people in the higher – much higher [than $25,000] – 
income brackets [then the minimum tax was a good idea],” Nixon said. “I don’t give a damn 
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about our big contributors. They can crawl on their hands and knees….”113 Nixon, however, still 
made clear he did not want to go “too far” in terms of “kicking the rich folks.”114 
Despite Nixon’s determination to project the image that was attacking “those [rich] 
assholes” who paid little-to-no federal income tax, he also wanted to avoid more progressive 
reforms. Nixon sought allies in key Democrats Russell Long and Wilbur Mills. The president 
hoped that, despite whatever pro-reform hints the two had given in 1972, they had come to their 
sense on tax reform. With Long, Nixon found a sympathetic ear. In a meeting with Nixon in 
February 1973, Long noted the appeal of protesters with signs calling for “fair taxes.” Long was 
furious that both the Democratic Policy Committee and outside groups like Common Cause 
wanted committee chairs to follow the wishes of the majority of the Democratic caucus. Long 
saw this as an attack on his power to dictate tax policy, since he stood far to the right of the 
Democratic caucus on tax reform. What the majority of the Democratic caucus wanted, in 
Long’s view, would look like McGovern’s tax program, but Long was determined to thwart it 
using his power as the Senate Finance Committee chair. Instead, Long said he would support 
only minimum, minor reforms to take a few talking points away from protestors. Nixon agreed 
that it was important to eliminate “gross inequities” so that “radicals” would not have something 
to “beating us over the head with.” But, Nixon said, he would not support measures that would 
“kic[k] business around” or “punish, unfairly, producers.”115 Nixon specifically opposed making 
capital gains taxes “more equitable.” “There’s no plus in that for you and it hurts all your friends 
and it’s just going to make everybody mad,” Nixon said. More than perhaps any other reform, 
closing the capital gains loophole would alienate the “rich voters” who formed the GOP’s base. 
Long agreed, telling Haldeman that it would “crazy” to reform capital gains. “There’s no votes in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Nixon Tapes, 772-12b (September 7,1972) 
114 Nixon Tapes, 852-15 (February 7, 1973) 






closing these loopholes. There’s not one vote in it for the president. There’s not one vote in it for 
me,” Long told Haldeman.116 Long pledged to Nixon that he would ensure that significant 
reforms never got past the Finance Committee. Long called the liberal reform provisions – 
particularly Al Gore’s amendments – in TRA69 “a bunch of junk,” and promised that Nixon 
would not be put in the position again of having to sign something so radical. Long’s strategy 
was to insert something radically conservative into any bill that reformers put something 
“irresponsible” into, that way he could try to force reformers to drop their measure in exchange 
for Long dropping his. “We have to start thinking about the politics of this thing on our side,” 
Long advised Nixon.117 The Senate Finance chair would do his best to ensure that Democrats 
would not turn Nixon’s reform proposals into much bolder measures.  
Wilbur Mills seemed to take his election-year turn towards tax reform more seriously 
than Long or Nixon, even as he remained anything but a committed left-distributionist. Mills’s 
embrace of left-distributionist reform during his short-lived presidential campaign gave hope to 
reformers, and Mills’s withdrawal from the presidential race did not dampen, at least initially, his 
commitment to reform. Indeed, it now seemed that the one of the foremost Democratic 
proponents of fiscalist, rather than distributionist, analyses of the tax system was beginning to 
rethink his position. “I would like to talk to you today about tax reform. There is great interest in 
this subject throughout the nation and properly so,” Mills told the Securities Industry Association 
– a no less tax-reform hostile a place than the site of McGovern’s tax reform speech – in 
September 1972. “Our taxpayers, particularly in view of the heavy burdens placed on them, have 
the right to expect that the tax system be as fair as possible. They have the right to expect that 
everyone pay his fair share of the taxes because it is obvious that if some are permitted to escape 
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payment of their fair share of the taxes, the rest of us will have to make up the difference in our 
tax payments.” Despite his less-than-enthusiastic stance towards reform during the 1969 debates, 
Mills now praised TRA69 for what it had accomplished, while maintaining that the TRA69 did 
not go far enough.  “[W]hen the Congress passed the 1969 Tax Reform Act, we did not regard 
this Act as the end of all tax reform….,” Mills said. “In my opinion, the time has come for the 
Congress to make an exhaustive review of our tax laws….” The first goal of this new round of 
reform, Mills said, would be “to make sure that the tax laws are operating fairly; that each 
taxpayer is bearing his fair share of the burden; and that no one is able to pass on the burden that 
he properly should bear on to the shoulders of someone else.” In other words, distributional 
issues should now take center stage. Most tax preferences, Mills suggested, were suspect. 
“[E]xclusions and tax allowances should be continued only if they can be demonstrated to be 
beneficial and in the public interest,” the Ways and Means chair said. “And, in considering what 
is beneficial and in the public interest, we must examine carefully all the equity, economic and 
administrative considerations.”118 These were the words that reformers had longed to hear from 
Mills. However, by the first months of 1973, Mills seemed to hedging his bets.  
Meeting with Mills in February 1973, Nixon sought common ground. “We [the 
administration] won’t go as far in reform – and you won’t – as some want to go,” Nixon told 
Mills. But, the president, conceded, “Sometimes we have to realize what we’re up against [in 
terms of pro-reform forces].” The popularity of reform and the strength of the left-distributionist 
agitators continued to weigh on Nixon’s mind. “How far do we have to go [on reform]?” Nixon 
asked Mills. The Ways and Means chair told Nixon that, if Mills could get reform that lowered 
the top income tax rate to 50 percent, then he would consider eliminating the preferential rate for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







capital income. A concerned Nixon interjected, saying that such a proposal would send their 
“friends on Wall Street…right up the wall.” Nixon speculated that average Americans might be 
upset up it, too. Mills doubted it, though. He told Nixon that almost all capital gains went to 
people who made more than $100,000. Capital gains taxes already allowed for the exclusion of 
the sale of a home, which was the only gain most people ever realized, as long as they reinvested 
the gain in another home. So, Mills concluded, average Americans had little reason to worry 
about. Rather than worry about Wall Street, Mills encouraged Nixon to focus on middle-income 
taxpayers. That was where the “greatest relief is needed,” since they had few tax breaks. “I 
couldn’t agree more…,” Nixon responded. “They’re the great Silent Majority. They’re raising 
hell – [George] Meany’s folks, the people below Meany’s folks, even. They earn $5[000], 
$10[000].” You could not, Nixon opined, live in Whittier, California, Nixon’s hometown, or 
Little Rock, Arkansas, near Mills’s hometown, on $5,000. Tax reform, Nixon and Mills agreed, 
needed to target those Americans.119  
In the press, Mills made it clear that the direction of tax reform remained uncertain. 
Hearings in his committee, Mills said, would either “increase the fairness” of the tax code, or 
“make a showing” to skeptical Americans that the code was already “as far as it can me.” Indeed, 
Mills seemed to indicate that the latter view had some validity. “If the income tax law is not 
unfair, and I know it is not, to the extent that some people have indicated it is, I want the 
American people to know that,” Mills told the Arkansas Democrat. The Ways and Means chair, 
though, did make clear that certain reform and relief provisions, like lessening the capital gains 
preference and enacting a program of property tax reform for the elderly, remained very much on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






the table.120 Like the TRA69, it seemed the direction of reform would ultimately depend on the 
push and pull of advocates on both sides of the reform debate – not only between Democrats and 
Republicans, but also distributionists and fiscalists within both parties. Most significantly, 
conservative business-backed groups – prompted by threats from left-distributionists like Nader 
and McGovern – waged a both intellectual and political fight for right-distributionism, which 
they increasingly couched in terms inflation-fighting, growth-boosting fiscalism.   
 The combination of the left-distributionist rhetoric of the 1972 presidential election, the 
popularity of reform among the public, and the success of activists like Nader and CAP, along 
with populist Democrats at the state level, mobilized the executives of corporate America as 
never before. Efforts of the business lobby to counter the expansion of the welfare state and what 
it saw as the encroachment of government on the private sector were nothing new. The New 
Deal, after all, had prompted a strong business backlash.121 However, many executives viewed 
the developments of the 1960s and early-1970s – the New Left, the consumer movement, the tax 
justice movement, and others – as a new and profoundly disturbing assault on “free enterprise.” 
These executives had good reason to be worried. The “anti-business” sentiment supposedly 
fomented by the left with exposes like Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed struck a nerve with the 
public. Between 1967 and 1971, the percentage of American who agreed that there was “too 
much power concentrated in the hands of a few large companies for the good of the nation” rose 
from 54 to 66 percent.122 Throughout the 1970s, surveys delivered even more alarming messages 
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to business. “Big business corporations” were consistently cited in the early-1970s as the group 
that had “too much power and influence in our society,” surpassing labor union, government, and 
the press, among other groups.123 Nearly seven in ten agreed that business swayed government 
policies so much that the public was being “shortchanged” when they bought products or 
services.124 By 1977, the public held business in such low esteem that when CBS News and The 
New York Times conducted a poll in 1977 with a series of questions about crime victimization, 
more Americans said that they were worried about “being cheated by corporations” than being 
robbed at gunpoint.125 
 In response to what it saw as an existential threat, business organized as never before in 
the 1970s. A variety of corporate executives, politicians, and conservative intellectuals sounded 
the alarm early in the decade, pointing out the need for business to fight back against the 
influence of activists on the left. Perhaps the most famous call-to-arms of this era is the so-called 
“Powell Memo,” sent by conservative attorney Lewis Powell, Jr. to Eugene Syndor, the chair of 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s education committee, just months before Nixon would appoint 
Powell to the Supreme Court. Titled “Attack on American Free Enterprise System,” Powell 
warned that the “assault on the enterprise system” was “gaining momentum and converts.” The 
leaders of this attack ranged from labor unions to liberal university professors to the press to 
ostensibly objective foundations and think tanks. Ralph Nader, Powell noted, was the “single 
most effective antagonist of American business.” In Powell’s view, these forces had completely 
overpowered corporations, which Powell portrayed as helpless victims. “[F]ew elements of 
American society today have as little influence in government as the American businessman, the 
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corporation, or even the millions of corporate stockholders,” Powell wrote, without a trace of 
irony. “One does not exaggerate to say that, in terms of political influence with respect to the 
course of legislation and government action, the American business executive is truly the 
‘forgotten man.’”126  
If the left had its way, critics like Powell warned, things would only get worse, 
particularly when it came to taxes. “Favorite current targets [of the left] are proposals for tax 
incentives through changes in depreciation rates and investment credits,” he wrote. “These are 
usually described in the media as ‘tax breaks,’ ‘loop holes’ or ‘tax benefits’ for the benefit of 
business. As viewed by a columnist in the [Washington] Post, such tax measures would benefit 
‘only the rich, the owners of big companies.’” To correct this sorry state of affairs, Powell 
advised corporate executives, the Chamber, and other business groups needed to “launch a 
counter-attack” of “confrontation politics,” including “attack[ing] the Naders” and “penalize[ing] 
politically those who oppose [the views of business].”127 Powell was not alone in sounding this 
alarm, and his lesson was one that many busineses had already learned. When corporations’ 
taxes were criticized by individuals like Nader or grassroots groups like CAP, executives did not 
hesitate to fire back. C. Lowell Harris, of the business-financed Tax Foundation, also warned of 
left-distributionist attacks on tax preferences benefitting corporations and the rich. In a 1972 
article, Harris warned of the “insidious and negative – even hostile…anti-business and anti-
capital attitudes [that] seem[ed] to spreading” and that manifested themselves in “proposals for 
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heavier taxes” on businesses and the well-off. “Perhaps we might dream – for a moment – of a 
time in which, with good justification, the business world could feel that government was really 
on its side…,” Harriss lamented. “Can any of us really envisage an environment in which 
something in the tax world favorable…to the business system was not thought of as a 
‘giveaway,’ a disreputable outcome of a selfish transfer to a few at the expense of the many?” 
Business needed to work, he advised, to make that “dream” a reality.128 Reginald Jones, the chair 
and CEO of General Motors, warned in the Harvard Business Review of the “antiprofit, 
antibusiness attitudes that have been rotting out the very foundations of our economy.” Corporate 
American needed a sustained effort to reverse not only this attitude, but also the “discriminatory 
tax treatment” of capital, which Jones argued was impeding “capital formation.” Business 
needed to begin pushing for tax reform “now,” Jones stressed. “[N]ot the kind of tax reform that 
regards every incentive to invest as a ‘loophole,’” Jones explained, but rather tax reform that 
makes it possible for business to finance the future of this country.” The GM chair knew that the 
public, as well as many politicians, favored the type of “loophole”-closing reform that Jones 
opposed. “The business community has a selling job to do,” Jones advised. “The problem of 
capital formation, and the consequences of inaction, must be set forth in compelling, job-and-
pocketbook terms that voters can understand – and that politicians will respect.”129   
Following the advice of prophets like Powell, Harriss, and Jones, the business response to 
the rise of the grassroots left was multi-pronged. The most significant immediate response 
proved to be the founding of new business think tanks and lobbying groups, as well as the 
reinvigoration and radicalization of older ones. Both corporations and wealthy individuals – 
including Richard Mellon Scaife, John Olin, Joseph Coors, and David and Charles Koch, among 
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others – poured money into business-friendly foundations, new and old, in the 1970s. Some 
donors were responding to the general anti-business trend, others, like Coors, were inspired 
directly by the Powell memorandum. Together and individually, they would launch the Heritage 
Foundation, Business Roundtable, Cato Institute, and American Council for Capital Formation, 
among others, in the 1970s. They would also revive and strengthen older institutions, like the 
Tax Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, the National Association of Manufacturers, 
and the Chamber of Commerce, pushing many even further to the right in the process, given that 
Powell and others had criticized these older groups for exerting insufficient muscle to battle 
Nader and his allies. The Chamber’s Syndor, for example, formed a task force at the Chamber to 
implement the Powell memo’s recommendations, including sharpening the Chamber’s political 
attacks.130 To combat this long-term decline in stature, corporations like General Motors and 
DuPont would sent millions of dollars to right-wing groups like the Foundation for Economic 
education in order to create comic books, pamphlets, television specials, and classroom lesson 
plans teaching Americans lessons like that minimum wages were a symptom of a “planned 
economy,” as one “discussion guide” for use in schools put it.131 The more immediate issue for 
the business lobby, however, was stopping the enactment of policies it deemed detrimental to its 
interests, particularly when it came to taxes. While, as the TRA69 debates demonstrated, 
business representatives had never been hesitant to press their case when it came to tax policy, 
the 1970s would see an even more aggressive stance on the part of corporations, upper-income 
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individuals, and their allies, both on the federal and (as will be discussed later in this chapter) 
state levels.  
The tax reform hearings promised by Wilbur Mills during the election year opened in 
February 1973. As the hearings began, the Treasury published estimates of the cost and 
distribution of federal “tax expenditures” – what most reformers dubbed “loopholes.” The single 
most expensive provision was the preferential rate for capital gains, which cost the Treasury $5.6 
billion in revenue in 1971. The deductibility of state and local taxes tied capital gains for 
costliness. Other large expenditures included the investment tax credit ($1.8 billion) and the 
deductibility of charitable contributions ($3.2 billion).132 But, from the start, it was clear that the 
idea of a general consensus around the need for progressive tax reform – especially around 
capital income – was a myth, at least insofar as conservatives were concerned. In orientation, the 
executives and economists appearing before the Ways and Means Committee to combat the 
proposals voiced by McGovern and approved by the public were themselves right-
distributionists. Under no circumstance was any element of the left-distributionist vision 
acceptable to them. At all turns, these spokespersons for the tax right sought to cut taxes for 
corporations and wealthy individuals, shifting taxes downward towards consumers and lower-
income individuals. However, during the 1973 tax debates, these lobbyists mixed philosophical 
arguments – positing left-distributionist reforms as immoral thievery – with fiscalist pitches that 
portrayed cutting taxes on business and the rich as a solution to inflation and economic 
stagnation.  
Business lobbyists entered the post-1972 election era determined, following the advice of 
Powell and others, to stem the rising tide of left-distributionist tax reform. As the 1973 reform 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






debates began, conservative economists, think tank spokespersons, and corporate officials struck 
at the very foundations of progressive tax reform. In part, this meant attacking the American 
public itself. The popularity of loophole-closing tax reforms, business spokespersons argued, 
should be irrelevant to tax policymaking. Most Americans, they argued, did not know what was 
good for them. Alan Greenspan, Leon Kendall, and John Whitehead, a partner at Goldman 
Sachs, testified on behalf of the Securities Industry Association – a newly formed finance-
lobbying powerhouse, produced by the 1972 merger of the Investment Banker’s Association and 
the Association of Stock Exchange Firms. The SIA’s biggest concern echoed the alarm 
expressed by many business lobbyists and representatives: Americans, at least when it came to 
taxes, were trending too far to the left. “We also come to express our concern over the decline in 
the willingness of Americans to supply the risk capital to keep the enterprise economy growing 
and competitive in a fast-changing world…,” Whitehead said. “There is little doubt that the 
concept of the capital gains tax is under attack.” The public increasingly saw “capital gains [as] 
just another way for the rich to avoid paying a fair share of the national tax burden,” the SIA 
representatives dismayed. 133 A representative of the New York Stock Exchange agreed. “[T]here 
is a lack of knowledge and lack of understanding of the American people of how the free 
enterprise system works,” the NYSE’s board chair James J. Needham argued.134 The Tax 
Foundation fired back at the rising tide of left-distributionist reform in a multi-volume 
September 1972 report. It argued, for example, that certain ideas – that “wealthy people are not 
paying income taxes,” “corporations do not pay taxes,” or “recent tax legislation has favored 
business” – were myths. Perhaps the biggest claim the Tax Foundation sought to dispel, though, 
was the idea that “the tax system is riddled with loopholes which favor the rich.” “So-called 
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loopholes,” the foundation argued, were there for a reason and would not raise much revenue if 
closed. Instead, the foundation cited Irving Kristol’s “Tax Populism” article and comments by 
Herbert Stein to support the idea that the public actually did not care about tax fairness, or have 
any particular distributional preferences. Rather, the public simply wanted tax reduction and a 
smaller government.135  Testifying on behalf of the foundation, C. Lowell Harris blamed the 
public’s “antibusiness attitudes,” presumably fomented by the likes of Nader, for this state of 
affairs. He lamented that average Americans had “difficulty” recognizing the tax “biases against 
capital….despite the fact that never has an economic system, has business, produced so well or 
treated the masses so well.” 136 The SIA and investment banks across the country hoped to 
educated the “masses.” A SIA-written leaflet, “What You Should Know About Tax ‘Reform’ on 
Your Capital Gains,” was sent out to tens of thousands of stockholders across the country in 
1973. The pamphlet predicted financial pain for stockholders as well as doom for the economy if 
capital gains taxes were raised. It encouraged investors to write the Ways and Means and Senate 
Finance committees. “It is necessary…that investors do register their views now,” the pamphlet 
concluded.137 The press, however, slammed misleading statements in the leaflet and, despite 
SIA’s hopes, the leaflet seemed to have no impact on the public’s views on tax reform.138 
If business could not sway public opinion, it hoped it could convince Congress to swim 
against the tide of public opinion. While many observers regarded loophole-closing reform as 
inevitable, especially when it came to capital income, these right-distributionists did not. “[W]e 
are told by those wise in the way of politics that, since there are more people in this country who 
do not own stock than there are stockholders, we are going to lose this battle,” SIA’s Whitehead 
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lamented. But, Whitehead explained, the goal of the IAF, and other likeminded organizations, 
was to ensure that this seemingly inevitable outcome did not come to pass. 139 NAM’s tax 
committee chair E. A. Vaughn denounced the “hysteria that arose over the tax reform issue in the 
last few years.” Vaughn hoped that the hysteria had  “disappeared” and that “objective” views of 
taxation – such as, presumably, those of NAM – could now prevail.140 Corporate lobbyists were 
concerned that Americans were being led astray by the idea of “fairness” put forth by left-
distributionists. The entire notion of “fairness,” business lobbyists argued, was meaningless. 
Norman Ture, a proto-“supply sider” who had previously served as an adviser to Wilbur Mills, 
quipped, “Fairness, like beauty and so many other things, is in the eye of the beholder. No 
university, thank heavens, bestows an advanced degree in fairness or has an endowed chair as a 
professor of fairness.” 141  Ture called supporters of tax equity as “zealots,” who, he argued, were 
dedicated to the meaningless and “elusive” ideas “horizontal equity” and “ability to pay.”142 
Greenspan likewise dismissed the “equity argument” against the preferential rate for capital 
gains. The left-distributionist view implicit in the “equity argument” was, Greenspan implied, 
socialistic. “[E]quity is usually synonymous with increasing tax rates for high income taxpayers 
and/or decreasing them for lower income taxpayers,” Greenspan said. “From this one must infer 
that ultimate equity exists when after-tax incomes of all individuals is equal.” Making sure his 
point was not missed, Greenspan added, “[T]his is not the principle which governs our free 
society, but one which is associated with socialism,” because it implied that “individuals are 
allowed to have income not as a right, but as a privilege vouchsafed by the state.”143 Ture 
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debated the validity of the very concept of “so-called tax expenditure[s],” as he put it. 144 Hoover 
Institution economist, and former National Tax Association president, Dan Throop Smith told 
the Ways and Means committee dismissed the idea of a “loophole” as irrelevant, arguing that it 
presumed all income belonged the government, not individuals. “[M]oney not taken away in 
taxation is not deemed to be given to them by the kindness of Congress and the government,” he 
quipped.145 There was no way to objectively say what tax structure was more or less fair, 
business representatives reiterated. Therefore fairness considerations should be completely 
removed form discussions of tax policy.146  
By denouncing the idea of “fairness,” business-friendly experts hoped to shift the tax 
debate from distributionist to fiscalist terminology. And, though the effects of the tax program 
that corporate lobbyists pushed in 1973 were decidedly right-distributionist, in that it would 
undeniably shift income upward, these business lobbyists couched their proposals in terms of 
growth and inflation. Perhaps the foremost lobbyist for the idea that the low taxation on capital 
income produced widespread economic and social gains was the newly formed American 
Council on Capital Gains and Estate Taxation, which would quickly rename itself the American 
Council for Capital Formation. It billed itself as  “a voluntary association of investors…formed 
out of the growing concern among investor-savers…that failure to understand and communicate 
the realities of capital formation, capital investment, and capital transfer in our economy would 
invite the adoption of tax policies detrimental to the nation’s productivity and economic health.” 
However, its membership was, in fact, almost exclusively bankers and corporate executives. The 
ACCF acknowledged the Treasury data showing that capital gains were concentrated almost 
exclusively among the very richest taxpayers was true. It argued, however, that such data was 
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irrelevant. “Capital gains are available to those who invest rather than consumer their earnings,” 
ACCF’s Leroy Simkins said. “Obviously, the higher a person’s earnings and income, the greater 
will be his potential for savings.” Such rich individuals were merely enjoying the “American 
dream,” according to the ACCF. Moreover, their investing would spread that dream down the 
income ladder. “One of the best ways to cure inflation, or offset it, and certainly the most 
confortable way for everybody, is to improve productivity,” ACCF’s George Cline Smith said. In 
contrast, he warned, “any tax change which shifts interest from investment towards consumption 
will simply intensify the problem [of inflation].”147  It was an old argument. During the TRA69 
debates Pierre Rinfret, Dow chair Carl Gerstacker, and representatives of the NYSE had all 
argued that increased capital investment would ultimately lower inflation by boosting 
productivity. Now, though, this argument gained relevancy as inflation began to, once again, 
creep upward following the expiration of Nixon’s wage-price controls.148 
Business conservatives sought to portray any attempts to “redistribute” income through 
closing loopholes as counterproductive. The only ones who would be hurt, they argued, would be 
average Americans. In the middle of the 1972 campaign, the National Association of 
Manufacturers hired Norman Ture to fire back against the increasing focus of left-distributionist 
reformer on both tax loopholes and the larger issue of growing income inequality. Published by 
NAM in January 1973, Ture’s “Tax Policy, Capital Formation, and Productivity” made the case 
that attempts to reduce income inequality or close “so-called loopholes” inevitably led to 
perverse and “self-defeating” outcomes. Ture attacked left reforms like George McGovern, who 
Ture noted “focused his 1972 presidential campaign on income redistribution” through the tax 
code. “[T]he present emphasis on closing ‘loopholes,’ if reflected in tax changes, would 
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accentuate the anti-savings bias without significant gains in reducing income inequality,” he 
wrote.  Ture argued that “tax-transfer income redistribution policies” were “ineffectual in 
reducing income inequality” because they had an “anti-saving, anti-capital formation cast,” 
thereby reducing growth, surprising employment and wages, and driving up dependence on 
government welfare programs. If anything, in Ture’s view, U.S. tax policy was already too 
“strongly redistributive.” 149  NAM’s Vaughn touted Ture’s study, summarizing its main 
conclusion thusly: “Imposing penalties on savings and capital formation in the name of 
redistribution is self-defeating and can only result in lower real wages for all.”150 All of the 
business representaitves agreed with this view and stressed it repeatedly. “Our present highly 
progressive income tax rate structure discourages investment…,” the Chamber of Commerce’s 
Walker Winter said. “The result is that everyone loses – the poor as well as the rich, and labor as 
well as management.” 151 The NYSE’s Needham even argued that – since the preferential 
treatment of capital income actually benefitted the whole society, in terms of higher wages and 
more jobs, not simply the pocketbooks of who actually made money off of capital – it was no 
longer beneficial to even use the term “worker,” since it implied a conflict with capital owners. 
“I think we ought to stop talking of the American worker,” Needham said. “We should start 
talking of the American citizen. That worker distinction has long since passed.”152 If Congress 
wanted to cure economic and social ills, business lobbyists told the Ways and Means Committee, 
the answer was to keep taxes on capital income low. “No tax ought to be applied to capital 
gains,” Ture argued. He also proposed that Congress increase business incentives like ADR, 
eliminate the corporate income tax, and reduce or eliminate the estate tax (or “death tax,” as Ture 
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put it). Ture additionally called for cutting individual income taxes – but only for the upper 
brackets. While these changes would, undoubtedly, drastically reduce – and, likely, entirely 
eliminate – the progressivity of federal taxes, Ture was not concerned. Just because many 
Americans and policymakers found it “repugnant” to accept a tax system that would 
“disproportionately burden the poor” should not stop policymakers from putting such a system in 
place. A regressive tax system, Ture concluded, would lead to the fastest economic growth.153 
Though Ture’s proposals were perhaps the most extreme, every corporate lobbyists, conservative 
economist, and right-wing think tank representative agreed that the only way to lower inflation 
and boost growth was to cut taxes on capital gains and investment even further.154 A tax on 
capita, the SIA put it, was “a tax on progress.” 155 
Liberal economists, left-distributionist activists, and populist Democrats came to the 
exact opposite conclusion as business lobbyists. Left-leaning economists, like Yale professor 
Boris Bittker and the Brookings Institution’s Joseph Pechman, focused on rebutting 
conservatives’ argument that low rates on capital income benefitted the entire country. Bittker 
questioned why, if the U.S. was as biased against investment as Ture and others suggested, the 
U.S. did “not look more like Bangladesh.” “I think Mr. Ture is muddying the waters,” Pechman 
agreed. Pechman pointed out that the rate of savings had remained virtually unchanged from the 
1920s, when the country had “very, very low” tax rates. Growth was actually much higher in the 
post-WWII era, Pechman noted, even though the U.S. had higher capital gains tax rates. “During 
the past three years, this committee raised the maximum capital gains tax rate form 25 to 36 ½ 
percent,” Pechman explained. “They [business representatives like Ture] would have told you 
three years ago that all sorts of terrible things were going to happen as a result of that increase in 
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the tax rate. In fact, no terrible things have happened.”156  Few negative consequences would 
occur from another increase in the capital gains rate, they suggested.  
Left-reformers once again linked the tax revolt to the unfairness of the federal tax code.  
“I would like to increase progressivity rather than reduce it,” Pechman said. “I also believe that 
the so-called tax revolt is a revolt by low- and middle-income people who see the tax favors and 
tax benefits given to high income people, thus permitting them to accumulate more and more 
income and wealth.”157 Other left-leaning witnesses amplified this message. “We have a crisis 
over tax reform because countless ordinary men and women are beginning to awaken to the fact 
that our federal revenue laws are nothing but a giant sieve, full of loopholes, through which pour 
billions of dollars in special benefits each year,” Ted Kenedy said.158 The continuation of 
loopholes, George McGovern agreed, was contributing to “distrust” of the government among 
Americans.159 Both Kennedy and Muskie also touted Philip Stern’s latest loophole-exposing 
bestseller, The Rape of the Taxpayer.160 The time was overdue for reform, the argued. It had been 
four years since Joseph Barr predicted the “taxpayers revolt” to Congress, McGovern noted, but 
all that had been accomplished since was TRA69, which the Democrat said “should have been 
called the tax mirage act of 1969.”161 Ohio Democrat John Sieberling argued that TRA69 merely 
postpone[d] the threatened ‘revolt.’” “The loopholes and inequities have been there for a long 
time,” Sieberling said, “[but] the public’s awareness of them, however, is was a relatively new 
phenomenon.” If anything, he argued, the TRA69 debates, which made the front pages of papers, 
had simply educated more Americans about the remaining loopholes in the federal tax code. 
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“And in recent years,” he continued, “the increasing pressures of other taxes on the low- and 
middle-income workers – local property taxes, state sales taxes, and the social security payroll 
tax –have brought an awareness to almost allpeople that our so-called ‘progressive’ tax system is 
not very progressive at all.”162  
The TRA69 had done little to solve the loophole problem, populist Democrats agreed. 
AFL-CIO president George Meany argued that, thanks to ADR and other provisions in TA71, 
the tax system had gotten worse since 1969. The “taxpayers’ revolt” scared Congress into its 
limited action in 1969, Meany noted, and it had not gone away in the years since. It was time for 
Congress to go further.163 Other left-reformers cited statistics demonstrating the continued 
prevalence of loopholes after TRA69. “Under the [remaining] loopholes, the more you have in 
income, the more you save in taxes. For example, the loopholes now save a machinist who earns 
$10,000 a year only $480. But an investor who makes half a million dollars a year may avoid 
$150,000…,” McGovern said. “[T]hese federal statistics tell only part of the story. In the last 20 
years state and local taxes which fall hardest on the average citizens have also increased 
dramatically. For example, property and sales taxes have more than doubled in the last 15 
years…. Our tax system therefore tends to be regressive, not progressive.” The minimum tax and 
other TRA69 provisions had done little to prevent either rich individuals or large corporations 
from escaping taxation. Not only had nearly 400 families making more than $100,000 per year 
pay no federal income taxes, but companies like U.S. Steel paid no taxes and received a 
substantial refund.164 Statistics like these, the populist Democrats argued, were the source of 
much of Americans’ frustrations. 
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While many of the Ways and Means members likely took the testimony of economists 
like Pechman and legislators like Muskie more seriously, perhaps the most significant element of 
the 1973 Ways and Means hearings was the growing contingent of left-distributionist reformers. 
Thomas Stanton testified on behalf of Nader’s Tax Reform Research Group. Unlike many 
observers, the TRRG remembered the polling data on taxes from the fall election, and it sought 
to remind the members of the Ways and Means Committee of those results. “The public favored 
George McGovern over President Nixon on the tax reform issue alone,” TRRG’s statement 
noted. “[And] an October Harris survey found 67% of voters felt ‘the tax laws are written for the 
rich and not for the average man.’”165 George Wiley appeared before the committee, along with 
nine other left-distributionist grassroots reforms, including leaders of other MEJ-affiliated 
groups, such as Lucille Adams of the St. Louis Tax Reform Group, Lillian Woo of the North 
Carolina Consumers Council, and William Callahan of Philidelphia-based Tax Equity for 
America. Both Stanton and Wiley submitted data that echoed McGovern’s testimony in 
demonstrating the tremendous value loopholes provided to upper-income taxpayers and the very 
sparse benefits afforded to low- and middle-income Americans. Using data from Joseph 
Pechman and Benjamin Okner, Wiley and MEJ calculated that existing tax loopholes gave a per 
capita benefit of $322 for families making less than $15,000 and nearly $2,000 for families 
making more than $15,000. TRRG’s data broke down the value of each loophole on a per-return 
basis. For example, the per return value of the mortgage interest deduction was $50 for taxpayers 
in the $10,000 to $15,000 AGI range, and less for those below, whereas the average return for 
taxpayers making more than $100,000 received more than $400 from the home mortgage interest 
deduction. Deductibility of property taxes showed a similar pattern, offering just over $90 per 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






return in the $10,000 to $15,000 group and more than $1,750 per return over $100,000. The 
pattern for charitable contributions and capital gains were even more disparate. Combined, they 
averaged approximately $100 per $10,000 to $15,000 return and nearly $50,000 per $100,000 
return, with capital gains accounting for $38,000 of that total.166  
Reflecting the duality of “populism,” left-distributionists stressed the similarities between 
the social expenditure “welfare” for low-income Americans that conservatives derided and the 
tax expenditure “welfare” that conservatives defended. McGovern argued loopholes that let 
certain types of income escape taxation was the same as writing a “welfare check,” except that 
the loopholes overwhelmingly benefitted the rich. While there had been much hand-wringing 
over welfare reform for the poor, McGovern noted, Congress had dedicated substantially less 
time to welfare for the rich. 167 Kennedy called the Internal Revenue Code “America’s biggeste 
welfare bill of all,” a type of welfare that “go[es] entirely to the richest individuals and the 
nation’s largest corporations.” 168 Loopholes were simply another form of welfare, Wiley agreed. 
“[MEJ’s goal is to] get some of the people who have been so hostile to poor people on welfare to 
begin to understand that this committee and this Congress have put literally millions of wealthy 
on welfare,” Wiley said. “I would suggest, for example, if the average taxpayer understood that 
the welfare bill for the families that we have represented in NWRO is about $7 billion a year, 
and the welfare bill for the wealthiest 3 percent of the families in America is at a minimum of $5 
billion a year, then I think Richard Nixon would be less able to attack welfare families as the 
scapegoats for the Nation's problems and maybe more attention would be focused on serious 
reform….”169  
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The liberal economists, populist policymakers, and grassroots activists all called for 
loophole-closing reforms to make the tax code more progressive, differing only in the 
ambitiousness of their proposals. All argued that capital gains taxes should be raised, with 
several suggesting that it should simply be taxed at the same rate as other income. “There are no 
valid grounds from the point of view of tax equity to accord special treatment to capital 
gains…,” Harvard economist Richard Musgrave said. “Failure to tax capital gains as ordinary 
income has been the dominant source of tax avoidance by high-income groups.”170 Muskie, 
McGovern, and Kennedy all offered a variety of loophole-closing proposals, with McGovern 
reiterating his call for the enactment of the Mills-Mansfield proposal to close 54 major 
loopholes. “Higher taxes for the tax avoider will mean lower taxes for the average citizen,” 
McGovern said. “Fairer taxes for all our citizens will mean greater public confidence in 
government.”171 Reducing taxes for low- and middle-income Americans was a shared goal of the 
reformers. Wiley, for example, touted his continued support for “[NWRO’s] $6,500 negative 
income tax at the bottom along with more progressive tax relief for people in the middle.”172  
Left-distributionsts’ calls for reform were met with a typical mix of disdain and interest 
from members of Congress. One of the grassroots reformers who testified was Robert Loitz, a 
small-businessman from Ohio who had attracted national attention – including that of Edmund 
Muskie and George McGovern – by gathering tens of thousands of signatures on a petition 
calling for tax reform that would repair the fact that “ultra-rich avoid paying taxes because of 
built-in loopholes in our tax laws.” Loitz told NBC in 1972, “Like millions of other American 
citizens, I am fed up with paying more and more taxes while wealthy individuals and large 
corporations pay little or no taxes, because of loop- holes in our tax laws... such as oil depletion 
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allowances, capital gains and foreign investment credits.”173 However, despite the attention that 
Loitz had received from the media and support he had received from Muskie, McGovern, and 
other legislators, along with the estimated 100,000 American who had signed his petition Whe 
Loitz finished his testimony, California Republican Jerry Pettis treated Loitz with contempt, 
comparing tax policymaking to the complexity of “atomic energy” and suggesting to Loitz that 
there was a “technical aspect [to tax policy] that you don’t appreciate.” 174 However, not all 
resprsentatives dismissed the grassroots reformers. California Democrat James Corman, noting 
the stark differences in the testimony of Wiley and the Chamber of Commerce, particularly in 
terms of capital gains, told Wiley, “I must say, I tend to agree more with you than them.”175 
Likewise, Wilbur Mills, after taking in reformers’ testimony, noted, “It’s pretty hard to justify 
treating a capital gain differently from ordinary income.” Though, in a fiscalist warning, he 
worried that higher taxes on capital income might “freeze” sales.176 
When it came time for Nixon officials to testify, they offered a modest set of income tax 
reforms, but it was the property tax took center stage for the administration. In terms of income 
tax reforms, the White House put forward a proposal for tightening the minimum income 
provision in the code. The administration’s plan was stronger than the minimum tax in the 
TRA69, but still substantially weaker than the 72-percent-of-statutory-rate provisions proposed 
by McGovern in 1972. In effect, Nixon called for all taxpayers to pay taxes on 50 percent of their 
adjusted gross income after several exclusions, such as one-half of long-term capital gains and 
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the percentage depletion allowance, were added back to the taxpayer’s AGI.177 Speaking for the 
administration, George Shultz also called for several specific loophole-closing reforms, including 
a proposal to curb tax-loss farming by disallowing the use of tax losses to offset unrelated 
income.178 However, much of Shultz’s time was spent on outlining the president’s plan to 
federally fund property tax relief for low- and middle-income elderly homeowners and renters.  
“[President Nixon] has continually recognized the nation’s problems with respect to the property 
tax and has been committed to reducing residential property taxes,” Shultz told the Ways and 
Means Committee. “Therefore, the revenue gained from the recommended [income] tax reforms 
will be further used to provide major tax relief to the elderly – a large segment of our population 
who are now overburdened by excessive state and local property taxes on their homes.” ACIR 
data, Shultz noted, showed that the average homeowner over age 65 paid more than 8 percent of 
their income in property taxes, while elderly homeowners making less than $2,000 paid property 
taxes at an average rate of nearly 17 percent. 179  Under Nixon’s proposed plan, elderly 
homeowners and renters could receive a refundable federal income tax credit for property taxes 
paid exceeding five percent of their income, up to a maximum of $500. The credit would begin 
to phase out for elderly homeowners making more than $15,000 and would be phased out 
completely by $25,000. For renters, property taxes would be calculated as 15 percent of rent 
paid. Shultz estimated that the program would cost $500 million. 180 
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Democrats and other left-leaning witnesses also stressed the property tax in their 
testimony. “[Even though ‘these hearings focus specifically on federal taxes’] we think it 
appropriate…to urge you to make maximum use of federal leverage to relieve the inequities that 
now exist in state and local-level financing,” AFSME president Jerry Wurf told the Ways and 
Means Committee. He lamented that revenue sharing did not include stronger incentives for 
states to implement progressive income taxes. He also supported Nixon’s plans to use federal 
revenue to cut income taxes for elderly Americans, but wanted the legislation to go further. “[I]t 
would be an injustice – in our opinion – to limit property tax relief to the elderly,” Wurf said. 
“Many working Americnas who own their homes find it increasingly difficult to pay the rising 
taxes on their property. As the tax base withers in our large cities, middle-income families who 
resist the flight to the suburbs pay a harsh penalty [in higher property taxes].” The federal 
government, Wurf said, needed to cap the percentage of income that all lower- and middle-
American families could be required to pay in property taxes. “The taxpayer revolt is for real,” 
Wurf concluded, “and it cannot be put down by rhetoric.” 181 In his call for an effective minimum 
tax to curb benefits like the capital gains preference, Ted Kennedy proposed using the resulting 
revenue to turn several deductions into credits so that they would benefit low- and middle-
income taxpayers. He made special mention of the possibilities this approach held for the 
property tax. “For example,” Kennedy said, “the credit for property taxes could be designed to 
urgently needed property tax relief for the elderly, especially the elderly who are poor.” 182 
George McGovern likewise called for using revenue from loophole-closing to finance property 
tax relief. “Where should the taxpayer’s dollar go?” McGovern asked. “To a $6.6 billion tax 
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subsidy for business in the form of accelerated deprecation and investment tax credit, or property 
tax relief for homeowners across the country?” 183 
The bipartisan agreement on some form of property tax relief seemed to point to its 
legislative viability. Only a few Ways and Means members and witnesses vocally objected to 
such proposals, and chair Wilbur Mills seemed not only to give the measure crucial support but 
also to point to the likelihood of more generous property tax relief. In fact, Nixon had privately 
assured Mills in a telephone conversation several months earlier that the administration was 
“going to go ahead on the property tax for the elderly.”184 Perhaps the most notable resistance to 
the Nixon property tax plan came from AFL-CIO president George Meany, who objected to it on 
the same grounds as general revenue sharing. Meany called Nixon’s plan a “form of back-door, 
no-strings revenue sharing” that would reward states with high property taxes. Instead of 
papering over the deficiencies of the property tax, which he called fundamentally flawed, Meany 
suggested that it should be minimized, or even eliminated, as a source of revenue. The solution 
to the property tax problem, in the AFL-CIO’s view, was for the federal government to directly 
assume the costs of local government, such as education.185 The AFL-CIO’s views were well-
known, however – union economist Arnold Cantor had aired Meany’s views during the ACIR 
debates – and did little to alter Congress’s views on property tax relief. 186   
 More significant was Wilbur Mill’s indication that he would support not only property 
tax relief for the elderly, but for all low- and middle-income Americans. During Shultz’s 
testimony, Mills speculated that more Americans than just the elderly needed property tax relief. 
Mills told Shultz that he “wonder[ed] whether we are as concerned as we should be about the 
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problems of the people who are in the so-called middle-income areas.” “They feel that they are 
very heavily burdened now with taxes at state, local, and federal levels and no ne ever seems to 
give them any modicum of sympathy, let alone relief,” Mills observed, in a comment seemingly 
as critical of his past action (or inaction) as Ways and Means chair as of the White House’s 
proposal. President Nixon, Shultz said, was concerned about low- and middle-income property 
taxpayers of all ages, but given the larger cost for a more comprehensive relief program, he had 
decided to address the “particularly acute” property tax problems for the elderly first. But, Mills 
noted, the program could easily be expanded. “It seems to me that, if we go down this path [of 
property tax relief], for people over 65, it won’t be many months or years before we find it 
advisable to include others,” Mills said. “How much revenue would be involved in the final 
analysis, I don’t know. I am not arguing against it.” 187 Finally, it seemed left-distributionist 
reformers had the powerful Ways and Means chair on their side.  
 For President Nixon, however, the use tax reform to help solidify his realignment-
defining New Majority was rapidly becoming eclipsed by other issues. By early-1973, inflation 
was beginning a steady upward climb that would not abate until the end of 1974, prompting a 
renewed commitment to budget-balancing austerity for the president who, just months earlier, 
had been pushing for any and all fiscal and monetary stimulus to boost his reelection chances. 
More significantly, though, for the chances of any legislative movement hinged on the Watergate 
investigation that was, by the spring of 1973, enveloping not only the Nixon White House, but 
also Congresss. By late-April, one of the White House’s most enthusiastic proponents of tax 
reform, John Ehrlichman, would resign. By mid-May, the congressional Watergate hearings 
would be underway. In August 1974, Nixon himself would resign.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







 More than a scandal over a break-in at Democratic national headquarters or other “dirty 
tricks,” Watergate also contained a headline-grabbing tax scandal, which was one of many to 
ensnare prominent politicians and celebrities in the early-to-mid 1970s. 
 
Worse than Watergate 
As Watergate overwhelmed the nation’s capital, the “tax revolt” continued unabated. 
Though voters were unwilling to pass conservative plans like California’s Prop 1, their tax 
discontent remained. Taxes continued climbing particularly sharply for low- and middle-income 
Americans. In the ACIR’s calculation of the total tax burden – local, state, and federal – facing 
the “average” family of four versus a similar families making twice the average family’s income 
and four times the average family’s income, the organization noted that there had been a 
progressive “narrowing of the gap in direct tax burdens borne by average and upper income 
families” between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s. As a percentage of income, two regressive 
taxes – the federal OASDHI payroll tax and the local property tax – had made the notable dents 
in the pocketbook of the “average” family. For that family, the payroll tax had risen from 1.1 
percent in 1953 to 3.2 percent in 1966 to 5.9 percent in 1975, while the local property tax had 
climbed from 2.2 percent to 3.1 percent to 4 percent over the same period. Overall, the “average” 
family had experienced a 92 percent increase in taxes, from 11.8 percent to 22.7 percent between 
1953 and 1975, whereas the family making four times as much had experienced just a 46 percent 






While the average family had paid 58 percent of the taxes, as a percentage of income, of the 
family making four times as much as them in 1953, by 1975 they paid 77 percent as much.188  
The rising property taxes squeezing Americans’ pocketbooks, especially for those with 
lower- and middle-incomes, was linked to the overall problem of soaring inflation in the early-
to-mid 1970s. According to both U.S. Census and National Association of Realtors figures, the 
median home price was increasing at a better than 10 percent yearly rate by 1974.  Some states 
had it worse, though. According to the California Association of Realtors, median home prices 
increased a startling 20 percent in the Golden State between 1974 and 1975.189 Thus, even had 
property tax rates and assessments ratios stayed flat – an outcome most homeowners could only 
dream of in the ‘60s and ‘70s – property taxes were soaring by the mid-1970s beyond the levels 
that had precipitated the sharp fall in levy failures in the 1960s. Given these realities, the notion 
that the tax revolt, as it applied to local property taxes, would abate without government action 
seemed to represent decidedly wishful thinking on the part of policymakers. Yet, as we shall see, 
this seemed to be what many elected officials hoped. 
 No one had to wonder about the state of Americans’ tax attitudes in the mid-1970s, 
though. Public opinion surveys made it abundantly clear that the tax revolt had not abated. In 
poll after poll between 1973 and 1976, large majorities of Americans expressed profound 
discontent with the level of taxes they paid, as well as profound cynicism and deep concern 
about the fairness of both the tax system and the American economy, as a whole. While 
Americans from all walks of life expressed similar opinions on some tax issues, Americans’ 
perspectives on what was wrong with the tax system often were not evenly distributed across 
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lines of class and race. Low- and middle-income Americans as well as people of color were 
particularly likely to take a dim view of regressive levies and the fairness of the tax system as a 
whole. Large majorities of Americans, for example, were displeased with amount of income and 
property taxes they paid. However, resentment of sales taxes was more notable for low-income 
Americans.190 Following the ACIR’s observation that rising taxes in the previous decades had hit 
poor and “average” Americans particularly hard, low- and middle-income Americans, much 
more than the well-off, expressed concern about the squeeze rising taxes were having on their 
pocketbooks. Large majorities of low- and middle-income Americans, but not the richest (those 
making more than $25,000 in 1974), agreed both that “people in power don’t know how much 
taxes cause people like me to suffer” and that “my standard of living is being hurt by high taxes.” 
This translated to political concerns, too. Majorities of the poor said that they would be more 
likely to vote for a candidate that proposed a tax cut. The higher one’s income, however, the less 
likely he or she was to feel that way.191 A majority of Americans, particularly those in the 
working- and middle-classes, said they had “reach[ed] the breaking point” on the amount of 
taxes they paid. 192 Half of Americans in nearly every income group said they would “sympathize 
with a taxpayers’ revolt.” Notably, upper-income people were more likely to say they would 
oppose one, and, contrary to the image of revolt participants as white conservatives, people of 
color and Democrats were more likely to say they sympathized than whites or Republicans. 193  
 Beyond concern about their own taxes, by the mid-1970s Americans’ cynicism about the 
tax system’s favoritism toward the rich had only increased since the 1960s. Nearly 90 percent 
said that “the big tax burden falls on the little man in this country today.” Three-quarters of 
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Americans said that “the tax laws are written to help the rich, not the average man.” Ninety 
percent agreed that “there are a lot of tax loopholes for the rich to avoid taxes.” Sixty percent 
agreed that “tax shelters are just a clever device to the let rich pay less taxes than the average 
person,” though the higher one’s income, the more likely he or she were to disagree (and the 
richest respondents were almost split on the question). These two convictions – that taxes on 
low- and middle-income Americans’ taxes were causing a pocketbook squeeze and that the tax 
code was letting the rich off easy – were related.  Seventy percent – particularly low- and 
middle-income respondents – said that tax shelters meant that “middle income people have to 
pay higher taxes” to cover for the taxes not paid by the rich. Underlining the political necessity 
of loophole-closing tax reform if public anti-tax sentiment was to be quelled, more than 70 
percent told pollsters that they would “feel better” about the amount of taxes they paid if the “tax 
loopholes for the rich were closed.”194 The public support for raising taxes on the well-off, 
especially by closing loopholes, was undeniable. Three-quarters of Americans, and majorities of 
even the richest, said they would support a program to raised taxes on those making more than 
$30,000 (roughly the top five percent in 1974) and cut taxes on those making less than $6,000 
(roughly the bottom 20 percent), though the higher one’s income the more likely he or she was to 
oppose such a tax plan.195 By the mid-‘70s public fatalism about economic fairness hit new 
hights. More than 75 percent told pollsters that “the rich get richer and the poor get poorer” – a 
ten percent jump from the early ‘70s.196 For Democrats, the mid-‘70s presented a political 
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opportunity on taxes. More than half of Americans said Democrats were likely to reduce their 
taxes, while less than 15 percent said the same about Republicans. But, overall, Americans did 
not believe that any politician would actually address the tax system’s unfairness. More than 80 
percent lamented that “politicians promise tax relief before election[s] and then do nothing about 
it when elected.”197 
 The politicians themselves doubtlessly were aware of the public’s discontent. 
Increasingly, both public officials and pundits began dubbing the post-Watergate pall that had 
fallen across the country a “crisis of confidence.” In reality, however, this “crisis” was anything 
but new. Watergate had simply attenuated further the declining faith in major American 
institutions that had spread throughout the country in the late-1960s as one revelation of 
deception after another implicated major institutions, both public and private. Whether one dated 
its beginning with Silent Spring or the Kennedy assignation, Gulf of Tonkin or Unsafe at Any 
Speed, by the late-1960s think pieces about the country’s “crisis of confidence” had become all-
too-commonplace.198 Regardless of its status as a nearly decade-old piece of conventional 
wisdom, after Watergate the idea of a “crisis of confidence” gained new currency among 
academics and policymakers.199  In late-1973, the Muskie’s Senate Intergovernmental Relations 
Subcommittee commissioned Louis Harris to conduct a national poll on the issue of this “crisis 
of confidence.” In the hearings on Harris’s study, much of the discussion revolved around 
amorphous issues of “spirit,” “mood,” and “alienation.” “On a scale of powerlessness, cynicism, 
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and alienation used by our firm since 1966,” Harris told the Senate committee, “an average of 55 
percent of the American people expressed disenchantment, compared with no more than 29 
percent who felt that way only 7 years ago.” Fitting with this theme, Harris closed his statement 
by quoting, at length, Archibald MacLiesh’s poem “America Was Promises.”200 
 Though it was never mentioned in the hearings, the tax revolt – and pocketbook 
discontent, more generally – lurked throughout the Senate’s two-volume report on the survey, 
Confidence and Concern: Citizens View American Government. In many ways, the tax revolt 
itself was both a contributor to and a reflection of this “crisis of confidence.” The distance 
between the costs of government and the benefits of government was foremost on the minds of 
most Americans. “[A]t all levels [of government], the official activity that awakes the highest 
recognition is tax collecting, and the response is  one of resentment,” the foreword to the 
Senate/Harris study, authored by Muskie and Republican Senator Edward Gurney, noted. In 
contrast, Americans had a “mixed view of the services rendered in return.” Beyond Social 
Security, Medicare, and local services like schools, most Americans felt totally disconnected 
from the government. Perhaps not coincidentally, as Americans’ faith in government fell, its 
esteem for grassroots activists grew. Confidence and Concern found that nearly 50 percent of 
citizens agreed that “groups of citizens and organizations are having more effect in getting 
government to get things done, compared with five years ago.” Among the top groups 
volunteered by the public were “local community groups,” “civil rights groups,” and “Ralph 
Nader’s consumer protection groups.” When it came to state and local officials, the 
Senate/Harris data made clear the vast gulf that existed between public officials and average 
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citizens, especially on issues of taxation. Harris interviewed state and local officials in addition 
to his representative sample of more than 1,500 Americans.201  
Though Harris did not ask the “taxpayers’ revolt” questions that had become a staple of 
his surveys since 1969, the distance between policymakers and the public over taxes was readily 
apparent in Confidence and Concern. It found that “one local government function that earns the 
[government] leaders’ confidence but the public's disdain is tax assessment.” Thirty-seven 
percent of public officials had a “great deal of confidence” in local assessment. Not a ringing 
endorsement, but a substantial fraction. Their views, however, stood in shocking contrast to the 
public’s. Only 19 percent of Americans had “a great deal of confidence” in local tax assessment, 
less than in television news, organized labor, major companies, and even law firms, among other 
institutions. Only the White House – ensconced in Watergate scandal – was less trusted than 
local property tax assessors. Taxation, the Senate/Harris report noted, was an “absorbing issue 
the public would like to talk to their local authorities about,” particularly regarding “tax 
inequities, especially on real estate.” As one Des Moines, Iowa, homeowner commented, “I’d 
like to know how the tax assessment works and why we seem to pay more than other people with 
better houses and more land.” Fittingly, while the first federal issue on the minds of Americans 
was “overwhelmingly” Watergate, the first issue mentioned by Americans when asked about 
state-level problems was “taxes and school funds.” But, despite the rise of Watergate to the top 
of the federal agenda, Americans’ tax fatalism extended to the national level, too. Confidence 
and Concern found, just like other surveys, that three-quarters of Americans believed both that 
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“the tax laws are written to help the rich, not the average man” and that “the richer get richer and 
the poor get poorer.”202  
 The Watergate scandal itself had actually exacerbated the public’s tax cynicism. 
Throughout all of the scandals that swirled around the White House during Nixon’s abortive 
second term, tax loopholes and tax fraud hovered just below the surface. Following the 
resignations of top White House staffers, including Haldeman and Ehrlichman, in April and the 
beginning of the Senate Watergate hearings in May, many of the revelation that followed either 
directly or indirectly involved tax malfeasance. Early in the Watergate hearings, John Dean, 
Nixon’s former counsel, alleged that the White House had used the IRS to investigate, harass, 
and audit political opponents.203 Wisconsin Democrat Henry Reuss added to the charges, 
alleging that the White House had pressured the IRS to exempt $20 million in stock 
contributions to the Nixon campaign from taxes, which Reuss called “legalized larceny.”204 Vice 
President Spiro Agnew’s resignation likewise had a twist of tax intrigue. As both a Baltimore 
County Executive and Governor of Maryland, Agnew had accepted bribes and kickbacks from 
companies attempting to secure contracts from the government. But, under the deal struck, 
Agnew’s ostensibly resigned for evading taxes on the hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes, 
facing only a fine and probation. 205  “[T]he IRS has taken a battering in the Watergate 
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revelations,” the Washington Post  concluded in mid-1973.206 The Post’s sweeping observation 
actually was an understatement, though. The worst was yet to come. 
President Nixon’s own finances, however, were the real tax story in Watergate. Nixon’s 
tax troubles began in mid-1973, when newspapers across the country reported allegations that 
Nixon received “preferential treatment” by the local property tax assessor on his San Clemente 
“Western White House.” Nixon – or, rather, an “investment company” that included Nixon, 
businessman “Bebe” Rebozo, and others – had purchased the home for $1.5 million in 1969 and 
put more than $500,000 in improvement into the property. Making appearances even worse, tens 
of thousands of dollars in improvements were also kicked in by the federal government itself, 
given the property’s official use by Nixon. When it came time to assess the property, however, 
Andrew Hinshaw, the Orange County assessor, pegged the property’s value at less than $1.4 
million. This assessment went unchallenged until 1973, when County Supervisor Robert Battin 
filed a complaint with the county Assessment Appeals Board alleging that Nixon’s San Clemente 
property should have been value at more than $2.3 million. This underassessment, Battin argued, 
has saved Nixon $55,000 over the past three years. It was a tax break, Battin argued, that average 
California homeowners would not have received. “I think the president should be treated fairly, 
and he should pay his fair share – no more, no less,” Battin argued. Rumors also swirled in the 
press that Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox was extending his investigation to the assessment 
on Nixon’s San Clemente property, though Cox denied the reports. Without Cox’s involvement, 
Battin’s appeal became embroiled in partisan politics. Former assessor Hinshaw, Republicans on 
the review board, and other GOP officials argued that Battin, one of the county’s few 
Democratic officials, was simply pursuing a partisan agenda. Both the appeals board and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Superior Judge Mark Soden – also a Republican, who admitted during the hearing that he was a 
GOP donor and a “Nixon supporter” – both rejected Battin’s appeal.  Soon, Hinshaw – who 
became Republican state representative following his turn as Orange County assessor – was 
targeting Battin, arguing that Battin had used his office and, thereby, misused public funds in 
challenging Nixon’s assessment. The following year, however, the assessment on Nixon’s San 
Clemente property was raised by $200,000. More significantly, Hinshaw would be convicted in 
1976 of accepting bribes for favorable property tax assessment during his time as Orange County 
assessor, casting a pall not only over Nixon’s assessment, but over all county assessment 
conducted during Hinshaw’s seven years in office.207 By that time, however, Nixon was no 
longer the story. 
 The most shocking allegations regarding Nixon’s taxes came at the federal level. On tax 
day 1974, Time magazine’s cover blared “NIXON’S TAX SCANDAL” with a glowering Nixon 
superimposed over his 1040 form, complete with red circles highlighting questionable portions. 
The convoluted dealings regarding the purchase, with Rebozo and other investors, of Nixon’s 
San Clemente property raised questions not only about the property’s local tax assessment, but 
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also about possible improprieties in Nixon’s finances, as well as how these properties were 
reported on his federal income tax returns.208 Nixon quickly dismissed press inquiries about 
potential tax misstatements or malfeasance that could have occurred, given the complexity of the 
president’s property holdings. In an early-September 1973 press conference, Nixon assured the 
public that his transactions were all above-board and that the IRS had audited his 1971 and 1972 
taxes and “did not order any change.” It was, Nixon said, “[G]ood news for people who wonder 
if Presidents are exempt from what the IRS does.”209 In fact, it was anything but. Already, the 
Baltimore Sun’s Adam Clymer had reported that Nixon’s deduction of his Vice Presidential 
papers to the National Archives at a value of $576,000 had likely wiped out several years of 
Nixon’s federal tax bill. Soon, however, all doubt was removed. With the Watergate hearings in 
full swing, an unnamed IRS employee leaked Nixon’s tax returns to a reported at the Providence 
Journal. In early-October, the Journal used the leak to report that Nixon had paid under $800 in 
federal income taxes in 1970 and less than $900 in 1971, despite more than $250,000 in income.  
This paper donation had, in fact, already come under question months earlier, thanks to a new 
public interest tax firm, Tax Analysts and Advocates. Tax Analysts and Advocates’ executive 
director, Thomas F. Field, had questioned the deduction of the papers in July and called for an 
audit of the president’s taxes.210 Now, with the revelations of the Providence Journal, among 
others, the president’s attempts to fend off calls for an investigation into his finances began to 
crack.  
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Under pressure from the public and the press, Nixon released his tax returns from 1969 
through 1972. They confirmed the leaked figures. Surely making matters more scandalous, at 
least from the public’s point of view, was the fact that Nixon’s $792 tax payment on $262,942 in 
adjusted gross income in 1970 came from the minimum tax provision of the TRA69. So, even 
after the “loophole”-closing reforms touted by Nixon in the TRA69, the president had paid less 
than one-half of one percent of his adjusted gross income – that is, after deductions – in taxes. 
The returns revealed other issues, too, including the deduction of his Vice Presidential papers 
and capital gains, or a lack thereof, on the sale of property. “The Nixon tax returns, as 
presumably would be the case with those of any near-millionarie, make fascinating reading,” the 
Wall Street Journal reported. “They add up to a picture of a man taking nearly every legal 
deduction his high-priced tax experts can find for him.” In 1970, 1971, and 1972, in fact, Nixon 
had paid substantially more for tax advice than had had paid in federal income taxes. Such was 
the reaction to Nixon’s returns that even the Wall Street Journal’s conservative editorial pages, 
while slamming the “groups professing to represent the public interest,” called for strengthening 
the minimum tax provision, since, “Considering what the average citizen pays, a President 
earning $200,000 should pay more than a few hundred dollars in tax. And so should anyone else 
earning $200,000.”211 More liberal elements in the press were even harsher on Nixon. 
In late-December, 1973, Nixon relented and asked the congressional Joint Committee on 
Taxation to review the reporting of his Vice Presidential papers donation and his sale of land in 
San Clemente. However, the JCT – led by the decidedly Nixon-friendly Russell Long and 
Wilbur Mills – took it upon itself to review Nixon’s returns in their entirety because, as the JCT 
report put it, the public needed to have “confidence in the basic fairness of the collection 
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system.” If Americans felt that individual like the president were getting away with malfeasance, 
the committee noted, it would erode support for the tax system, as well as compliance. In the 
end, the JCT concluded that Nixon owed $444,022 in back taxes and more than $32,409 in 
interest. The deduction for this Vice Presidential papers, the committee found, had been 
purposely misdated in order to qualify for a deduction to which Nixon was not legally entitled. 
Nixon had also failed to report a variety of income, including  $151,848 dollars in capital gains 
from the sale of his New York City apartment and $117,836 in gains from sale of land in San 
Clemente, among other sources.212 The White House had little room to object to the JCT’s 
shocking conclusion. San Francisco Attorney William Coblenz, who represented the Hearst 
family, among others, told Time magazine that the JCT “was, if anything, a little easy on 
President Nixon.” Most other experts consulted by Time agreed. Accounting professor Abe 
Briloff said that the issues in Nixon’s returns were “so egregious” that they could not have been 
mistakes, but rather suggested “a carefully orchestrated, finely tuned program” of deception. 
Following the JCT’s report, the White House attempted to blame the president’s tax attorney for 
the “errors.” However, the president’s attorney called Nixon’s claims “ridiculous,” saying that he 
had gone over the president’s returns with Nixon “page by page.” In fact, the attorney said, many 
of the evasions were done following Nixon’s instructions, as relaying by John Ehrlichman. Such 
were the improprieties in Nixon’s taxes that Wilbur Mills speculated Nixon’s tax returns alone 
would be enough to force the president to resign.213 Things would continue to get worse for 
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Nixon.214 Newsweek and investigative political columnist Jack Anderson reported that Nixon had 
attempted to conceal his daughter Tricia’s interest in Florida properties that Nixon had sold in 
order to save her income taxes. Subsequent reports also made it public that Nixon had not paid 
state income taxes in California, D.C., or any other state in 1970, 1971, or 1972.215  
In short, there was no shortage of tax scandals facing Nixon in 1973 and 1974, both 
related and unrelated to Watergate. The public outcry over Nixon’s taxes was swift and severe. 
“Nixon's taxes were an issue that average citizens readily understood as compared to the 
constitutional issues raised by the Watergate investigation,” as one accounting professor put it. 
“Most taxpayers – with far less income than Nixon – had paid more federal income tax than the 
president.”216 Indeed, half of Americans objected simply to Nixon’s income, saying that that 
“resent President Nixon becoming a millionaire at a time when the American people have had a 
hard time making ends meet.” Sixty-four percent agreed that Nixon had “failed to provide moral 
leadership for the rest of the country by taking advantage of legal tax loopholes.” Three-quarters 
said that it was “wrong for President Nixon to have paid less taxes than a person with an income 
of $8,000 a year, when he is paid a salary and expense account totaling $250,000 a year.”217 For 
the public, the revelations of tax malfeasance by Nixon, Agnew, and the Orange County assessor 
were just the latest in a long line of tax scandals facing the rich, the famous, and the powerful. 
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The early-to-mid ‘70s saw string of highly publicized celebrity tax scandals that 
reinforced and amplified the claims and revelations made by muckrakers like Philip Stern and 
Ralph Nader. President Nixon’s sometime Republican antagonist, Ronald Reagan, found himself 
at the center of the juiciest of these revelations, along with a veritable cavalcade of stars. It 
became, as the New York Times put it, “one of the bitterest controversies of his four-and-a-half-
year career as an elective officeholder,” which was saying a lot for controversial California 
governor.218 Like Nixon’s, the public Reagan’s began with a leak. In May 1971, Rosemarie 
King, a 29-widow with three children and a student journalist at Sacramento State College 
broadcast that Governor Reagan had paid no state income taxes in 1970. Reagan denounced the 
leak as an invasion of privacy and claimed in a press conference days after the leak, “You know 
something, I don’t actually know whether I did [pay state income taxes] or not…. I have a fellow 
making it out for me, a lawyer makes it out.” The governor did remember signing his tax form, 
however, and admitted, “I know in the federal [income tax] in the last couple of years or 
something I got a rebate.” Reagan’s executive assistant, Edwin Meese, promised that he would 
investigate Reagan’s tax California status and mere moments after the press conference ended a 
one-line “memo to the press” was released. It read, “Because of business reverses of Gov. 
Reagan’s investments, he owned no state income tax for 1970.” The governor’s office refused to 
comment on Reagan’s federal tax rate, however. King then followed-up her first scoop with 
another claiming that Reagan had not paid any state income taxes during at least one other year 
as governor. 219  That Reagan – a politician who had famously quipped that “taxes should hurt” – 
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paid no state or federal income taxes, given that he made more than $40,000 in his gubernatorial 
salary alone, was shocking. In a survey of Reagan’s staffers, the Desert Sun found that all had 
paid state income tax. Even Reagan’s secretary had paid $900 in California income taxes. An 
“average” California family making Reagan’s salary would have been expected to pay more than 
$2,700 in California taxes, the press noted.220  
Reagan’s revelation made news across the country. Most commentators linked Reagan’s 
eager use of tax loopholes to his previous comments taxation and welfare. Many observers threw 
Reagan’s “taxes should hurt” quip back at the governor.  George Moscone, the California 
Senate’s Democratic leader, chastised Reagan. “It’s very easy to say ‘taxes should hurt’ when 
you’re not paying your fair share,” Moscone told UPI. Echoing the Democrat’s line of attack, the 
Desert Sun titled one news story on the controversy, “Taxes Should Hurt? Governor Reagan 
Feels No Pain.” Likewise, the Dayton Beach Morning Journal’s editorial page chastised the 
governor in an editorial that began, “‘Taxes should hurt,’ once said Gov. Ronald Reagan of 
California. That is, they should hurt all but Gov. Reagan.” His tax-free status probably made the 
“ex-movie star quite happy,” the paper continued, “Just think of all the people he described as 
‘bums’ on welfare – abandoned mothers, babies, the old and disabled – he won’t be supporting 
with her personal tax dollars.” That Californians making as little as $5,000 per year would be 
paying more in taxes was “saddening,” the paper concluded, “For such disparity is what 
discourages young people about the system.”221 Grassroots activists took the opportunity to 
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tweak Reagan, too. At a Sacramento speech on his welfare reform program, which critics argued 
was designed to cut benefits to recipients, members of the California Welfare Rights 
Organization attempted to present Reagan with the “highest paid welfare recipient award” to 
sarcastically signify that Reagan was, as one of the protesters put it, “one of us – the truly 
needy.” Though Reagan engaged in a “shouting match” with the protestors, as the Los Angeles 
Times put it, the governor claimed afterward that he was not “upset.” Like the CWRO, a group of 
Fresno State College students held a mock canned food drive for Reagan to help the governor 
through his “hard times.”222 Democratic State Senator Nicholas Petris agreed that tax loopholes 
were simply a different form of welfare. “It’s exactly the same thing,” Petris said, except the 
governor’s situation applies to people at the top of the income level and welfare applies to those 
at the bottom.” But, Petris argued, the real issue was not Reagan’s use of the loopholes, but that 
they existed in the first place.223 Indeed, many on the left pointed to Reagan’s tax-free riches as 
proof that tax reform was very much an unfinished deed. As RFK and McGovern adviser Frank 
Mankiewicz argued in an editorial co-written with Tom Braden, “The lesson [to be drawn from 
Reagan’s returns] is that the rich often do not pay taxes and that Reagan paid no tax only because 
he is rich,” Mankiewicz and Tom Braden wrote. “The lesson is that our tax laws are designed 
almost solely for the rich.” When Reagan and his office referenced “businesses reverses,” 
Mankiewicz and Braden predicted in May, “it is a safe bet that what he was really talking about 
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were the paper reverses that abound in the tax field, artificially created expenses and deductions 
which cancel out income and profits on the books, while leaving sizable income ‘sheltered.’”224 
For their part, conservatives leapt to Reagan’s defense. Many attempted to focus 
discussion the leak, but some also argued that there was nothing wrong with Reagan’s low, or 
nonexistent, level of taxation. Putnam Livermore, the chair of the California GOP’s central 
committee, denounced critic’s “outpouring of demagoguery and self-righteousness” over 
Reagan’s taxes. “Many taxpayers, rich or poor, occasionally have years when they pay no 
taxes…,” Livermore said.225 The founder of the conservative National Review, William F. 
Buckley, Jr., took to his “On the Right” syndicated column to defend Reagan. Buckley mocked 
Californians who acted “gravely wounded” and “outraged” by Reagan’s nonexistent taxes on his 
40-plus thousand dollar income. Those offended, Buckley said, needed to be “instruct[ed] in the 
facts of life,” which were that “one pays taxes according to whether one owes taxes.” The public, 
Buckley said, should understand that Reagan paid taxes because he was rendered “less well off” 
by his “business losses.” The governor, like any “rich man [who] pays no taxes” was actually a 
victim of “demagogy.”226 Reagan also came out swinging against his accusers. “I have never 
avoided taxes or failed to pay an income tax owed in my entire adult life,” Reagan said. The real 
issue, Reagan argued, was the “invasion of privacy” involved in the leak of his tax return. 
Ratcheting the rhetoric up a level, Reagan declared, “We fought a war about that! I say all men 
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have a right to be safe in their books and records. That’s what the revolution was all about.”227 
Reagan even attempted to make light of the situation. Running late for a speech at a high school 
in Loomis, California, the governor quipped to the adoring audience upon arrival, “Sorry to be 
late. I was having a consultation of my tax adviser.”228 But the story of Reagan’s light tax bill 
dragged on into the summer of 1971, when news broke of exactly how Reagan had avoided taxes 
– revelation that tied into a larger story about the varied methods of tax avoidance available to 
the rich. 
The details of the “business reverses” that allowed Reagan to avoid paying income taxes 
tied in with a longer history of one of the most notorious tax dodges in the U.S. tax system. In 
the summer of 1971, the Sacramento Bee and New York Times had uncovered records showing 
that Reagan, like many wealthy individuals, was engaged in what was known as “tax loss 
farming.” 229  The California governor was a client of Oppenheimer Industries, a “cattle 
management” firm that made its wealthy clients cattle ranchers in absentia solely to allow them 
to claim the benefits of the preferential tax treatment accorded to cattle breeding herds. “This is 
strictly a tax dodge on their part,” rancher Ivan Remely, who held cattle for Oppenheimer Clients 
on his Dillon, Montana, land, told the New York Times. Based in Kansas City, Missouri, with 
offices in major cities across the country, Oppenheimer only dealt with clients with a net worth 
of at least a half-million dollars, excluding their home, or have single-year earnings of more than 
$100,000. When a high-income client had a windfall, he or she could contract with a company 
like Oppenheimer to purchase, usually with borrowned money, a sizeable enough number of 
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cattle – often indirectly, via shares in the company – to offset his or her tax liability. This scheme 
worked because the favorable deductions allowed for cattle purchases in the IRS code, including 
depreciation of half the value of the cattle over the first two years of ownership, Oppenheimer’s 
fees, and interest on money borrowed to purchase the cattle, as well as the costs of caring of the 
cattle, such as feed and veterinary care. When the cattle were sold later, generally in two to five 
years, the rich client could recoup the money her or she had invested, but this time it would be 
subject to the lower capital gains rate.230 “Federal tax laws favor cattle if you pick the right kind 
and stick to the rules…,” an Oppenheimer brochure read. “When you buy them, you become a 
farmer and you can keep your books on a cash basis. You put in dollars that depreciation or are 
deductible. You take out capital gains.” Oppenheimer’s clients need not know the first thing 
about cattle, see their cattle, or even know where in the country they were located. Oppenheimer 
steered most of its clients towards “breeding” contracts, rather than risker “feeder contracts” 
(cattle raised for beef). “This [‘feeder’],” the company’s founder proudly told Time magazine, “is 
where the tax play is.”231 In order to mitigate risk, Oppenheimer spread a single client’s cattle at 
ranches across the country. “[I]f an investor gets hit by a drought in New Mexico,” an 
Oppenheimer spokesperson told the Wall Street Journal, “he’s unlikely to get hit by a blizzard in 
Montana, too.” 232 Owned in name only, one client’s cattle were distinguished from others’ – or 
from non-tax dodge cattle – only by a brand with one of Oppenheimer’s logos and the name of 
the particular wealthy client’s cattle concern – “Reagan Cattle Co.,” in the governor’s case.233 
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Reagan moved quickly to mitigate the damaging effects of the Oppenheimer revelation. 
Shortly after the story broke, the governor’s office released a statement, ostensibly from Reagan, 
that attempted to spin the governor’s tax-dodge cattle investment as a more genuine interest, 
fitting with the rugged, outdoorsman image the former actor had always tried to project. It read, 
“I have been interested in cattle, horses, and ranches all my life. It is an ordinary part of my 
business, and I intend to continue with it even though it is a relatively small investment.”234 
Reagan’s attempts to turn the issue around on his critics and, more importantly, a little luck, 
helped mitigate the scandal’s effect on his political career. Just as the real details of Reagan’s 
zero taxes came to light, the New York Times ran the “Pentagon Papers,” relegating the front 
page-worthy inside story of the governor’s tax dodge to deep inside the paper.235 
Tax-loss cattle farming, however, remained in the news throughout the 1970s. The 
practice had first caught press attention in the early-1960s, when some left-leaning Democrats 
pushed, unsuccessfully, for limiting the tax benefits of cattle during the debates over the JFK tax 
cuts. The industry’s growing titans, like Oppenheimer, defended their business using language 
common to so many loophole beneficiaries. In 1961’s Cowboy Arithmetic book, Oppenheimer 
dismissed claims that there was something wrong with what he was doing. “While the term ‘tax 
loophole’ or ‘tax gimmick’ is occasionally applied to cattle, this is definitely not the case,” 
Oppenheimer wrote. “The special provisions were purposefully put into the law, after long 
study….”236 Under questioning by the Ways and Means Committee in 1963, Oppenheimer said 
he was “not sure what the term ‘legitimate rancher’ means.” Later, he amended his answer, 
simply stating that a “legitimate rancher” should simply be considered “one who is operating in 
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according with the laws and the statutes.” “Another definition,” Oppenheimer added 
sarcastically, “could be that ‘a legitimate rancher is one whose mother and father were 
married.’”237  
Legitimate farmers and ranchers, however, saw things quite differently. “If his [the cattle 
owner’s] sole purpose is to produce a loss, deductible against his 91 percent income [tax rat] to 
be recouped eventually with a 25 percent capital gain, we feel that is an abuse,” Stephen H. Hart 
of the National Livestock Tax Committee, an umbrella group representing a variety of livestock 
associations, told Congress in 1963. “A great majority of my industry, I think would feel that 
money which is purely tax motivated has done harm because it has artificially inflated prices to 
where the return on the investment is reduced, to where the ability to continue in the business has 
decreased.”238 “Because of the tax loss gimmick,” the vice president of the National Farmers 
Union told Congress in 1968, “they can operate at a loss, flood the markets at a loss for long 
enough to drive family farmers out of production.”239 A 1969 article in Successful Farming 
denounced the practice. It recounted a cattle farmer’s reaction to hearing a speech by a pitchman 
for tax-loss farming explaining how one investor saved over $19,000 in taxes from his 
investment. “And why in the blanket-blank can’t we ranchers make that much?” the exasperated 
rancher asked.240  
Keeping with the Kennedy-Johnson era’s focus on fiscalist growth, rather than 
distributionist reform, Congress did little to address the tax-loss farming loophole. In 1965, 119 
millionaires reported involvement in farming. Of those, 104 reported a net loss on their taxes. As 
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one moved down the income scale, fewer and fewer individuals involved in farming reported net 
losses, and more and more reported gains. By the $15,000 to $20,000 group, fewer than half of 
those in farming reported losses on their tax returns. 241 Using 1966 IRS data, Successful 
Farming magazine found that, of the 1,435 individuals who grossed more than $200,000 from 
farming in 1966, only 251 made a profit. “In other words,” the magazine reported, “82.5% of 
these high-income citizens were engaged in tax loss farming.”242 In its 1969 study on the “Impact 
of Corporate Farming on Small Business,” the Senate Select Committee on Small Business 
found that “Federal tax policy is one of the main determining factors, if not he most important” 
in attracting “corporation and other nonfarm investors into agriculture.” Most actual farmers 
made “some use” of “capital gains and depreciation provision.” However, these farmers 
“normally have little or no taxable nonfarm income against which to offset farming losses.” 
Moreover, actual farmers were concerned with maximizing income, in any form, not about 
artificially generating losses and structuring any income as capital gains only. “The tax loss 
advantage, therefore, accrues almost entirely to outside investors…,” the study concluded. 
“Widespread incidence of ‘tax loss farming’ was clearly shown….”243  
With Congress seemingly unwilling to act to close the loophole, new tax loss farming 
companies sprang up each year, and the firms, both new and old, became more brazen in touting 
their con. In a Wall Street Journal advertisement touting the sale of limited partnership units 
Oppenheimer Industries, the New York Securities Co., openly explained the Oppenheimer as “a 
tax shelter for investors in high brackets.”244 Likewise, the assistant to the chair of Black Watch 
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Farms, another of the many firms jumping into the industry, told the Wall Street Journal 
forthrightly, “Investment in cattle is a tax shelter.”245 Another firm, Modern Dairy Farms, Inc., 
saw its investors grow from 35 to 120 in just two years. 246 Often, these tax-loss farming firm’s 
connection to actual farming was tenuous, at best. The vice president of Computer Sciences 
Corp., Vincent R. Grillo, Jr. founded Mountain Shadows Ranch as a deliberate tax dodge for the 
$390,000 in ordinary income he made in computersThe “ranch,” Grillo bragged, was “a 
corporation and a concept, not a place.” After successfully sheltering his own income on the 
“ranch,” Grillo opened it to other high-income individuals in similar circumstances.247 Likewise, 
Chateau Briand Ranches was started in 1968 by a 27-year-old MIT graduate in the computer 
businesses looking for a way to diversify his interests.248 By the late-1960s, high income 
Americans had their choice of an expanding number of tax-loss farming firms. Moreover, the 
risk continued to decrease. As tax-loss cattle ranching grew in popularity, many of the cattle 
management companies’ contracts also insured clients against losses that exceeded a prescribed 
amount, usually three to ten percent, ensuring that the tax savings always greatly outweighed the 
risks.249  
Oppenheimer Industries remained the biggest fish in the rapidly expanding sea of tax-loss 
farming, however. As the 1960s wore on, the company and its founder, Harold L. Oppenheimer, 
became more brazen. In 1968 profile, Time called Oppenheimer, a 47-former WWII Marine, the 
“Bonaparte of Beef.”250 By that year, Oppenheimer’s company controlled 220,000 head of cattle 
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on 100 ranches in 17 states.251 After returning from the war, Oppenheimer had run his family’s 
small auto agency, real estate, and loan businesses after leaving the service. His introduction to 
tax-loss farming came in 1953, when Oppenheimer’s rich stepfather, Jules Stein, the founder of 
MCA studios, asked Oppenheimer to purchase land and cattle for use as a tax shelter.252 It was 
through Stein that Reagan put his trust, and his money, in Oppenheimer’s company. In the early 
1950s, Reagan had been instrumental in securing a waiver from the Screen Actors Guild to allow 
MCA to expand into producing television shows. From there, Stein became one of Reagan’s 
most ardent supporters. In the view of many, Stein was the Svengali behind Reagan’s political 
success. Indeed, novelist Henry Denker’s 1973 work, The Kingmaker, was a thinly disguised 
roman à clef about Stein and Reagan’s relationship. When Reagan sold part of his his Yearling 
Row Ranch in the Malibu Mountains to 20th Century Fox for $1.9 million in 1966, Stein helped 
the aspiring politician handle the windfall. In ridding himself of 36 acres of the ranch, Reagan 
was shedding what was widely viewed as little more than a tax shelter, given Yearling Row’s 
low assessment and unsuitability for cattle grazing. The sale to 20th Century Fox proved 
controversial, given that the company paid Reagan 30 times his purchase price and far more than 
its assessed value. Indeed, just after Reagan sold the land, a high school government and 
economics teacher challenged Yearling Row’s low assessment. The appeals board sided with the 
teacher and, eventually, the California Supreme Court doubled the assessment on Reagan and 
20th Century Fox’s land. Still, the assessment was much lower than Fox’s purchase price, and 
during Reagan’s last year as governor, Fox sold the land to the California State Parks and 
Recreations Board for one-fourth the price it had given Reagan six years earlier. So, selling part 
of his ranch and, at Stein’s advice, in Oppenheimer, Reagan was trading one tax controversy for 
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another.253 For the most part, Reagan was able to sweep these tax scandals away, and the 
California governor avoided the potential financial pitfalls of pursuing the tax-loss farming tax 
dodge. Others were not so lucky.  
Despite guarantees of riches, some tax-loss farming firms were poorly run. Black Watch, 
the firm that had bragged that it was in the “tax shelter” to the Wall Street Journal, declared 
bankruptcy in 1970. Black Watch’s action comically sent confused coastal capitalist searching 
the Great Plains for the cows they had never seen, even though they had written them off on their 
taxes. The company’s clients included singer Connie Francis and Peter Revson, the son of 
Revlon’s founder, as well as countless high-income professionals, like doctors and lawyers. Until 
the bankruptcy, dealing with actual cattle was not part of the deal, as far as most Black Watch 
investors had understood it. “I made a lot of money in the brokerage business. I needed a tax 
shelter. I heart cattle was a good investment,” one anonymous Black Watch investor told the 
Wall Street Journal. “I don’t know a damn thing about cattle…. And look what happened [the 
Black Watch bankruptcy]. It’s a lesson.”254 When Black Watch went belly-up, this tax-dodge 
seeking investors had to hire hundreds of lawyers to represent them at the company’s bankruptcy 
hearings. The ranchers contracted to take care of the company’s cattle were no longer getting 
paid, and they demanded that Black Watch, or its investors, take the cattle off their hands. But 
sorting out the details proved difficult. “A typical herd owner might have two of his cows at 
Trails End Ranch near Hillside, Colorado, four cows at Angus Valley Farms near Stillwater, 
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Oklahoma, and 40 more strung from Wyoming to Florida,” Farm Journal reported.255 Black 
Watch tried to blame the TRA69, which limited write-offs against nonfarm losses to $25,000 a 
year and required owners to hold cattle for two years in order to qualify for the capital gains rate, 
for its bankruptcy. However, Black Watch, as both Farm Journal and the Wall Street Journal 
reported, was simply grossly mismanaged, a fact obvious to farmers, but unseen to the gullible 
investors to whom the company promised low-tax riches.256  
Despite its billing as a sweeping reform measure, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 did little to 
stem most loopholes, including tax-loss farming.257 A 1971 New York Times study found that 
three out of every four individuals with an income of over $100,000 was “involved in farming in 
some way, most of them reporting agricultural losses that can be written off against taxes on 
nonfarm income.”258 In 1974, economists at the Department of Agriculture conducted a study 
into farm losses on tax returns. Using 1970 tax data, the study found that more than 90 percent of 
returns showing farm losses had losses of less than $5,000. Only about three percent of those 
reporting farm losses had losses exceeding $10,000. These individuals reaped a disproportionate 
share of the total tax expenditures for farm losses, however. Those with losses exceeding 
$25,000, despite their small numbers, claimed over 17 percent of all farm losses. Not 
coincidentally, these were the people with high income from other sources. “The higher the basic 
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income, the more frequent became the reported farm losses,” the Agriculture study found. Many 
of the individuals with large nonfarm incomes and large farm losses were concentrated in a few 
geographic areas, especially New York and New Jersey, according to the study. While most 
taxpayers reporting farm losses were legitimate farmers, many of these individuals with high 
nonfarm incomes were “probably motivated more by tax than real economic considerations.” 
Simply put, they were “seeking tax shelters.” Relatively few legitimate farmers would and 
ranchers would be hurt by further limiting the amount of farm losses deductible against nonfarm 
income, the Department of Agriculture concluded, but such limitations would catch a substantial 
portion of those simply seeking a tax dodge. “Limiting farm loss to $10,000 would have affected 
3.3 percent of individuals who reported a farm loss in 1970, increasing their income tax liability 
by 63 percent and resulting in an additional $258 million in federal tax revenue,” the report 
found.259  
By the mid-1970s, tax-loss farming had become an almost comically well-known 
loophole. Covering the growth of tax-loss cattle farming, the Wall Street Journal penned a 
parody of the 1930s tune “I’m an Old Cowhand from the Rio Grande” that read, “I’m a rich 
cowhand, of the Wall Street Brank/And I save on tax, to beat the band/Oh I take big deductions 
the law allows/And I never eve have to see my cows/Yippee-i-o-ki-ay!” 260 In addition to 
Reagan, the press reported that celebrities and athletes like Jack Benny, Alfred Hitchcock, 
Richard Widmark, Jack Nicklaus, and Gary Player were all clients of Oppenheimer Industries.261 
Other famous tax-loss cattle ranchers included Leonard Bernstein, Jerry Lewis, Anna Maria 
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Alberghetti, Robert Lehman, Joane Fontaine, and Woody Allen.262 Other forms of farm-loss tax 
dodges, like citrus or almonds, attracted wealthy clients, too. Nor were such shelters limited to 
celebrities. “[D]octors, dentists, entertainers, lawyers, and corporate executives,” as one Boston 
College proferssor of law put, could be counted among the ranks of  “IRS Farmers.”263 
As with many of the issues that concerned both average Americans and left-
distributionist reformers, it remained to be seen, as Gerald Ford took office, whether the mid-to-
late 1970s would see Congress finally act to close the tax-loss farming loophole. Policymakers 
throughout the government also would need to grapple with both the continual rise of inflation 
and a steadily-climbing unemployment rate – a combination that made undeniable the existence 
of the vexing problem of “stagflation.” The fate of tax reform would be placed in in the hands of 
an unelected GOP president and a Congress increasingly dominated by a very different type of 
Democrat. 
 
The 1974 Midterms and the Birth of the “New Democrats”  
 Just two years after enduring one of the most sweeping landslides in U.S. presidential 
history, the Watergate scandal and President Richard Nixon’s resignation seemed to give the 
Democratic Party new political life. The 1974 midterms, falling less than a week shy of the three 
month anniversary of Nixon’s resignation, saw Democrats pick up four governorships, four 
Senate seats, and a whopping 43 House seats. In the House, the Democrats also had a veto-proof 
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majority. In the Senate, Democrats needed to attract only a few liberal Republicans to override 
the White House.264  
 Democrats now found itself in a position of unquestionable power and influence, even 
with a Republican in the White House. But with that influence came the expectation of action. 
As Hubert Humphrey succinctly put it after the midterm sweep, “Democrats beware. Now you 
have to deliver.” 265  On that count, the new crop of Democrats would fail. Differing 
interpretations of the 1974 mandate, conflicting explanations for McGovern’s defeat, and debates 
about the party’s future gripped the Democratic Party in the years the followed, undermining 
unified approaches to nearly all policy issues. When it came to taxes, this intraparty battle for the 
soul of the Democrats would see the left-distributionist reformism of both McGovern and the 
grassroots left supplanted by the JFK-inspired fiscalism embraced by the new generation of 
Democrats who would eventually come to be known as “New Democrats,” “Atari Democrats,” 
or “Neoliberals.” In 1974, though, they were given a different name – the “Watergate Babies.” 
 Rather than “Watergate Babies,” though, the 1974 election class should really have been 
dubbed “Stagflation Babies.” By election day 1974, Watergate and trust in government had 
receded to a decidedly minor concern for Americans, according to polls. Instead, better than two-
thirds of Americans listed economic issues as both their top personal concern and the biggest 
issue facing the country. In the press, this was often reported as “inflation.” However, in reality, 
it was a mélange of topics that could broadly be construed as pocketbook or cost-of-living issues. 
In the Gallup poll, respondents who offered a variety of pocketbook problems as the “most 
important problem facing this country today” were lumped into the “High cost of 
living/Taxes/High prices/Economic situation/Price freeze/high cost of gas” category, which, by 
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late-1974, included between 60 and 75 percent of Americans.266 As David Broder put it 
succinctly, “The major issue in almost every state is the economy… Democrats are benefitting 
from the public’s pocketbook problems.”267 The New York Times likewise took note of the 
predominance of pocketbook issues in the 1974 midterms, ascribing their dominance to the 
Democratic Party’s ability to reclaim states and districts, particularly in the South, where 
decisive racial and cultural issues had – in the view of commentators like Kevin Phillips and Ben 
Wattenberg and Richard M. Scammon – begun costing Democrats elections in the mid-1960s. 
“Several Democrats took advantage of the economic concerns to put together coalitions of black 
and white voters based on populist and blue-collar appeals,” the Times reported the day after the 
midterms. With the weight of “economic distress,” the paper continued, whites could no longer 
“afford the luxury of anger at blacks.”268 
Indeed, political experts on both sides of the aisle had been predicting this very outcome. 
By late-1973, pollsters from George Gallup to Republican Robert Teeter to Democrat Pat Cadell 
were predicting that Nixon’s “New Majority” of blue-collar “ethnics” wsd already drifting back 
to the Democrats, thanks to both Watergate and the flagging economy. Nixon’s triumph, it 
seemed, was evanescent. “They want to take it out on the Republicans wherever they can lay 
their hands on them,” Gallup told the Washington Post in December 1973.269 However, any 
swing was tenuous. Many of these “New Majority” voters were simply waiting for one party to 
prove itself in addressing the pocketbook squeeze. Gallup reported in late-1973 that, even as 
perspective voters were indicating that they planned to vote for the Democrats in the upcoming 
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midterms, they nonetheless were not identifying as Democrats. “The results indicate that in terms 
of party affiliation, the Democratic Party thus far has been unable to capitalize on either 
Watergate or on widespread discontent over the cost of living.” Democrats had, in fact, seen their 
party affiliation drop from 53 percent to 43 percent over the previous ten years, though they still 
bested the GOP, who held steady at a quarter of Americans.270 But continued drift away from 
Democrats would pose long-term problems for the party.  Only successful action would lead to a 
shift in identification. Nixon, with the help of Arthur Burns and well-timed wage-price controls, 
had created a booming economy in 1972, all while promising to address the root causes of the 
tax revolt. By 1974, however, the rising taxes on low- and middle-income Americans remained 
unaddressed and stagflation gripped the economy.  
The effects of economic hardship manifested themselves at the polls, both in terms of the 
decision of whom to vote for, as well as whether to vote at all. More than 40 percent of 
Americans in 1974 said that they were worse off financially than in 1973, continuing a rising 
trend of increased dissatisfaction of Americans’ with the state of their pocketbooks since the 
1960s. As in nearly all years, the lower one’s income in 1974, the more dissatisfied she or he was 
with her or his finances. Nearly half of the poorest Americans said they were worse off than in 
1973. However, the biggest net gains in dissatisfaction occurred in the middle- and upper-income 
brackets. By the mid-1970s, the pocketbook squeeze that had plagued poor and working-class 
Americans even in the heady economy of the 1960s spread up the income ladder, at least to some 
extent.271 One striking feature of the 1974 elections, however, was low turnout, even by midterm 
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standards.272 In the 1974 midterms, those experiencing financial hardship – the unemployed and 
those with lower incomes – were much less likely to vote. As one study found, “compared to 
those with a median house hold income, people making less than $2,000 a year are 9 percent less 
likely to vote; people with an income $2,000 to $3,999 are about 5 percent less likely to vote; 
and people with household incomes of $4,000 to $7,499 are 4 percent less likely to vote.” The 
1974 midterms were, in this sense, an extreme illustration of a general trend in turnout.273 One of 
the midterm’s most striking features, then, was that pocketbook issues dominated the election 
even though many of the most economically squeezed stayed home. Based on the economic 
unease felt even by onetime “Silent Majority” middle-class voters, the Democrats made notable 
inroads into the suburbs. “In many cases the suburban districts that went Democratic contained 
thousands of former Democrats who left their party behind as they became prosperous enough to 
move outside the city limits,” Congressional Quarterly noted. These suburban voters often had 
become nominal independents and were adept at ticket splitting. In 1974, these independents 
broke for Democrats, thanks as much to Watergate as to stagflation and the continued tax revolt. 
“The new suburban middle class had been hard hit by recession and inflation, and Republicans 
may have paid the price,” CQ concluded.274 
The question of whether the new Democratic majority could “deliver,” as Hubert 
Humphrey put it, hung over the party as it took office in 1975. If the Democrats failed to address 
the pocketbook squeeze generated by these intertwined issues, there was good reason to believe 
that the “New Majority” voters would just as swiftly reject the Democratic Party as they had 
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Nixon and the GOP. Given its status in the 1972 presidential election, tax reform stood as a key 
issue on which the Democrats could make good with voters. As the DNC’s former 
communications director, John Stewart, put in mid-1974, “President Nixon has handed the 
Democrats an excellent chance for the balance of the ‘70s…. Whether the Democrats will 
capitalize on this opportunity, however, is not as clear.” The “crucial period,” Stewart argued, 
would occur after the Democrats’ presumed sweep of the midterms. The key, he argued, would 
be to deliver results on key issues, including the pocketbook ones that had dominated local, state, 
and national politics for the past several years, Watergate notwithstanding. “The 1972 
presidential primaries demonstrated the political appeal of tax reform when it is dramatized with 
flair and persistence,” Stewart noted.275 Liberal political columnist David Broder agreed. Tax 
reform had united the party in the 1972 elections, he noted. While certain obstacles, such as the 
possible resistance of Wilbur Mills and Rusell Long still plagued the party, taxes “may be the 
best place for Democrats around the country to learn what their party’s policy is,” Broder 
noted.276  
Cynics, however, doubted that Democrats would use their new majority to deliver on past 
tax promises. “Full-scale tax reform is one of those things that never quite happens,” the 
Washington Post noted early in 1973. Despite the dominance of tax reform as an issue in 1972, 
including Ways and Means’ chair Wilbur Mills’s proposal to close 54 loopholes, the paper still 
doubted that reformers would finally succeed. “The Hill’s tax reformers are all dusting off their 
old proposals,” the Post continued, making special note of reformers’ desire to close the capital 
gains loophole.277 Whether anything would come of those proposals remained to be seen. Some 
Democrats, at least, seemed optimistic. George McGovern, for one, began preparing a package 
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of reforms modeled on his 1972 platform.278 The members of the new Democratic majority had 
different ideas, though.  
The “Watergate Babies” were uniquely ill-equipped – and, in many ways, unwilling – to 
handle the pocketbook squeeze wrought by higher taxes and stagflation. Among the 
congressional majority taking office in January 1975 were 75 first-term Democrats. Running in 
1974, most were not only able to present themselves as untainted by the kind of dirty politics 
represented by Watergate, but by politics, generally. Thirty-one of the 75 had never held elective 
office before, and many of the others had only held minor positions prior to entering the U.S. 
Congress. The story was much the same on the state level, too.279 Having little previous political 
experience, the so-called Watergate Babies lacked knowledge of the type of transactional politics 
that held political coalitions together, but which was second-nature to Democrats who had risen 
through successive elective offices, working along the way with traditional Democratic interest 
groups, like labor unions, farm organizations, business, and community groups. “We don’t have 
the local roots that some other have,” Colorado’s Timothy Wirth, a 35-year-old with an 
undergraduate degree from Harvard and a doctorate from Stanford, said of himself and most of 
the other freshman Democrats. 280 
Beyond simply lacking experience in this world, many of the Watergate Babies also held 
such wheeling, dealing politicking in contempt. Instead, many of the newly elected Democrats 
saw the old politics as symptomatic of the festering corruption that finally burst to the surface 
with Watergate. Broad national issues, not specific local or pocketbook issues, dominated their 
agendas. Not a single Democrat, the Times suggested, had won “because he promised a highway 
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through his district” or some similar concrete promise. Rather than make specific political 
promises important to local constituencies, most new Congressional representatives, the New 
York Times noted, shared a common vision. “The strongest bond between the freshmen is the 
fact that most of them were elected on similar platforms…,” the paper noted. “[T]hey 
campaigned for clean and open government.” The distance the class of 1974 exhibited from 
Democratic interest groups and the Democratic Party itself was, in fact, purposeful. The 
Watergate Babies were “entrepreneurial,” as political scientist Burddett Loomis put it. “Their 
prevailing legislative philosophy emphasized problem solving by individual legislators,” Loomis 
continued. “The new pols by and large developed into policy entrepreneurs who hooked their 
careers to ideas, issues, and problems-and prospective solutions,” rather than parties or interest 
groups. Even partisanship itself seemed corrupt to some new members, who complained to the 
press that Democratic leadership was too partisan, too quick to attack the GOP.281 “Party labels 
didn’t matter…,” Pennsylvania Representative Bob Edgar recalled of his 1974 campaign. “I 
never ran races from day one as Democratic versus Republican,” he continued. “It was good 
government versus bad government. It was reasonable, rational, targeted, fiscally responsible, 
spend-the-dollars-well-and-wisely government,” he concluded, adding, “It sounds very 
conservative.”282 
 Indeed, these young Democrats saw politics very differently from their party elders. 
Generationally divorced from the New Deal, socially disconnected from organized labor, and 
politically distant from the grassroots left, many these new Democrats shared well-off, well-
educated, suburban backgrounds. “We’re not a bunch of little Hubert Humphreys,” Colorado 
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Senate candidate Gary Hart declared just before the 1974 midterms. Asked to clarify his 
comments later, Hart explained that his generation of Democrats “were not automatic regulators, 
new-agency creators, and higher-tax-and-spend people.” 283  Needless to say, these “new 
Democrats” would not be pursuing sweeping new programs in the same way that New Deal and 
Great Society Democrats like Humphrey had. “We were not just marching forward with New 
Deal formulas for our answers,” Oregon Representative Les AuCoin explained. By the time the 
1974 midterms were in full swing, the rightward pivot of Democratic candidates, especially on 
economic issues, was unmistakable to most political observers. 284  
 The Democrats drift away from distributionism towards a more moderate, business-
friendly fiscalism began in the wake of McGovern’s defeat. Democratic operatives, at least in 
some circles, attributed Nixon’s sweeping victory not to a government-stoked economy, but to 
McGovern’s supposedly radical stances, which many of these same party workers blamed on the 
influence of left-leaning activists. Viewed in this light, the Democrats’ 1974 midterm victory 
was a fluke bestowed upon the party by Richard Nixon – hence the “Watergate Babies” 
terminology. Indeed, Gary Hart, who had served as McGovern’s campaign manager, led the 
charge in defining McGovern’s defeat. McGovern did not lose because of the supposed 
radicalism on social and cultural issues, Hart explained to the Wall Street Journal in October 
1974. Rather, the Colorado candidate for U.S. Senate explained, McGovern’s defeat was 
representative of a systemic flaw common to most Democrats: “the failure of the Democratic 
Party to evolve or articulate economic theory responsive to the needs of the latter part of the 20th 
century.” The 1970s economy – and its voters – would not respond to “New Deal thinking,” Hart 
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counseled. 285  Acting on this analysis of McGovern’s loss, Hart distanced himself from 
McGovern’s 1972 policy proposals. Hart now told reporters that he was “disturbed” by the fact 
that many of McGovern’s policy proposals “were traditional solutions that came out of the ‘60s, 
the ‘50s, and even the ‘40s” and claimed that he “kept complaining inside the campaign” about 
the lack of “new ideas or new concepts.”286 Such was Hart’s move to the right that his GOP 
opponent in the 1974 Colorado senate rate, incumbent Peter Dominick, complained that Hard 
had “shifted his positions like a chameleon” and was now running “to the right of Attila the 
Hun.”287 Asked about his conservative shift, Hart argued, “I have not moved left or right, but I 
hope I have moved beyond some of the old liberal solutions that have been tried and failed.” Just 
which liberal solutions had failed, Hart did not say, but his Senatorial campaign made clear that 
the frank redistributionism of George McGovern sat at the top of the list.288 This diagnosis of 
McGovern’s defeat ignored that the South Dakota senator had done about as well as most 
academic projections predicted. But few young Democrats in 1974 accepted that explanation. 
Just as the “new” Democrats’ interpretation of McGovern’s 1972 defeat was misguided, 
so too was their understanding of the 1974 midterms. Despite the taint of Watergate, the 
Democrats did about as well as most political science models would have predicted, based on the 
state of the economy and Ford’s popularity. Whatever temporary boost the GOP received from 
Ford’s replacement of Nixon, the disastrous economy more than overwhelmed. Like most 
midterms, 1974 was a “referendum” on “the performance of the President and his 
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administration's management of the economy.289 Nonetheless, many young Democrats continued 
to harbor the feeling that McGovernism and influence of interest groups on the party was to 
blame for Nixon’s two victories. Acting off of this conviction that the party was becoming 
beholden to the left, former staffers of several unsuccessful Democratic presidential campaigns – 
mainly Muskie advisers, but also former workers from the Eugene McCarthy and McGovern 
campaigns, among others – came together in 1973 to form a new organization called the 
Democratic Forum.  
 The Forum’s explicit purpose was to forge a new direction for the Democratic Party in 
the wake of the Nixon landslide. Key organizers included Mike Barnes (Muskie), Keith Haller 
(Muskie), Jessica Tuchman Matthews (McCarthy), Lanny Davis (Muskie), Anne Wexler 
(McCarthy, Muskie, and, after Muskie’s defeat, McGovern), and Ted Van Dyk (Humphrey and 
McGovern).290 While the Democratic Forum ostensibly privileged no specific political agenda 
over others, it had a clear emphasis on shifting the party in a different direction than that embrace 
by McGovern. The Forum promised to “reappraise basic premises that have dominated 
Democratic Party thinking since the New Deal,” as Congressional Quarterly put it.291 While the 
Forum, in both its publications and meetings, would feature contributions from unionists, 
Naderites, and others on the left, the unmistakable idea advocated with its founders was that the 
part needed to break away traditional Democratic constituent groups. Visiting a meeting of the 
Forum’s leaders, political columnist David Broder sensed that its leaders had a “shared 
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frustration with the intellectual and political rigidity of their party.”292 Its leaders shared that 
assessment. “[The Forum’s purpose was] to debate the traditional premises that had underpinned 
the party – no holds barred…[and] unfettered by the immediacy of elections and interest-group 
demands,” Haller recalled later.293 There was no mistaking the fact that, by “interest group 
demands,” the Democratic Forum’s leaders generally meant the labor unions and the grassroots 
groups who advocated for downward redistribution.  
 A November 1975 Forum conference in Louisville, Kentucky, dubbed the “National 
Democratic Issues Conference” illustrated the boldness – and contentiousness – of the 
Democratic Forum’s project. The purpose of the conference, according to the Forum was, to 
devise ways that the Democrats could “go beyond the New Deal and the Cold War.”294 By 1975, 
the Forum, as journalist David Broder reported from the convention, was comprised of primarily 
white “young Democratic lawyers, economists, and writers.”295  The conference attendees, 
according to a survey of its 644 delegates by pollster Peter Hart, were decidely “not a national-
cross section.” Instead, “their median age was 36…their median income of $20,000 was high by 
national standards; their education level, one would guess, was even higher…[and] [o]nly one in 
five was a union member.”296  
 If the “beyond the New Deal” theme of the convention did not make the Forum’s project 
clear enough, Ted Van Dyk – who, in his own words, was an “older generation mentor” to the 
Forum – circulated a discussion paper prior to the Louisville conference that called for a “New 
Democratic Agenda.” Put succinctly, Van Dyk’s called for Democrats to embrace an anti-“big 
government” politics of bureaucratic reorganization and public sector downsizing. Citing Daniel 
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Patrick Moynihan’s charge that Democrats were only good at “throwing dollars after problems,” 
Van Dyk suggested both that the problems that had faced the country during the New Deal era 
had passed and that “recent presidential election experience, if nothing else, should now cause us 
to give them [traditional Democratic Party ‘premises’] serious reexamination.” McGovern lost, 
Van Dyk charged, because the public believed all he wanted to do was dispense money “to his 
own radic-lib, welfare-chiseling adherents.” New York City, teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, 
Van Dyk wrote, represented “the New Deal fulfilled.” He conceded that the New Deal ideology 
was not “solely” responsible for the city’s predicament, but Van Dyk nonetheless argued that the 
city’s swollen welfare rolls, its large population of “unskilled black and Spanish-speaking 
immigrants,” and the “unprecedented” strength of organized labor in the city all indisputably 
pushed New York into its current unenviable predicament. Just to make his point perfectly clear, 
Van Dyk added this evocative passage: “One has a vision of millions of American voters seated 
before a massive television screen. On the screen is portrayed New York City, inundated to the 
Empire State Building's 50th floor with uncollected garbage, picket signs, welfare recipients and 
protesting city employees. Standing astride it all, in a hovering cloud of pollution, are Humphrey, 
Ted Kennedy, Ed Muskie, and the ghost of Lyndon Johnson, all furiously signing new laws to 
create similar situations in the voters' own communities.” It was fitting, he concluded, that the 
Democratic National Convention would be held in NYC in 1976.297  
 Only a radical reorientation of the Democratic Party’s priorities could save it, in Van 
Dyk’s view. This meant abandoning away old ideas, old constituencies, and old experts. Van 
Dyk described the old guard of New Deal/Great Society Democratic advisers, like Wilbur Cohen 
and Sargent Shriver, as “huddled together for mutual support in academia and the Northeast 
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corridor.” Should another Democrat get elected and turn to them for advice, these advisers would 
simply advocate more tax-and-spend liberalism. They had confused the “means” with the “ends” 
of Democratic politics, Van Dyk charged. Praising Mayor Daley as a model, “whatever his other 
faults,” Van Dyk argued that Democrats should shed larger goals and focus on 
“figuratively…[the] fixing governmental potholes” that New Deal/Great Society liberalism’s 
“freewheeling cavalcade of progress has left in its wake.” This meant cutting many of the 
programs and agencies that Democrats created. “The first 1,000 days of a new Democratic 
presidency could well be used to promulgate a new agenda,” Van Dyk wrote, “concentrating on 
reorganization and management of the whole government process. Such an agenda would 
include a ruthless reexamination of every federally-funded and administered agency and 
program.”298  
 Republicans, Van Dyk suggested, had the right idea when it cam to downsizing the 
federal government. While the Democrats had supported revenue sharing out of a belief in “tax 
progressivism,” Van Dyk argued, it now seemed that conservatives’ support for revenue sharing 
as a “disguised means of stopping the growth in federal grant programs” were the ones with the 
better motivation. Van Dyk even called for Democrats to embrace the suggestions of the Nixon-
appointed Advisory Council on Executive Reorganization, which called for dismantling 
numerous departments, from Agriculture to HUD to HEW – proposals that went nowhere while 
Nixon was in office. Pursuing the type of vigorous reexamination and shrinkage of government 
Van Dyk suggested would involve taking an oppositional stance to the constituencies that had 
traditionally formed the Democratic base. No longer, Van Dyk argued, should labor unions be 
“exempt” from the scrutiny Democrats give to “private institutions such as corporations and 
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banks.” The assumption that unions were “acting on the average citizen’s behalf” no longer held. 
“[W]e as a party no longer can reflexively endorse labor's program as our own,” Van Dyk 
wrote.299 (As if to emphasize the break from the New Deal’s labor-liberalism, Van Dyk would 
travel to D.C. just after the Louisville convention in order to help the Washington Post’s 
management bust a strike by its reporters.)300 
 The message that the Democratic Party had to move on from its New Deal past – and, 
implicitly, move to the right, politically – was reiterated again and again at the Democratic Issues 
Convention. The Democratic Forum invited futurist Alvin Toffler (whom Van Dyk had quoted in 
his paper) to give the keynote address at the Louisville issues convention. Toffler surely did not 
disappoint those who wanted the party to break with the past when he advised Democrats to 
“throw out all that old New Deal claptrap.”301 Other speakers supported the message of Van Dyk 
and Toffler. For example, in a panel on public opinion, pollster Peter Hart declared, “Americans 
want change, and the Democratic Part cannot expect the voters to put Democrats back in office 
on the strength of a few newly warmed-over 1933 programs.”302 Likewise, economist Charles 
Schultze – who would go on to be Carter’s CEA chair – told the Louisville convention that he 
believed Democrats should turn to tax or other financial incentives to get the private market to 
solve problems, rather than having the government address the issues itself.303 Reporting on the 
Louisville convention, Alan Ehrenhalt, the editor of the Congressional Quarterly noted that it 
was “striking” to hear the young Democrats at the convention “talking about the New Deal not 
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only as an anachronism but as a dangerous piece of ideological baggage the party will have to 
discard if it wants to win elections from now on.” It was “surprising,” Ehrenhalt noted, how 
quickly Democrats had come to embrace an anti-government outlook. “George Wallace should 
not be the only Democrat in next year’s presidential primaries talking about big government,” he 
concluded.304  
 Not everyone attendee at the Democratic Issues Convention proved to be pleased with the 
new direction advocated by many of its attendees, though. “[E]ven in its own terms,” David 
Broder wrote, “the conference’s purpose ran into an unexpectedly strong challenge from some 
participants.” While the largely white, well-off organizers wanted to move “beyond the New 
Deal,” Democrats from different background had other ideas. Speaking for the Congressional 
Black Caucus, Michigan Representative John Conyers called the Democratic Forum’s 
conference “an utter fraud,” since it dealt little with economic problems like unemployment, 
which Conyers said “must be the number one issues if we are going to get Democrats elected.” 
Indeed, the CBC circulated a statement at the Louisville convention that pushed for a clear 
distributionist reading of the problems facing the country. “It is time to move toward 
fundamental structural changes in America,” the statement argued. “It has become increasingly 
apparent that many groups in addition to blacks fail to receive a just share of the nation’s wealth. 
We must openly, forcefully challenge and alter systems that benefit the wealthy first and best, 
and the majority least and last.” The Democratic Party did not need to move beyond the New 
Deal and Great Society, the CBC argued, it needed to expand and improve upon them. Likewise, 
Mexican-American labor activist Henry Santiestevan, lambasted the conference’s opening 
session for talking about “try[ing] to move beyond the New Deal when many of us haven’t even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






reached the New Deal.”305 Even conservative Democratic analyst Ben Wattenberg – who had 
literally co-written the book Nixon used to target Democratic voters – was alarmed by the 
rightward direction of the Democrats when it came to economic and social policy. Wattenberg 
defended the New Deal as the cornerstone of the Democratic Party’s appeal to voters. “Throwing 
dollars after problems is better by far than the alternative, which is to do nothing,” he quipped at 
the Louisville convention. 306 Other old-guard liberals agreed. “Federal tax reduction, taken by 
itself is an inefficient form of stimulation…,” John Kenneth Galbraith told the Louisville 
conference. “Democrats have bought a slightly modified version of the Hoover trickle-down 
doctrine.” Such distributionist views, however, were quickly rebuked by other attendees. 307  The 
“new Democrats” had a decidedly different, non-distributionist, inspiration for their economic 
politics.  
 More than any other politician, John F. Kennedy influenced the Watergate Babies. They 
were, as an Atlantic profile put it, “JFK’s children.”308 Many came of age during the Kennedy 
year. As Colorodo governor Richard Lamm explained, “I was apolitical. If you had taken a vote 
of my high school or college class, I would have been among the least likely to become a 
politician. But I got out of college the year John Kennedy was elected President. That was a siren 
call to a whole generation.” These new Democrats took JKF’s adage to “ask not what your 
country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country” as an attack on the Democratic 
interest groups who sought “handouts” from the party. Likewise, Kennedy’s call in his 1962 
Yale University address to put aside “clashes of philosophy and ideology” and focus on 
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“technical answers, not political answers” to society’s complex problems resonated with the 
Watergate Babies. When combined with their well-off, well-educated backgrounds, JFK’s 
influence led the Watergate Babies to privilege issues with technocratic solutions, rather than 
conflictual distributional ones. The upper-middle class voters with whom the Watergate Babies 
sympathized “were reform-minded, libertarian in their social views, and anti-military….[but] had 
no interest in big-spending, high-taxing, pro-labor Democrats,” as another profile of the class of 
’74 aptly put it.309 Though the Watergate Babies’ alliances were mutable, they had a clearer idea 
of who and what they opposed. 
 Perhaps nowhere was the influence of JFK more evidence than in the class of 1974’s 
economic views. For these ascendant JFK-inspired Democratic moderates, growth (not 
distribution) and the market (not the government) were the targets on which the Democrats 
needed to focus. Here Kennedy’s repeated use of the phrase “a rising tide lifts all boats” to argue 
for the shared benefits of economic growth informed the fiscal views of the Watergate Babies. 
When asked to explain his economic views to traditional Democratic constituencies, 
Massachusetts Representative Paul Tsongas paraphrased Kennedy, explaining, “If the U.S. 
economy does well, a rising tide lifts all boats.” Tsongas was expressing the consensus view of 
the “new Democrats.” “A strong economy is best for the poor,” New York Representative Tom 
Downey explained to the same reporter, “You don't want it to appear as though you have been 
hog-tied or collared by those groups [African Americans, poor people, unions, and cities] 
because they voted for you in the last election.” Or, as Oregon’s Les AuCoin put it, looking back 
on the class of ’74 fifteen years after their election, “We brought a commitment to traditional 
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Democratic values without putting them into a class-warfare context.”310 This view was very 
much on display at the 1975 Democratic Issues Convention. “The number of jobs will grow only 
when the economy grows,” Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen, a 1976 Democratic presidential 
hopeful, argued in opposition to distributionist views put forward by other Democrats. “When 
John Kennedy ran for the presidency in 1960 and made economic growth the keystone of his 
campaign, no one thought to question the need for that growth.” In contrast, Bentsen continued, 
“today…the very idea of growth is under attack,” not only from inflation-focused conservatives, 
but also from “so-called progressors” among Democrats. Bentsen called not only for across-the-
board tax cuts, but also for incentives for specific industries, like domestic oil producers.311  
 For the New Democrats of the class of 1974, not only the New Deal, but also – and 
especially – Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society served as foils to the technocratic vision they 
believed Kennedy had embodied. In this conviction, Gary Hart was typical. While Hart’s stock 
campaign speech in 1974 was titled, provocatively, “The End of the New Deal,” the candidate 
reserved special ire for the LBJ’s programs. “The ballyhooed War on Poverty,” Hart said, 
“succeeded only in raising the expectations, but not the living conditions of the poor. The federal 
housing program has been a miserable failure.”312 New Jersey Representative James Florio said 
that the Watergate Babies’ anti-government sentiment “was a response among some of us to 
having been burned by Great Society programs.”313 Likewise, investment banker Felix Rohatyn 
– a Democratic adviser appointed by New York Governor Hugh Carey in 1975 to oversee 
NYC’s finances – exaggeratedly lambasted the Great Society as a misguided attempt at “cradle-
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to-grave security.”314 This conviction was seared into the very identity of the nascent “New 
Democrats.” Intellectual Charles Peters – who founded the Washington Monthly magazine in 
1969 as an outpost of what he would eventually dub “neoliberalism” – called Kennedy’s 
assassination “the main event in my career.” Johnson’s Great Society, in Peters’s view, was little 
more than a “vulgarized New Deal” – a sharp departure from Kennedy’s forward-looking New 
Frontier.315 The common refrain for the Watergate Babies was a return to growth fiscalism. 
“Economic growth is most important,” Peters would write in his early-1980s “Neoliberal 
Manfiesto.” “It is essential to almost everything else we want to achieve.”316 While many of the 
new Democrats spoke of living within limits and accepting “shrinking” pie, in practice such calls 
for restraint were limited to the government and those who sought new spending programs, but 
not to business.317  
Ultimately, this new economic outlook would mean that the Democratic Party would 
become less friendly to labor, less supportive of regulation, and more friendly to business. Such 
conclusions were, in fact, taken for granted by the class of ’74. “We didn't take our marching 
orders from organized labor, nor did we take them wholly from business,” AuCoin recalled. 
“One of the marks of our class has been…a search for the best practical ideas in a number of 
ideological camps to put together something that works in a rapidly changing world.” 318 Even a 
few Democrats not part of the class of ’74 came around to their younger counterparts views. “A 
great many liberals now see the limits of government…,” California’s Alan Cranston, who had 
been elected to the Senate in 1968, said in late-1975. “[T]hey are concerned about government 
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spending in ways that threaten the economy and limit the choices of individual citizens.”319 
Likewise, Peters echoed both AuCoin’s knock against labor and Cranston’s libertarian-tinged 
rhetoric, writing, “[W]e no longer automatically favor unions and big government or oppose the 
military and big business…. Our hero is the risk-taking entrepreneur who creates new jobs and 
better products.” 320 Needless to say, the “risk-taking entrepreneur” was a far cry from the farmer 
or industrial worker idealized in the “cultural front” of the New Deal.321 By late-1975, the Los 
Angeles Times pronounced the ardent New Dealer Hubert Humphrey – seen as too conservative 
by many in the party in 1968 and 1972 – “out of step” on economic issues with the conservative 
turn among Democrats.322 The Democratic Forum’s leaders, for example, clumsily tipped their 
pro-business hand – and caused a minor scandal – when they sent out a letter in May 1975 to 
corporations asking them to “lend a hand” with a contribution to the Forum that would “help 
prepare our party for the responsibilities that lie ahead in 1976.” The legality of the solicitation 
would questionable and, more importantly, the Forum had not asked the permission of the four 
Democrats – Humphrey, Muskie, McGovern, and Henry “Scoop” Jackson – whose names the 
Forum signed to the corporate fundraising letter.323 
These new entreaties to business had clear implications for tax policy and, consequently, 
the Watergate Babies’ relationship with the distributionist tax justice left. When asked for an 
example of how the Watergate Babies departed from Democratic orthodoxy, Tsongas picked 
capital gain tax policy. “The traditional Democrat would take the position ‘If business is for it, 
I'm against it,’” Tsongas argued. “Our position would be ‘If it generates wealth and helps the 
economy and makes us more competitive, we’re for it.’ That is a tremendous divide.” While he 
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conceded that such a stance made Democrats guilty of “me too-ism” in following GOP policy, 
Tsongas said he “[didn’t] give a damn” about such criticism.324 By the mid-‘70s, Gary Hart and 
other young Democrats began calling for pro-capital investment policies to stimulate growth – a 
call not far removed from business lobbyists’ longtime plea from pro-“capital formation” 
policies. In an April 1975 New York Times editorial, Hart lambasted the consumption-oriented 
tilt of U.S. fiscal policy “Much of the nation’s capital assets…deteriorate,” Hart lamented, 
“while we seek to ‘stimulate’ an economy premised on wasteful consumption and planned 
obsolescence.” Instead of pandering to voters, Hart wrote, the country needed “leaders who will 
tell the hard truth – that old-time, ‘fine-tuning’ economic remedies are no better than leeches and 
snake oil…the free lunch is over.”325 The sense that this view was ascendant in the Democratic 
Party by the mid-‘70s could be found everywhere. For example, when Hart explained his 
economic views in a 1976 interview to the Chicago Tribune, the interviewer commented that 
they “sound[ed] like the same things that Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Gov. [Jerry] Brown 
have been saying,” and Hart agreed.326  
This pro-growth, pro-business inclination would lead to an explicit rejection of 
distirbutionist policymaking, especially in tax policy. When Timothy Wirth joined with Dick 
Gephart to draft a Democratic policy paper, dubbed “Rebuilding the Road to Economic 
Opportunity,” in 1982, Wirth touted the investment- and growth-centric plan as proof that the 
party was “moving away from the political of redistribution to the economics of growth and 
opportunity.”327 Insofar as the “new Democrats” retained a belief in loophole-closing tax reform, 
it came from the pursuit of simplicity and good-government, not from a strong desire to shift the 
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tax burden upward.  
In taking this new stance on taxes, young Democrats were moving away from the 
distributionist tax justice left just as its powers were peaking. This shift away from the Democrat 
Party’s interest group base would leave the party searching for a political and policy identity in 
the late-1970s. Some within the party blanched at this trend. Perhaps most importantly, these 
New Democrats were betting that the grassroots left’s diagnosis of the tax revolt – and 
pocketbook politics, generally – had been incorrect. George McGovern urged his fellow 
Democrats to reconsider their shift to the right. In an October 1975 speech to the crowd at Iowa 
Democratic Jefferson-Jackson dinner, McGovern accepted blame for his defeat in 1972, but 
urged his fellow Democrats not to mistake his defeat for the public’s rejection of many of his 
policy positions. McGovern pointed to a variety of strategic mistakes – including failure to 
adequately explain his Demogrant plan, the chaotic convention, and his selection of Eagleton as 
his running mate – as the things that sunk his candidacy. McGovern told the crowd of 4,000, 
including many 1976 Democratic presidential hopefuls, that he accepted blame for those 
mistakes, “not because they are easy for me,” but because “[o]therwise, the defeat of 1972 may 
become an excuse for an empty politics of nonissues in 1976.” The next candidate for president 
needed to “continue where we were right” in 1972, such as on issues of tax reform, McGovern 
explained. The public rejected him, but it “did not repudiate change and approve the status quo.” 
Winning elections, McGovern cautioned, was not the ultimate aim of politics. “The Democratic 
Party must demand of itself not merely how it may win, but how it would govern,” McGovern 






of the people.”328  
When it came to taxes, “the people” would speak before the 1970s were over. However, 
as the class of 1974 began to govern, they would attempt to inscribe their new brand of 
liberalism into policy, all while facing off against a new Republican president – Gerald Ford. 
 
Taxes, Stagflation, Inaction, and the Persistence of Pocketbook Politics 
The Ford years were ones of frustration for tax reformers. Added to the New Democrats’ 
distance from the grassroots left and skepticism of left-distributionist tax policy, Gerald Ford’s 
administration also represented a shift to the right from the Nixon White House’s eclectic 
economic views. Ford’s personal views were staunchly fiscally conservative. The budget-
conscious Republican was more concerned with protecting revenue to balance the budget than he 
was with reforming the tax code. Likewise, many of Ford’s economic and domestic policy 
advisers stood significantly to the right of former Nixon advisers like John Ehrlichman and John 
Connally. Alan Greenspan, whom Ford appointed as his CEA chair, was particularly hostile to 
progressive reforms. As an investment banker and analyst, Greenspan had testified before 
Congress against progressive reforms and lobbied for upwardly redistributionist policy and 
incentives for “capital formation,” and he continued to advocate for the same policies as CEA 
chair.329 
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Facing and unsympathetic White House, left-distributionist reformers placed their hopes 
in the Democratic Congress. However, for reasons discussed in the previous section, Democrats 
would offer little more hope for the “tax justice” left than the Ford administration. Edmund 
Muskie’s high-profile Senate property tax hearings in 1972 grabbed headlines and raised the 
hopes of left-distributionist reformers. For Gary activists and Ralph Nader, alike, Muskie’s 
hearings helped keep Calumet Township assessor Thomas Fadell under the microscope – 
attention that ultimate led to Fadell’s removal from office and receipt of a three-year sentence for 
obstructing the investigation into bribery and kickbacks in his office.330 As Congress convened in 
1973, dozens of property tax reform bills were introduced. However, the scandals surrounded the 
Nixon White House subsumed the work of Congress in 1973 and into 1974. As Lee Enflied – 
Muskie’s Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee staff member, who dubbed herself “Miss 
Property Tax” – put it, Watergate pushed bold federal reforms of local revenue off the agenda, at 
least temporarily. “[T]he property tax never really sort of got off the ground…,” she 
remembered. “We started to do it, we geared up to think about hearings. And Watergate came 
along and it just sort of subsumed everything, the Watergate hearings.” Indeed, Congressional 
staffers remembered watching the Watergate hearings, rather than working on one-pressing 
legislative issues.331   
For property tax reform, however, the interregnum initiated by Watergate proved not to 
be temporary. In the years that followed Watergate, property tax legislation a handful of senators 
and representatives continue introduce bills, but each year the number dwindled. Few bills 
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progressed beyond their introduction and none was enacted. Not one, in fact, even received a 
floor vote.332 While the Ford administration contained few, if any, policy staffers sympathetic to 
left-distributionist reforms, the new Democratic Congress was arguable as responsible, if not 
more responsible, than the White House for the demise of federal property tax relief. Not only 
did the new Democratic leadership let property tax bills introduced by Democrats languish, it 
also rebuffed the White House’s brief property overture. Though many reformers had long 
blamed Wilbur Mills leadership of the House Ways and Means Committee for stifling reform, 
Mills’s departure due to personal scandals did little to improve reform’s prospects. The new 
Ways and Means chair, Oregon Democrat Al Ullman, proved to be scarcely more sympathetic to 
the demands of left-reformers than Mills. Moreover, when it came to federal property tax reform, 
Ullman joined with Senate Finance chair Russell Long to unceremoniously close the door on 
federal property tax relief that Mills had left open. Shortly after taking office, the Ford 
administration broached the subject of resubmitting President Nixon’s proposals for property tax 
relief for the elderly, the “proposal gathered no support from anyone and the Committee declined 
to take it up,” as William E. Simon explained to Ford in a 1975 memo. Based in part on the lack 
of enthusiasm for the proposal from Ways and Means, Ford declined to officially resubmit 
Nixon’s property tax relief proposal. 333 Thus, the combination of the New Democrats’ and Ford 
administrations’ shared disinterest in the issue and the onset of stagflation condemned the once-
popular idea of federal intervention into soaring local property taxes to the legislative dustbin.  
The drift away from concern about local property taxes at the federal level – from 
Congress to the White House – was a political shift with complex causes that would have long-
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term consequences for American tax politics. Certainly this shift was not caused by the public’s 
flagging concern with rising regressive taxes. Rather, both the White House and Congress 
believed that stagflation had eclipsed the tax revolt. This belief was mistaken, though. It 
oversimplified what the public’s concern about inflation signified. For most Americans, inflation 
and taxation were simply part of the same pocketbook squeeze. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, surveys showing that the public viewed inflation as the “most important problem” 
masked that the public’s definition of inflation lumped together “High cost of living/Taxes/High 
prices/ Economic situation/Price freeze/high cost of gas.”334 This was not merely the confusion 
of uniformed voters, though. 
Americans had good reason to lump the pocketbook issues of inflation and taxation 
together. A 1975 Joint Economic Committee study, Inflation and the Consumer, found that tax 
increases were the single most significant element of inflation in the average family’s budget. “It 
cost the average family with an income of $12,626 in 1973 an additional $1,840 in 1974 simply 
to maintain its 1973 living standards…,” the report noted. “Higher tax payments outstripped all 
other price increases in the consumer's budget in 1974. While food prices rose 11.9 percent, 
housing 13.5 percent and transportation 14.3 percent…taxes rose twice as fast…. The family at 
the intermediate budget level would pay $2033 in Federal, State and local income taxes in 1974 
compared to only $1607 in 1973 - an increase of $426 - even though its real standard of living 
remained the same.” Keeping with stagflation’s historical uniqueness, the JEC noted that current 
recession was “the first recession during which the overall tax burden on individuals and families 
has increased.” Moreover, keeping with regressive tax increase trends evident throughout the 
post-WWII era, the JEC report noted, “Inflation has increased the income tax burden on low and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Author’s analyses of ANES data; Gallup, October 11 - October 14, 1974 , Roper iPoll Databank 
[USGALLUP.916.Q007A];  Gallup, September 27 - September 30, 1974, Roper iPoll Databank 






middle-income taxpayers more than on wealthy individuals…. Thus, inflation makes the tax 
system less progressive.” Likewise, the JEC found that throughout the early-1970s price 
increases – particularly for food and housing – hurt lower income Americans more than the well-
off.335 The JEC study’s findings proved to be so notable that even NBC anchor David Brinkley, 
who years earlier had been so dismissive of average Americans’ complaints about taxes, devoted 
one of his “Journal” editorial segments to the topic. Brinkley noted not only that taxes were the 
fastest rising element of inflation, but also stressed several times in the segment that low and 
moderate income Americans were getting hit worse than the well-off. “It appears to be the first 
time in American history, or any history, when people were suffering inflation, recession, and 
loss of buying power while their government was still gouging them for more and more 
taxes…,” Brinkley noted acidly. “From the beginning, the basic idea of the American tax system 
has been that it’s based on ability to pay – the only way that makes any sense. But now that basic 
idea is gradually being eroded or destroyed and in Washington nothing is being done to change 
it.”336  
Stagflation’s intensification of the squeeze on low- and middle-income Americans’ 
pocketbooks – and the outsized role played by taxes in that squeeze – explained the persistence 
of the tax revolt throughout the mid-1970s, even as many policymakers turned their attention 
away from the revolt. The Ford White House’s most significant attempt to understand 
stagflation, however, revealed the extent to which the tax revolt and stagflation were inseparable. 
Shortly after taking the oath of office, President Gerald Ford called for a series of “mini-
summits” on inflation. The summits were designed to allow the president and members of his 
administration to show clear concern for the plight of ordinary Americans, cull experts’ views, 
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and receive feedback from the public. In focusing on inflation, Ford seemingly placed himself on 
firm ground by selecting an issue that played to his fiscally conservative, anti-inflation instincts. 
The first of the mini-summits, dubbed the Economists Conference on Inflation, followed 
expectations.  
Most of the attendees at the Economists Conference talked of taxes only in fiscalist 
terms, though they often had significant distributional consequences. While a few liberal 
economists broached the idea of tax cuts for low- and middle-income individuals as a way to 
ease the burden of inflation, most economists discussed supply-side effects of taxes, arguing – in 
the language stressed by NAM earlier in the decade – that increased capital formation would 
ultimately combat inflation. While arch-conservative Senator Roman Hruska called for an 
“exam[ination]” of “our total tax structure,” including state and local taxes. He believed that any 
tax reform, however, needed to be geared towards increasing capital formation and growth. 
“Unfortunately, most taxes and tax policies are discussed in only one context, that of equity…,” 
Hruska lamented. Instead, the Nebraska senator wanted to examine the tax system with respect to 
its effect on “productive capital” and “output.”337 Even Democratic Senator Claiborne Pell 
balanced his calls for a surtax on high-income taxpayers with a recommendation that the capital 
gains tax should be cut in order to “inprov[e] capital flow and “encourage[s] a greater mobility of 
capital.”338 Perhaps the only hint of strong dissent at the Economists Conference came in the 
form of a statement authored by the Black Economic Summit, which included Dorothy Height, 
Maynard Jackson, Charles Rangel, Roy Wilkins, John Lewis, and Jesse Jackson among its 
dozens of signatories. It called for “thorough-going reform of income, Social Security, and 
property taxes; erasing inequalities created by tax loopholes and subsidies (such as capital gains 
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taxes, agricultural subsidies, and oil depletion allowances) for individuals and corporations.”339 
Not surprisingly, however, both the Financial Conference on Inflation and the Business and 
Industry Conference on Inflation featured repeated calls to cut, or scrap altogether, taxes on 
capital income, as well as suggestions for the enactment of new, more generous investment tax 
credits.340 At the other mini-summits, however, the Black Economic Summit’s statement came 
closer to the mainstream view.  
Attendees at many mini-summits looked at them as an opportunity to broaden the 
discussion from fiscalist solutions to inflation to distributionist views of the pocketbook squeeze. 
Echoed throughout the State and Local Governments inflation mini-summit was a concern that 
Congress would fail to reenact General Revenue Sharing before it expired in December 1976. At 
the inflation summit and elsewhere, state and local officials linked revenue sharing to relief from 
rising regressive taxes. By 1975, it already was clear that RS’s well-document suppression of 
property tax increases in its first few years of existence was coming to an end. Soaring inflation 
ensured that the needs of local governments were now far outstripping revenue sharing’s 
assistance. Prior to Revenue Sharing, Newark Mayor Kenneth Gibson explained in a 1975 
Congressional hearing on General Revenue Sharing’s renewal, Newark’s property tax rate was 
$9.63 per $100. Revenue sharing funds allowed the city to lower rates two years in a row, 
dropping it to $8.60 per $100, which Gibson still called “too high.” Yet, stagflation ended that 
positive trend. “Unfortunately, because of the current state of the national economy, the 
downward trend in our property tax rate came to an abrupt halt this year,” Gibson explained. “In 
fact, we recently approved a city budget which requires an increase in our property tax rate for 
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1975 from $8.60 to $9.98 per $100. This is clearly much too high. A family in Newark owning a 
$20,000 house must pay over $1900 in property taxes.”341 
State and local officials not only wanted to see Revenue Sharing renewed, they also 
wanted further federal aid. In his statement to the State and Local Governments Conference on 
Inflation, Gibson noted that cities were “squeezed between the financial constraints of rising 
prices and the citizen’s demand for improved services.”342 In a joint statement, the National 
League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors demanded that the federal government stop 
saddling states and localities with unfunded “federally-mandated expenditures.” Instead, the 
statement called for the feds to expand aid to states and localities and to enact “tax expenditure 
reform.” Loopholes in the federal tax code were draining badly needed revenue from the federal 
government, the League of Cities and Conference of Mayors argued. “Every time the federal 
government grants a tax deduction or provides a tax shelter, this action must be viewed as an 
expenditure decision,” the statement argued. Such expenditures needed to be guided by “sound 
national economic and social policy,” not the demands of “special interests.” The joint statement 
also harshly criticizing the federal austerity proposed by many Republicans and right-leaning 
Democrats. Federal budget cuts, it argued, would simply result in “shifting responsibility to local 
and state governments to provide services formerly provided by the federal government.” With 
stricter budget rules and less elastic forms of revenue, it was “absurd” to expect states and 
localities to make up for federal cuts. Instead, they would “be faced with either increasing local 
taxes, reducing levels of essential public services, or both.” The NLC and Conference of Mayors 
said neither option was acceptable. Instead, they singled out taxes – at both the federal and state 
and local levels – as a central concern. The local property tax, the statement concluded, was 
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“inflexible and often counter-productive.”343 Likewise, Minnesota State Democratic-Farmer-
Labor Representative Martin Sabo argued that both budget cuts and federal tax cuts failed to 
address budget crises and soaring taxes and state and local levels, Sabo noted. “I have a basic 
fear that in the final analysis the federal government, the [Ford] administration and the Congress 
will respond to all the rhetoric of a balanced budget by cutting those funds which go to State and 
local government…,” Sabo said. “[Y]ou will have simply transferred the money-raising system 
from the Federal income tax and other federal revenues quite often to the local property tax 
which is [the] most regressive of all taxes….[I]f we simply adopt tax cuts at the Federal level but 
the revenue funds coming to state and local government and the local property taxes go higher, I 
am not sure you served a useful purpose.”344  
Concern for the distribution of the tax burden, both between federal and state and local 
governments and among Americans, was a central concern for attendees of the State and Local 
Governments mini-summit. Buffalo Mayor Stanley Makowski argued that the burden of 
stagflation had been “greatest for those least able to bear it.” He included not only high prices at 
the store, but soaring local property taxes in his portrait of suffering. “Our tax system is unfair, 
discriminatory and a national disgrace,” Makowski said. “[T]he tax burden must be redistributed. 
Enacting comprehensive reforms of our income tax system would involve no tax increase for the 
average person who already pays his fair share of taxes.”345  Keeping focus on the ability of 
federal government to ease the squeeze of regressive taxes, Edmund Muskie used his time 
speaking at the State and Local Governments Conference to call once again for “measures to 
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ease the burden of regressive taxes, including state and local sales and property taxes on our 
most hard-pressed citizens.”346  
The most headline-grabbing mini-summit proved to be the Conference on Health, 
Education, Income Security, and Social Services – a catchall meeting for grassroots and interest 
groups, from the ALF-CIO and the AARP to the League of Women Voters, NWRO, National 
Council of Negro Women, SCLC, the Grey Panthers, and the American Nurses Association, 
among many others. Many of the HEISSS conference participants were eager to stress a 
distributionist view of both inflation and taxes. Ford administration members, however, bristled 
at this line of thought. In her opening remarks on education, designed to provide a “framework” 
for the mini-summit’s discussion of the issue, Assistant Secretary of Education, Virginia Trotter, 
was dismissive of the public’s anger at rising property taxes and policymakers’ concern about 
continued reliance on the levy. “In spite of the creation of new taxes from new sources, [and] 
recent taxpayers’ revolts, property tax revenue has remained releatively constant…,” Trotter 
argued in her discussion of education funding. “[T]he experiences during the past several years 
do demonstrate that, in spite of apparent weaknesses in tie property tax, it has held its own.” 
Rather than discuss high-profile cases of assessment inequities and malfeasance (as discussed 
earlier in the chapter), Trotter praised local assessors and other “political and administrative 
institutions” that had increased both tax rates and assessments in order to make the property tax 
revenue source “responsive” to inflation. Trotter even predicted that, if “recent trends” 
continued, property taxes could be counted on to “generate roughly an additional ten billion in 
revenues within a few years.” The only hint of trouble in Trotter’s otherwise optimistic property 
tax remarks came when she noted, “Even prior to the current inflation, voters were beginning to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






reject requests for additional taxes.” Without considering that, in many states, approval rates had 
little room to drop further, Trotter added, “As voters feel the pinch of inflation it is likely that 
they will reject tax increases much more often.” The solution to both the budget squeeze facing 
schools and the pocketbook squeeze facing voters, Trotter concluded, was simply fighting 
inflation with “stringent budgetary measures.”347 
Other attendees had very different ideas about the continued viability of the United 
States’ system of fiscal federalism. In his testimony, American Federation of Teacher’s President 
Albert Shankar questioned the Ford administration’s determination to fight inflation by 
balancing the budget through spending cuts. Insofar as Ford sought to fight inflation with a 
balanced budget, Shankar argued, he should do so by pursuing progressive revenue raising tax 
reforms, such as “(1) closing the capital gains loophole, (2) eliminating tax subsidies for overseas 
Investment, (3) ending the 7 percent Investment tax credit, and (4) repeal of oil depletion and 
foreign tax credit loopholes and [introduction of] an excess profits tax” – a list that reflected the 
longstanding demands of tax justice activists. Reflecting the concerns of Shakar and others, John 
B. Martin, representing both the AARP and the National Retired Teacher Association, stressed 
the interrelatedness of inflation and taxes and called for federal intervention in rising regressive 
taxes if states could not manage. “Because the inflation of state and local service costs are passed 
on through the regressive property tax system, the states should be encouraged by financial 
incentives to provide relief for the aged,” Martin said, “in the alternative, a credit against federal 
income tax liability (or in the absence of liability, a refund) for property taxes paid should be 
adopted.” Likewise, other groups, especially those representing the elderly, emphasized the 
detrimental effects that rising taxes were having on low- and middle-income Americans’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







pocketbooks. Along with property taxes, “regressive payroll taxes” were singled out for 
criticism.348 For most activists and interest group representatives at the HEISSS mini-summit, 
inflation and taxation were two sides of the same coin.  
Debates about the distributional effects of inflation, however, proved to be the topic that 
generated fireworks at the conference.  NWRO Executive Director Johnnie Tillmon was one of 
many speakers who used the HEISSS mini-summit to put distributional issues front-and-center. 
Tillmon noted the inequities built into inflation. The poor, she noted, spent a larger portion of 
their budget on food than the rich. They also tended to buy higher-priced food products than the 
poor, who were budget shoppers by necessity. “[T]he middle and upper classes are able to 
change their food selections by ‘spending down’ to purchase cheaper foodstuff,” she noted, 
while the poor were unable to do so, since they were already consuming “the cheapest food 
items.” It was just one of many examples offered by Tillmon illustrating how inflation hit hardest 
those at the bottom of the income ladder. One of the comparatively few academics at the 
HEISSS conference, the University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty’s Thad W. 
Mirer, also focused on the distributional effects of inflation and economic inequality, more 
broadly. Mirer took aim at the view that “inflation is good for the poor.” The Institute for 
Research on Poverty’s research, Mirer noted, found that “the rapid rise in consumer prices in 
recent years has fallen more heavily on the poor than on middle income and wealthy families.” 
349  Though the January 1974 edition of the JEC’s Inflation and the Consumer had also 
demonstrated this fact, the notion that the poor – not the rich – suffered most from inflation was 
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still a controversial view.350 Tying this distributional observation to the fact that income 
inequality had risen between 1969 to 1972, Mirer predicted that the intermingling of stagflation 
with demands for tax reform would “reopen the repeated struggle over the distribution of income 
which occurs during the consideration of revenue measures.” Citing work by Joseph Pechman 
and Benjamin Okner, Mirer explained that, when taxes at all levels of government were 
considered together, “the U.S. tax system is shown to be essentially proportional for the vast 
majority of families, hence having little effect on the distribution of income.” With that in mind, 
he called for tax reform that would “mak[e] the system as progressive as it is in its ideal form.” 
Both Mirer and, in separate testimony, the Institute for Research on Poverty’s director, Robert 
Haveman, called for some form of guaranteed income payment or negative income tax, which 
would, Havemen noted, make the income tax system “more progressive” and “offset…the 
regressive effect of the rapidly growing payroll tax.”351 While Tillmon, Mirer, and the JEC were 
all on the same page when it came to inflation’s disproportionate effects on low- and middle-
income Americans, not everyone agreed. 
In what would prove to be perhaps the most memorable incident in all of the inflation 
summits, Alan Greenspan appeared HEISSS mini-summit just weeks after being sworn in as 
Ford’s CEA chair. While Greenspan’s prepared remarks served up a relatively unremarkable 
dose of balanced-budget fiscalism – complete with hints of the necessity of “capital formation,” 
of course – one of Greenspan’s off-the-cuff remarks in the question-and-answer caused a stir. 
From the floor, State, County and Municipal Employees Union President Jerry Wurf criticized 
the Ford administration’s economic policies, including its reluctance to consider targeted tax 
relief. Inflation, Wurf argued, was “pushing down the lower middle class into the poor and 
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putting the middle class down into the lower middle class” at the same time that banks and 
corporations were reaping “fantastic profits.” Greenspan bristled at Wurf’s comment. “If you 
really wanted to examine who, percentage-wise, is hurt the most [by inflation] in their incomes, 
it’s Wall Street brokers,” the new CEA chair opined. “I mean, their incomes have gone down the 
most.” Greenspan’s comments were met with instantaneous boos and catcalls. One unidentified 
audience member yelled, loud enough for the cameras to hear, “That’s the whole trouble with 
this administration – Wall Street brokers.” Greenspan dismissed the shout with a grimace, a 
wave of his hand and mutter of “Oh, come on.”352 However, other audience members were not 
about to let the CEA chair’s comments go. Continuing his comments, Wurf quipped, “I suggest 
to you, Mr. Greenspan, they [low- and middle-income workers] are suffering a hell of a lot worse 
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from prices than are Wall Street brokers.” Later, Rhoda Karpatkin, of the Consumers Union, 
lambasted Greenspan’s comment, as well as the general idea that the budget should be balanced 
through cuts to the safety net. “[M]oderate income people who are already bearing the brunt of 
this inflation, more, I think, Mr. Greenspan, than Wall Street brokers,” she argued, “should [not] 
bear the further responsibility and the further pain and suffering and poverty that will cone from 
cutting the social welfare budget.” Continuing the pile-on, the SCLC’s Jay Lawry quipped, “I 
find it very bad that the man who is the economic advisor to the president [worries] that some 
Wall Street financiers have to cut down on their number of steaks a week when there are people 
eating dog food and sometimes then the dog.” 353  
Greenspan’s comments were covered by all three evening television news broadcasts. In 
introducing video of the comments, NBC news anchor John Chancellor noted, in a decided 
understatement, that Greenspan’s comments “made some of his listener highly indignant.” 
Greenspan’s gaffe also made the papers across the country, garnering headlines like “Boos Green 
Greenspan Plea for Stockbrokers” and “Greenspan Sees Wall St. Hurt By Inflation More Than 
the Poor.” Meanwhile, satirist Art Buchwald immortalized Greenspan’s comment in a column.354  
Intentionally or not, the Greenspan controversy was a clear indication that right-
distributionism now ruled the White House. So, when it came time for the concluding two-day 
conference on inflation in late-September, designed to summarize the mini-summits and draft a 
plan for action, discussion of the distributional effects of inflation, rising state and local taxes, 
and tax reform, which had been so abundant in earlier conferences, were confined to brief 
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summaries of testimony in the mini-summits.355  
As Congressional hearings on tax reform began in 1975, tax justice reformers had high 
hopes, though their views would ultimately be as minimized as they had been in the concluding 
inflation summit. To activists like Ralph Nader and the late George Wiley who, in other areas, 
had already profoundly affected federal policymaking, it seemed only a matter of time in the 
early-to-mid ‘70s before the tax left would make their movement felt in the nation’s capital. 
Building off the nationwide organization and integration of local grassroots tax justice groups 
fostered by Nader’s Tax Reform Research Group and Wiley’s Movement for Economic Justice, 
representatives of a dozen tax reform groups met in Wilbur Mills’s district in Arkansas in March 
1974 to discuss pushing for federal loophole-closing tax reform and relief for lower- and middle-
income payers. The result was the National Committee for Tax Justice – a coalition of local and 
national groups, including Nader’s Tax Reform Research Group, MEJ, ACORN, the California 
Tax Reform Association, the St. Louis Tax Reform Group, the Ohio TEA Party, and the Texas 
Tea Party, among others. In a follow-up meeting in D.C. a few months later, the committee 
announced that its main goal would be lobbying Congress for the passage of a federal tax reform 
bill, the Tax Justice Act of 1975. Drafted by the coalition with technical help from public interest 
tax experts at Public Citizen’s TRRG and Taxation with Representation, the bill represented a 
veritable laundry list of left-distributionist tax reforms.356  
Left-liberal Democrats introduced the Tax Justice Act of 1975 in the House and within a 
few weeks it had attracted more than thirty co-sponsors, including Mo Udall, Ron Dellums, John 
Conyers, and Bella Abzug. Introducing the bill, New York’s Benjamin Rosenthal cast the 
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legislation in left-distributionist terms that echoed the tax justice left and addressed average 
Americans’ pocketbook anxieties. “This bill will eliminate many of these welfare programs for 
the privileged while redistributing much fo the additional revenue garnered to the average 
taxpayer…,” Rosenthal explained. “Squeeze by high unemployment and a rising cost of living, 
middle and working class Americans deserve relief….” Additionally, Rosenthal noted, by raising 
new federal tax revenue, it also accomplished President Ford and other fiscalists’ inflation-
fighting goals.357  Udall likewise echoed not just tax justice activists by George McGovern’s 
1972 refrain when he argued that the TJA75 embodied the notion that, “A dollar earned is a 
dollar earned: there is simply no justice in treating a dollar earned by the capital investor more 
favorably than the dollar earned by working men and women.” Many of the co-sponsors also 
praised the National Committee for Tax Justice and its constituent grassroots groups for drafting 
the bill. Conyers said that the committee was evidence of “a gathering movement for economic 
justice without which the best efforts at legislation can have little effect.” Concluding his 
remarks on the Tax Justice Act, Rosenthal warned, “I urge speedy enactment of this legislation 
to avert a wholesale taxpayer revolt….”358 It would not be the only warning of a coming revolt 
that federal policymakers would receive that year. 
New Ways and Means Chair Al Ullman began holding tax reform hearings in the summer 
of 1975, but from the beginning, it was clear that left-distributionist activists’ idea of reform was 
quite different from both the White House’s and many Democrats, including Ullman. During the 
same private consultations in which Ullman and Russell Long had dismissed the idea of federal 
relief for local property taxes, the two key Democrats expressed enthusiasm about pursuing tax 
policies to stimulate “capital formation.” Their interest in “capital formation” encouraged the 
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White House to begin preparing proposals for capital gains cuts and liberalized cost recovery. 
Long even gave the White House tips on how to enact what were sure to be unpopular measures, 
advising the Ford administration that “any major benefits for business will need to be wrapped in 
a ‘populist’ package.” Taking Long’s advice, Ford’s Secretary of the Treasury, William Simon, 
warned the new president of the “danger in separating the capital issue from tax reform,” since 
tax reform, not capital formation, was the popular issue spurring legislation.359 Keeping with the 
plan, when Ford appeared before the Ways and Means Committee on the first day of reform 
hearings, he called for a variety of policy changes to encourage “capital formation.” “Lowering, 
capital gains taxes would decrease the cost of capital and help in greater capital formation,” 
Simon said. “It would tend to ‘unlock’ assets which investors are loath to sell because of the 
attending tax liability and a stimulative ‘ripple’ effect should follow.”360 Helping to build the 
case for capital-friendly tax legislation, Ullman dedicated several days of testimony to the topic 
of “capital formation,” panels on which reformers found themselves decidedly in the minority. 
Expanding, rather than narrowing, provisions like the capital gains preference in order to 
boost “capital formation” topped the wish lists of conservative witnesses. The Hoover 
Institutions’ Dan Throop Smith defended the capital gains loophole as “fundamentally sound” 
and encouraged even more favorable rates for capital income due the fact that “our tax 
law….now discriminates against capital formation.” 361  The National Association of 
Manufacturer’s once again pointed Congress to its Norman Ture-penned 1973 report calling for 
policies to stimulate “capital formation.” Likewise, the Chamber of Commerce’s Walker Winter 
argued for lower capital gains rates, since “capital gains merely reflect the inflationary spiral of 
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our economy.” Concerns about inequity related to capital gains were unfounded, in Walker’s 
view, since everyone benefitted from the economic growth that low capital gains rates spurred. ” 
While it is true that the alternative rate for capital gains primarily affects a relatively small 
number of taxpayers in the higher brackets, it must be recognized that it is this group of taxpayer 
that provides much of the risk capital that keeps our economy growing,” Walker said. “Any 
changes in the alternative rate for capital gains would have the effect of discouraging the free 
flow of capital among investments and could severely limit the availability of venture capital, 
thereby limiting our economic growth. 362 House Republican Jack Kemp testified with a rousing 
paean to capitalism. Kemp began his testimony with a historical anecdote: “This is the 200th 
anniversary of the invention of the steam engine – an invention which was financed by $150,000 
of capital from the savings of a man by the name of Matthew Boulton.” This, Kemp argued, was 
the essence of capitalism, which had “improved the standard of living of the wage earners to an 
unprecedented level.” “All this well-being,” Kemp continued, “is conditioned by the increase in 
savings and capital accumulated.” Therefore, the very existence of the individual and corporate 
income tax systems, was “both anti-labor and anti-social,” since each discouraged “capital 
formation.” Indeed, Kemp blamed layoffs at steel mills near Buffalo, New York, and Canton and 
Massillon, Ohio, on tax policies that were biased against capital. As a solution, Kemp touted his 
own bill, the Jobs Creation Act, which slashed a variety of business and capital taxes.363 
Like the Ford administration and Russell Long, advocates of tax cuts for business and 
capital income understood that their proposals had little support among average Americans. 
Some “capital formation” advocates struck back against the public’s view of the tax system, 
while others seemed resigned to the political difficulty of enacting their preferred policies. Chair 
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of the American Council for Capital Formation Charls E. Walker called the idea that the tax 
system was “stacked against the little man” a “myth.” The rich, according to the ACCF, “pay 
through the nose.” To those that claimed that tax preferences for capital were “trickle down,” 
Walker quipped, “I really don’t know…what ‘trickle down’ means.” Capital tax cuts, Walker 
said, would not lead to revenue losses, but to gains, because of the economic growth it would 
stimulate. Thus, Walker called for a variety of “capital formation” measures, including a more 
generous investment tax credit and cuts to the capital gains tax.364 Take a more defeatist tack, 
Price Waterhouse & Co.’s Kenneth Sanden noted that, while cuts to both capital gains and 
dividend taxes were desirable in his view, he understood that such cuts were, at the moment, 
“politically inexpedient.” “Any attempt to reduce taxes at the individual level – particularly for 
the more affluent investor – threatens to bring on the ‘taxpayer revolt’ envisioned by former 
Treasury Secretary, Joseph Barr, several years ago,” he noted. 365 
The task for the tax justice left was not only to rebut calls for “capital formation,” but 
also to advocate for the type of loophole-closing reform that had escaped them since the tepid 
victory of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. In his testimony, the AFL-CIO’s George Meany called 
TRA69 a mere “down payment on tax justice.” Congress, Meany said, still owed the public the 
real thing, repeating the words “tax justice” over and over again in his testimony. Responding 
specifically to witnesses calling for new tax breaks to encourage “capital formation,” Meany 
used the language that Walker claimed not to understand, dubbing such policies “the old, 
discredited, trickle-down doctrine of the 1890s and 1920s.” Further breaks for businesses and 
capital gains, Meany said, would have predictable results. “Give those at the bottom less; 
squeeze those in the middle even harder,” the union leader quipped. “Give those at the top – 
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especially the corporations-more tax shelters, more loopholes, more opportunities for profit.” 
Instead, Meany reiterated his union’s call to eliminate the preferential rate for capital gains, 
among other loophole-closing reforms.366 Robert Brandon, the Director of Public Citizen’s Tax 
Reform Research Group, noted that claims of capital shortage and insufficient “capital 
formation” had a long history. Particularly during times of inflation, corporate and Wall Street 
executives flocked to Congress, begging for new tax cuts to spur capital formation. In most 
instances, though, Brandon noted, Congress did nothing and the supposed capital shortage 
abated.  “The point here is that we always have a capital shortage,” Brandon argued. “That is the 
nature of our capital system.” Attempts to artificially boost capital availability with tax cuts, 
Brandon suggested, were often self-defeating. “[I[f we just talk about cutting corporate taxes you 
have two choices. You are either going to increase the deficit or increase individual taxes to 
make up the difference. Increased deficits mean higher interest rates, during times of full 
employment, are going to mean crowding private capital needs out of the market by increased 
government borrowing,” Brandon noted. “Increased taxes can only mean decreased savings by 
the consuming public and less capital. It means less disposable income and less consumption 
which has to lead to less corporate profits, which leads to less corporate savings, and we are back 
to the beginning again.” Continuing this logic, Brandon reiterated, “Increases in investment 
necessitate cuts in consumption. This committee is being asked to do that through the tax code 
by reducing the spendable income of consumers and increasing the spendable income and the 
profits of corporations. But profits will not remain high if consumers cut down on their 
purchases. The approach seems to be self-defeating.” Ultimately, Brandon argued that the need 
for increased capital formation was a myth. “I would urge the committee not to react to the cries 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






of a well orchestrated campaign to cut taxes for business and its owners in the name of capital 
formation. I think we should focus on tax relief for the vast majority of Americans and not 
simply those who own most of the corporate stock, the one percent that own 51 percent of the 
corporate stock in the country.” 367 
Tax justice activists’ skepticism about calls for “capital formation” were backed up by 
ostensibly more neutral observers. Renowned Harvard tax law scholar Stanley Surrey argued that 
“achiev[ing] greater fairness” in the tax system, not “capital formation.” Only loophole-closing 
reforms, Surrey said, would “restore the confidence of the public in the fairness of the tax 
system.” Surrey contrasted full income tax rates that wage earners paid on their modest incomes 
with the fact that “a great deal of the income of the most wealthy people in the land is taxed at 
only one-half [normal rates]” thanks to the capital gains preference. “Over 50 percent of all 
capital gains are received by two percent of the families in the United States,” Surrey noted. He 
went on to outline specific cases of rich individuals who appeared as “poor folk in the Internal 
Revenue Services files because of the use of tax shelters.” Surrey called for a skeptical 
examination and reform of all “tax expenditures,” including treating capital gains as ordinary 
income. Responding to conservatives’ claims that existing capital tax breaks needed not only to 
be kept, but expanded, Surrey quipped, “I probably am a skeptic on the whole issue of capital 
formation. I have heard too many cries before this committee in tie area of capital gains. The 
slogans are always there. They are either inflation, or lock-in, or shortages of capital whatever 
you want. In the capital area, you have well-organized drives before this committee generally to 
reduce the capital gains tax, or do something that will benefit people well-off. It turns out that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






always the solution for any problem dealing with capital formation.”368 Self-interested corporate 
and Wall Street lobbying, Surrey said, not objective fact, guided calls for pro-“capital formation” 
tax cuts. 
Despite finding themselves far outnumbered by “capital formation” advocates, the 1975 
tax reform hearings featured several grassroots tax justice advocates – in addition to Public 
Citizen’s Brandon – reflecting the movements growing, if still tenuous, influence. Bert De 
Leeuw, MEJ’s leader following the tragic death of George Wiley, touted the Tax Justice of Act 
of 1975 to the Ways and Means Committee while wearing buttons emblazoned with slogans that 
had become popular on the tax justice left: “Robin Hood Was Right” and “Take the Rich Off 
Welfare.” The TJA75, De Leeuw noted, would lower taxes on every family of four making less 
than $20,000 without cutting the budget. It did so by closing a variety of loopholes, including the 
capital gains preference, as well as eliminating a wide variety of business subsidies, such as the 
oil depletion allowance. For a family of four making $10,000 – just below the median household 
income in 1975 – the TJA75 would save them $364 in income taxes per year. De Leeuw as not 
alone in advocating for the TJA75. Robert Loitz testified on behalf of the National Committee 
for Tax Justice. Touting TJA75, Loitz quipped, “The tax system should be used to collect 
revenue and not as an ‘Aid to Dependent Corporations’ program.”369 Stuart Filler, representing 
New York Citizens for Tax Reform – a member of the National Committee for Tax Justice – 
testified in support of TJA75, connecting it to rising regressive state and local taxes. With the 
extreme burdens of our Federal, State, and local systems of taxation falling primarily on lower 
and middle income taxpayers, it is incumbent on the Ways and Means Committee to reform our 
Federal tax system to place the burden of this increase in Federal revenues on those individuals 
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in society more financially able to bear that burden.” 370 Ted Keller, of the Delaware grassroots 
tax justice group, Citizens Coalition for Tax Reform, singled out the capital gains loophole as 
one in special need of closing. Ending his testimony, he warned, “Two hundred years ago, our 
Nation was born as a result of a taxpayer's revolt. More recently, former Treasury Secretary 
Joseph Barr warned Congress that another taxpayer's revolt was brewing. The signs of that revolt 
are everywhere. Many of us around the country feel utter frustration when we see the way in 
which our tax laws are bent to serve the few, and the way in which Congress continually creates 
new tax loopholes faster than they can be repealed. The greatest gift that this committee could 
give ordinary citizens as we enter the celebration of our Nation’s Bicentennial is meaningful tax 
reform.” 371 
 The nation would get a two tax bills, but both would fall decidedly short of “meaningful 
tax reform.” The first, the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, was a slapdash effort to stimulate the 
economy. The TRA75, in fact, represented a last-minute “179-turn” on the part of President 
Ford. Keeping with his anti-inflationary fiscal conservatism, Ford had used the inflation mini-
summits as a springboard for proposing an income surtax to fight inflation in a speech to a joint 
session of Congress. In order to blunt anger from low- and middle-income taxpayers, the 
president proposed limiting the five-percent surtax to families with incomes above $15,000 and 
individuals making more than $7,500. However, other portions of his plan would prompt the 
same distribution-based criticism. In his speech, Ford also proposed to increase the business 
investment tax credit from seven to ten percent and pleaded for Congress to enact additional cuts 
to capital gains and dividend taxes. In the short term, Ford’s specific policy proposals were 
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overshadowed by another segment of his speech. Wearing a “WIN” button during the speech, the 
president had announced his “Whip Inflation Now” campaign, which called for Americans to 
exercise personal “fiscal discipline” by “cut[ting[ the food that you waste by five percent” or 
driving five percent less, as Ford suggested in his speech. The WIN campaign was widely 
panned, even by Ford’s own advisers, and died a quick death. The president’s tax proposals fared 
little better. Liberal Democrats criticized the investment tax credit increase a handout to 
business, and few others in Congress had the desire to enact yet another surtax after the 
unpopularity of the Johnson-Nixon levy. Only a few months after his address to Congress, little 
remained of Ford’s proposals.372 
 After failing to garner either Congressional or public approval with his WIN and surtax 
proposals, President Ford was left directionless. For better or worse, though, the economy forced 
action. Unemployment, which had begun inching upward in the final months of 1973, soared 
throughout the second half of 1974, reaching nine percent in May 1975.373 Discussing the 
country’s growing unemployment problem in December 1974, Ford and his economic advisers 
were “somber, almost frightened,” as one staffer remembers.374 Eventually, Ford settled on a 
proposal that would give all taxpayers a temporary 12 percent rebate. Democrats, the press, and 
letter-writers, however, roundly criticized the plan. Even conservative Democrats like Russell 
Long argued that Ford’s across-the-board rebate was too generous to upper-income taxpayers. 
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While the White House defended cuts to upper-income people as a boon to capital formation, the 
plan had little chance of passing the Democratic controlled Congress. 375   
Following a little more than two months of wrangling, the House and Senate conference 
committee produced a bill with a mix of temporary and permanent measures. The Tax Reduction 
Act of 1975 featured a one-time refund on 1974 individual income taxes, with a maximum of 
$200 and a minimum of $100. Each Social Security recipient also received a one-time payment 
of $50. In terms of permanent breaks for individuals, TRA75 increased the minimum and 
maximum standard deductions by $300 for singles and $600 for couples, and added an addition 
$30-per-taxpayer-spouse-and-dependent tax credit to the personal exemption, among other minor 
provisions. Perhaps most significantly, in the long run, was the inclusion of the Earned Income 
Credit, which is today known as the Earned Income Tax Credit. However, for NRWO activists 
and others who had pushed a guaranteed income, the EITC fell far short not only of NWRO’s 
$6,500 per family of four proposal and McGovern’s $1,000 per person Demogrant, but also 
Nixon’s initial $1,600 per family of four FAP proposal. Russell Long, who had almost single-
handedly sunk FAP, had for years pushed the idea of a “work bonus” for poor parents of 
dependent children. The TRA75 gave Long an opportunity to revive his idea, which was not only 
more limited than FAP, but also than Ullman’s 1975 alternative EITC, which would have 
covered all workers, not just those with dependent children. In the end the Louisiana senator 
prevailed and the $400 maximum EITC as enacted in TRA “embodied Long’s vision of a 
program that moved individuals off welfare and into paid employment, while keeping others off 
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the welfare rolls,” as one historian has put it.376 All told, most individual income taxpayers would 
see a tax break of something less than $200 from the combined provision of the TRA75. By far, 
the most significant measure in TRA75, from the perspective of reformers, was a partial the Oil 
Depletion Allowance. Rank-and-file Democrats rejected the wishes of many leading Democrats, 
including Ullman, in the House to vote a full repeal. In fact, it was the first time a repeal had 
even made it to a House vote since the allowance’s enactment in 1926. Russell Long, however, 
attempted to block repeal entirely in the Senate and, eventually, a compromise continuing the 
allowance for natural gas and small oil producers was struck. Despite this defeat for one 
industry, however, the TRA75 also included a bevy of breaks for businesses. Most notably, it 
increased the Investment Tax Credit from seven to ten percent – a provision that had been the 
centerpiece of Ford’s initial proposals. The Investment Tax Credit increase, in fact, was more 
than double the value of the EITC.377  
Despite its mild reforms, relatively modest (and largely temporary) individual income tax 
cuts, and expansion of the Investment Tax Credit, conservatives strongly disliked the Tax 
Reduction Act of 1975.378 The American Conservative Union scored a vote for the bill as a 
negative in its ratings of Congress.379 Ford and his advisers believed the bill was too expensive 
and too tilted towards low- and middle-income taxpayers. Ford believed the repeal of the Oil 
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Depletion Allowance would discourage energy production, and White House economic advisers 
considered many of the extraneous measures, particularly the EITC, to be little more than 
“junk.”380 Indeed, the EITC particularly enraged conservatives, who had dreaded its potential 
inclusion in the bill. A memo summarizing TRA75 prepared for Ford called the EITC “a new 
and undesirable welfare type program,” seeings its only “redeeming aspect” as the fact that the 
enactment of the EITC made “other, worse approaches somewhat less likely.”381 HEW Secretary 
Caspar Weinberger called the EITC “disastrous…from almost any perspective” in a memo to 
Ford.382 Treasury Secretary William Simon told Ford’s Economic Policy Board members that he 
“opposed this [EITC] strongly.” The most generous reading of the EITC, Simon noted, was that 
it relieved low-income taxpayers of their half of the payroll tax. Simon objected to this on 
distributional grounds. Social Security, in Simon’s view, already redistributed to the poor. There 
was no reason to make it even more downwardly redistributive. “Low-income persons get much 
more than they pay for from social security,” Simon wrote. “Effect of tax and benefits is very 
progressive.”383 Both Simon and Arthur Burns recommended that Ford veto the TRA75. 
However, Congressional Democrats threatened to pass an even more generous bill if Ford vetoed 
TRA75 and a majority of Ford’s advisers suggested he grudgingly sign TRA75. Ford did. His 
signing statement, however, scolded Congress for “distribut[ing] the cuts differently” than Ford’s 
proposals and adding “a lot of extraneous changes to our tax laws” beyond the temporary across-
the-board individual cuts and Investment Tax Credit increase Ford had urged.384 Whatever the 
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bills merits or defects, beyond the partial repeal of the Oil Depletion Allowance, TRA75 could 
hardly be considered reform.  
The second tax bill to emerge from Congress in the Ford years would go under the banner 
of reform, but would be almost as disappointing at the Tax Reduction Act of 1975. Work on 
what would become the Tax Reform Act of 1976 had begun with hearings in 1973 and run 
through the “capital formation”-heavy 1975 hearings in the House Ways and Means Committee 
that had also featured more than few tax justice activists. In December 1975, the House had 
passed a reform package, but the Senate did not pass its own bill until August 1976. Overall, the 
bill that emerged from the House included a solid menu of reforms, even if it fell decidedly short 
of the type of sweeping loophole-closing, let alone downwardly redistributive, reform favored by 
the tax justice left. Nonetheless, the Ways and Means Committee had felt the influence of the 
grassroots tax left. Stanley Surrey, in fact, credited Robert Brandon of Nader’s Tax Reform 
Research Group, Taxation with Representation, and the AFL-CIO for pushing the shaky Ways 
and Means Committee to fend off the Ford administration’s calls for “capital formation.” The 
Senate Finance Committee, however, was another story. “[I]t was all down hill” for reform once 
the bill reached the Finance Committee, as Surrey put it. From the beginning, left-liberal 
Democrats spent much of their time battling the enlargement of loopholes. Chair Russell Long 
initially moved to increase the capital gains preference, prompting Ted Kennedy to call the 
process “a fraud in the name of tax reform.” Surveying work in the Finance Committee, Nader’s 
People & Taxes quipped, “The Tax Reform Act of 1976 could well prove to be the Loophole 
Enlargement Act of 1976.” Thanks to Long’s efforts, the passage of TRA76 would, at every 
stage – Finance Committee, full Senate, and conference committee – prove to be a fraught battle, 






As passed by both chambers, the TRA76 was a decidedly mixed bag. Perhaps the most 
significant loophole-closing measures, in the eyes of reformers, came in a tightening of the rules 
that allowed upper-income taxpayers to generate paper losses with ta shelters. Thanks to a robust 
pushback from the tax shelter lobby, aided by Long, however, plenty of loopholes remained. As 
for “capital formation,” Surrey quipped that the TRA76’s “major gain was in avoiding major 
damage,” since “[t]he Wall Street-Washington lobbyists axis worked hard in 1974 to drastically 
reduce the tax on capital gains.” An extension of the 10 percent Investment Tax Credit, though, 
certainly qualified as a win for business. Likewise, the bill tripled the amount of ordinary income 
against which capital losses could be deducted. However, it tightened the capital gains 
preference in other ways. By increasing the minimum tax, it increased in the effective capital 
gains tax rate for the highest earners. It also lengthened from six months to one year the time an 
asset needed to be held to qualify as a long-term capital gain. The mixed bag on capital gains, 
Surrey noted, was the result of a “Congress [that] seems unwilling to lower the present rate 
directly, but also unwilling to raise that rate directly.” Ultimately, Surrey concluded that the bill 
at least “lies on the reform side of the tax spectrum,” if barely. Likewise, TRRG’s quipped that 
the bill was only “euphemistically” the Tax Reform Act of 1976. However, with its mix of 
genuine reforms and some steps backward, Brannon wrote that the “hydra-headed tax bill” was 
something that, for better or worse, “both tax reformers and money interests can live with, 
although they will never learn to love it.” If TRA76 was, overall, seen as lackluster for 
reformers, it also did little to alleviate the pocketbook squeeze faced by low- and middle-income 
Americans. Beyond making some of the changes made in TRA75 permanent, TRA76 did little to 
affect the tax burden on average Americans.385  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






All told, the mid-1970s saw the tax justice left unable to translate its state and local 
victories in federal policy and, as a result, the pocketbook squeeze facing average Americans 
remained unabated. The National Committee for Tax Justice’s Tax Justice Act of 1975 never 
made it out of Ullman’s Ways and Means Committee and was never discussed again. Likewise, 
the notion of using the federal government to relieve low- and middle-income Americans from 
rising local property taxes was not revived following the Ford administration’s brief and 
unsuccessful overture to Long and Ullman. At substantial part of this failure could be traced to 
the divided Democratic caucus. The party’s large majority concealed not only traditional 
divisions between Southern and Northern Democrats, but between older New Deal Democrats 
and the new crop of “neoliberal” Democrats. Indeed, by mid-1975, the New York Times observed 
that the new Democratic majority was “fractured today by rancor of an intensity seldom seen in 
the normally chummy atmosphere of Congress.” While some of it could be traced to icy relations 
with the Ford White House, a large portion of discord was attributable what the paper called the 
“aggressive group of young freshman Democrats” whom many party leaders saw as “politically 
naïve” and intent on “seeking instant solutions to complex problems.”386   
The “New Democrats” ideological pull was felt on a variety of issues beyond taxes, too. 
Whereas House Democrats had approved legislation calling for the creation of a federal 
consumer agency by better than two-to-one margins in both 1971 and 1974, the party lost 20 
Democratic votes in the House when the issue came up again in 1975, despite a larger majority. 
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Most of the defectors were “normally liberal northern Democrats concerned about bureaucratic 
expansion,” as one report noted. Freshman Montana Representative Max Baucus, for example, 
successfully pushed for an amendment that would have sunset the agency in seven years. 387 For 
many “New Democrats,” then, economic justice was out, while economic growth and fiscal 
responsibility was in. 
With so many federal doors closed, the late-1970s would see many of the decisive battles 
over taxes return to the state level. Two states on opposite coasts – California and Massachusetts 
– would see tax justice activists battle with New Democrat governors, and the outcomes of these 
battles would permanently shift the direction of American tax politics.  
 
The Battle in the States, from Coast to Coast 
 For all the attention to the “Watergate Babies” in the Congress, the New Democrats that 
garnered the most media attention, as well as the most praise from like-minded Democrats, were 
found in the statehouses of perhaps the two most liberal states in the union, California and 
Massachusetts. In his controversial “New Democratic Agenda” presented to the 1975 
Democratic Issues Convention, Ted Van Dyk singled out California Governor Jerry Brown and 
Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis as models of Democrats who had successful distanced 
themselves from what Van Dyk called the “New Deal ethic.” Once in office, Van Dyk noted, 
they had followed through on their New Democrat campaigns by “refus[ing] a priori to accept or 
endorse pre-existing government programs and practices within their own states, even if they 
were instituted by Democrats and continue to have their support” and standing up against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






“Democratic Party establishments and traditional supportive interests groups, including teachers 
and labor unions.”388  
Van Dyk was far from alone in his praise for the Golden and Bay states’ governors. The 
Boston Globe linked Dukakis and Brown, billing them as “realistic Liberal Democrats” who “cut 
welfare and attacked tax increases” while personally eschewing the old political of patronage and 
profligacy. “There’s nothing inconsistent about being liberal and progressive and fiscally 
responsible,” Dukakis told the paper, though he conceded that some critics said that he “sounds 
like the Republicans.”389 Not surprisingly, Dukakis was invited by the Democratic Forum to 
address one of its gatherings.390 In his speech, Dukakis recommended cuts to federal aid for the 
poor, saying, “We have seen enough of failing Great Society programs.”391 Going beyond the 
Great Society, Dukakis declared, “[M]uch of what the government has tried to do over the past 
15 years has failed.”392 Brown likewise counseled Americans to stop looking to the government. 
“The conclusion is that merely because there’s a problem doesn’t mean we retain the ability to 
find the solution,” Brown said. “There are problems government cannot solve.” 393 Inactive 
government could be a virtue, in Brown’s view. “You don’t have to do things. Maybe by 
avoiding doing things you accomplish quite a lot…,” Brown philosophized. “Inaction may be the 
highest form of action.”394 For good reason, journalist Sidney Blumenthal called Brown and 
Dukakis part of a “new breed of lowered-expectations liberals.”395 Newsweek called Dukakis and 
Brown “national symbols of the pragmatic new conservatism – tight-fisted political hybrids who 
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seek to limit the further spread of government and place a balanced budget at the top of the 
public agenda.” These two governors, the magazine continued, were joined by “a new breed in 
Congress – cost-conscious liberals like Democratic Sen. Gary Hart, who was George 
McGovern's campaign manager in 1972 but now tells his Colorado constituents that to ‘get the 
government off your back, get your hands out of the government's pockets.’” These Democrats, 
the magazine noted, echoed many of the anti-government, pro-market positions being put forth 
by the new “neoconservative” writers publishing in journals like Commentary and Public 
Interest.396 The media’s attention to Brown made them, as the Los Angeles Times put it, the topic 
of “political conversation in Washington.” These two young new style” Democrats, the paper 
noted, seemed to be viewed by many beltway insiders as the future of politics.397 
Just how much attention Brown and Dukakis deserved, however, was another question. 
Their victories in liberal states were hardly surprising, especially in the first post-Watergate 
election of 1974. Nonetheless, by 1975 Brown and Dukakis were seen by many observers inside 
and outside the Democratic Party as embodying the party’s future. This future, presumably, 
depended upon Brown and Dukakis successfully addressing the issues facing their states. 
Undoubtedly, in both California and Massachusetts, the tax burden rested near the top of that list, 
and Brown and Dukakis were taking over states where anger about rising regressive state and 
local taxes was undoubtedly founded in fact. By most tax measures, the Golden and Bay states 
sat in the top five states nationwide, often occupying the top two spots. In the early-1970s, for 
example, California and Massachusetts were number one and number two, respectively, in 
property taxes per capita. Distributionally, the total state and local tax burden in Massachusetts 
were more regressive than California’s, thanks to the Golden State’s progressive income tax. In 
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fact, Massachusetts had the highest taxes on low- and middle-income families in the entire 
country, whereas California’s were above average. By the late-70s, however, collected a far 
disproportionate share of their state and local revenues from the property tax compared to the 
national average. When the ACIR devised a “fiscal blood pressure” formula in 1977 to measure 
detect states facing fiscal crises, California and Massachusetts were not only categorized as 
having “high and rising” fiscal blood pressure, but also occupied two of the top five spots on the 
list.398 These were problems on which grassroots left had clear views. But, as the two governors’ 
dealings with these groups during their first terms would show, Brown and Dukakis had little 
interest in tax justice.  
Jerry Brown’s meteoric rise in California politics was inextricably linked with both his 
upbringing and Watergate. Brown drifted into politics from a life of privilege. The son of former 
California governor Edmund “Pat” Brown, Jerry Brown had dropped out of the seminary, earned 
a degree in classics, traveled Latin America, then entered Yale Law School on a scholarship 
given to him by a San Francisco foundation headed by a friend of his father. Eventually, after 
passing the California bar on his second try, Brown began practicing at a prestigious Los 
Angeles law firm Tuttle & Taylor. Within a few years, Brown grew dissatisfied with law. In 
1969, he won a seat on the Los Angeles Community College Board of Trustees. By 1971, Brown 
was California’s Secretary of State and just three years later he would be campaigning for 
governor. On the campaign trail in 1974, Brown openly advertised himself as “Pat Brown’s 
son.”399 Jerry Brown not only benefitted from his status as Pat Brown’s son, but also from 
Watergate, which the younger Brown expertly exploited. 
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As California Secretary of State, Brown successfully magnified a tangential scandal in 
the Watergate saga into a large issue. A side story in the backdating of Nixon’s donation of his 
presidential papers to the National Archives in order to secure a soon-to-be-infamous $500,000 
tax deduction was that, Frank DeMarco, Jr., a law associate of Nixon’s personal attorney, had 
been the one to notarize the phony donation document. Brown maneuvered this small side story 
into a headline-grabbing matter by publicly revoking the attorney’s notary license. DeMarco 
argued that he was not responsible for ensuring the date of the gift and called Brown’s actions an 
“obvious ploy” in his planned gubernatorial campaign. Indeed, even Brown conceded that his 
investigation was “not directly related to the president’s tax situation.” However, the California 
press, eager for a local Watergate angle, ate up the story. “Reporters in the state capitol know 
very well that jerry was reaching for headline by using a trifle to take advantage of a national 
obsession with Nixon’s misdeeds…” one reporter remembered. “I knew we were being had, and 
so did my fellow reporters. But we wanted a bite of the Nixon-Watergate apple somehow, so we 
gleefully went along with it.” This small act helped position Brown publicly as an anti-
corruption crusader just months before 1974 gubernatorial primaries, elevating Brown, an 
otherwise unremarkable candidate, into a poster boy for post-Watergate good government.400 
Throughout his gubernatorial campaign, however, Brown avoided taking clear stances on any 
issues. As a result, even with the Watergate boost, Brown’s victory over his Republican 
opponent, former professor and current California State Controller Houston Flournoy, proved to 
be narrower even than his father’s victory 12 years earlier over a stronger opponent, Richard 
Nixon, with the elder Brown receiving larger margins even in Democratic strongholds like San 
Francisco County than his son. 
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In office, Brown would do little to endear himself to Democratic voters and activists. In 
an era of a tightening pocketbook squeeze on low- and middle-income Californians, Jerry Brown 
preached austerity. “Many people thought now Brown would change Reagan’s tight fiscal 
policies…,” ABC’s Dick Shoemaker noted in a 1975 profile of Brown. “They were wrong.”401 
Brown’s budget, in fact, called for an increase of less than half Ronald Reagan’s average.402  
“People always say money….,” Brown argued. “Well I would only say ‘the Vietnam War’…. 
The other side had less…and they won!” 403 The new governor handed out copies of Small Is 
Beautiful, a tract of “Buddhist economics” by British economist E.F. Schumacher from which 
Brown was fond of quoting. Yet, in most cases, Brown sounded more like a conservative 
economist as a Buddhist one. Brown repeatedly declared, “There is no free lunch,” a quote 
paraphrased from a book by science fiction writer Robert Heinlein that was popularized by 
libertarian economist Milton Friedman in articles and columns throughout the ‘60s and ‘70s, as 
well as his 1975 book, There’s No Such Thing as a Free Lunch. For Friedman and other 
conservatives who deployed it, the phrase served as an argument against government in all 
forms, but especially redistributive government. Even if the poor or the working-class thought 
they were getting a “free lunch” when the government raised taxes on business or rich 
individuals to fund a new program, Friedman argued, they were actually being hurt by the 
negative effects of all government interference on the economy. Brown’s meaning was little 
more optimistic. “You don’t get something for nothing,” Brown told San Diegans in 1975 after 
repeating his “free lunch” truism. While some to the governor’s left were encouraging him to 
raise taxes, especially on upper-income Californians, rather than cut the budget, Brown 
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explained that he preferred cuts. Citizens needed to “recognize the inherent limits of 
government,” Brown instructed.404 
Brown bristled at what he saw as Democrats overweening concern with the 
disadvantaged and the poor. “We have got to be compassionate,” Brown said. “But you can only 
take that so far before you begin to reward those characteristics of your society that are not 
building it. You’ve got to reward those who are making the more significant contributions 
reward them mostly by getting off their backs….” It was a “difficult balance” to care for the 
disadvantaged while encouraging success, Brown conceded, but he believed that the post-Great 
Society U.S. was erring on the wrong side. “More and more of our resources are devoted to 
trying to prop up failures in society, rather than a positive vision,” Brown continued. “When we 
won the West, explored the moon or advanced technology, there was a societal recognition. By a 
peculiar reversal [in today’s society], it gives unconsciously the rewards to the very kinds of 
attitudes and behavior patterns that we’re trying to minimize. Whereas, the person who is not 
doing any wrong, nobody pays any attention to him. Nobody gives him any recognition.” Recent 
government interventions, Brown suggested, were perversely encouraging poverty and bad 
behavior. “[The government is] making welfare, unemployment insurance, and all these various 
programs available…[while] making it more difficult for people to go out and undertake their 
own enterprise…,” Brown said. “It’s a strange combination that is really weakening the spirit of 
this country. And in my own modest way, I’d like to reduce that.”405 In an “era of limits,” Brown 
counseled, the left could not achieve all it wanted. “Freeways, child care, schools, income 
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assistance, pensions, health programs, prisons, environmental protection all must compete with 
one another…,” Brown said. “[D]ifficult choices” had to be made. Some of the left’s objectives 
had to be abandoned.406 Like Reagan, Brown singled out welfare recipients as those who 
deserved a dose of austerity. “We cannot go on much longer in this country paying people when 
they don’t do very much,” Brown said. “We are going to have to slowly change our ways so that 
people put in a hard day’s work for a good part of their lives.”407 
Brown’s austerity did not extend to business and California’s well-off, though. Instead, 
the Democratic governor self-consciously appealed to business. Standing against the Naders and 
McGoverns of the world who were critiquing the motives of business and the wealthy, Brown 
defended greed and profit-seeking by appealing to innate urges. “The profit motive,” the 
governor argued, “builds on a basic aspect of human nature. You know you can call it profit or 
greed or self-assertion or self-seeking. That is part of our makeup, and a system that takes 
advantage of that is certainly in tune with human nature and I think the opposite side of the coin, 
central planning, has major defects….”408 Keeping with his desire to woo business, Brown’s 
gubernatorial office formed an economic advisory board that consisted of chief executives from 
Bank of America and Standard Oil of California, along with former Nixon administration staffer 
and GOP fundraiser David Packard. 409 The California governor also spoke openely of his 
annoyance with bureaucrats, skepticism of the “alphabet soup” of government agencies, and 
belief that public employees were simply “pad[ding] payrolls in the public sector,” rather than 
doing meaningful work – a view that echoed not only business conservatives, but also public 
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choice theory-influenced libertarians. Government, in Brown’s view, needed to be “leaner.” 
Federal policymakers and bureaucrats, Brown said, were “completely mindless, muddleheaded” 
planners constructing a “Tower of Babel” in the form of needless regulations and pointless 
proposals. “Government regulations are making it tougher for the smaller businessman to 
prosper. Economic power is concentrating, and that calls forward the bigger unions and bigger 
government,” Brown said. “The private sector has a lot of potential left.”410 For well-off 
Californians, Brown’s was a reassuring message. They were the ones, they believed, who were 
paying the tab for the state’s social programs. Given his steadfast opposition to tax hikes of any 
kind, the clear implication in Brown’s austerity rhetoric was that California’s upper-middle and 
upper classes would feel no pinch on Brown’s watch. The most Brown would say was that 
“those at the upper reaches” of the income spectrum might have to “cut back a bit” on their 
“corporate and special privileges.”411 It was a decidedly mild reprobation from a Democratic 
governor busy scolding government workers and public aid recipients.   
Embedded in Brown’s worldview was a distinct distaste for transactional pocketbook 
politics. The government, Brown believed, not the market created the problems that angered the 
public. The governor argued that American would accept economic hardship that came from “the 
market,” but not ones caused by policymaking. 412 Hence, he decided to err on the side of doing 
less. “I’m not going to twist arms and threaten people the way old-time politicians would have 
done,” Brown said. “That’s the old kind of politics, and I won’t do it.” The catchphrase around 
Brown’s office was “creative inaction.” “I reject get-it-done, make-it-happen thinking,” Brown 
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philosophized. “I want to slow things down so I understand them better.”413 As a result, Brown 
purposely avoided stances on tough issues, and few issues were tougher in mid-to-late ‘70s 
California than taxes. “Jerry Brown has seldom risked any of his enormous popularity on any 
difficult issue,” Democratic California assembly member Willie Brown, Jr., quipped bitterly in 
1976.414 On issue after issue, Brown was content with inaction. Few issues were subjected to 
more inaction from Brown than taxes. Even his personal taxes evidenced neglect. When Brown 
made his tax return public in 1975, it revealed that he had failed to take all available deductions. 
Why did Brown neglect to take those deductions? “[I]t doesn’t turn me on,” he told UPI.415 
Brown had little concern for the pocketbook woes of average Californians, either.  
Whereas many Democrats, as well as Republicans like Nixon, argued that poor and 
working-class Americans had yet to reach economic security and were instead suffering through 
a pocketbook squeeze, Brown argued that fiscal and environmental realities demonstrated the 
opposite. It was not the inflation Americans faced at their local markets that was the issue, in 
Brown’s view, but Americans inflated assumptions of what businesses could pay them and what 
government should do for them. “The day is coming when people will have to work more and 
get paid less for it…” Brown argued. “I’m trying to bring some reality to the political process at 
a point in history when I see a lot of unreality and a lot of inflated expectations about what can 
be done. I see that the easy life that many have enjoyed is going to get tougher. And no 
commission or politician has any magic wand to wave that away.” 416 The goal of left-
distributive tax justice groups in California, however, was to get Brown to address the tax- and 
inflation-induced pocketbook squeeze facing low- and middle-income Californians. 
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Throughout the 1970s, the ACORN-affiliated Citizens Action League – often joined by 
labor unions and the California Tax Reform Association – had been sounding the alarm on the 
coming tax revolt. CAL argued that rising property taxes were squeezing the pocketbooks of 
homeowners and renter. In response, CAL sought tax relief for low- and middle-income 
homeowners, as well as an upward redistribution of the tax burden in the state. Specifically, CAL 
focused on the intertwinted issues of rising properties taxes and inequitable assessments. In 
1975, the group captured media attention by orchestrating a “Taxpayers’ Tour of Downtown 
S[an] F[rancisco],” which pointed out commercial properties, like the Embarcadero Center and 
the Standard Oil Building, which had seen their assessments stay flat, or even fall, at the same 
time that assessments for average homeowners were soaring. CAL orchestrated campaigns in 
cities across California targeting assessors viewed as favorable to business at the expense of 
homeowners. It also publicized how large companies like Prudential Insurance were using 
appeals board to reduce already-favorable assessments. CAL called for a reassessment of 
downtown commercial properties and the use of the new revenue to fund homeowner tax 
relief.417 
Yet, CAL had struggled to get Governor Brown and many legislative Democrats 
interested in property tax reform for years. The only issue on which Brown and CAL were able 
to find common ground was energy pricing and they did so at least partly for different reasons. 
CAL had pushed a “lifeline” utility rate measure, designed to apply the logic of progressive 
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taxation to energy. Rather than energy getting cheaper with each unit consumed – known as 
“declining block pricing,” which favored large commercial and industrial users – a “lifeline” rate 
structure charged small energy users less than large energy users. CAL and other grassroots 
groups, such as Electricity and Gas for People (EG&P) and Toward Utility Normailization 
(TURN), successfully prodded Brown and the legislature to make California the first state in the 
country to adopt lifeline rates. Brown’s support, though, likely had much more to do with the 
belief that progressive electric rates would encourage conservation as with a left-distributionist 
outlook.418 Despite signing the “lifeline” utility rates legislation, Brown remained cool to their 
proposals for property tax relief.  
Given Brown’s evident lack of interest, by 1977, CAL was ready to act on its own. The 
group with CTRA, labor unions, and various other left-leaning grassroots groups to sponsor a tax 
reform package. Echoing the now-defunct grassroots-pushed federal reform legislation, the 
California tax justice coalition dubbed the bill the Tax Justice Act of 1977, and it was introduced 
by friendly state legislators as Senate Bill 154. The Tax Justice Act proposed to cut the tax bill of 
the median-income homeowner in half. The bill also provided “tax insurance” by pegging relief 
to increasing property tax bills. It paid for the new tax relief through a variety of progressive 
means, including increasing income taxes on upper-income Californians and curtailing the 
preferential rate for capital gains. The left-coalition stage three mass rallies throughout the 
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summer of 1977 to drum up support for the bill, each drawing thousands of protestors, including 
many elderly homeowners particularly alarmed by the effects of rising property taxes bills, given 
their fixed incomes. Some middle-aged homeowners invoked the symbolism of Vietnam draft 
resisters by burning their tax assessment notices in protest of the legislature’s delay in passing 
SB 154. Republicans countered with a bill offering only $155 in relief to the same middle-
income family – relief that would not rise with inflation.419  
Despite Republican opposition, the Tax Justice Act passed the Senate by a one-vote 
margin, and later passed the Assembly in a slightly altered form. However, the bill languished in 
conference. The first conference report substantially watered down the bill by adding in relief for 
business, and a coalition of Democrats – with the support of CAL – killed it. A second 
conference bill added more relief for middle-income homeowners, ensuring that nearly 70 
percent of homeowners would receive substantial relief from the bill.420 But in the press and 
among activists, Governor Brown was seen as willing to let the Tax Justice Act die. “The biggest 
obstacle to Tax Justice in California at this moment is Governor Brown,” the CTRA put it 
bluntly. Business groups – particularly realtors – strenuously opposed SB 154. Seeking the 
support of business for his 1978 reelection campaign, Brown favored a bill that was less costly 
than SB 154, aimed more relief at upper-income homeowners, and spared businesses the tax 
hikes contained in SB 154, thereby garnering the endorsement of major real estate and business 
lobbies. Brown, as one adviser later put it, “did not want to run in November with such a liberal 
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bill hanging around his neck.” Brown refused to meet with the CAL-fronted tax coalition to 
discuss his opposition to the Tax Justice Act, and the governor did not expend any political 
capital to cultivate the two votes necessary for SB 154’s passage. In response, CAL held a 21-
day vigil outside Brown’s Los Angeles office. Each day, hundreds of activists gathered to read 
the names of the 150,000 Los Angeles-area residents who had signed CAL’s petition calling for 
property tax relief and reform. But CAL’s efforts were to no avail. Needing a two-thirds majority 
to become law, the second conference bill fell two votes shy of passing, thanks in part to 
Brown’s clear lack of support for the legislation.421 Keeping with his emphasis on austerity, 
Brown believed that his sizable budget surplus, which he hinted might eventually be used for tax 
relief (though clearly not for the Tax Justice Act) was a selling point for his 1978 reelection 
campaign.422 As we shall see in the conclusion, it was a belief that the seemingly moribund tax 
right would prove wrong in mid-1978, much to the surprise of Brown and the despair of tax 
justice activists. 
 In Massachusetts, the story was much the same as in California. Unlike the populist 
Democrats of the 1970 midterms, Dukakis campaigned in 1974 on pledge not to increase taxes 
on anyone, including the rich, even if it meant the state would be unable to provide relief to low- 
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and middle-income taxpayers. When cities like Boston, filled with homeowners groaning under 
steep property taxes, looked to the state capitol for fiscal aid, Dukakis told them there was no 
chance. Even a proposal by the conservative Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation to broaden the 
sales tax base and use the revenue to let cities freeze and then roll back their property taxes was 
dismissed out-of-hand by Dukakis. “We ought to stop talking about additional taxes – whether 
state or local – at this time,” the governor said. When real estate taxes at the local level continued 
to spiral in the years that followed, the head of the MTF quipped that Dukakis’s fiscal policy was 
“a euphemism for balancing the state budget at the expense of the cities and towns.” 423 
Dukakis’s politics were dubbed the “new pragmatism.” Other observers just called him “Jerry 
Brown East.” 424  But Dukakis’s former aide, Barney Frank, charged that Dukakis was balancing 
his budget “on the backs of poor.” To the title of the “new pragmatism,” Frank responded, “It’s 
the new opportunism, the new electability. It’s Calvin Coolidge with a smile.” 425   
Like Brown, Dukakis sought to signal his break with Great Society liberalism, as well as 
McGovern’s Demogrant proposal, by taking a hard line on welfare. Dukakis’s cuts were 
protested by groups like the League of Women Voters, the Americans for Democratic Action, 
and the Massachusetts Council of Churches. The elderly and persons with disabilities joined 
other welfare recipients and social workers for a three-hour “People’s Hearing” organized by a 
coalition dubbed the Alliance for Economic Justice to protest Dukakis’s proposed cuts. 
Representatives of the Dukakis administration had been invited to defend their proposals, but 
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none showed. Researchers at Boston College, including economist Barry Bluestone, presented a 
report that argued the administration’s cuts were based on “myths,” rather than facts, about the 
state’s expenditures. The sense that Dukakis was channeling the public’s anger over taxes toward 
the disadvantaged was palpable. “The governor has been trying to direct the resentment of the 
middle class over economic conditions in this state against the needy,” a daycare worker at the 
“People’s Hearing” told the Boston Globe. One welfare advocate alleged that, in a private 
meeting, Dukakis told her, “I see those kids on food stamps in the supermarkets in Brookline. 
Eighty percent of the foot stamp recipients in Brookline are students. I see them stuffing roast 
beef in their carts and paying with food stamps – my money – while Kitty [Dukakis’s wife] and I 
have to settle for hamburger.” While it was implausible that the governor could not afford 
whatever cut of meat he desired, Dukakis’s sentiment was clear. Indeed, all the protest and 
studies urging Dukakis to take another budget path had no effect, and Dukakis signed bills 
enacting steep cuts to welfare and human services.426 The ultimate effects were cuts medical care 
and cost-of-living increases for families on welfare and the institution of a mandatory “workfare” 
program that required unemployed fathers on government assistance to work three days a week 
in government or non-profit jobs or lose benefits. 427   
Massachusetts tax justice groups attempted to push Dukakis to the left on taxes and 
spending by putting forward plans for graduated income taxes, a “lifeline” utility plan, and 
property tax relief. During his gubernatorial campaign, Dukakis said that, philosophically, he 
preferred a graduated income tax to a sales tax, but promised not to raise any taxes or pursue 
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graduated taxes in Massachusetts, which were prohibited by the state’s constitution. During his 
first year in office, when it became clear he would have to break his no-tax pledge, Dukakis 
proposed cushioning low- and middle-income people’s tax increase by instituting a “vanishing 
exemption” – essentially, a tax exemption that decreased in value as one made more money, 
rendering income tax rates effectively progressive. However, many experts still questioned its 
constitutionality, and after Dukakis’s initial proposal of the idea, it evaporated, despite 
Democratic control of the legislature. Ultimately, Dukakis was forced to propose increases in 
both the state’s flat-rate income tax and its sales tax, not to fund new programs or local tax relief, 
but simply to balance the budget.428 Dukakis’s politics were dubbed the “new pragmatism.” 
Other observers just called him “Jerry Brown East.” 429  The combined cuts to social welfare 
programs and increases in regressive taxes angered even many formerly sympathetic Democrats. 
Dukakis’s former aide, Barney Frank, charged that Dukakis was balancing his budget “on the 
backs of poor.” To the title of the “new pragmatism,” Frank responded, “It’s the new 
opportunism, the new electability. It’s Calvin Coolidge with a smile.” 430   
In the wake of the regressive tax increase, left-leaning grassroots groups attempted to 
force Dukakis’s hand on the graduated income tax. The most notable activist group pushing the 
measure was the Alliance for Fair Share, which had been begun pressing for tax reform in the 
Bay State in the early-1970s. “Mass Fair Share,” as it was commonly called, was an MEJ-backed 
project started by former NWRO and SDS members. Fair Share focused on organizing English- 
and Spanish-speaking low- and middle-income residents in cities like Chelsea around 
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pocketbook issues like taxes, utility pricesa bridge tolls, and school lunches.431 In addition to 
organizing, Fair Share focused on offering services to its members, like free tax preparation, 
legal assistance, and ambulance care.432 By 1977, Fair Share had 7,000 members.433Fair Share 
and other like-minded groups formed the Coalition for Tax Reform. CFTR succeeded in placing 
Issue 2 on the 1976 ballot, giving Bay State voters the fourth chance in the past 14 years to vote 
on graduated tax rates. CFTR argued that 80 percent of Massachusetts residents would pay less 
under a graduate income tax, which the group said was fairer to low- and middle-income 
taxpayers than the state’s current flat tax. The group also argued that the legislature should use 
any additional income tax revenue collected from graduated rates to lower local property taxes, 
which CFTR said was the truly unfair tax in the state. Supporters’ goals were decided 
distributive. Fair Share’s Lional Vincent said the group’s main concern was that the rates were 
“graduated” once all of the “exemptions and deductions” were calculated. “Under the present flat 
rate system the $10,000 per year person is taxed at the same rate as the person who earns 
$100,000 a year. For the family living on $10,000, a tax bill of a few hundred dollars means less 
money available for the necessities of life,” Florence Rubin, the president of the LWV, argued. 
“For the $100,000 a year family, a tax payment of a few thousand dollars is little more than 
nuisance.” Or, as another LWV’s member put, the new rates would “provide relief for low and 
middle income taxpayers.”434  
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That same year, essentially the same coalition behind the graduated income tax proposal 
were also pushing a ballot measure that would have replaced Massachusetts’s declining-block 
electric pricing with flat-rate pricing. Fair Share had initiated the petition to the flat-rate 
electricity proposition, Issue 7, on the ballot. The measure was expected to lower bills for three-
quarters of ratepayers, while limiting most increases to large businesses. Fair share and other 
supporters also estimated that average residential customers would see their bills drop by 10 to 
20 percent, since they were currently paying the highest rates. 435 Undoubtedly, though, the 
Massachusetts flat-rate referendum would save Bay Stay residents less than California’s 
graduated-rate electric law. According to some estimates, this could have been as little as $50-
per-year savings (more than $200 in 2015 dollars) – a not altogether inconsequential amount – or 
as much as $100 per year. Issue 7 also granted the legislature the ability to charge less for the 
first 300 kilowatts of residential electricity use, effectively opening the door for future 
progressive rates. For large users, the measure encourage conservation by offering lower rates on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Ballot Pits Citizen Groups vs. Business,” Boston Globe, September 5, 1976; A.A. Michelson, “Grad Tax Needs 
Long Slumber Before New Try,” Boston Globe, November 6, 1976; Jonathan Fuerbringer, “Dukakis Aide Admits 
Error in Graduated Tax Benefit Figures,” Boston Globe, September 17, 1976; Michael Kenney, “Grad Tax Strategy 
Stymied,” Boston Globe, March 26, 1976; John Dane, Jr., “One Way to Kill Jobs,” Boston Globe, October 20, 1976; 
Florence R. Rubin, “Savings Due for Many,” Boston Globe, October 20, 1976; “Results of Poll,” Boston Globe, 
October 20, 1976; “Voters Not Sure on Graduated Tax,” Boston Globe, October 6, 1976; R.S. Kindleberger, 
“Graduated Tax – 4th Test in 14 Years,” Boston Globe, October 31, 1976; R.S. Kindleberger, “Voters Won’t Know 
What Gradauted Tax Will Cost,” Boston Globe, October 21, 1976; A.A. Michelson, “Industry Amasses War Chest 
to Fight November Referenda,” Boston Globe, August 28, 1976; David Farrell, “Flat Rate Dim on Electricity,” 
Boston Globe, April 26, 1976; R.S. Kindleberger, “Fair Share, Legislators Discuss Flat Rate Plan,” Boston Globe, 
April 27, 1976; R.S. Kindleberger, “Cost of Electricity: The Rate Fight Grows,” Boston Globe, February 8, 1976  
435 R.S. Kindleberger, “Graduated income tax on the ballot again,” Boston Globe, October 2, 1976; “Mass. ballot 
issues... 2 graduated income tax,” Boston Globe, October 21, 1976; R.S. Kindleberger and Janathan Fuerbringer, 
“Ballot Pits Citizen Groups vs. Business,” Boston Globe, September 5, 1976; A.A. Michelson, “Grad Tax Needs 
Long Slumber Before New Try,” Boston Globe, November 6, 1976; Jonathan Fuerbringer, “Dukakis Aide Admits 
Error in Graduated Tax Benefit Figures,” Boston Globe, September 17, 1976; Michael Kenney, “Grad Tax Strategy 
Stymied,” Boston Globe, March 26, 1976; John Dane, Jr., “One Way to Kill Jobs,” Boston Globe, October 20, 1976; 
Florence R. Rubin, “Savings Due for Many,” Boston Globe, October 20, 1976; “Results of Poll,” Boston Globe, 
October 20, 1976; “Voters Not Sure on Graduated Tax,” Boston Globe, October 6, 1976; R.S. Kindleberger, 
“Graduated Tax – 4th Test in 14 Years,” Boston Globe, October 31, 1976; R.S. Kindleberger, “Voters Won’t Know 
What Gradauted Tax Will Cost,” Boston Globe, October 21, 1976; A.A. Michelson, “Industry Amasses War Chest 
to Fight November Referenda,” Boston Globe, August 28, 1976; David Farrell, “Flat Rate Dim on Electricity,” 
Boston Globe, April 26, 1976; R.S. Kindleberger, “Fair Share, Legislators Discuss Flat Rate Plan,” Boston Globe, 






consumed during off-peak hours, a policy known as peak load pricing. Even if the legislature 
never enacted graduate rates, Issue 7 was expected to shift between $60 and $90 million in 
electricity costs from homeowners and small businesses to large commercial and industrial firms. 
This shift, Fair Share argued, was not only distributionally just, but would also stimulate the state 
economy by putting money into the pockets of consumers and the registers of small businesses. 
In the long run, too, it would encourage energy conservation, according to Fair Share.436  
Bay State conservative activists and businesses groups strenuously opposed both the 
graduated tax and flat-rate electricity pricing. The tax initiatives main opponent, Citizens for 
Limited Taxation, was led by Edward F. King, whom the Boston Globe called “Mr. Anti-Grad 
Tax.” In his campaign to keep the governor from supporting the measure, King made headlines 
by presenting Dukakis with what the Boston Globe described as a “Haitian witch mask,” which 
King said was relevant because Proposal 2 was “just so much mumbo jumbo and had about as 
much chance of succeeding as the spells cast by a Haitian witch doctor.” CFLT was joined by 
People Against Increased Income Taxation a group of anti-tax businesspersons formed for those 
who opposed the income tax but also objected to King’s “flamboyant and hard-hitting style.”  
CFLT was, as its executive director said, “the responsible voice of the opposition,” which did not 
use any “inflammatory language.” Additional opponents included the Massachusetts Taxpayers 
Foundation, the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, and the Greater Boston Chamber of 
Commerce, among other business groups. Opponents of the income tax, “flamboyant” and 
otherwise, argued not only that individuals would pay higher taxes under graduate rates, but that 
businesses would leave the state en masse if progressive tax rates were instituted in the Bay 
State. The Chamber’s Gerald Holtz, for example, predicted that graduated rates would lead to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






higher taxes on “individuals with high incomes,” whom he noted were “a mobile group.” “They 
are also, typically, the group who control most of the key economic decisions made by business,” 
Holtz added ominously. Likewise, the chair of People Against Increased Income Taxes, John 
Dane, Jr., argued, “The high technology industries, such as those found in the Route 128 area, 
require a large pool of highly-trained and well paid employees and executives…[who] would be 
most seriously hurt by a shift from a flat rate at 5.375 percent to a graduated tax. And if our 
Massachusetts high technology concerns cannot attract highly skilled personnel….they obviously 
will have fewer jobs for production workers, secretaries, file clerks, maintenance staff and the 
like.” 437  
Business groups’ arguments against flat-rate energy were much the same. Opponents 
argued that businesses would flee the state if flat-rate pricing were put into effect, since the 
primary beneficiaries of the existing declining-block pricing were large businesses. The forces 
against Question 7 were many of the state’s “major manufacturers, bankers, insurance 
companies, and commercial interests,” as the Globe summarized. These interests gathered in the 
Council for Economic Energy Use. 438  The CEEU and other opponents regularly predicted that 
the measure would cost the state 35,000 jobs, a figure derived from a University of 
Massachusetts model that placed the range between 17,500 and 62,000. The model’s designer, 
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though, cautioned that the estimates were not to be taken as existing jobs eliminated necessarily, 
but instead as future jobs not created. “You can’t take these numbers too literally,” he told the 
Globe. Harvard economist Kenneth Arrow, in contrast, conducted a study that supported 
Question 7. “Electricity is a very small fraction of total costs [for businesses], and the adverse 
effect must be very small,” Arrow said. “In addition, the slower growth of eclectic generating 
will mean that….with a few years the price of electricity, even to industry, will be no higher than 
it is today, while the rest of the population has lower rates [than today].”439 Nonetheless, the 
CEEU’s claims were echoed by other business groups. A representative of the Greater Boston 
Chamber of Commerce, for example, claimed that the flat-rate electricity measure would cost the 
state 16,000 manufacturing jobs .440 The CEEU also bolstered its anti-flat rate argument by 
asserting that that the measure would not only cost jobs, but also drive up the prices that 
consumers would pay for goods and services offered by the large businesses paying the higher 
costs.441 
The battle was, as a Globe headline summarized, “Citizen Groups vs. Business.” The 
business groups had the decided spending advantage. In 1972, the last time a graduated income 
tax was on the ballot, opponents outspent proponents $118,000 to $15,000 to defeat the measure. 
In 1976, CFTR, in fact, had less money in 1976 than in 1972. Fair Share did better than CFTR, 
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though, raising a little less $120,000, mostly from door-to-door canvassing and fundraising 
raffles. 442 Proponents’ spending, though, paled in comparison to opponents’ war chest. Business 
pledged $2 million dollars – ten percent of Jimmy Carter’s 1976 president campaign spending 
and as much as both Dukakis and his opponent, Francis Sargent, had spent in the 1974 primary 
and general elections combined, as the Boston Globe observed – to defeat the four 1976 ballot 
measures (the graduated tax proposal, the flat-rate electricity proposal, one allowing for public 
power, and another calling for a deposit for returnable bottles and cans). All four were labeled by 
Bay State corporations as “anti-business” and “anti-jobs.” Individual industries took the lead on 
the issues most relevant to them. Utility companies, for example, had already spent half a million 
dollars by September, thanks to the flat-rate ballot measure. 443 The CEEU raised $350,000, 
mostly from large businesses, to oppose flat electric rates. 444  Not included in spending reports 
by anti-initiative forces was the – ostensibly voluntary – time spent by the employees of 
Massachusetts companies in defeating the initiatives. 445  Businesses also worked hard at 
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persuading their own employees. The 25,000 workers at the Raytheon Company received 
instructions to vote “no” on Question 7 in their paychecks. Question 7, Raytheon told its 
workers, “could substantially hurt our ability to maintain jobs in our energy intensive 
operations.” “This could affect as many as 30,000 jobs in Massachusetts,” the letter continued, 
“of which 200 are at Raytheon.” 446 
 The grassroots left received little help from the Dukakis administration in encouraging 
voters to support their initiatives. Activists’ relationship with Dukakis had, in fact, turned south 
the previous year. In February 1975, 500 “housewives, elderly persons, and [members of] 
consumer groups” descended upon the Massachusetts State House’s Gardner Auditorium for a 
meeting with Dukakis and his consumer affairs secretary, Lola Dickerman, about high electric 
rates. The meeting was called for by a Boston-based coalition of consumer groups known as the 
Citizens Action Program on Energy (CAP-Energy). While Dukakis talked of President Ford’s 
energy policies, CAP-Energy’s Jack Kittredge pointed to the state’s declining block electric 
rates. “Consumers must not continue to subsidize big office buildings and industries,” he said. 
Instead, Kittredge urged Dukakis and the state legislature to enact “lifeline” rates, which charged 
lower prices for less usage. Other left-grassroots activists agreed. “There’s a Bob Dylan song 
which goes ‘You don’t need a weather vane to know which way the wind blows,” Myrna 
Brodstof of the Fenway Tenants Union quipped, noting that blue-collar wages were stagnating 
while profits and executives salaries at the companies could not absorb higher electric rates were 
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soaring.447 While Dukakis had given his tentative support to an activist-backed lifeline bill that 
had died in the state Senate the previous year, he now changed his tune, telling consumer 
activists that he was no longer sure how rates should be structured. His argument was pure 
fiscalism. “The question is,” he told activists, “can we set up a system that protects consumers 
but doesn’t throw another 10,000 people out of work.”448 It was part of a larger effort by Dukakis 
to woo business.  
Now, the Dukakis administration focused on shaking Massachusetts’s – and Democrats’ 
– “anti-business” image. “[N]ew and different things are going on,” Howard N. Smith, Dukakis’s 
secretary of manpower and economic development bragged, pointing to Dukakis’s decision to 
cut the budget rather than raise taxes. “Massachusetts is changing.” Or, as a Boston Globe 
headline on the Dukakis administration’s efforts to curry favor with business put it, “The State 
House View: We’re PRO-Business.”449 Indeed, many of Dukakis’s budget decisions directly 
reflected the suggestions of the state’s “bankers and business community,” as Sidney Blumenthal 
put it in a 1976 profile of Dukakis.450 To make the Democrat’s new ideology abundantly clear, 
the Dukakis administration launched a $100,000 advertising campaign touting his business-
friendly policies. Large ads ran in newspapers throughout the state declaring in bold letters, 
“We’re starting to run this state like a business.” The ads, signed by Dukakis and his secretary of 
economic affairs, outlined the policies Dukakis had pursued, bragging how Massachusetts 
employees who quit their jobs could no longer collect unemployment benefits, how the Dukakis 
administration had “started to treat people in business like paying customers,” and how “[f]or the 
first time in 39 years we’re spending less money than we spent the year before – in spite of 10 
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percent inflation.”451 The state’s business interests were thrilled. William McCarthy, the chief 
State House lobbyist for the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, the state’s largest business 
group, gushed, “They [the governor’s office] advocate our interests regularly, effectively, and 
vigorously. There has never been anything like it.”452  
The public relations blitz with business seemed to be working working. By the end of 
1976, Boston Globe’s political columnist David Farrell was noting that “talk about 
Dukakis…throughout the business community is most favorable now.” One businessman told the 
paper that Dukakis was doing “a hell of a job.” What made business leaders so pleased? 
Dukakis’s staunch resistance of calls by other Democrats, like Boston Mayor Mike White, to 
raise taxes and the governor’s generally “austerity-minded administration,” not to mention his 
“firm position against the flat-rate electricity and public power referenda.”453 One political, 
however, reporter noted the irony of the fact that Democrats, led by Dukakis, had tried made 
“giving business a big lift” a “big priority,” while business was repaying them by amassing a 
“big war chest” to oppose initiatives favored by Democrats. “[I]n that spirit of cooperation 
[between Democrats and business],” Globe reporter A.A. Michelson quipped, “business 
executives are now trying to expand the philosophy that what’s good for business is good for the 
state….[to] what’s good for the personal well-being of the high-paid executive is good for 
Massachusetts.” 454 
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Keeping with his new pro-business image, Dukakis declared his open opposition to flat-
rate electricity, arguing that it would hurt business, as well as potentially drive up costs for 
schools and government buildings.455 Speaking for Dukakis, Smith called the lifeline electricity 
proposal “an unmitigated disaster.” Supporters of the measure, the secretary of manpower and 
economic development said, needed to be confronted with the “economic facts.” Echoing the 
business line against the measure, Smith asked rhetorically, “What good is a $2.50 savings [on 
an electricity bill] to a person if he loses his job?” 456 Legislative Democrats, worried that it 
would be viewed as anti-business, soured on flat-rate electric, too. The speaker of the House, for 
example, switched his position from support to opposition.457 Electricity bills themselves proved 
to be supporters’ best advertising for Question 7. “I will vote for [Question 7],” one resident old 
a Fair Share canvasser gauging support for flat rates. “I got an electric bill of $118 last month 
and $87 this month.” Median income for a four-person family in Massachusetts in 1975 was 
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$16,500. 458  Despite the energy crisis, Fair Share’s attempts to win back support among 
Democrats were swamped by the strength of big business and Dukakis’s opposition. 
Democrats were little more help on taxes. Perhaps the most serious problem facing the 
pro Issue 2 forces was the legislature’s unwillingness to approve a graduate tax plan to go into 
effect should the issue pass. “Supporters of a graduated tax…argued that if people knew the rates 
that would be in effect if the constitutional amendment were passed,” one report noted, “then 
they would not fear the open-ended nature of the amendment which has been a factor in its three 
successive defeats.” The Democratic leadership in the Massachusetts legislature, however, did 
not want to force its members tangle with the difficult issue of formulating tax brackets in an 
election year. A Fair Share representative slammed the legislature for “muddying the waters” by 
failing to approve a rate structure. Likewise, the president of CFTR, Diane Kessler, lamented, 
“In an election year, legislators don’t want to talk about taxes, regardless of the issues of the 
matter.” In contrast, the reaction from Issue 2 opponents to the legislature’s failure to pass a rate 
schedule was gleeful. “We’ve got the thing beat now,” brimmed Donald A. Feder, a 
spokesperson for CFLT. 459 Thanks to the legislature’s inaction, Issue 2’s supporters had only 
hypothetical responses to opponents claims that Issue 2 would lead to increased taxes on most 
Bay State residents. The Dukakis administration did not help matters, either, by touting a set of 
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distributional calculations that it had to later retract when Citizens for Limited Taxation found 
errors. This only provided further fodder for opponents and added to the public’s confusion. 460 
After a strong start to their campaign, Fair Share and other graduated tax and flat rate 
electricity supporters began to feel the effects of a well-funded business opposition and apathetic, 
or downright oppositional, Democrats. Support for Issue 2 eroded over the summer. In June, 49 
percent of Massachusetts residents said they planned to vote for the measure, with 31 percent 
against and 20 percent undecided. This was before the opposition campaign had rolled out its 
advertising blitz, though. By June, support had dropped to 41 percent, while opposition had 
ticked up three points and undecided voters had increased by five points. One additional data 
point, however, indicated that the drop in support may have had little to do with voter 
disapproval of progressive taxation. Indeed, 60 percent of voters said they supported graduated 
income tax rates, even as only 40 percent in the same poll said they planned to vote for Issue 2. 
Significantly, most Massachusetts residents who said they planned not to vote supported the 
principle of progressive taxation. A quarter of those making less than $10,000 per year – “a 
natural and large graduated tax constituency,” as the Globe noted – said they planned to stay 
home. The opposition campaign, as well as the legislature’s failure to enact a rate schedule and 
the Dukakis administration’s math gaffe, seemed to turn voters against Issue 2, polls suggested. 
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A majority of those who said they had seen an anti-2 advertisement said they opposed the 
measure and when presented with the argument that Issue 2 would result in a “tax increase,” 
rather than a redistribution of the tax burden, support for Issue 2 fell further, to only 33 percent. 
The collapse of support for flat rate billing was even more dramatic. After seeing support for the 
measure peak at a whopping 71 percent in February, it fell to just 42 percent in October. 461 
In November, both the tax and electricity went down to overwhelming defeat. Perhaps 
most disheartening for activists, however, was the fact that progress seemed not only to have 
stalled, but moved backwards. In 1962, the vote was five to one against the graduated tax. In 
1968, it was three to one. In 1972, it was two to one and many towns in the state actually voted 
for the measure. This narrowing of the margin, however, ended in 1976, when it lost three to one. 
As one political reporter put it, the reasons for the defeat likely went beyond the anti-Issue 2 
force’s spending and a bungled “yes” campaign. But the economy of 1976 was far different from 
the economy of 1972. In the intervening four years, inflation, unemployment, and taxes had all 
soared. “People are hurting,” Globe political reporter A.A. Michelson noted. “State and local 
taxes are escalating to the point where they are really hurting. Thousands wonder when the plant 
they’ve worked in all their lives is either going to close or move to the South or Southwest. They 
were obviously in no mood for what the opponents falsely called a ‘new tax.’” Michelson noted 
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that moderate-income counties like Berkshire had nearly approved the graduated income tax 
measure in 1972. In 1976, though, Berkshire voters went against it two to one. 462 
Despite the losses, the tax justice left in Massachusetts pushed onward. Now, Fair Share 
turned to state-level solutions to rising Bay State property taxes, a topic on which, at the local 
level, the group had already enjoyed success. Fair Share’s early tax activism focused on 
picketing underassessed and tax-delinquent businesses. But its ultimate goal was reducing 
property taxes on homeowners.463 In 1975, during the middle of the busing crisis, the Dorchester 
Community Action Committee, which would become the Dorchester chapter of Fair Share, 
brought 350 black and white residents together to strategize challenging high assessments, and 
over a period of four years, they won 2,500 reductions for Dorchester residents.464 But Fair 
Share’s ultimate goal was a legislative solution to rising property taxes on low- and middle-
income Massachusetts homeowners, who faced the highest property tax rates in the country.465 
Fair Share would get its opportunity to square off with Dukakis on the property tax issue, but not 
until after a right-distributionst tax earthquake shook California. 
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Left-distributionist grassroots activists in California and Massachusetts were not alone in 
their frustrations with conservative Democrats, either. In Arkansas in 1978, Bill Clinton, in 
middle of his campaign for governor, refused to support an ACORN-pushed referendum, 
Amendment 59, to exempt food and drugs from the sales tax, even though it had the backing of 
some major Democrats, like Secretary of State Winston Bryant, who chaired the Citizens 
Committee to Fight Unfair Taxes, which was formed to back the measure.466 However, the 
state’s major businesses and Chamber of Commerce opposed the measure. They were fearful that 
any lost revenue would be made up for in higher taxes on business, which is exactly what 
ACORN was proposing.467 So they formed an anti-59 front group dubbed the Committee to Save 
the People Services and dramatically outspent ACORN and its allies. In a well-financed ad 
campaign, the anti-59 business coalition argued that Amendment 59 would actually raise taxes 
on average homeowners. Clinton and many Democrats sided with business, and the measure 
narrowly lost.468 When Clinton wrote to ACORN’s founder Wade Rathke to explain that even 
though he opposed the sales tax cut he would still be “the best governor the working people of 
our state ever had,” Rathke responded, “A working people’s governor with a fixation for the 
sales tax is not likely under any condition to be the best of anything we have ever had in 
Arkansas.”469  
In other cases, activists faced the combined resistance of both Republicans and 
Democrats. In Illinois, a left coalition led by the Illinois Public Action Council successfully 
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lobbied the legislature to pass a “circuit breaker” property tax bill, capping assessments for low- 
and middle-income households. However, Republican Governor James Thomson vetoed the 
measure.470 The next year, labor and public interest groups in Illinois pushed a bill exempting 
food and medicine from the sales tax through both the House and Senate only to see Thompson 
veto it, too. Then an attempt to override the veto was scuttled by the Chicago delegation who, 
under the influence of Democratic Mayor Jane Byrne, worried about lost state revenue for the 
city. Instead, to the frustration of most Democrats and grassroots activists, Byrne and Thompson 
proposed an unpopular alternative to cut only once cent from the sales tax on food and drugs, 
producing scant savings that even the supportive Chicago Tribune called “hardly noticeable” to 
struggling families.471 
 Little wonder, then, that the public would soon grow wary of promises of pocketbook 
squeeze-relieving reform. Time and time again, policymakers failed to deliver.  
 
Conclusion 
In retrospect, the first half of the 1970s proved to be the high watermark for the tax 
justice left. By the time the dust settled from Watergate and the “Watergate Babies” took office 
in 1975, left-distributionists’ window of opportunity was nearly closed. As first federal relief for 
rising local property taxes, then federal tax reform, then progressive state initiatives fell by the 
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wayside thanks to a combination of New Democrats’ indifference or hostility and a resurgent 
business lobby, it became clear that the institutional landscape of politics – if not public opinion 
– was becoming less and less welcoming to entreaties of the tax justice movement. Reflecting on 
the 1975 Democratic Issues Convention, the editor of Congressional Quarterly observed, “A 
weekend in Louisville…made it clear that Brown and Dukakis are not abberations….”472 As if to 
reaffirm the party’s shift to the right prior to the 1976 presidential elections, Colorado Governor 
Richard Lamm took the pages of the New York Times to call for the Democratic Party to abandon 
its New Deal and Great Society inclinations. “The Democratic Party should take care neither to 
be frozen into the rhetoric of thirty years ago nor to its past tendency to call for federal 
solutions,” Lamm wrote. While during the New Deal era such “traits” may have “built the 
Democratic Party,” continuing them today could lead the part to its “downfall.” “Tax dollars for 
new programs will become ever more scarce,” he concluded. “It is doubtful that we will have the 
tax dollars to fulfill the expectations we already offered the public: national health insurance, 
housing, etc.”473 It was a conclusion with which many of the Democrats vying for the presidency 
in 1976 would agree. 
One of those candidates was, surprisingly, Jerry Brown, despite having served as the 
governor of California for less than two years. During his presidential run, Brown did not run 
away from either his youthful image or his fiscally conservative philosophy. He embraced he 
embraced. Brown’s 1976 presidential campaign buttons equally evoked Bob Dylan (“THE 
TIMES ARE CHANGING”), Eugene McCarthy (“THE NEW POLITICS”), and the model 
conservative fiscalist, President Eisenhower (with a button that read, “IN THE TRADITION OF 
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EISENHOWER, JERRY BROWN, PRESIDENT 1976” and displayed headshots of both 
Eisenhower and Brown).474 Brown’s coalition, a Mother Jones profile suggested, consisted of 
three groups: “the young eco-freak types,” “the older, conservative less-government-is-more 
people,” and “the intellectuals.”475 On the campaign trail, Brown touted his “small is beautiful” 
brand of austerity. His disquisition on federal power, for example, sounded a great deal like the 
conservative argument for Revenue Sharing that Nixon had abandoned in favor of one that 
stressed RS’s potential for progressive tax relief. “Everywhere we look in this federal 
government we find that they are forcing us to do things that we don’t have the tax base to do 
and for which they are unwilling to pay,” Brown said. “The federal government is taking onto 
itself more and more power for local matters, meddling in affairs because of their lack of faith in 
the ability of the people to govern themselves. Decentralized power – that’s important to me.”476 
Another California governor on the campaign trail in 1976 agreed. “We can and must reverse the 
flow of power to Washington,” Ronald Reagan declared during his GOP primary challenge to 
Gerald Ford.477 With his youth and his decidedly right-leaning views, however, Brown could not 
defeat the Democrats’ eventual nominee, Georgia Governor Jimmy Carted.  
Carter raised tax reformers’ hopes, at least temporarily. Carter had, after all, participated 
in Fred Harris’s Tax Action Campaign’s Tax Action Day in 1973.478  Keeping with that image, 
Carter ran on a platform of unabashed progressive tax reform during the 1976 presidential 
election. “Last year there were 24 people in the nation that made over a million dollars in income 
that didn’t pay one nickel in income tax,” one Carter television commercial noted. “Jimmy 
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Carter believes we need to reform our tax laws now for people who don’t have lobbyists working 
to find tax loopholes for the privileged few.”479 In another commercial, Carter called “the tax 
laws of this country…a disgrace to the human race,” because of the tax “loopholes for people 
who are rich and who have those lobbyists working in Washington full time to retain their 
special privilege.”480 On most economic issues, however, Carter was an avowed fiscalist and a 
balanced-budget conservative. Carter favored “sunset laws” (setting expiration dates for 
programs and agencies), “zero-based budgeting” (forcing each agency write a budget from 
scratch each year), and “cost-benefit analysis” (an attempt, drawn from business, to calculate all 
of the cost and benefits, however indirect, from a new program of regulation).481  
Carter’s seemingly left-distributionist rhetoric on taxes sprang more from his good 
government inclinations and his black-and-white sense of morality than from a deeply left-
distributionist outlook. Carter indicated that he wanted to make the tax code more progressive by 
closing loopholes, including the capital gains preference, but was generally short on specifics. 
Moreover, reformers like Nader’s TRRG got worried when Russell Long claimed that, in a 
private conversation, Carter assured him that he would not push reforms that would hurt business 
or investors – a claim Carter denied.482 However, considering that the last tax action of the Ford 
administration would be the release of a study by William E. Simon’s Treasury Department 
touted the possibility of moving from a federal income tax to a federal consumption tax, Carter’s 
vagaries seemed like the best reformers could hope for.483 His first year-and-half in office, 
though, saw Carter put tax reform on the backburner. With the Consumer Price Index once again 
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marching upward as Carter took office, inflation-fighting austerity dominated Carter’s economic 
agenda.484  
For average Americans, the main story of the mid-to-late 1970s was the pocketbook 
squeeze, which seemed to be getting worse by the day. Despite all the tax wrangling between 
White House administrations and Congresses over those years, for the average American 
taxpayer, it must have seemed that federal inaction – and indifference to their plight – had ruled 
the past fifteen years. In the 1977, the federal tax burden actually looked remarkably similar to 
how it had looked prior to the JFK-LBJ tax cuts. The top one percent of Americans paid a total 
of 46.2 percent in federal taxes in 1962 and 46 percent in 1977. For the lowest 20 percent of the 
population, the shift was from 15.5 to 14.4. For the middle 20 percent, the federal tax burden had 
actually increased from 17.9 in 1962 to 19.7 in 1977. On the state and local level, however, 
things were very different. The steep rise in regressive state and local taxes, along with the now-
seemingly-ever-present threat of stagflation, meant that the pocketbook squeeze was more acute 
than ever. In 1953, the “average family” in ACIR’s study paid a total of 11.8 percent in state, 
local, and federal taxes. By 1977, it had nearly doubled to 22.5. A family making four times the 
average, however, had seen its tax burden go up only by half, from 20.2 in 1957 to 31.5 in 1977. 
This “narrowing of the gap” between the taxes paid by the rich and the poor, as noted by the 
ACIR, meant that the U.S. tax system was, indisputably, becoming less and less progressive.485  
By the late-1970s, low- and middle-income taxpayers’ patience was running out. With 
promises of federal relief from rising state and local beginning to 1972, various state-level vows 
of relief beginning even earlier, and assurances of federal loophole-closing tax reform stretching 
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back all the way to the Kennedy administration, their patience had run out for good reason. In 
June of 1978, policymakers across the country would see the results of this loss of patience, and 
the battle over the meaning of that event would define the direction of American tax policy for 



































Spinning the Tax Revolt 
 
 
“We have a new revolution against the arrogant politicians and insensitive bureaucrats 
whose philosophy of tax, tax, tax, spend, spend, spend, elect and elect and elect is bankrupting 
we the American people and the time has to put a stop to it!...,” Howard Jarvis bellowed from the 
podium, surrounded by supporter and jutting his finger forward from the podium. “We, the 
taxpayers, have spoken.”1 Just a year earlier, the moribund middle-aged white businessman had 
been little more than a conservative political gadfly in California, failing four previous times 
gather enough get his tax limitation measure on the ballot, including as recently as 1976. Now, 
Jarvis was the undisputed king of California and American tax politics.2 Californians went to the 
polls on June 6th, 1978, and nearly two-thirds of voters cast their votes for Jarvis’s property tax-
slashing measure. The battle to define what Prop 13 meant – and, most importantly, how 
policymakers across the country should respond – began the night of Jarvis’s victory speech. As 
we shall see, the framing of Prop 13, rather than why voters actually approved it, would define 
American tax politics for decades to come. 
But why did voters approve Prop 13? Despite the political spin that would follow, the 
reason was simple. It was the pocketbook squeeze. Californians’ ideology had not changed since 
Ronald Reagan’s Prop 1 went down in defeat in 1973. But the economic circumstances had. As 
one Los Angeles Times headline put it, “Prop. 13’s Biggest Booster Was Inflation, Not Anger 
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Against All Government.”3 Throughout mid-1970s, homeowners in California cities were seeing 
their assessments increase by 50-100 percent each year. By 1977, many middle-income 
Californians paid as much as 10 percent of their income in property taxes and, very often, even 
more.4 Despite angry letters from homeowners, streams of distraught homeowners at assessors’ 
offices year-after-year, and organized campaigns by groups like CAL, many legislators in 
California believed that the long-promised “tax revolt” would never really materialize. “I think 
that anger developed over a number of years as California real estate went through the roof…,” 
Assembly speaker Leo McCarthy remembered later. “I think a lot of us in Sacramento, who 
really didn’t measure the distress of homeowners accurately enough, sort of said, ‘Well, they've 
got this big asset, a home, that's being greatly inflated now, and that's going to be good for their 
kids, their families, whoever inherits it,’ and so on. We didn’t understand, and should have, the 
fears of a lot of these homeowners. Jarvis was able to capitalize on Sacramento’s relative 
inaction versus this growing rage out there among homeowners. So the old curmudgeon was able 
to ride the crest of the waves.”5 Ride them Jarvis did. 
Once Governor Jerry Brown and the legislature failed to enact the CAL-backed Tax 
Justice Act of 1977 (SB 154), the passage of Prop 13 was nearly assured. Howard Jarvis began 
collecting signatures for Prop 13 in July 1977. By December, Jarvis had gathered more than a 
million signatures, and secured Prop 13’s place on the June ballot. Still, even as Brown, CAL, 
and the legislature wrangled over SB 154, many Democrats and political observers dismissed the 
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idea that Jarvis’s initiative would succeed. 6  “Most knowledgeable Californians are 
predicting that the amendment will be defeated,” Richard Reeves wrote in Esquire in May, “that 
nothing can stand up to the political juggernaut of the government- union-business-newspaper 
complex and the threat of chaos if Jarvis wins.”7 After all, Prop 13 was nearly identical to Philip 
Watson’s two initiatives – in 1968 and 1972 – which voters soundly defeated, along with 
Reagan’s Prop 1 in 1973. 
But 1978 would prove to be different. During the past decade, Californians had been 
asked by Democrats and left-leaning activists to resist conservative tax initiatives. During the 
campaign against the Watson initiative in 1972, the liberal Californians Against Higher Taxes 
told voters that opponents of conservative tax limited agreed that tax reform was necessary, but 
argued that Californians would be better off waiting for a different, more progressive plan. “It 
[Prop 14] means higher taxes for everyone except land developers and speculators who will 
receive huge breaks if this is adopted…,” CAHT argued. “California needs tax reform, but not 
this proposition, which shifts the tax burden from large landowners to homeowners and renters 
[emphasis in original].”8 Opponents of Reagan’s Prop 1 delivered the same message. Each time, 
voters obeyed, defeating one conservative tax limitation proposal after another. But the promise 
of a progressive alternative had not materialized until the “Tax Justice Act of 1977.” Now it was 
dead, and Prop 13 appeared to many voters to be the only alternative.  
Jarvis’s message was simple. “Save Our Homes, Yes on 13,” as one pro-13 yard sign put 
it. Prop 13’s biggest selling point was the safety it provided homeowners. It rolled back 
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assessments to 1976 levels, capped property taxes at one percent of property value, and limited 
assessment increases to two percent per year. For years, the left had been arguing that most 
homeowners needed this type of security, and SB 154 was designed to give it to lower- and 
middle-income homeowners. While Prop 13 would undoubtedly help those same homeowners, it 
also gave huge tax breaks to upper-income homeowners and business, while also making it 
harder for the state legislature to increase other taxes, including progressive income taxes. In 
many ways, it was a repeat of Reagan’s Prop 1. However, unlike the Prop 1 battle, the coalitional 
dynamics of the Prop 13 campaign gave Jarvis the opportunity to claim the mantle of populism.  
Throughout the Prop 13 campaign, Jarvis justifiably argued that business, government, 
and labor were aligned against Prop 13. Nearly all of California’s major corporations joined in 
the effort to defeat Prop 13. While the opposition of labor and the Brown administration to Prop 
13 was not surprising, business’s opposition was. But companies like Bank of America, U.S. 
Steel, Hewlett-Packard, and Coca-Cola made large donations to the anti-13 coalition. The 
California Chamber of Commerce and California Manufacturers Association, as well as the 
business-backed California Taxpayers Association, all opposed Prop 13, too.  As left-leaning 
activists had long argued, large companies already received favorable assessments. Even though 
many would have received even more benefits from Prop 13, large businesses were not 
clamoring for property tax relief in the same way that low- and middle-income homeowners 
were. Moreover, many large businesses worried that Prop 13 would cut taxes too much for 
homeowners, and that the legislature would seek to make up the lost revenue by hiking taxes on 
business. The business opposition to Prop 13 proved to be crippling for the anti-13 coalition.   
Because of its hefty investment in the “No on 13” campaign, business called the shots. 






13” campaign to argue that Prop 13 would be a handout to businesses and the rich. But that had 
been the successful message of Prop 1’s opponents five years earlier. Jarvis argued that he was 
on the side of the small homeowner. The “No on 13” campaign’s strategy was to argue that Prop 
13 was too expensive. Yet, the slogan repeated in every “No on 13” commercial – “It may look 
good, but it costs too much” – inadvertently complimented Prop 13 by implying that it would cut 
homeowners’ taxes, just by “too much.” To the frustration of labor unions and left grassroots 
groups, the “No on 13” campaign drastically underemphasized Californian’s real pocketbook 
fears. “Tax grievances are real,” the CTRA’s Dean Tipps argued. “When the issue is taxes, we’d 
better talk about taxes.” But the businesses funding “No on 13” did not want Prop 13’s 
opponents to emphasize the legislature’s hastily-crafted Prop 13 alternative, Proposition 8 – 
which was far less generous than SB 154 – because many corporations backing “No on 13” felt 
Prop 8 was too hard on business.  
Instead of focusing on taxes, the “No on 13” campaign talked only about the budget 
deficits and cuts to services that would result after Prop 13 passed. But California had been 
accumulating a surplus for years, making it difficult for voters to believe Prop 13 would impose 
a hardship. Just days before the Prop 13 vote, in fact, the Brown administration announced that 
the state’s already substantial surplus had become “huge” and pledged to use some of the surplus 
to help localities if Prop 13 passed. Making matters worse, just weeks before the vote, the Los 
Angeles County assessor Alexander Pope – who opposed Prop 13 – began allowing homeowners 
to come to his office and view their new assessments. The “Yes on 13” campaign ran television 
ads arguing, “The politicians have a surprise for you. But they don’t want you to know about it 
until after the election.” Democrats tried to get Pope wait until after the election to release the 






thanks to Los Angeles’s overheated housing market, the average assessment was about to jump 
125 percent. “I don’t know if I can walk to the car,” one woman said after finding out that her 
assessment had nearly tripled, raising her taxes from $2,000 to $5,500. 9 The release of the Los 
Angeles County Assessments proved to be a turning point in the campaign. After trending 
against Prop 13, polls began shifting in the initiatives favor.10 
In the end, many of Prop 13’s opponents ignored the official “No on 13” strategy and 
instead tried to portray Jarvis’s initiative as a handout to business. But it was too late, and Jarvis 
had a ready comeback. He simply rattled off a list of the major corporations opposed donating to 
“No on 13.”11 It worked. As Frank Taylor, who by 1978 was struggling to make property tax 
payments on the modest home in Santee he had bought with his wife in 1962 for $13,000, 
remembered, “I thought [Jarvis] was a crackpot. I thought this guy is a Republican! He’s not 
going to be for the people. But he was. And the more I listened to him, the more I liked him.”12 
Like him or not, most California voters cast their ballots for Jarvis’s Prop 13, giving Jarvis his 
first victory after more than a decade of attempts. 
Immediately, the debate over the meaning of Prop 13 kicked into high gear. Within 
California, many on the left and in Brown’s own party blamed the passage of Prop 13 on the 
governor for his inaction when it came to SB 154. “By failing to go to bat for [the Tax Justice 
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Act of 1977], Brown effectively killed it – and Jarvis stepped into the vacuum,” one of Brown’s 
former economic wrote in the Los Angeles Times. Had Brown lobbied for SB 154, he argued, it 
would have passed, and Prop 13 would have never succeeded. Privately, the Democratic 
legislators who had backed SB 154 agreed. Brown had “misjudged” the budding “tax revolt,” as 
Democratic Senator Barry Keene later recalled. Instead, Brown saw the state’s growing surplus, 
which some critics called “obscene” as the proof of his fiscal responsibility, an issue that he 
believed was more significant than providing the type of property tax relief contained in SB 154. 
“[I]t was a very critical juncture, and things might have been different had Jerry Brown gone to 
the legislature and said, ‘We need property tax relief now. You guys better pass it, or there’s 
going to be an explosion…,” Keene explained. “[H]e didn’t see that [growing ‘revolt’].”13 
Nationally, however, the discourse was very different. The national media elevated Prop 
13 to watershed political event and made Jarvis a celebrity. Above the words “Tax Revolt!” Time 
placed Jarvis on its, his fist thrust defiantly in the air, head framed by the stars in a revolutionary-
era American flag. Newsweek countered with a Prop 13 cover featuring an all-white group of 
Californians sporting “Yes on 13” signs and t-shirts. The passage of the ballot initiative and its 
aftermath was covered in multiple reports on all three television networks’ evening news 
broadcasts. In the furor following the passage of Prop 13, the history of the tax revolt was erased. 
Suddenly, the press that had been covering the revolt since the wave of levy defeats in the 1960s 
and Barr’s congressional testimony in 1969 forgot that Jarvis’s victory was a long time in 
coming. “The California revolt had raced the middle-class pulse of the country as feverishly as 
anything since the invention of the station wagon,” Newsweek exclaimed. Prop 13 was not just a 
desire for a rollback in specific, regressive tax, most publications concluded. Rather, they argued 
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that it was a rebellion against all taxes. More than that, it was proof that the public wanted to 
shrink government and slash spending. As U.S. News and World Report explained, Prop 13 was 
a “message to city halls, state houses, and Washington, ‘Roll back spending and cut our 
taxes.’”14 The idea that the causes of Californians’ vote for Prop 13 were more nuanced and 
varied was almost nowhere to be found. 
Conservatives encouraged this interpretation. From the moment Jarvis took the podium to 
declare victory, the right-distributionist framing of the measure began. Activists and politicians, 
like Reagan and Friedman, who had repeatedly tried, and failed, to get voters to support right-
distributionist initiatives now claimed victory. Past defeats were retrospectively reframed as 
prescient moral victories. Reagan argued that Prop 13 vindicated his failed Prop 1 effort and 
showed that conservatives were on the right side of history when it came to taxes. In a speech 
delivered just after Prop 13’s passage, Reagan said he agreed with those who said that Prop 1 
was “the beginning of the tax revolt.” According to Reagan, Prop 1 “was an idea whose time had 
not quite arrived… But, on June 6, this year, Californians went to the polls and…passed 
Proposition 13 by a two-to-one margin.” Reagan even mocked CAL’s failed SB 154, calling it a 
“socialist redistribution scheme.” 15 Friedman agreed with Reagan. Though he had previously 
dismissed the notion that the failure of Prop 1 or Prop C represented any type of referendum on 
the right’s tax arguments, now Friedman argued that Prop 13 was proof that the public had 
finally seen the light and was embracing the strident anti-tax, anti-government message he had 
been pushing since the Goldwater campaign. “The ‘brewing’ tax revolt is no longer brewing. It is 
boiling over,” Friedman wrote in a Newsweek column about Prop 13’s victory. “The populace is 
coming to recognize that throwing government money at problems has a way of making them 
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worse, not better, that people are likely to get more out of spending their own money than out of 
turning it over to bureaucrats to spend for them.”16 
Both conservative and liberal commentators seemed to agree with the conservative 
interpretation of Prop 13 offered by Reagan and Friedman. The public, pundits declared, had 
lurched to the right. Fortune magazine said that those who approved Prop 13 were “Voting For 
Capitalism.” Prop 13 proved that lower- and middle-income Americans were now on the side of 
the wealthy, the magazine explained. It was a call to unleash capital from the shackles of taxation 
and big government. “This property-owning class…by now includes most members of what used 
to be referred to as the working class,” the Fortune article explained. “What this vox mediorum is 
saying to government at all levels is: get out of our pocketbooks and give us back control of our 
own resources. What the middle class is also saying, or rather assuming, is that if the load of 
government could be lightened, if young and old were allowed not only to get capital but to keep 
it, the private economy could propel the country into a new era of expansion.”17 Liberal 
economist Robert Lekachman agreed. According to Lekachman, while some on the left might try 
to convince themselves that Prop 13 was simply a reaction to California’s skyrocketing property 
taxes, it did not. “[J]ust for the record,” he argued, “American taxpayers are less burdened than 
the citizens of most other advanced societies.” Genuine pocketbook concerns did not cause Prop 
13. Rather, Lekachman explained, a “sour, cynical, and self-regarding” “public mood” was to 
blame for Prop 13’s passage. Since voters began defeating school levies in the 1960s and voting 
Nixon into office, they had been “drifting inexorably rightward.” Prop 13 was a rejection not 
only of “the New Deal, New Frontier, and Great Society,” it was a rejection of liberalism itself 
and a wholesale acceptance of Reagan’s vision of America, according to Lekachman. 
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“Proposition 13 and its progeny offer a politically acceptable cover for penalization of the 
economically vulnerable, in those articles of true conservatism which assert the inherent 
wastefulness of all government action, the superiority of private markets, the immorality and 
sloth of many or most welfare recipients, the pathetic incompetence of teachers and public 
schools, and the stifling impact of high taxes on incentives to work and invest,” he concluded.18  
More importantly, most Democrats came to the same conclusion as Friedman, 
Lekachman, and U.S. News. President Carter said that Prop 13 “sent a shock wave through the 
consciousness of every public servant.”19 His pollster, Pat Caddell, confirmed the conservative 
view for the president, telling him, “This isn’t just a tax revolt. It’s a revolution against 
government.”20 In a memo analyzing the effects of Prop 13, Carter’s advisers recommended that 
he link his economic policies “to the sentiment behind tax-cut initiatives.”21 Unlike Nixon, 
Muskie, and McGovern, who had all considered ways to use federal revenue to allow states to 
lower regressive property taxes, Carter’s advisers warned the president not to consider any 
entreaties from California or other states to devise new plans to replace lost property tax revenue 
with federal funds.22 The message of California voters was clear, they said. Giving the state – or 
any state where voters enacted a tax limitation – revenue to save it from drastic program cuts 
would be an insult to voters. “We should not willy-nilly replace state spending with federal 
spending,” OMB director James McIntyre warned Carter, “unless we are willing to ignore the 
message from the voters of California.”23 With that, the belief that the federal government could 
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aid in solving the tax revolt – an idea embraced by everyone from Nixon to McGovern just a 
handful of years earlier – was erased. Nor was Carter the only New Democrat to embrace Prop 
13.  
In California, Jerry Brown now enthusiastically embraced both Prop 13 – which he had 
opposed prior to the vote – and Howard Jarvis. Prop 13 was, as Newsweek put it, “a kind of 
Damascus West for him [Brown] – a blinding revelation that frugality is to this generation of 
voters what free-spending was to the last.” 24 The California governor called himself a “stimulus-
response politician.” He would do whatever the voters seemed to want, even if it went against 
Democratic Part traditions. What guided him, Brown said, was a sense of “planetary realism” 
that embraced the “small is beautiful” ethos of E.F. Schumacher. 25    Now, Brown 
enthusiastically spun Prop 13 as a ratification of his “small if beautiful” fiscal conservatism. 
“The concept that we’re in an era of limits has been ratified by 65 per cent of the people,” Brown 
declared.26 In a long speech delivered just two days after Prop 13’s passage, Brown expanded 
upon his interpretation of the ballot initiative. “Over four million of our fellow citizens have sent 
a message to city hall, to Sacramento, and to all of us,” Brown said. “The message is that the 
property tax must be sharply curtailed, and that government spending – wherever it is – must be 
held in check. We must look forward to lean and frugal budgets.” Brown also dismissed the idea 
that voters were angry at the property tax, specifically. Rather, he argued that Prop 13 proved the 
public’s resentment of all taxes, no matter the type or the distribution of the burden. “No new 
state taxes,” Brown declared. “Voters have told us they want a tax cut, not a shell game.” 
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Instead, he pledged, he would cut the state budget.27 So convincing was Brown’s retroactive 
endorsement of Prop 13, that within a month polls showed that half of California voters believed 
that Brown had supported the measure from the beginning.28 Brown followed the logic of Prop 
13 by declaring – against the advice of his advisers – that he now supported a federal balanced 
budget amendment. It was, Brown told the press, “the major priority of the 1980s.” “I think that 
the country cannot indulge the illusion that printing money and endlessly pouring responsibilities 
and burdens onto the next generation is a mature solution to any problem,” Brown said. Most 
observers believed that this radical proposal would be the centerpiece of a challenge to Jimmy 
Carter in the 1980 Democratic primaries or, if not, a campaign for the presidency in 1984.29 In 
Brown’s 1978 gubernatorial reelection campaign, Brown even successfully lured Jarvis into 
doing a campaign commercial for Brown.30 Reporters soon dubbed the governor “Jerry Jarvis.”31 
With the Democrats back on their heels and the media embracing a favorable 
interpretation of Prop 13, right-distributionist Republicans and activists moved quickly to 
capitalize on the moment. Thanks to the power shifts within the GOP following Watergate, they 
were well positioned to do so. Whereas distributionist tax justice groups like CAL and Fair Share 
struggled to get support from Democrats like Brown and Dukakis, the Republican Party was 
becoming increasingly amenable to the appeals of the upwardly distributionist grassroots tax 
right. The same shifting political sands that led to the rise of the conservative, fiscalist New 
Democrats in the 1970s also moved the GOP in the direction of right-distributionism. Watergate 
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created a political vacuum in the Republican Party, and few conservatives were enthused by the 
moderate, “fiscalist” Gerald Ford, even if Ford was still to Nixon’s right. Ford’s defeat in 1976 
created an opening for the right, embodied by Reagan’s surprisingly strong challenge to Ford in 
GOP primary that year.32  The group of libertarian-leaning anti-government conservatives 
surrounding Reagan rejected the fiscalist idea that Republicans should worry about worried 
about balancing the budget above all else.33 Milton Friedman, who had helped Goldwater 
formulate the sweeping across-the-board tax cut proposed in his 1964 campaign and Reagan 
draft his Prop 1 proposal, argued that Democrats were exploiting the GOP’s balanced-budget 
fiscalism. “The standard scenario has been that the Democrats – in the name of the New Deal, 
the Fair Deal, or the Great Society – push through large spending programs...and produce 
deficits," Friedman wrote in Newsweek in 1968. “The Democrats then appeal to the Republicans’ 
sense of fiscal responsibility to refrain from cutting tax rates or, as in this case [the surtax], to 
raise them. The Republicans cooperate, thereby establishing a new higher revenue base for 
further spending. The Democrats get the ‘credit’ for the spending; the Republicans, the ‘blame’ 
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for the taxes[.]”34 At the time Friedman wrote those words, his views were in the minority among 
Republicans. 
By the mid-1970s, however, the view that balanced-budget fiscalism was to blame for the 
right for the GOP’s inability to challenge Democrats’ dominance on pocketbook issues had 
become the standard explanation among conservatives. “The Democrats, the party of income 
redistribution, are best suited for the role of Spending Santa Claus,” Wall Street Journal 
columnist Jude Wanniski wrote in a 1976 article popular among conservative Republicans. “The 
Republicans, traditionally the party of income growth, should be the Santa Claus of Tax 
Reduction.” The problem, Wanniski explained, was that the GOP had been “playing into the 
hands of the Democrats [by agreeing to Democrats’ requests for tax hikes to balance the budget], 
who know the first rule of successful politics is Never Shoot Santa Claus.” Only two choices 
existed for the GOP. “The political tension in the marketplace of ideas must be between tax 
reduction and spending increases,” Wanniski explained, “and as long as Republicans have 
insisted on balanced budgets, their influence as a party has shriveled, and budgets have been 
imbalanced.” The conclusion was inescapable. “[T]he Two-Santa Claus Theory holds that the 
Republicans should concentrate on tax-rate reduction,” Wanniski declared.35  Wanniski had been 
at least partly inspired by Arthur Laffer, who explained to Wanniski and Ford advisers Dick 
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Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld over dinner in 1974 that tax cuts could actually raise revenue.36 In 
an era of rising inflation, this proposition also dovetailed, indirectly, with the monetarism of 
libertarian economist Milton Friedman, which argued that the Fed’s control of the money supply, 
not Congress’s control of fiscal policy, primarily determined the inflation rate.37 If, under the 
twin auspices of the so-called “Laffer Curve” and monetarism, taxes were no longer necessary 
for fiscalist inflation fighting, what was to stop enterprising members of the GOP from focusing 
almost solely on an upwardly disributionist view of taxation? 
While Eisenhower Republicans had never embraced a tax-cuts-at-all-costs mentality, and 
Ford had only reluctantly agreed to propose a small tax cut during the 1976 campaign, anti-
government conservatives like Goldwater and Reagan had no qualms about putting the GOP’s 
traditional concern about deficits aside in the name of slashing taxes – particularly progressive 
taxes on the rich and business, which these conservatives argued were both immoral and 
restrained growth. It also helped, of course, that these groups were the most loyal members of the 
GOP base. With Ford’s near-loss to Reagan in the 1976 Republican primaries and Jimmy 
Carter’s defeat of Ford in the general election, the last vestiges of Eisenhower-era balanced-
budget Republicanism seemed to be extinguished. By the time Reagan announced his candidacy 
presidency in 1979, the classic conservative fiscalist notion of raising taxes – particularly on 
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business or the rich – in order to balance the budget and fight inflation was treated as absurd. 
Upwardly-distributive tax cuts took its place.  “[T]he federal government has cynically told us 
that high taxes on business will in some way ‘solve’ the problem [of inflation] and allow the 
average taxpayer to pay less,” Reagan said. “Well, business is not a taxpayer it is a tax 
collector.  Business has to pass its tax burden on to the customer as part of the cost of doing 
business.  You and I pay the taxes imposed on business every time we go to the 
store.  Only people pay taxes and it is political demagoguery or economic illiteracy to try and tell 
us otherwise. The key to restoring the health of the economy lies in cutting taxes [emphasis in 
original].”38  
This was a vision that Reagan and likeminded conservative grassroots activists had 
embraced since at least Prop 1, and it was one they continued to nurture throughout the 1970s, 
even in the face of defeat after defeat. Rather than view the defeat of their initiative as a rejection 
of their upwardly-redistributive small-government anti-tax vision, the leaders of the Prop 1 
campaign, including Milton Friedman and Lewis Uhler, founded the influential National Tax 
Limitation Committee in 1975, an organization that joined other existing conservative anti-tax 
groups, like the National Taxpayers Union. The NTLC supported conservative tax-and-
expenditure referenda across the country in the years that followed, usually with little success. In 
1976, Reagan and Friedman rallied behind Michigan’s NTLC-backed Proposal C, which was 
placed on the ballot by Michigan’s Taxpayers United for Tax Limitation. By design, Prop C 
strongly resembled Prop 1. It froze state taxes at current levels and prevented the state from 
shifting services to localities by requiring any local tax increases to be approved by voters. 
Friedman was campaigning in Michigan for the measure when it was announced that he had won 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







the Nobel Prize in Economics. When reporters inquired whether Friedman would return 
immediately to the University of Chicago to conduct the customary post-award press conference, 
Friedman demurred, arguing that staying in Michigan to campaign for Prop C was more 
important than the Nobel Prize. Unfortunately for Friedman, Reagan, and the NTLC, however, 
Prop C shared more in common with Prop 1 than its structure. Voters rejected Prop C, 57-to-43 
percent.39 That same year, however, Michigan voters did pass a measure backed by labor unions 
and the left-leaning Michigan Citizens Lobby exempting food and drugs from the sales tax.40 In 
fact, the few successes that NTLC and other conservative groups could count in the mid-1970s 
came in the form of blocking – usually with the help of generous business backing – 
constitutional amendments allowing the graduated income tax in states like Michigan and 
Massachusetts. But in terms of passing their own measures, they had little to show for their 
efforts besides defeats.  
 The grassroots tax right and its GOP allies like Reagan were undeterred, though. Reagan 
devoted numerous episodes of his syndicated radio commentaries to tax limitation, including two 
analyzing the defeat of Prop C and one touting the vision of the NTLC, whose pamphlets Reagan 
encouraged listeners to purchase.41 “In the State of Michigan, as in California three years ago, 
government employees and other special-interest groups have succeeded in bamboozling the 
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naive taxpayer…,” Friedman despaired in his Newsweek column. In opposing Prop C, Friedman 
argued, these groups were issuing “a call for an authoritarian government, an explicit rejection of 
democratic self-government.” The public had not really rejected conservatives’ tax vision, he 
argued. They could not, because it was synonymous with democracy itself. “This second defeat 
is no reason for giving up…,” Friedman concluded. “We must redouble our efforts.”42 And they 
did. When Prop 13 landed on the ballot, the tax right rallied behind it. Friedman touted it in 
Newsweek, Reagan promoted it on his radio broadcasts, and both taped endorsements for Prop 
13.43 Though Reagan and Friedman had played minor roles in boosting Prop 13 – given that their 
much stronger endorsement of Prop 1 had little effect – they saw it as their victory as much as 
Jarvis’s. 
 In late-1978, Reagan and other likeminded conservatives were eager to consolidate their 
newfound influence over Democrats’ understanding of tax politics. In September, thirty 
prominent Republicans – including Reagan, Jack Kemp, William Steiger, Bob Dole, David 
Stockman, and Alan Greenspan, among others – staged what they called the “Tax Cut Blitz.” 
They grabbed national headlines by flying around the country in a jet dubbed the “Tax 
Clipper.”44 At stops in seven states, the GOP tax-cut team held rallies and gave speeches to drum 
up support for both the Kemp-Roth across-the-board income tax cut plan and a capital gains cut 
proposal authored by Steiger, a Wisconsin Republican.45 The Kemp-Roth bill was a long-term 
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goal. It seemed unlikely even to the GOP that Democrats could be convinced to support such a 
costly income tax-slashing measure. The Steiger bill’s two billion price tag was still steep, but it 
was more budgetarily achievable in the short term. Just as Russell Long had advised Ford that 
pro-capital tax cuts were politically untenable unless tucked into larger tax packages, Steiger’s 
capital gains cut had languished in Congress with seemingly little support among either the 
public or most Democrats.   
  Few Americans had capital income – seventy percent of Americans told pollsters that 
they had never paid capital gains taxes – and a capital gains cut was one of the most regressive 
tax cuts possible. It was, without question, hard to spin the Steiger bill as something that would 
benefit low- or middle-income Americans. Ninety-eight percent of Steiger’s proposed cut was 
earmarked for the top 10 percent of taxpayers. Sixty-six percent would go to the top 1/10th 
percent of taxpayers.46 The average benefit for a median-income taxpayer was 25 cents. The 
average benefit for a millionaire was $145,302.47 Carter had campaigned vowing to close the 
capital gains “loophole” and tax investment income the same as ordinary income – a change that 
both left-leaning tax activists and liberal tax experts had encouraged for years.  
But the right-distributionist supporters of the Steiger and Kemp-Roth bills were 
unapologetic about their distributive impacts. The regressive effects of the tax cuts were part 
their virtue. The idea of big tax breaks for the rich “won strong Republican support,” as 
Congressional Quarterly noted. Representative Barber Conable called the GOP’s tax proposals 
“revolutionary” because they were not the typical “redistributional” Democratic plans that “take 
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from one group of people through higher to give to other people in lower taxes.”48 Senator Orrin 
Hatch approvingly cited a William Simon speech, in which Simon blamed liberalism for its 
“coercive egalitarianism,” which “punishes the hard working and ambitious and rewards those 
who are not” through “redistribution.”49 Republicans argued that progressive “redistribution” 
was immoral, and that the real moral purpose of taxation was to reward the investor class. They 
combined this distributionist justification with growth-oriented fiscalist rhetoric that suggested 
that other Americans would be better off, too, because of “capital formation.” “Who will benefit 
from my amendment? Taxpayers in the upper bracket would benefit…,” Steiger argued. 
“But…the high tax on capital gains has discouraged productive investment.” To argue that 
capital income should be taxes the same as ordinary income was to deny the unique moral 
importance of investment and “capital formation” for the good of everyone. Moreover, Steiger 
suggested, “it begins from the premise that the government has a right to all income and capital” 
and “display[s] and irrational fear that someone, somewhere, somehow may be making 
money.”50  
Continuing the push for “capital formation” that the business lobby had begun years 
earlier, the Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, and American 
Council for Capital Formation all lobbied for Steiger’s bill. Additionally, individual Wall Street 
firms like Merrill Lynch wrote to their customers to tout the benefits of the Steiger plan and 
encouraged customers to contact their representatives to voice their support for it.51  The 
business-organized campaign flooded the Carter White House with letters supporting the Steiger 
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amendment.52 In many ways, however, the typical business-led push for pro-capital tax cuts was 
out of step with the Prop 13 mood. A technical fiscalist argument delivered by big business 
groups was not the image Steiger and the riders of the “tax clipper” wanted to present to the 
public.  Privately, Steiger worried that business support for his measure would stoke public 
opposition.53 “One could argue, as I suggested to [the National Association of Manufacturers’ 
Tax Policy Group] that the best thing we could do would be to get NAM to oppose this!” Steiger 
joked to the chairman of Kohler Company.54  
After Prop 13, even a highly regressive tax cut aimed at Wall Street could be given a 
populist veneer. Republicans linked the Steiger capital gains proposal and the Kemp-Roth plan to 
Prop 13. Calling the GOP’s tax proposals an extension of Prop 13, Reagan justified the 
upwardly-skewed cuts in both fiscalist and moral, distributionst terms. “What these Republican 
proposals in Washington have in common with Proposition 13 here in California is that they are 
aimed at economic growth,” Reagan said. “They show our party’s faith in the good sense of the 
American taxpayer. They know that when his taxes are cut…he’ll invest it…. And the economy 
will grow and jobs will be created.” Finishing with a supply-side flourish, Reagan claimed, 
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“And, not to incidentally, it results in new sources of revenue for public services, too.”55 
Republicans’ goal was to make upwardly-distributive tax cuts seem like they offered substantial 
benefits for the public. They argued that, besides spurring growth, the Steiger and Kemp-Roth 
cuts would actually have pocketbook benefits for middle-income taxpayers. For example, the 
GOP claimed that the Steiger bill would help the middle-class because selling a home constituted 
a capital gain. Of course, as many articles on the tax debate noted, the law already allowed 
homeowners “roll over” the gain from the sale of a home every 18 months, rendering that 
consideration moot for most taxpayers.56 But Republican pressed forward. “Give us more 
Republicans in Congress and we’ll see that every family in the nation gets a tax cut of major 
significance,” GOP chair Bill Brock said on the “Tax Blitz” tour.57  
The GOP’s attempt to link the Steiger and Kemp-Roth bills with Prop 13 did not seem to 
be working as well as the party had hoped, though. Steiger’s Wisconsin constituents sent him a 
stream of angry letters, decrying his bill as a giveaway to the rich.58 UPI reported that the 
“Blitz”-ers were “met with skepticism” in Chicago.59 “Everyone wants lower taxes,” a Detroit 
woman asked Brock skeptically. “But how can you cut them 33 percent without creating huge 
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budget deficits and cutting vital programs?”60 She was not alone. “It’s the same old stuff,” a 
telephone repairman said dismissively after hearing the GOP’s pitch at a Minneapolis rally. “All 
they tell you is that they want to cut taxes,” another man complained. “It’s frustrating that they 
don’t tell you what they want to cut spending on. Is it national parks, cancer research, or what? It 
sounds like a meat-ax approach to me, a cheap shot.” The Washington Post reported that the 
passengers of the “Tax Clipper” “found as much skepticism as excitement in the three-day 
trip.”61 At one Minneapolis rally, the “Tax Blitz” group attracted only 250 people, even though it 
had been advertised on the radio and in newspapers for two days – and that was the largest crowd 
at any of the more than a dozen “Tax Blitz” events in the city that day.62 Brock dismissed the 
small crowds. “I haven’t seen a good crows in politics for six years,” he said. “I really don’t 
think the crowd is an indication of interest. I think the interest level is high.”63 Moreover, the 
polls were showing that the public trusted Democrats more than the GOP on taxes.64 When 
Reagan was told of a Harris/ABC poll showing Democrats ahead of Republicans on taxes by a 
42-to-26 margin, he claimed that the public believed a “fairy tale.”65 
Luckily for Steiger, with the GOP soaring across the country in the “Tax Clipper” and 
framing the Steiger cut as the indistinguishable from Prop 13, most Democrats did not want to 
put up a fight, even against an upwardly redistributive, big business tax bill. The post-Prop 13 
rhetoric worked. Democrats were too afraid of being on the wrong side of the “tax revolt.” The 
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GOP was almost unanimously behind the Steiger cut, but the same could not be said for the other 
side. Almost immediately, influential Democrats in Congress clamored to join the capital gains 
cut chorus. In the key House Ways and Means Committee, Democrats Jim Jones of Oklahoma 
and Al Ullman of Oregon, the committee chair, teamed up to craft a “compromise” capital gains 
cut. Instead of lowering the maximum rate on long-term capital gains from 49 to 25 percent, as 
Steiger proposed, the Jones-Ullman proposal lowered it to 35 and included a minimum tax 
provision to help assuage the left that millionaires could not escape taxes completely due to the 
new lower capital gains rates. “The Democratic members are divided…,” Carter’s cabinet noted 
in a meeting. “The Republican members of the [Ways and Means] Committee are solidly 
supporting a significant reduction in capital gains taxes and are opposing the Administration’s 
proposal.” The White House’s reform recommendations to Congress were already weaker than 
what the president had promised on the campaign trail. Instead of eliminating the preferential 
rate for capital gains, for example, Carter had only proposed curbing its benefits for upper-
income taxpayers. Now, it seemed almost certain that Congress would present him with a bill 
slashing capital gains, handing a windfall to the rich and doing nothing for lower- and middle-
income taxpayers. “Neither the Jones nor Steiger proposal would help the average taxpayer at 
all,” the Carter cabinet concluded.66 
The tax justice left and the populist Democrats who had been pushing for distributionist 
reforms since the 1960s both lobbied against any capital gains tax cut. “This massive 
redistribution of the tax burden away from the most well off would do serious damage to the 
progressivity and fairness of the tax system and is completely unjustified by any economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






rationale,” Nader’s Public Citizen wrote to representatives. 67  Twelve Democratic House 
members, including longtime reform advocate Henry Reuss, drafted a sharp denunciation of the 
Steiger proposal. “[W]e are so concerned about the impact of the Steiger amendment – both real 
and symbolic – that we want to point out how deeply the Steiger amendment threatens the 
concept of a fair tax system, and jeopardizes a fair distribution of tax relief this year.” Likewise, 
the letter writers urged their fellow Democrats to reject the Jones-Ullman compromise. Instead of 
using the money to cut capital gains, the letter writers argued that rates should be reduced for the 
low- and middle-income taxpayers suffering from the squeeze of rising taxes and soaring 
inflation.68 Carter agreed. He threatened to veto any bill that included a cut in capital gains, 
saying it would create “huge windfalls for millionaires and two bits for the average American.”69 
One Carter aide put it more bluntly, calling the Steiger proposal “the greatest hoax ever 
perpetrated on the American people.”70  
But congressional Democrats were undeterred. The GOP’s linking of Prop 13 and the 
capital gains cut worked, at least inside the Beltway. “To dozens of congressmen, slashing 
capital-gains taxes sounds like both good politics and good economics,” Newsweek reported, 
“and the Steiger amendment, like Proposition 13 in California, has become a popular cause in the 
Tax Revolt of 1978.” It was, the magazine put it, “Congress’s own tax revolt.”71 Jones and 
Ullman pushed ahead with their proposal. “I think capital formation’s one of the critical items in 
the country today and we have to have some capital gains relief,” Jones explained. One-by-one, 
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all but the most left-leaning “distributionist”-oriented Democrats turned towards the capital gains 
cut. Dick Gephart, who had cosigned the Reuss letter objecting to a capital gains cut, now told 
his fellow Ways and Means Committee members, “I think there is pretty broad agreement among 
a lot of people that it is a good time to be addressing the issue of reducing the capital gains tax.” 
By a 25-to-12 vote, thirteen Democrats joined twelve Republicans to send a tax bill out of the 
Ways and Means Committee. The bill included the Jones-Ullman capital gains compromise and 
a variety of other measures, but almost none of the reforms Carter had proposed in January.72 
“This obviously is not a tax reform bill,” Ullman explained in “fiscalist” terms. “It is an 
economic tax package. We have voted here a substantial reduction in the deficit. It is very 
counter-inflationary.”73 Privately, Ullman tried to defend the bill to Reuss, who voted against it 
in Ways and Means. Ullman suggested that Prop 13 was driving “tax cut rhetoric” and making 
“taxation…one of the toughest political issues of the year.” Ultimately, though, Ullman echoed 
the GOP’s talking points from the “Tax Blitz” in asking Reuss to vote for the bill on the floor. 
“Capital gains taxes are reduced, but not irresponsibly…,” Al Ulman. “Homeowners, who watch 
inflation drive up the cost of housing, benefit most of all from the capital gains proposals.”74  
The House passed the bill 362-49, with only 47 Democrats – mostly left-liberal stalwarts 
like Reuss, Shirley Chisholm, Pete Stark, and Louis Stokes – and two Republican voting against 
it.75 In the Senate, Ted Kennedy attempted to strip the bill of any capital gains cut. But only ten 
Democrats joined his effort – including, most notably, both Muskie and McGovern – and it 
failed 10-82. Unable to reduce the tax cuts for the rich, Kennedy and Dale Bumpers turned to 
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adding more tax cuts for working- and middle-class taxpayers in the bill to reduce its 
regressivity. The amendment narrowly passed. Conservative Republican, like Goldwater, and 
moderate Democrats, like Daniel Patrick Moynihan, voted against the Kennedy-Bumpers 
amendment, proving that all tax cuts were not equally popular in the post-Prop 13 tax cut fever.76 
The final bill passed the Senate 86-4.77 The conference committee quickly hammered out a deal, 
and it was all over.  
The idea of progressive reform that had taken hold in the late-1960s was dead, even 
though little reform had actually been accomplished in the intervening decade. “Congress 
scrapped almost all of Carter's proposed ‘reforms,’ including his celebrated 1976 campaign 
pledge to crack down on businessmen's tax breaks for ‘three-martini lunches,’” Congressional 
Quarterly reported. “Indeed, lawmakers riding the crest of a middle-class ‘taxpayers' revolt,’ 
wound up reversing some 1976 tax ‘reforms’ that congressional liberals prized highly.” 
Conservatives gloated. “We’ve turned around the whole thrust of what tax reform was two years 
ago,” Republican Senator Clifford Hansen said. 78 The inclusion of the capital gains cut, in 
particular, was, as Newsweek put it, “a defeat for the populist reforms of Jimmy Carter.”79 
Distributionally, the “compromise” on capital gains still gave the top 10 percent of taxpayers 90 
percent of the cut. All told a, four-person family making $20,000 – just above median income – 
received less than $100 from the tax bill. The average reduction for a taxpayer making over 
$200,000 was more than $25,000.80 “This reflects the American people’s view of tax reform 
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because it is a tax reduction,” Conable argued.81 Unable to beat the “Tax Blitz”-ers, Carter joined 
them. After having initially threatened to veto the bill, Carter tried to claim the mantle of tax 
cutter. “Do you want a government that cuts your income taxes?” Carter asked a Florida 
audience, who cheered loudly at his question. “Okay. Okay…. When I get back to Washington 
and get that bill, do you think I ought to sign it?” More cheering. “I'll take your advice, Carter 
said. “I’ve decided to sign the bill.”82 The Republican rebranding of the “tax revolt,” it seemed, 
was complete 
 After their capital gains success in 1978, Republicans moved steadily towards a total 
embrace of an upwardly-distributionist tax philosophy. Reagan ran in 1980 touting the sweeping 
Kemp-Roth income tax cut. At the state level, the years after Prop 13 saw a flowering of 
conservative tax-limitation measures. Conservatives’ on both levels had powerful allies. Nearly 
every measure – national, state, or local – pushed by left tax justice groups in the 1970s had been 
met with fierce resistance from business groups. But business only occasionally went on the 
offensive. In the late-1970s, however, a network of right-leaning business-backed groups turned 
to tax limitation. Most reflected the era of rising business activism following the “Powell Memo” 
– which was itself partly inspired by the type of left-distributionist activism practiced by Nader 
and Alinsky – and some were formed in response to Prop 13 itself.83 Now, groups like the 
aforementioned National Tax Limitation Committee and American Council for Capital 
Formation were joined by the American Tax Reduction Movement, the National Taxpayers 
Union, the American Conservative Union’s ACT Now, and the American Legislative Exchange 
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Council, among others. By the late-1970s, all of these groups were united in pressing for 
regressive tax policies at the state level, the federal level, or both.84 
While groups like Nader’s Tax Reform Research Group continued to fight against the 
rightward drift in taxation, more and more Democrats cleared the way for conservatives. By 
1979, left tax reformers were calling Carter administration a “debacle.” Nader’s Tax Reform 
Research Group cited several reasons for Carter’s move to the right, including structural ones 
like the sluggish state of the economy. But they also blamed Carter for proposing half-measure 
reforms at the beginning of his administration. Given the tone of Carter’s 1976 campaign, 
lobbyists for big business and the wealthy were gearing up for battle, the TRRG argued. So when 
Carter delivered only timid reforms and they realized they had little to defend against, the 
lobbyists decided to go on the offensive and push for even greater loopholes, setting the stage for 
the Revenue Act of 1978, which – along with including the Steiger tax cut – weakened many 
previous reforms and included the Steiger capital gains cut.85 By the 1980 presidential campaign, 
Carter had tilted so far towards business in his 1980 campaign platform that one Carter adviser 
noted in a memo that Reagan was actually running to the left of Carter on taxes. Carter slammed 
Reagan for proposing a tax cut for individuals. Instead, Carter cast taxes in fiscalist terms as a 
tool to fight inflation. Carter strenuously opposed indexing individual income taxes for inflation, 
which would have helped alleviate the pocketbook squeeze on low- and middle-income 
taxpayers, since brackets were closer together at lower levels of income. 86 Instead, in an echo of 
the “capital formation” diagnosis of stagflation, Carter took to the television airwaves in order to 
criticize his opponent’s tax platform for being insufficiently generous to business and too 
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generous to individuals, which the Democrat argued would stoke inflation.87 Instead, Carter 
proposed a large tax cut for business, which Carter said would “encourage industry to build new 
plants and to remodel existing plants” and “increase jobs.”88 When Reagan campaigned on both 
slashing taxes and combating inflation, many Americans were skeptical. Yet most reasoned that 
he was at least trying to do something about the pocketbook squeeze.89 Just as Jarvis had flipped 
the script on opponents of Prop 13 by claiming the mantle of the populist reformer more 
concerned with individuals’ pocketbooks than businesses’ profits, Carter allowed Reagan to 
become the candidate concerned with average Americans’ finances, not business. Weighed down 
by stagflation and an uninspiring platform, Carter lost to Reagan – though, like McGovern’s loss, 
it was an outcome predicted by political scientists based on the poor state of the economy.90 
Despite the favorable conditions for conservatives, their tax efforts in the late-1970s and 
early-1980s yielded mixed results. Even with the post-Prop 13 tax revolt fervor, voting on 
similar measures in other states was mixed. While numerous states passed some form of tax 
limitation in the late-1970s and early-1980s, they varied considerably in their content, 
comprehensiveness, and stringency.91 Voters in some state, like Idaho, approved imitations of 
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Prop 13. Others rejected them. Oregon voters, in fact, rejected Prop 13-type measures four times 
between 1978 and 1984. Some states fell in between. Michigan, for example, defeated their 
state’s Prop 13 lookalike and instead passed a more moderate measure. Modest initiatives in a 
variety of other states passed. But extreme measures like Prop 13 often struggled to win 
approval. Out of the more than five-dozen tax-limitation initiatives of various types placed on 
state ballots between 1978 and 1983, only slightly more than half were approved.92 In general, 
bills that could be portrayed as boons to homeowners and middle-income taxpayers in states with 
rising regressive taxes and little previous meaningful tax relief were more likely to pass.93 In 
contrast, many initiatives explicitly aimed at businesses – like a measure in Florida designed to 
increase property tax incentives for corporations – lost. Likewise, measures designed to cut 
progressive taxes, like income taxes, struggled. In 1980, Howard Jarvis sponsored “Jarvis II,” 
which proposed a 50 percent across-the-board cut in state income taxes, and it lost by a three-to-
one margin.94 In November 1984, Michigan voters were offered an American Tax Reduction 
Movement-backed initiative that would have rolled back all state and local taxes to 1981 levels 
and required all future tax increases to be approved by voters. They defeated it 60-to-40 percent 
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in the same election that they voted for Reagan for president by the same margin, once again 
demonstrating the limitations of reading tax preferences into electoral decisions.95 Despite the 
supposed public support for conservative tax measures, low turnout was the biggest help to most 
successful tax limitation. When few voters went to the polls, conservative activists were able to 
make a bigger impact with their own votes. However, when too much public attention turned to a 
tax limitation initiative, it mobilized voters worried about the potential distributional effects of 
the tax and budget cuts.96 
Besides Prop 13, the tax right’s greatest success at the state level came in the other state 
where a New Democrat governor had rebuked the entreaties of the grassroots left to enact 
progressive property tax relief. Following the defeat of the graduated income tax and flat-rate 
electricity ballot initiatives in 1976, Fair Share and other left-distributionist grassroots groups 
turned to a state-level solution Bay State’s soaring property taxes. Like California under Brown, 
Massachusetts under Dukakis enjoyed a budget surplus, thanks to inflation-swollen tax receipts. 
Fair Share proposed using a portion of the $200 million surplus for property tax relief. So they 
drafted a “circuit breaker” plan similar to the one proposed by CAL in California, though less 
generous. Under Fair Share’s plan, for residents making less than $30,000, the state would 
refund 80 percent of any homeowner or renter’s property taxes that exceeded eight percent of 
income, up to a maximum of $500. A median-income family with a $1,200 property tax bill 
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would have received a $243 rebate. Democrats Vincent Piro, the House Taxation Committee 
chair, and William Bulger, the Senate majority leader, agreed to sponsor the Fair Share bill, and 
it quickly gained strong support among Democrats in the legislature. But Governor Michael 
Dukakis was cool to the bill, preferring to save the surplus for future spending. Hoping to 
pressure the governor, Fair Share rallied in support of their “circuit breaker” on April Fools Day 
to send a message. “This [rally] will say to the governor, and to others who would like to 
sidetrack real tax relief – you can’t fool us anymore,” Kathy Gorman, Fair Share’s president told 
the Boston Globe. “We don’t want another ‘lead pipe guarantee’ from the governor. We want 
real tax relief.”97  
As the bill wound its way through the Massachusetts legislature, it kept pressure on the 
Democrats. During Ways and Means Committee hearings, a Fair Share spokesperson dramatized 
the pocketbook pressures facing average Bay State residents and predicted dire consequences if 
the legislature failed to act. “If you’re talking tax relief,” Chelsea’s Mike Regan said. “People 
want something they can feel. They want something they can tough. They want something they 
can spend. They want money in their pockets, because they’re blowing a fuse over property 
taxes.” Regan then removed two fuses from his pocket and placed them in front of the 
committee’s chairperson. Then 150 Fair Share members walked up and did the same.98 
Throughout the spring and summer, Fair Share members arrived at the capital in buses. They 
worked in shifts, staying overnight, to ensure that Fair Share members were always there, calling 
lesislators or confronting them in the hallways to ask whether they were going to vote for the 
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“circuit breaker.” Finally, the bill passed both the House and the Senate, though the latter 
trimmed the “circuit breaker,” and was sent to Dukakis.99  
The governor had ten days to sign the bill. Dukakis had consistently argued that the 
“circuit breaker” was inequitable. Rather, Dukakis disingenuously argued that it would allow a 
“swinging bachelor” to receive property tax relief. Instead, he proposed sending money to 
localities to cut property taxes across-the-board, a plan Fair Share pointed out would create a 
windfall for of relief for corporations, given none to renters, and little to both poor and rich 
homeowners, alike. Fair Share’s plan, in contrast, helped renters and homeowners, but only if 
they made less than $30,000 per year, and did nothing for business.100 On the ninth day, Fair 
Share bused more than 500 protestors to a Dukakis “town meeting” in Revere. Only about 100 
people had showed up to the meeting, but Fair Share packed the other 300 seats in the 400-seat 
hall with their members while the remaining 200-some Fair Share activists waited outside. Faced 
with questions from Fair Share members, Dukakis reiterated his opposition to the plan. “Okay,” 
Carolyn Lucas of Fair Share said. “All those who want direct property tax relief may leave.” 
Then 300 people walked out of the hall chanting, “We put you in. We’ll pull you out.” The 
governor left through a back door to avoid confronting Fair Share protestors outside. Rather than 
formally vetoing the bill and sending it back to the legislature, Dukakis announced he was 
“holding” the bill until after the legislature ended its session to ensure that they would not have 
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the opportunity to override his veto – a maneuver Fair Share claimed was likely illegal and 
certain against Dukakis’s self-proclaimed “good government” ideals.101  
With the support of Boston Mayor Kevin White, Fair Share tried another approach. They 
placed Issue 2 on the November 1978 ballot. The “classification” measure changed the state 
constitution to allow the legislature to tax homes and businesses at different rates. It had strong 
support on the left, but was opposed by a business group called the Committee Against Property 
Tax Discrimination. Nonetheless, the Fair Share plan passed by a by a two-to-one margin, 
supported by homeowners who thought the measure would cut their property taxes and shift the 
burden to business and commercial property.102 However, as Fair Share knew, classification by 
itself did little to prevent property taxes on homeowners from skyrocketing and experts predicted 
that – if the legislature did nothing else to taxes for low- and middle-income homeowners – 
further tax limitation were in the offing for the Bay State.103 When the legislature gave little 
indication that it would move to make use of classification, the group pushed for a “taxbreaker” 
plan to cut property taxes on residential property by 10 to 20 percent. Given the state’s 
longstanding resistance to attempts to institute a progressive income tax, Fair Share settled on a 
plan to fund the “taxbreaker” by taxing banks and professional services, such as legal fees, real 
estate transactions, and stock transfers. The plan had the support of the state AFL-CIO, along 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Nick King, “300 Tax Demonstrators Walk Out on Dukakis Meeting in Revere,” Boston Globe, June 27, 1978; 
Laurence Collins, “Dukakis Signs Budget; Vetoes Circuit Breaker,” Boston Globe, July 11, 1978; Laurence Collins, 
“Budget Passed; 4 Items Vetoed,” Boston Globe, July 8, 1978; Elizabeth Bass, “Reassessing the Circuit Breaker” in 
State and Local tax Revolt: New Directions for the 80s, Dean C. Tipps and Lee Webb, eds. (Transaction, 1980), 
130-132; Clarence Y. H. Lo, Small Property Versus Big Government: Social Origins of the Property Tax Revolt 
(University of California Press, 1990), 181-182. 
102 Howard S. Bloom, “Public Choice and Private Interest: Explaining the Vote for Property Tax Classification in 
Massachusetts,” National Tax Journal (December 1979); David Rogers, “Question 1 Funding OK’d,” Boston Globe, 
November 7, 1978; David Rogers, “Question No. 1 – The Issue Is Property Tax,” Boston Globe, October 9, 1978; 
David Rogers, “The Question 1 Legacy,” Boston Globe, November 9, 1978; Ray Richard, “Chance to Sound off on 
Taxes,” Boston Globe, October 29, 1978;  







with dozens of other private and public employee unions, the state Public Interest Research 
Group, and other left-leaning organization. But the potentially-affected businesses instantly 
rallied to oppose it. The new governor, Edward J. King – a conservative Democrat – opposed it, 
and the Democratic legislators and liberal professionals who had previously supported Fair Share 
turned against the group. With no opportunity in the legislature, Fair Share scrambled to gather 
enough signatures in two months to put it on the 1980 ballot, but when a public employee union 
failed to deliver their promised share of the signatures, the initiative died.104 
This gave right-distributionist conservatives an opening. Edward F. King was the Bay 
State’s answer to Howard Jarvis. King was a business lobbyist with a long history in 
conservative politics in Massachusetts, including a previous failed attempt to qualify a tax-
limitation initiative for the ballot. But in December 1979, King’s Citizens for Limited Taxation 
barely submitted enough petitions to get a new tax-limitation measure on the 1980 ballot. Prop 2 
½ was so-called because it reduced property taxes to 2 ½ of values and limited the growth of 
property taxes to 2 ½ percent per year. It was a worthy heir to Prop 13. Jarvis even went to 
Massachusetts to stump for 2 ½.105 As in California, the opposition to 2 ½ was divided. The 
business-backed Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation also opposed Prop 2 ½, which limited the 
opposition’s populist credibility. Likewise, Democrats provided an unconvincing opposition, 
given that the state’s conservative Democratic governor had backed his own tax limitation law 
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just a year earlier. Like the failed “No on 13” campaign, anti-2 ½ ads focused on the revenue loss 
to states and localities, rather than on alternative solution to rising taxes.106 
King’s CLT also had a powerful – and politically savvy – business ally in support of Prop 
2 ½. The Massachusetts High Tech Council bankrolled much of the pro-2 ½ campaign. It 
established the Concerned Citizens for Lower Taxes front group, and hired a political consulting 
form led by Dick Morris, who would later go on to formulate President Clinton’s centrist 
“triangulation” strategy. Morris’s firm recommended that the pro-2 ½ side downplay the 
MHTC’s backing and instead sell it as a “liberal compassionate measure” that would help 
struggling homeowners. “The voters are not particularly impressed by the fact that 2 1/2 is 
supported by CLT, High Tech, or the auto dealers…,” the firm warned. “Therefore, it is 
advisable to begin your presentations by pointing out that Prop 2 1/2 is on the Nov. 4 ballot 
because ‘100,000 of your friends and neighbors wanted it there’…. Don’t sell 2 ½ as a 
conservative, limited government concept [italics in original].”107 
The CCLT’s pro-2 ½ ads were positive and upbeat and portrayed the measure as voters’ 
only chance go curb out-of-control property taxes. “In Massachusetts we’ve been fighting unjust 
taxes for a long time,” one commercial showing men on a boat in revolutionary-era outfits 
began. “It started with the Boston Tea Party and it’s still going on.  Since 1932 there have been 
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125 proposals to limit taxes, and how many have passed the legislature? None. Absolutely none. 
Now we have a way to make the legislature get the message.” Another CCLT ad aimed at 
convincing Massachusetts voters that 2 ½ was not partisan. “Do you think your taxes will be 
lower if you vote for this man [Carter photo on screem] or this man [Reagan photo on screen] or 
this man [John Anderson photo on screen]?” it began. “Maybe you’re not sure, but the most 
effective vote you can cast if you want to bring taxes down is a vote for this [a big, yellow ‘2 ½’ 
comes up on screen].”108 
Besides populist campaigns that downplayed their upward redistributionism, the anti-tax 
right’s two biggest successes – Prop 13 and Prop 2 ½ - shared another key similarity. In both 
California and Massachusetts, the higher one’s income, the more likely he or she was to vote for 
Prop 13 or Prop 2 ½.109 This was the polar opposite of the low- and middle-income coalitions 
that voted down local school levies during the unorganized late-1960s “tax revolt,” supported 
progressive tax measures like “circuit breakers,” and defeated past conservative initiatives like 
Reagan’s Prop 1. And when it came to defeating Jarvis’s regressive income tax cut proposal in 
1980, the low- and middle-income coalition once again united to defeat it, while upper-income 
Californians voted for it.110 The well-off had always been much more supportive of conservative 
tax-limitation measures than lower- and middle-income voters. Crucially, though, Prop 13 and 
Prop 2 ½ – unlike Prop 1 – attracted enough “yes” votes from previously skeptical groups to win. 
Both Prop 13 and Prop 2 ½ attracted large pluralities or slight majorities of poor and working-
class voters, as well as at least 40 percent support among “non-white” voters. In both states, 
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between one-third and one-half of public employees – the voters who seemingly had the most to 
lose from the passage of Prop 13 and Prop 2 ½ – voted for the measures, anyhow. 111   
For low- and middle-income voters, a vote for measures like Prop 13 and Prop 2 ½ was 
not an indication of rising conservatism. While upper-income voters and conservative activists 
may have supported these measures for ideological reasons, polls showed that others did not. In 
fact, voters’ views on taxes and spending had changed little in the five years between the defeat 
of Prop 1 and the passage of Prop 13.112 In California, even those who supported Prop 13 
opposed cuts in all but a few services. Just as often, they wanted substantial increases in state 
spending on schools, mental health, and police and fire.113 Likewise, one Massachusetts study 
found that the “squeezed” residents in high-tax areas voted for Prop 2 ½ because they thought it 
would cut their property taxes. Those voters were also the most likely to support generous public 
services and progressive reforms that would use state taxes, rather than property taxes, to fund 
local services.114 Even when it came to relatively unpopular services, like welfare, voters 
expressed ambivalence. While they were willing to see it cut somewhat, two-thirds of 
Californians still opposed eliminating “almost all welfare” because they believed “people really 
need” it. Because of the strong support for services among Prop 13 voters, early studies surmised 
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that Californians wanted “something for nothing.”115 But that was not the case. The “pocketbook 
squeeze” explained many low- and middle-income voters simultaneous support for cutting 
regressive taxes and expanding social services. That Prop 13 and similar measures finally gained 
public traction during a period of intense inflation – especially in property values – should come 
as no surprise. In fact, during the same period in which California voters were supposedly 
turning to the right by passing Prop 13, they were also enacting a raft of progressive rent control 
measures opposed strenuously by businesses and conservatives.116 What Prop 13 and rent control 
had in common was the creation of pocketbook relief and stability at a time of rising prices and 
rising taxes.   
Conservatism did not create “yes” voters, the arithmetic of the household budget did. 
This financial distress did not turn voters to the right, but it did make them more willing to 
overlook their objections to the distribution of the cuts contained in measures like Prop 13. 
Throughout the 1970s, taxes continued to rise faster than paychecks. Year after year, the 
“squeeze” intensified until finally enough low- and middle-income taxpayers were willing to 
vote for the types of conservative tax measures they had opposed before. In California, as in 
most states across the country, the effect of rising property taxes on low- and middle-income 
residents was dramatic. Between 1960 and 1970, median home values in the U.S. increased from 
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$11,900 to $17,000, before soaring to $47,200 in 1980. In California, rates increased 40 percent 
between 1958 and 1977, the year before Prop 13. In 1960, the median home price in California 
was $15,100. By 1980, it was $84,500, a 460 percent increase in value. Even if they usually hit 
first-time homebuyers, rising sale prices did not necessarily translate into proportional increases 
assessments for existing homeowners. However, the climb for existing homeowners was still 
steep. Los Angeles county assessor Alexander Pope revealed that his own home’s assessment 
had risen from $22,800 in 1963 to $54,700 in 1977, at a time when the property tax rate was 
rising. Pope was not alone. In 1967, the average owner of an FHA-insured home paid $23 per 
month in property taxes. By 1977 property taxes had doubled to $56 per month. Accounting for 
rising incomes, this was a 25 percent increase in property taxes.117 
Even left-leaning activists were not immune from the ideology-muting effects of the 
pocketbook squeeze. As one CAL activist said after reluctantly deciding to cast a vote for Prop 
13, “I prefer the Tax Justice Act, but I want to keep my home.”118 This dynamic was not lost on 
all observers. “I think that the voters of this state were incredibly patient with their political 
leaders in waiting for them to relieve them of the unfair burden of the property tax. The problem 
has been known for decades,” Boston’s Mayor Kevin White’s handpicked advisor for dealing 
with Prop 2 ½ explained shortly after its passage. “We have had an overreliance on the most 
regressive tax in America. The family of with the low income in Massachusetts has a higher 
percentage of its yearly pay taken away because of the property tax than any other form of 
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taxation. Richer people are not affected by the property tax as much as poor people. And I think 
that the cry for proper tax [relief] has gone on for so long that the people were very patient 
waiting for the political leadership to do something. So I think that that is what they did. Now 
any referendum is a crude way to govern. But [Prop 2 ½] was the only tool [voters] 
had.”119Among conservative activists, the recipe for success after Prop 13 was clear. If the public 
became “squeezed” enough, voters would support measures that they knew were unfair, but that 
they also knew would benefit them, at least a little. 
Most tax justice activists understood this dynamic, too. Diane Fuchs and Anne White, 
staffers for Nader’s Tax Reform Research Group, argued that Prop 13 was a referendum on 
rising regressive taxes and a corrupt system of assessment, not conservatism. “[N]o wonder 
people voted for Proposition 13,” they wrote. “It was a very simply way of voting against high 
taxes and against the system the people thinks produces them.”120 Other left activists agreed. “[I]t 
would be a historic mistake to define the success of 13 as a ‘victory for conservatism,’” Tom 
Hayden  argued. “For every sinister operative of the landlord associations…there were at least 
ten plain, honest frustrated citizens pushed to the edge by the incessant chorus of big business 
and big government, higher prices and higher taxes.” James Weinstein argued that the public saw 
Prop 13 as “addressing itself to lowering taxes and raising income.” It was “a popular issue on 
which the right has adroitly cashed in,” but Prop 13 was filed with “endless ironies” for the left, 
“not the least of which involve seeing the right make political hay out of issues the left has long 
been raising[.]”121 Instead, “tax justice” activist blamed Democrats’ decade-long inaction on 
unfair taxes for leaving to door open to right-populists like Jarvis. Some Democrats agreed, too. 
After Prop 13, the now seemingly discredited George McGovern reflected on his 1972 campaign 
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and the grassroots tax activism surrounding it and concluded, “We were six years ahead of 
Howard Jarvis – and we explained how to pay the bill fairly.” 122 
By the late 1970s, the once-promising tax justice coalition consisting of left-leaning tax 
groups and sympathetic distributionist Democrats like McGovern that seemed ascendant in the 
late-1960s and early-1970s had evaporated. However, contrary to the oft-repeated narrative that 
the grassroots left pulled Democrats away from broad pocketbook concerns to allegedly narrow 
issues of “identity,” the actual dynamic was nearly the opposite.123 As several scholars recently 
have begun to argue, the post-1960s grassroots left embraced a wide variety of economic 
concerns. They did not view “pocketbook” and “identity” issues as a zero-sum game.124 
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Likewise, most left grassroots groups that participated in the tax justice movement had concerns 
that spanned both, supposedly oppositional, spheres. Rather than viewing, for example, unfair 
property taxes assessments stemming from racism, classicism, or political corruption as separate, 
competing issues, most “tax justice” groups saw them as distinct-but-complementary examples 
of the myriad injustices contained within the tax system, as well as the American economic and 
political systems, more broadly. By the late-1970s, however, the balance of power within the 
Democratic Party shifted toward a fiscalist view on taxes. This shift made it increasingly difficult 
for Democrats to find common organizational ground with “tax justice” activists. Well after the 
1970s, groups like ACORN, PIRG, Fair Share, and labor unions, among others, as well as newly 
formed groups like Citizens for Tax Justice, continued to push for “distributionist” tax reforms. 
However, despite the occasional deployment of “fairness”-based rhetoric during election 
campaigns, few Democrats at state or national levels privileged distributional concerns over 
fiscal ones like growth and balanced budgets. To paraphrase Ronald Reagan: The grassroots left 
did not push the Democrats to abandon tax justice. Rather, the Democratic Party abandoned the 
grassroots left – and its concern with tax justice. In fact, by embracing “pro-growth” capital-
friendly policies and “job creating” business incentives like “tax abatements,” Democrats at all 
levels of government have moved – both discursively and substantively – away from the 
concerns that animated the tax revolt beginning at the local level in the 1960s. 
The one constant, both before and after Prop 13, was that the public’s concern about 
taxes was not simply about their own rising tax rates, but also about the fairness of the tax 
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code.125 Prop 13 did not accurately address those concerns, nor did the state and federal tax cuts 
that passed in its wake, like Reagan’s 1981 tax cuts.126 In fact, by acting on the widespread belief 
that Prop 13 represented “a revolution against government,” as Carter’s pollster put it, 
policymakers enacted policies that actually exacerbated both the “pocketbook squeeze” and the 
tax “loopholes” that had angered low- and middle-income Americans in the first place. 127 
Overwhelming majorities of voters told pollsters that they thought Reagan’s tax proposals would 
benefit the wealthy and businesses disproportionately.128 But Democrats joined with Republicans 
to pass them, anyhow. Democrats, in fact, eagerly competed with Republicans to be seen as the 
most “pro-business” during negotiations over the Reagan tax cuts. As the Atlantic noted, 
“Democrats in the House, the party’s sole remaining stronghold, engaged Republicans in a 
contest to see which side could chop more business loopholes in the 1981 tax-cut legislation. 
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Democrats hoped to win back the hearts – and open the pocketbooks – of businessmen, who in 
1980 had overwhelmingly supported Republicans.” In the end, Reagan’s 1981 tax cuts were 
actually less favorable to lower- and middle-income taxpayers than the Kemp-Roth plan on 
which they were initially modeled – and which Democrats, at the time, had staunchly opposed.129 
Throughout the 1980s, New Democratic candidates came forward with proposals for business-
friendly, pro-growth tax reform. In 1982, “Watergate Baby” Tim Wirth would join other self-
styled “neoliberals” to forumate a tax plan that explicity moved away from the “politics of 
redistribution,” as Wirth put it. Senator Paul Tsongas explained Democrats’ newfound concern 
with business and the well-off thusly, “Democrats have been concerned for too long with the 
distribution of golden eggs. Now it’s timem to worry about the health of the goose.” 130 By 1991, 
Jerry Brown would turn to Arthur Laffer to help him craft the tax plank of his 1992 president 
campaign. The result was a plan to scrap all existing taxes – including payroll taxes – and replace 
them with a flat 13 percent income tax, a proposal that proved to be popular with pundits, but not 
with voters.131  
The nearly unbroken string of upwardly-distributive tax cuts that have followed Prop 13 
have made the federal tax code less progressive and more rife with loopholes. As recent studies 
have shown, the last thirty years of regressive tax cuts – particularly capital gains cuts – have 
been a driving factor in the United States’ rising economic inequality.132 Today, both the federal 
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tax code and the social safety net are less progressive than they were in the 1970s.133 The 
tendency has been the same at the local level. In the decades following the early-1970s exposes 
of the systematic property tax underassessment of major corporations, both Republican and 
Democratic officials worked with business to replace the “informal” tax property breaks that 
Nader and CCC protested with formal abatements and development incentives.134 By the end of 
the century, it was a rare development or factory that was not “incentivized” by the tax dollars of 
local homeowners and consumers. A 2012 New York Times study calculated that localities gave 
more than $80 billion in such incentives each year, roughly the same as the entire “food stamp” 
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(Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) budget.135 Just as stagflation opened the door for 
Prop 13 and the ascendance of right-distributionism in the 1970s, the fiscal crises facing states 
following the 2008 financial crisis allowed “Tea Party” Republican governors in states like 
Wisconsin, Kansas, Louisiana, and Michigan to undo many of the progressive reforms the 
grassroots left had pushed in the 1970s and shift the tax burden downward.136 Consequently, 
rather than producing an improvement in the public’s view of the tax system, measures like Prop 
13, the 1978 capital gains reduction, the Reagan tax cuts, and all that has followed have done 
little to change’s the public’s cynical tax mood. In 1969, more than 71 percent of Americans said 
that “the tax system is set up to let the rich get the real breaks.” In 2012, 68 percent said that the 
tax system “favors the wealthy.”137  
In other words, the problems that caused Americans to “revolt” against taxes remain 
relatively unchanged today. Addressing them will remain impossible, however, without first 
understanding the meaning of the tax revolt. Instead of marking Americans’ shift to the right on 
economics and the beginning of the so-called “Reagan Revolution,” the tax revolt actually 
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